

**Timo Kinnunen**

Särkiniementie 16 A 41

70700 Kuopio

Finland

[1]

## The Man of Pragmatism, Chapter I

Timo Kinnunen, On the 20th March 1997

### Should we choose isms for the orientation of the current study - or instead the doctrine of synechism

At a first glance, every ism appears to us as an unit, and compact, and as such, as a kind of a *continuum* (1) in spite of the fact that all of them are inclined *e.g.* (2) divide the world into the two separate portions, and with their special tools we can prove, and also recognize only one of them as true one. But then there can be also other conflicts - as a result - which cannot be solved at all. And there can be still several questions in their silent, and never-found grave, which, perhaps, are never raised up - because of the fact that they would break the illusion of unity, if ever solved.

But still those isms can be considered as active participants of complex unity, namely of human mind, which is a continuously enlarging, and explosive phenomenon. By this kind of continuity, say, *idealism* (3), for example, seems to become capable to see *materialism* (4) as an antithesis of it, and as restricted interpretation, notwithstanding that idealism cannot falsify materia of the world - as it is - in its way of being - whether it had got its existence due of our disinterpretation, or was its inner nature nothing but nonsense, or completely dead structure. But regarded as a component of human mind, there is no need to deny that very presence of materia in the world, because it is a kind of packed idea, or stored energy, or dead mind - as we shall get to know mind interpreted by C.S Peirce. In fact, idealism doesn't insist that there are no material things but it tries to claim that these are not as true as infinite ideas are. This is also according C.S. Peirce's interpretation.

- 
1. (*Continuum*: The term used by C.S. Peirce; c.f. his terms of percipuum, ponecipuum, and antecipuum.)
  2. ((L.) *Exempli gratia* (abbreviation = e.g.): For example, for instance.)
  3. (*Idealism*: The system of thought in which object of external perception is held to consist of ideas [in various senses].)
  4. (*Materialism*: An [philosophical] opinion that nothing exists but matter and its movements and modifications and that consciousness and will are wholly due to material agency.)
- 

[2]

And Idealism insists further, that ideas we actually have are some kind derivates from infinite ideas - a kind of shadows on the wall of our cave. And this is just admitting that a portion of the world is something else than pure ideas - that is - our reality consists of things which are vague, and dim, and which prevent us to see the truth. This is how **Plato** (1) described them - hence, the term *Platonism* (2). Thus we can say that idealism is just arguing for that man with his world is a kind of shadow on the wall, and that there is a real world behind out there.

This hypothesis is not solving the problem of the meaning of our lives, or giving an explanation and relief for our angsts, or explanation of the purpose, or goal of all our struggles as mankind, or specie within

species, etc. **J.P. Fell** (NOTES 1) has written that far before Plato philosophers regarded ideas as the forms of the presence of physis, and they hold that aletheia was the carrier of ideas. But Plato regarded ideas just as absolute and eternal. We do not know in detail how Plato actually got this interpretation, and what he actually meant by it, but we might say that by the process since then both textual and contextual have been covered with enduring facts, or ideas, which were aimed to explain both of these spheres, from the point of ideas. But since then an emphasis of an explanation, and an interpretation of the world has been migrated into a sphere, which is something in itself, and from where our reality has been seen. And because of that, if we are true idealists, we must explain any case only through ideas - and *vice versa* (3), if we are materialists, we must propose for that there is nothing but materia and its derivatives.

If we argue something against materialism we suppose implicitly that there is a view, or a case, for or against which we can argue, or something to prove or disprove. Even if we want to deny something, we implicitly make a hypothesis, that we have a real object, which we want to prove to be false, whatever that view, or a case has stood for, or is there something real in our world at all, for or against which we have argued. Anyway, we must regard something as true, when we are trying to prove something an illusion.

Martin Heidegger (NOTES 2) has written:

".. *if the truth itself is an illusion, there is still some ground, by which it could be proved to an illusion*".

- 
1. (PLATO was the Greek philosopher, pupil of SOCRATES, and author of Dialogues based on the teaching of SOCRATES and the doctrines of Pythagoras; the principal of these dialogues were Protagoras, Gorgias, Parmenides, Theaetetus, Sophist, and Philebus, Timaeus, Laws and the Apology. At his symposium, Republic, Phaedrus, and Phaedo, he introduced his doctrine of that only the ideas are real, as well as the metaphors, according with the ideas, we actually have, are like shadows on the wall.)
  2. (*Platonism*: The philosophical system of PLATO, of which central conception is existence of a world of ideas, divine types, or forms of material objects, which ideas are alone real and permanent, while individual material things are but their ephemeral and imperfect imitations)
  3. ((1.) *Vice Versa*: The order being reversed.)

---

[3]

If we consider the [whole] world *per se* (1) as a fiction, or illusion, or consisting illusory of innumerable continuums, with which we do not have any common explanative spheres, we cannot speak about the world at all, and about any general concepts either, by which to describe it. This is logical conclusion, and valid, too. But there might be no room for pure *relativism* (2), either, because there is no room for alternative, or other kinds of worlds within one kind of a totally fictitious world, which is an only and one. We may become advocates of *dualism* (3) if we admit that there might be two different kind of spheres in the world, or we may become an advocate of *monism* (4) if we think that there exists only one of these spheres, and within it all observable, thinkable, or imaginable things are valid, and within it the rest of it belong to nothingness, and any explanations which are derived from it are only false ideas about the monistic world. Then there must be error within it, and without error there is no sense to argue for a monistic world. How this is possible is an interesting thing - that in only and one there is something which does not actually belong to it, and one of the explanations is that we can make mistakes - even in totality and solid world. But we can choose also pluralism (5) which seems to avoid the confusion of the previous alternatives, but then we have only restricted validity at hand, and, perhaps, not at all universal truths.

If we suppose that only eternal ideas are true ones, we have the question from where we might get them, and which is the point of view to see them as they are. If we accept that Platonian interpretation, that our everyday experience is very faint form of ideas, and that most of our ideas are not at all valid ones, in

respect to each others, or in respect to really true ones out there. If our interpretations of ideas do not resemble in any way to the really true ideas, which are undeniable - we have no use of those ideas, especially in our science and philosophy. Certainly it makes no sense to say that there are endlessly valid ideas out there, but we cannot get them. Sorry.

And if our ideas in science and philosophy were ultimately true, we should have no living companionship with them in our true everyday uses of language. Why. We have a very feeling that our ordinary life is interesting just because its variations, and not because its constraint nature. If we are not able to get overlapping ideas, and if the only idea that we can get is - for example - that the world is splitted into two, as in dualistic view, or that we can crasp true meanings only unintentionally - as given - there might always be true that nothing but accurate perception, obedience, controversy, or comparison, can produce more knowledge, and it is not due that a part of the world were dealing with the truth than another part. But because of this dualism, there is always certain part of the world, which we cannot apprehend or comprehend, as it is, when seen and accepted from controversy, or from another point of view of an opposite ism.

But we cannot deny, were we advocates of this or that view, that there are other alternatives, too, which are equal to the view we advocate, when studying e.g. their [logical] formal structures, or that there exist several alternatives, and they do so, notwithstanding that we deny their truthfulness time after time. I think, that this suggest to that we have an illusory way of being, because we have not yet got any pure ideas, with which to make any other alternatives vanish, and because of this, the nature of our experience is quite illusory.

- 
1. ((L.) *Per se*: by itself; by its own nature.)
  2. (*Relativism*: The doctrine that knowledge is of relations only.)
  3. (*Dualism*: E.g. the doctrine of DESCARTES that mind and matter exist as distinct entities. In moral philosophy, dualism refers to the doctrine that there are two independent principles, good and evil.)
  4. (*Monism*: Any theory denying the duality of matter and the mind, as distiction from dualism and pluralism.)
  5. (*Pluralism*: The system that recognizes more than one ultimate principle.)
- 

[4]

In that kind of splitted world, or plurality, we cannot prove any possible continuum as false one, because the continuums we can bring into our consciousness are not universally true ones, but instead somehow valid in themselves, or according their own internal ways of being. Hence, by them we cannot prove any of other continuums as absolutely false. But should we conclude from this that our own, familiar continuum, as well as those other ones, are not at all reliable, and that they never will be, notwithstanding that we have experienced something as being presence all the time, as well as we have survived with our weak understandings and intellect trough the all previous ages? And does it mean, if we accept, say, idealism, as a true one, that our illusory experience do not have any firm meaning, and it does not make sense to talk about our everyday continuity and its *continuums*, or *immediacy*? (1) Does this mean that all of our scientific arguments and achievements live their own life?

What does it mean that we can still discuss innumerous false beliefs which are not like ours, or that we can set innumerous isms to describe another points of view? Does it make sense to say that we cannot have any true ideas, or that we are continuously proving something to false by the ideas which we only believe to be true? What are we doing? The answer is, probably, that we are imitating truth, whatever it shall be at the end of the world, if we do not have any well-developed ideas like *ad infinitum* (2) at hand. But we cannot claim that we have done just nothing, either. We can have a very feeling that we are doing

something, even when we are asleep, and we can be sure that something has happened, and caused results in certain part of reality, and we have not had this or that belief but instead the very feeling of their presence and immediacy. There will be arisen several what concerns dreaming or believing, as well as living, if we think that our everyday experience is just nothing, and that dreaming must be more less that it?

What are we actually doing with our faint facts in our everyday life, which is like an illusion? But is it such one? If we accept that those facts are valid ones, what are we actually doing in our dreams, or when believing to supernatural beings or eternal ideas? What are we doing when believing to be right? When we can claim that we have, at last, known exactly what is the phenomenon of believing, and what is its role in human understanding, and so on. There are no fundamental differences between different mental states, such e.g. waking and sleeping, from which C.S. Peirce (NOTES 3) has suggested that:

*"When you sleep, you are not so largely asleep as your fancy that you be".*

---

1. (*Immediacy*: Our scientific observations have their fundamental basis in the world of immediate experience; every reading of any indicator ,or a meter is made by senses. We might to construct a measuring instrument, which were quite free from any disturbances of reading, and which were free of the restrictions of human senses, and which would just measure for itself, and make absolutely objective reports, and nothing less - but we should have any utility of it, because we are, and will stay, to, restricted beings, who make mistakes.)

2. ((L.) Ad infinitum: to infinity; and so on to its logical conclusion.)

---

[5]

**Ludwig Wittgenstein** (NOTES 4) argued in his late philosophy for, that somebody must have "tached us" something which is, and which can be considered - in the same time - as an uneducible rock bottom, and the foundation of our concepts and *forms of life* (1), which we can also regard as the final ground for communication. This sounds to me as synechism - but what for synechism stands as an alternative? The term in question has been derived by **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 5) (who has derived many of his terms from ancient languages, e.g. from Latin and Greek. From the Greek word: sunecismoz - whose root is the word: sunechz - which means continuous. The one feature in it is that way of being continuous, but another feature, and not less important, is that way of being social. But there is a larger meaning, which has been produced by that English term synechism, which signifies to the general tendency in C.S. Peirce's philosophy to regard almost everything as continuous, and not as splitted. By the new term he considered especially the existing isms saying:

*"for two centuries we have been affixing -ist and -ism to words, in order to note sects which exalt the importance of those elements which the stemwords signify. Thus materialism is the doctrine that matter everything, idealism is the doctrine that ideas are everything, and dualism is the philosophy which splits everything in two".*

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 6) has given us an information that he has been endeavoring to develop this idea a long time, and he has also written some of his results in *The Monist*. He insisted further that continuity governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it. Accordingly, every proposition, except so far as it relates to an unattainable limit of experience (which he has called by the term absolute) is to be taken with an indefinite qualification; for a proposition which has no relation whatever to experience is devoid all meaning. I think that we have just there an important feature at hand, namely, that we receive everything in a relatively vague state, and develop it further, untill it has no special connections left in regard of the beginning of the process. I will emphasize just here that most philosophies have produced a lot of speculation on the true essence of the world, but we cannot rely on them because they are not yet developed into a state of being reliable.

However, I think that there are certain, perhaps originally human antitheses present, from which it is possible to mirror the unknown. Thus, on the one hand you can see (if you want to) the world as ideal in its nature, and on the other hand you can see it as material. But what about physicality and psychic phenomena?

---

1. (*Forms of life*: = Germ: Lebensformen. Also EDUARD SPANGER had a similar concept, and he wrote a book *Lebensformen*, in which he described how different types of persons have their own strategies, and how they have different goals of life, and there are presented e.g. social- political,- and religious forms of life [see. J.A. Hollo, *Kasvatuksen maailma*, pp. 134-135, 1952.)

---

[6]

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 7) wanted to root up also physical and psychical controversy insisting that all phenomena are such of one character, though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more material and regular. Still, all alike present that mixture of freedom and constraint, which allows them to be teleological or purposive. It is no wonder that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 8) has argued for that there is no fundamental difference between a self and another self (1). Then there is the question of larger personality. It seems obvious that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 9) has wanted to broaden the barbaric conception of personal identity quoting a brahmanical hymn [which sentence can be found in *Collected Papers*] as follows:

*"I am that pure and infinitive Self, who am bliss, eternal, manifest, all-pervading, and who am the substrate of all that owns name and form".*

continuing that this expresses more than humiliation - the utter swallowing up of the *poor individual self* (2) in the spirit of prayer.

There is an evidence of that he might have derived some elements from hinduistic philosophy to his synechism, too. At *Bhagavad-gita* (NOTES 10) we find almost similar sentence than the quotation above, and at *Veda* we can read further that only the person who fully dedicates to worship the highest can understand him. This comes very close to the question concerning the role of man in the whole development of the universe - where **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 11) has argued for that:

*"all communication from mind to mind is through continuity of being! A man is capable of having assigned him a rôle in the drama of creation (3), and so far as he loses himself in that rôle, -no matter how humble it may be, -so far he identifies himself with an author".*

---

1. (We shall return to the question of the close relationship of self and anotherself later during the current study.)

2. (*Self*: Cf. above pure and infinite Self, which, as a concept, has recorded important by G.H. MEAD - whose influence to JOHN DEWEY (E.g. "George Herbert Mead" 1931, 311) we shall discuss later in the current study. From those influences we have got also support from C.W. MORRIS (1932, chapter IV). But also W. JAMES (1952, 146-154) has described self in *Principles*, as waves, current of thought, or a chain of past selves, which associates to C.S. Peirce 'S conception of self, as something not-preetermined; the spiritual development of self is due by a larger vision, which is beyond the current self (SCHEFFLER 1974, 86.)

3. (*Role*, as a concept, has also an important "role" in G.H. MEAD 'S epistemology.)

---

[7]

There must also be discussion on the nature of immortality, to which **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 12) has suggested to, when studying that possibility in carnal,- social,- and spiritual consciousness, and when referring to **Edward Stanton's** (1) and **Freytag's** (2) books for further information, when insisting that:

*"synechism refuses to believe that when death comes, even the carnal consciousness ceases quickly. How it is to be, it is hard to say, in the all but entire lack of observational data! Here, as elsewhere the synechist oracle is enigmatic ... But further, synechism recognizes that the carnal consciousness is but a small part of a man. There is, in the second place, the social consciousness, by which a man's spirit is embodied in others, and which continues to live and breathe and having itself being very much longer than superficial observers think ... A man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole. This is an archetypal idea (that) can never fail; and in the world to come is destined to a special spiritual embodiment".*

All of these passages comes very close to the world of **Phagavad-gita**, as well as **Veda**, indeed. He has regarded man as something great, and valuable at the end of the world, but we shall not discuss the topic any longer now, but I shall return generally to the theme later in the current study when dealing e.g. psychognosy. But for now, some words of dualism.

**W. Percy** (NOTES 13) has considered the difference between mental and physical and emphasized there especially the role of **Descartes** (3) and his categorization of the world to be consisting the different departments, on the one hand of **res extensa**, and on the other hand of its [opposite] counterpart **res cogitans**, and his proposition that only the God know what one had to do with another. Percy has referred especially to *English nominalism* (4) which has split off the words and ideas from things. He continued, that there is difference of similar kind between European materialism and idealism.

---

1. (**E. Stanton**, *Dreams of the Dead.*, 1898)

2. (**Freytag**, *Lost Manuscripts.*, Leibzig, 1869)

3. ((1596-1650); **RENE DESCARTES** was the French mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, and especially he was an author of *Le Discours de la Méthode* (1637), in which he e.g. expounded a quasi-mechanical conception of the universe, which he reduced to space, matter and motion, operating under mathematical laws. But there was his famous (L.) *Cogito, ergo sum*: I think, therefore I exist. Famous has also become his other doctrine, namely the doctrine of Cartesian scepticism, which he introduced in his *Méthode*, too. Well-known is his differentiation between *res cogitans* and *res extensa*.)

4. (*English nominalism*: The philosophical doctrine of Scholastics, according with e.g. universal, or abstract concepts are mere names, without any corresponding reality. We shall return to the theme later in the current study, because there is an opposite theory of **JOHN DUNS SCOTUS**, whose Scholastic realism was well-known by C.S. Peirce.)

---

[8]

But more interesting at this context is what **W. Percy** (NOTES 14) uttered on natural events [according to C.S. Peirce]:

*"there are not one but two kinds of natural events in the world"*,

from which one is *dyadic* (1) and the other *triadic* (2). In addition to this there are also **complexus of dyads**, which can be associated to conditioned learning by animals. There is a gap in the world, if we accept only the former alternative of these natural events as valid, but this does not refer to that they are independent from each others, or that we were able to split the world in two denying the latter.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 15) has described feeling, knowing and willing as the three integral states of mind - according to **Kant** (3) and Tetens. We are not discussing the topic in detail now - but only referring by it to the integrity of mind, which a view C.S. Peirce advocated for, as well as the integrity of the whole world. The principle of synechism gives support to the interpretation that we cannot produce any remarkable views on reality without other people - which refers to sociability [of the concepts]. We should suspect strongly the possibility that there existed that kind of individuality that were rather independent from other individualities, that is, that there were single truths, which were independent from others, and something in themselves. In addition to this, we ought to expect that the difference between mental and material is not at all real one. We don't know the whole world, whatever it is, and we are participants of the world, which makes us unchallengeable witnesses. If there were something absolutely out there, from where it could be possible to evaluate the world, we have nothing to do with it, anyhow. And if there is God, who knows all, He certainly has not told us what He knows, or made us as representatives of that truth of His own. But why He is so evil? Namely, if we were such truth at hand, we should not make so much mistakes that we have done, because of Wisdom, and shared omnipotence, and we were free from Sin. But now we shall leave this theological topic, and instead try to study those social settings, to which C.S. Peirce participated.

- 
1. (*Dyad*: The number two, or group of two, couple.)
  2. (*Triad*: Group or set of three. in music: Chord of three notes. in chemistry: Group of three chemical elements, having similar properties, as e.g. iron, nickel, and cobalt.)
  3. ((1724-1804); **IMMANUEL KANT** was the German philosopher, and metaphysician, and the founder of the school of transcendental philosophy, of which one of the fundamental principles is that knowledge of the external world depends upon sense-impressions co-ordinated or synthesized by reason, employing such categories or laws of thought as quality, quantity, causation, etc. However, **KANT** had two stages in his philosophy, from the early metaphysics, and absolute interpretation of the ultimate reality: he proposed for, that we can have the knowledge from substances by reason. Later he became more critical, and insisted that substances are beyond man's horizon. He reacted against **HUME'S** scepticism, insisting that it is only **Das Ding an sich**, from which we cannot have definite knowledge. He also reacted against **LOCKE'S** empirism, according with we cannot have knowledge concerning substances, arguing for that the knowledge concerning universals is derived from the mind, and it is a priori, but the knowledge, which we have after experience is a posteriori. In 1860's there were Neokantian Philosophy, whose advocates were e.g. **LIEBMANN**, **HELMHOLZ**, **CASSIRER**, and **RICKERT**.)

[9]

C.S. Peirce could not develop his ideas from nothing, and quite alone. There must have been a concrete-kind of synechism of social settings - by which I refer especially to C.S. Peirce's correspondence with his close friend **WILLIAM James** (1), whose younger brother was **HENRY James** (2) - the famous mystic author. The brothers made together two journeys to Europe from their father's demand, and because of William's "mental difficulties", and health. From **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 16) we know that nobody could challenge William James, what comes to vividness and large imagination, and the freshness of his sense of humour. But trying to get more audiences than many of his colloquies, he emphasized mainly vivid and psychologically effective features, and not critics, and he was apt to maintain his own attitudes, and emphasized the philosophy which was a kind of view of life. From the correspondence between James and C.S. Peirce we get to know that - in addition to the change of information - they sent to each others manuscripts, articles, and books. From *Collected Papers* (NOTES 17) we know that James has read that C.S. Peirce's manuscript which is known by the name "Telepathy" and that he also made several marginal notes on it.

There were other themes, too, which can be associated to synechism. At the letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to William James on 13th March in 1897 (NOTES 18), he praised James' ideas of tychism, but considered it only a part, and corollary to the general principle of synechism, which he told to have been

studying already for 15 years.

---

1. ((1842-1910); WILLIAM JAMES was the American philosopher and psychologist, and one of the formulators of theory of pragmatism. According A.J. AYER (1968, 190), James has written an introduction to *The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James*, [HENRY James Sr.] who became his "intellectual father", and influenced to James so that he got deep religious attitude. According to the fourth ENCY (1967, 240-241), James was sent with his brother to Europe twice, and he became and advocate of Renouvier's personalism. We shall discuss these themes later in the current study. From I. SCHEFFLER (1974, 85-86) we know that the reason, why their [biological] father sent them to Europe, was its free philosophical climate (see also: R.B. PERRY (1935)). According to A.J. AYER (1968, 183), James was first as an instructor in physiology at Harvard, after his studies in Europe, and later, in 1880, he became professor. He was a close friend of C.S. Peirce almost the whole of his life (1968, 13-14)). Also this theme we discuss later in the current study. One of the [possible] consequences of JAMES' journeys to Europe was that he also informed C.S. Peirce for the institutes of European universities, which C.S. Peirce valued high in that respect - BUT as we know from J. BRENTt, he himself had an opportunity to visit in Berlin in 1875.)

2. ((1843-1916); HENRY JAMES was an American novelist, and the younger brother of WILLIAM JAMES. He has been regarded also as realist novelist at the end of 19th c., with William Dean Howells, Edith Wharton, and Villa Cather. Finally HENRY JAMES settled in Europe from 1875, and he was naturalized as a British subject in 1915, but most of his books are psychological interpretation of American high-society. As the realist views there are also the novels of American farming, whose advocates are e.g. Hamlin Garland, and the Norwegian-American author, Ole Roelvaag.)

---

[10]

But what an earth does this theme of telepathy at this context - especially when we discuss *pragmatism* (1) which has been considered very empirical and also as very pragmata in its nature? We know that especially what concerns the questions on religion and metaphysics C.S. Peirce, as well as other pragmatists kicked very often over the traces. **J.E. Smith** (NOTES 19) has written that when C.S. Peirce studied the questions of the philosophy of science he also studied the existence of God, and he tried to use the theory of hypothetic reasoning in the questions of religion. But also James tried to synthesize different areas of human knowledge together, and seek tendencies between them - which are, according to C.S. Peirce, synechistic, live and flexible. These themes have their currency, too, when just thinking all kinds of human networks - with or without such technical equipments as computers.

Accepting that man has not got any essential features, or ideas in regard of the real world, and that he never will, is he believing or knowing something - concerning knowledge or other beliefs? What are the necessary consequences of that. It was already **Duns Scotus** (2) who argued for that there is no difference between science and religion. And further - according to C.S. Peirce, we can consider our present reality as something between the opposite poles of *accidental chance and lawfulness* (3). But if we have this kind of mixed reality - what makes it possible that we can still discuss the pure concepts of being false or true? If we have apprehended all of the ideas which are true, the question is: why those false things have been in front of us before, and what has been their role - should we just conclude that there has taken place some development, within which there must be present mistakes, and wrong interpretations? And what makes it possible that there are certain spheres and directions, or that such one come to existence - to where we can develop ourselves? We can conclude further that there must be a possibility that both false and true things can exist, and that ideas are able to interact with each other somehow, and that also those false ideas must have some characters which we can find in true ideas. I suppose that every ism can be proved to be true or false, because of that very feature - notwithstanding that there were no eternal and infinite ideas available, yet. But it does not suggest to any validation, but instead the use of temporal rules, which seem to be applicable enough, and that there is no need for ideas, which need to be developed ad ininitum.

---

1. ((*Pragmatism*: (according a narrow pragmatic maxim): a belief or a theory that the truth or value of a concept or assertion depends upon its practical bearing upon human interests. C.f. the narrow term Pragmatic: concerned with practical results and values, and treating things in a matter-of-fact or practical way.)

2. ((1266-1308)JOHN DUNS SCOTUS ( John Duns) was a Scholastic theologian, and -according to tradition - born at Duns, Berwickshire. He was called the 'subtle doctor', and his works on theology, logic, and philosophy were university textbooks until the 16th c. He was a Franciscan monk, who worked as a teacher in Oxford University, and attacked especially against AQUINAS -emphasizing especially the difference between knowledge and faith. However, Scotus has been considered the one of those Scholastic philosophers, and an advocate of Scholastic realism, which C.S. Peirce appreciated high.

3. (These are the two opposite poles in C.S. Peirce's cosmology, where the former illustrated the state of beginning, and the latter the state of the end. This can be applied to single concepts, and to their development, too, from interpreted to *sign ad infinitum*. [that is= to its ultimate end].)

---

[11]

If we now think to choose isms as the model of orientation, we ought to remember the very reason, why they have been constructed. First of all, they are in explanation, and categorization when comparing schools of philosophy; they are not *entities* (1) to be found. When discussing, instead, synechism, we have (at least) a faint possibility to get used work-principles, according which the world might be made of - or we can have a strategy which to apply to describe what has taken place especially in human knowledge. I shall prefer of these alternatives synechism, but I shall use the categories of isms, too, as the useful equipments, or tools, for the purposes of current study.

I want especially to emphasize the role of future in knowing, also when discussing the present study, and its Wisdom. If future is a powerful agent in knowing, it shall reveal its faces during the current study, or at least, during the whole development of human knowledge. But what are we studying, then? This study, or something more general? Let us now think that pragmatism [if it is a school of philosophy at all] is such a collection of ideas, which have been derived from different philosophical schools. We have already discussed that the question of schools as isms, may be quite illusory. Instead, there might have been several philosophers, and everyone of them is something more than the rest of the mass. Such a brilliant philosopher is not remarkable as a schoolmaster, but instead interesting as a fascinating person, who has written his best ideas to facilitate work of future generations, and they have also succeeded to be something more than a stereotypic image of a philosopher. Pragmatists have repeatedly emphasized that man must reach the heart of philosophy, or science, and that some philosophers have succeeded to do this, as also add something into the kernel of human knowledge.

C.S. Peirce has emphasized the view that the most important, and explanative in knowing is distant future, if we discuss what our concepts and inventions might really mean, say e.g. synechism, or have they any importance in a course of time, notwithstanding that some of them might have their rightness right now, and they have it for the current purpose we have in our currency. That is, we cannot measure the absolute validity of the concepts, but only use them. This, in turn, means [If we think the current study] that any new idea, which we shall have during the study, and which concerns the results we might have, is [in fact] carrying on beyond the horizon of the study, and this kind of a new idea is, in a way, nonsense, before we shall have the results, which are revealing its truths. Hence, there are several ifs before any further explanation, and the most decisive of them is, that whether the mind [to come] becomes capable to handle with the new surroundings [to come], or not.

As a consequence, we cannot overrun any ism, before we have a point of view, from which it is easy to see them as fictions, and not via new isms, but from a state without them all. But we have not this scenery or view, yet. And we have not yet presented any new idea, either. But if we are trying to deny isms, for example, it is clear that if we have any ism in the world to come still left, we have not reached the world,

to which the development has been aimed to - if we are insisting that the end of the world cannot include such things any more. But we can have a kind of future as simulation, or something *in posse* (2), that is, in imagination. And if it seems to be that we have the end of the world already now, which we have just expected to come in future, and which we have predicted in detail, we have, in fact, lost the whole game before it has began. We can destroy ourselves as a specie, and claim that just it was the goal of all our enterprises, but this is not true.

Future is not a matter of our present, or our agony, or human specie, and we have no inevitably valid equipments - which were necessary to prove things to be true. We are not the most important feature of the universal development, and without us there shall be the great goal - the question is: are we willing to participate to it, or not, and not of our great influence. To avoid those traps of megalomania when discussing the development of the whole universe, or its blind, and still endless loops (which are not like ends), we must have in our use the principle of synechism, as well as many other tools. And we must also comprehend in the new way those things - eternal and infinite - as kinds of possible futures, because the world we have **NOW** is not migrated into such kind of state of things yet, but our present can be illustrated as a kind of end. This special end does not stand *in saecula saeculorum* (3) but instead it has its greatest effectiveness during this very moment, and then it shall fall asleep - until it shall be awakened at the future reality - if it had any genuine meaning - as the new start, perhaps.

---

1. (*Entity*: A things existence, something with real and separate existence, as distinction from its qualities or relations.)

2. ((L.) *In posse*: In potential existence; possible.)

3. ((L.) *In saecula saeculorum*: For ever and ever.)

---

[12]

## NOTES 1:

1. (Fell, J.P., Heidegger and Sartre, *An Essay of Being and Place.*, New York, p. 367, 1979)

2. (Heidegger, M., *Nietzsche., I*, Verlag Günther Neske., Pfullingen., p. 548, 1961)

3. (Peirce, C.S., *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce., VII.*, edited by Arthur W. Burks., Cambridge-Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., *Synechism and Immortality*, .573, 1966)

4. (Wittgenstein, L., *Über Gewissheit - On Certainty.*, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H. von Wright, Engl. trans. by D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe., Oxford., Basil Blackwell., §§449, 559, 1969 - Cf. Wittgenstein, L. *Philosophische Untersuchungen - Philosophical Investigations.*, Engl. trans. by D. Paul and G.E.M. Anscombe., Basil Blackwell, Oxford., p. 226, 1953)

5. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VII., *Synechism and ...*, .565, 1966)

6. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VII., *Synechism and ...*, .566, 1966)

7. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VII., *Synechism and ...*, .570, 1966)

8. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VII., *Synechism and ...*, .571, 1966)

9. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VII., *Synechism and ...*, .572, 1966)

10 (Bhagavad-gita, As it Is., New York., 10.12-13, 1972)

11. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synecism and ..., .572, 1966)

12. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synecism and ..., .574-.576, 1966)

13. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"., reprinted from WILSON QUARTERLY., Copyright 1989, by The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars., Summer 1989., AA 9/89-37., pp. 78, 80.)

14 (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , p. 81, 1989)

15 (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2. Forms of Consciousness., .540, 1966)

---

[13]

16 (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., London - Melbourne - Toronto., p. 185, 1968)

17 (Collected Papers of ... , VII., p. 359f, 1966)

18. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Lett., 13.3. 1897; C.S. Peirce to William James pp. 187-188, 1966)

19 (Smith, J.E., The Spirit of American Philosophy., New York, pp. 3-37, 1966)[14]

## The Man of Pragmatism, Chapter II

### Idealism and pragmatism

Most critics, as well as historians of the American philosophy have generally regarded *transcendentalism* (1) as very essential philosophical movement in America during the 19th century. From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 1) we know that at the beginning the center of that movement was Boston, and its influence was the most effective just before *American Civil War* (2). American transcendentalists were interested in philosophies of Kant, and **Hegel** (3) - as well as in the philosophies of von **Schelling** (4), and Victor Cousin. In addition to this, those American philosophers were acquainted with Platonian thoughts. But it was **Emerson** (5) who presented most clearly the characteristic traits of American transcendental metaphysics in his *Nature* which was published in 1836.

An interesting question is that have these idealistic traits of philosophy anything common with pragmatists? Let us study the topic next. If we think C.S. Peirce's cosmology - there is a certain similarity with certain ideas of Schelling - for example how **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 2) has put human mind, as a plastic unit, to the important role in the development of the universe. Also when he assumed that in the human mind evolution and generalizing tendency is still at work - there are echoes of Schelling - but also echoes from evolution philosophy.

---

1. (*Transcendentalism*: Transcendental philosophy: especially idealism of SCHELLING, FICHTE, and HEGEL which does not recognize KANT'S distinction between transcendent and transcendental. Also: the religio-philosophical doctrine of EMERSON and his followers. Other, more diffuse meanings of the term are e.g.: extravagant, vague, or visionary quality, philosophy, language, etc.)

2. (*American Civil War* (1861-1865); War between Southern (Confederate) and northern States before their Union.)

3. ((1770-1831); GEORG WILHELM FRIENDRICH HEGEL was the German philosopher, in whose system known by the name of Absolute Idealism pure being is regarded as pure thought, and the universe,

as well as its development, and philosophy - as its dialectical explication.)

4. ((1775-1854); FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH von SCHELLING was the German philosopher, who regarded nature as single living organism working towards self-consciousness, a faculty dormant in inanimate objects and fully awake only in man, whose being consists in 'intellectual intuition' of the world he creates.)

5. ((1803-1882); RALPH WALDO EMERSON was an American philosophic writer and essayist.)

[15]

In C.S. Peirce's (NOTES 3) synechism, which we have already discussed at previous chapter, there was e.g. the sentence, which says:

*"a man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole,*

which expressed also a similar point of view that Schelling has advocated for. Unfortunately, I cannot prove that C.S. Peirce has derived his thoughts just from him, but it is obvious that he got the idea from ancient Greek philosophers, from those who emphasized living features of the world. Obviously there were this kind of thoughts in that philosophical climate, where C.S. Peirce spent his life - and it is the very fact that many of his ideas which he introduced were not new ones. There was an objective, or absolute idealism, whose great advocator was Hegel, to whose name the term *dialectic* (1) has been generally associated to. He regarded the whole and objective reality as the reflection of Geist, and maintained that man is able to comprehend it, too. But what is important in this idea is that there cannot be the larger objective reality behind that totality, which we are able to apprehend, and with which we can interact actively. This is true notwithstanding that we cannot reach all of its ultimate ends right now. At some day, perhaps, we shall become acquainted with those distant things - that is - there is nothing preventing us to apprehend the whole world as it is.

Just in that sense - there is nothing hidden, or secret, or something unknown forever, and which only Geist knows. In general: it is no wonder that in the American philosophical tradition there are all kinds of personalisms - also idealistic ones, because man has this access into the secrets of the world, and that man can do it consciously. We can become acquainted with these schools of personalism from the sixth *ENCYCLOPEDIA* (NOTES 4). From the fourth *ENCYCLOPEDIA* (NOTES 5) we know that G.H. Howison has been known such as an advocate of personalism who didn't interpret individuals dependent from infinite person, or creation, as e.g. B.P. Bowne - or Rational Theists, and their famous predecessor **Aquinas** (2). Howison emphasized the freedom of individuals which would be fulfilled if there were such a creator who has ruled all the things beforehand [as well good as bad alternatives]. What is that idealistic tradition - as a whole? **M.L. Bigge** (NOTES 6) has described idealism, that it considers the world as the universal consciousness, whose variants are substantial consciousnesses. It seems to me that there are something very Hegelian currents in Bigge's illustration, but it says nothing about that how large the whole universal consciousness really is, or is it becoming something more, or is it possible that it can lose its control - as a consequence of "command and control problems" - or what kind are the real and ultimate things in themselves in the universe.

---

1. (*Dialectic*: Critical dealing with metaphysical contradictions and their solutions, especially in HEGEL'S philosophy, the stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis representing the process of thought developing towards completion.)

2. ((c 1225-1274); St. THOMAS AQUINAS was the Italian philosopher, a Dominican friar, whose many writings, and works, notably his *Summa Totius Theologiae* represent the culmination of Scholastic philosophy.)

[16]

There is also a school of subjective idealism which considers the nature as the reflection of finite spiritual being who have no objective reality behind it, or within it, that it has in itself, and there is nothing behind the wholeness we know e.g. at the moment. **Berkeley** (1) and Kant [in his critical stage] have been regarded as advocates of such idealism. Also German idealist **Fichte** (2) have been regarded as subjective idealist, and as a founder of German idealism. If we think e.g. Berkeley's statement *esse est percipi* applied in a concrete situation - e.g. that we have a knowledge concerning a thing because somebody has had a experience of its existence, and that somebody has perceived it to happen - we do not have much idealism in our view. But if we think the whole principle, that nothing can exists without being perceived, we can find out, that the whole universe exist because of that kind of observation.

It is quite possible that I just don't have that kind of experience because I am not a creature to be intended to have this experience of it, and I don't know anybody who has it. But if the existence of a thing (or any thing) cannot be possible at all, without somebody is perceiving it, say, God, for example, we have concerning with an idealistic interpretation of the true essence of the world, because a perceiver in question is not a material thing, but realtively complicated cluster of non-material elements. But we might suppose, too, that if there are no mental acts, there is nothing.

Thinking the world *in initio* (3), and any kind of existence in general, there might be nothing without a perception before. In the situation like this - there is nothing to to perceive, either, because there have been no actions, and the only actions, which we ought to count, should be perceptions [of nothing]. There might be no development at all, without other, more sophisticated perceptions made by somebody [e.g. by God], or without accidental series of happenings, which were unconscious. There is a question of that if God had any complicated structure in His mind before the very first perception, or not?

It is strange that Berkeley argued for that there are no abstract ideas, or matter in themselves. This sounds clear, if we think the idea, that perception comes before any thing perceived, and that ideas are reflections arised from this kind of context. There is no doubt that before these contexts there must have been long series of self-communication of God, or First Cause, and that there were any mutual interaction before this kind of existence. Because the whole universe exists after the self-perception continuously made by God, we might discuss of our own ignorance mainly by the terms of incompleteness, or something to come, and not yet reached.

---

1. ((1685-1753); **GEORGE BERKELEY** was an Irish bishop and idealist philosopher. Well-known is his statement *esse est percipi*, which is an expression of that idealism, too. His critics against the law of cause and effect was the preliminary of later critics made by **HUME**.)

2. ((1762-1814); **FICHTE** was the German idealist philosopher, and an advocate of **KANT'S** philosophy, and inspired by it, he wrote *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung* (1792), which was regarded as written by **KANT**. He was also famous for his *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (1807-1808), which he wrote during the French occupation of Prussia.)

3. (L.) *In initio*: In the beginning. When discussing the very beginning of the universe, we can suppose that there was nothing before - or we can suppose that there was nothing material, but something which was able to expulse it into existence - or we may suppose that there was something, but not in a form that we can understand, or not the kind which was able to create the world as conscious being, but being still a kind of a reality.)

---

[17]

But what about those American transcendentalists who actually influenced to the pragmatist movement, or who have been in contact with it?

Let's take two of the cases in consideration. From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 7) we know that one of those was Paul Carus. At a letter, which C.S. Peirce has mailed to him and which has been written in 1910 (NOTES 8) we can read e.g. some C.S. Peirce's thoughts concerning the logic of science. Unfortunately part of the letter have been lost. From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 9) we know that also HENRY James Sr. has been regarded one of the American transcendentalists, and that he has been in close contact with pragmatists, too. His literal remains has been considered to be full of mystics but he had an important role in the philosophical development of William James. And **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 10) has told us that James wrote an introduction to *The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James*. But why we should consider HENRY James Sr an important person?

Just because we can regard him as WILLIAM James' "spiritual father", who influenced strongly to his moral and intellectual orientation, as well as to the development of his religious attitudes. Here and there in the correspondence between C.S. Peirce and James we can trace a lot of religious themes, and we know, too, that C.S. Peirce was apt to join religious themes to his philosophical discussions. And we cannot forget JOSIAH Royce, with whom C.S. Peirce was in correspondence. But what kind were C.S. Peirce's attitudes towards Royce's philosophy, in fact? At the letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to W. James on the 12th June in 1902 (NOTES 11) he told that he has been studying Royce's *The World and Individual*, and that he regarded its ideas as beautiful ones but that its logic seemed to him most execrable (1). These opinions suggest to that, notwithstanding that C.S. Peirce didn't accept Royce's logic, he had some contacts with American idealistic tradition by him. From the fourth *ENCY* (NOTES 12) we get to know, in turn, that Royce was a member of W. James' intellectual society. We know that **James** (NOTES 13) appreciated a lot the idea of the instant and infinite nature of God's consciousness by **J. Royce's** (NOTES 14), which can be found at *The Conception of God*. When considering Royce, we must take in advance **Dewey** (2), too.

It was just **Dewey** (NOTES 15) who has derived some of his thoughts from Royce - as he has written himself at his article which concerned G.H. Mead. We shall return to this article later during the current study. But via Royce we cannot find a genuine, and reliable link from pragmatism to idealism, because we cannot prove who is derived something from another, and when this has been taken place.

---

1. (C.f. C.S. Peirce's opinion to HEGEL'S logic later during the current chapter.)

2. ((1859-1952)); JOHN DEWEY was an American philosopher, pragmatist, and an influential figure specially in the field of education. In his philosophical development there were different stages, namely [Scottish] intuitionism, absolute [Hegelian] idealism, and instrumentalism (acc. VAUGHN 1976, 77). It was due of G.S. MORRIS, that he became an advocate of Hegelian idealism (acc. BORING 1931, 506-507, 539-542). His interest to experimental psychology influenced to that he rejected that Hegelian idealism (acc. VAUGHN 1976, 81). His experiences at the field of pedagogics influenced to that he adopted instrumentalism (acc. BERNSTEIN 1976, 83-84). When he became the professor at Chicago in 1894, he founded the work [laboratory] school in 1896, and he was a principal of the school until 1904. However, his concepts concerning education didn't change much after 1897 (acc. VAUGHN 1976, 87). Later his method influenced to Austrian school reform - to which LUDWIG WITGENSTEIN participated first as student, and later as a teacher in (two) Austrian village schools.)

---

[18]

There were live social relationships between pragmatists and American Idealists, among these some Royce's ideas which pragmatists appreciated - but this was not a systematic flow of the mutual influences, and acceptances, however. We have only that warm and positive influence which we can prove between WILLIAM James and HENRY James Sr. - in this case. Now I want to discuss idealism in the sense of Plato, and his concept of *idea* (1). But there is also the general definition of the term *idea* (2). The adjective *ideal* (3) which can be related to the sphere of the world which is consisting of Platonic ideas, too, but there are also the meanings of ordinary life within it. But is it the case, as Plato says, that object of external perception can be held to consisting of ideas? Or is the rock-bottom of the whole world

something according to **Democritus** (4)? Notwithstanding that we shall discuss the atomistic philosophy of Democritus later in the current study just few words about it.

He just reasoned that the world might be made of materia, and void. When thinking its ancient advocators, and their knowledge, it is obviously not the same as *atom theory* (5). The essence of Democritean materialism, or atomistic philosophy, is that there are two kinds of reality in the universe, namely *chaos* (6) and *cosmos* (7), and that the latter will exist only temporarily, and only for an age. Hence, a cosmos is not as eternal, as the former, with its smallest particles, atoms, which are eternal, and infinite in number. But the fact is that there can exist also rational cosmos, but its duration does not match to the age of cosmos, and it is finite, and therefore, there cannot exist infinite ideas in the materialistic universe.

**C.W. Morris** (NOTES 16) has called C.S. Peirce as Platonian realist for the reason that C.S. Peirce advocated the view that the whole nature is controlled by laws which are above all existences. Those laws are that power which make it possible that there can be a space, where, in turn, the results of those laws can exist- as well as organic existences and life, and both matter and causation. Those laws are eternal forms, and like mind, thought, or ideas, but not like any of the rules which we can discover in actual and sequential causation, and finite existences. As the consequence of this, the final mind has nothing to do with our operating with our incomplete signs, in spite of that we can regard any sign as means, by which something is brought into the mind, meanwhile the object, to which sign has referred to, has been left outside the mind. Hence, all phenomena have been only presented to mind with them.

- 
1. (*Idea* [in Platonic philosophy]: Externally existing pattern of which individual things in any class are imperfect copies. See also idea in philosophies of Descartes, Locke, Kant, and Hegel at footnotes of next page.)
  2. (*Idea*: [General definition]: Archetype, pattern, as distinction from its realization in individuals; also conception of standard or principle to be recognized or aimed at; plan of action; notion conceived by the mind; way of thinking; vague belief, fancy)
  3. (*Ideal*: Relating to consisting of Platonic ideas. There are also such meanings as: 1.) Answering to one's highest conception; perfect or supremely excellent in its kind. 2.) Embodying an idea; existing only in idea, visionary.)
  4. ((c. 460-c 370 B.C.); DEMOCRITUS has advanced the theory that the world was formed by the concourse of atoms. He held that the universe consists of material bodies and void.)
  5. (*Atom theory* [Physics]: Theory that elements consist of atoms of definite weight, and that atoms of different elements unite with one another in fixed proportions.)
  6. (*Chaos*: Formless void, great deep of primordial matter, abyss from which cosmos was evolved.)
  7. (*Cosmos*: The universe as an ordered whole.)

---

[19]

**C.W. Morris** (NOTES 17) has argued for that C.S. Peirce regarded symbolic process also as something more than the means, by which man will achieve the larger contexts of understandings. But there is also that conception of sign that they can develop further, according to the laws of interference, which is obviously linked to the [field of] association. **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 18) has written, too, that C.S. Peirce emphasized the symbolic nature of man, and his externality, too. Every thought can be regarded as external sign, and, therefore, man can be regarded as external sign, too. But is man an agent who is bringing something in, and in the same time leaving something outside - as an external sign? The answer is yes, if we are thinking human understanding in general.

From **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 19) we also know C.S. Peirce regarded human mind as symbolic, unlimited, and as a sign by interference, and that concept - as well as the concepts of thought and idea, act like eternal laws which are something above space - where in turn all the results and existences can be found. Man is something above space and time, and can be understood by his special nature of being something synthesized, and not something to be found in certain space and time. According to Morris, all of this is [just] like Platonian idealism. But if we think e.g. the term idea there, we can say that in C.S. Peirce's conception of the term is similar to the concept which was introduced by Descartes and **Locke** (1) - but there is something from **Kant** (2), and something from Hegel (3), too.

In addition to this, C.S. Peirce has also derived his ideas concerning the role of man in the development of the universe - not from Plato (if we are speaking about the idea in question derived from idealism) - but instead from Berkeley, and, perhaps, from Schelling, and from Royce, too. And as we shall see, there are certain influences from **Spinoza** (4), too.

Of course, it was not only a single term, say, idea, which C.S. Peirce adopted from idealism, but instead the general belief to that there are some eternal features, or self-regulating, and sophisticated ways of being, which are not apart of the world, and by which we can explain the world, as well as answer the question how all once began, and what kind might be the end, after all. The very important point in there is that we really need those constructions when explaining something more complicated.

And if we discuss development, any kind, there must be something out of reach, but still something more complete - by which to explain becoming. But why? Because there must be a kind of space, or possibility, to which any development can be based, and within with it can be forced to be run, and from where there is also a kind of gravity, or cues to follow. I think that these kind of ideas he just derived from idealism, when emphasizing the role of generalizing tendency [of ideas] when describing e.g. forms of consciousness. The similar echoes we have in his general- and nomological psychognosy, which we discuss later in the current study in detail.

- 
1. (*Idea*: In the philosophies of Descartes and Locke: immediate object of thought or mental perception.)
  2. (*Idea*: In the philosophy of Kant: conception of reason transcending all experience.)
  3. (*Idea*: In the philosophy of Hegel: absolute truth of which all phenomenal existence is expression.)
  4. ((1632-1677); BENEDICT(US) (Baud) de SPINOZA was a Dutch Jew of Portugese origin, philosopher; author of Ethics, in which he rejected the CARTESIAN dualism of spirit and matter and saw only 'one infinite substance, of which infinite existences are modes or limitations'; God was (for Spinoza) the immanent cause of the universe, not a ruler outside it, and his system is, in a sense, panteistic; he also denied personal immortality and the transcendent distinction between good and evil. He was an author of Tractatus Theologico - Politicus (1670), De intellectus emendatione, and Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata, Postume publ. (1677))

---

[20]

Let us discuss now in detail some Spinoza's ideas - because C.S. Peirce appreciated him a lot - as we know from his letter to Mario Calderoni which has been mailed c. 1905 (NOTES 20). But what kind was that idealism Spinoza advocated for? In general, he was an advocator of *rationalism* (1), as well as an enthusiast advocate of *pantheistic philosophy* (2). Both of these elements are essential features in his philosophy:

First, he has emphasized the unity of the world, and according to him we cannot reach the dimensions of infinite as persons, but before it we must join to the wholeness of the world. There is the same tendency as in **C.S. Peirce's** (NOTES 21) doctrine of synechism, namely, to regard the world as an unity, too.

Second, Spinoza has thought that there are several competing things as the pleasure and egoistic strives, which were not in agree between strives for higher perfection - which is the final goal of all souls. This, in turn, is connected to the mutual relationship of love and reason, in general. From **H. Sidgwick** (NOTES 22) we know that Spinoza's idea that the individual mind strives so far as it is able to continue its state of being but that the object of this impulse cannot be separated from pleasure or joy; because they are a passion, in which the soul passes to higher perfection. The pleasure is not the goal of that impulse intended to be hit primarily - but is a counterpart at the mind's perfection, or at self-realization or self-development. All of these ideas are familiar to pragmatists, and they can be found also by C.S. Peirce - but there are differences between pragmatists and Spinoza, too, especially what concerns the concept of *substance* (3). Spinoza has urged in his *Ethica ordine* for that the basic concept of the substance implies to the creature which has an self-existence, and which will be understood by that self-existence. This kind of [fundamental] substance Spinoza called God, who has infinite number of characters. We do not know all of His characters but only two of them, namely the thought and the dimension - which are eternal and infinite in their nature, because they are the characters of God. W. James didn't advocate this kind of spiritualistic view (4), but instead argued for that it is possible to crasp almost everything at last.

---

1. (*Rationalism*: Practice of explaining the supernatural in religion in a way consonant with reason, or treating reason as the ultimate authority in religion as elsewhere; theory that reason is foundation of certainty in knowledge.)

2. (*Pantheism*: Doctrine that God is everything and that everything is God.)

3. (*Substance*: What underlies phenomena, permanent substratum of things, that in which accidents or attributes inhere; also essential nature, and essence of most important parts of anything, and purport and real meaning - Descartes emphasized the independence of substance, as a contrary to its varying attributes, and referred to God, who doesn't need anything else to maintain His existence; Spinoza referred, by the concept, to the whole universe, but for Hume substance was an imagined thing. We shall discuss this Hume's idea later.)

4. (*Spiritualistic substance psychology*: James rejected this kind of view when applying it to psychology (see: JAMES 1952, 211). He referred with the concept substantial mainly to the kind of the self-existing being, or one which doesn't need other subject in which to inhere (FORD) 1982, 13). Hence, we cannot become acquaintance with this kind of reality. As we know e.g. from Pragmatism, and from other literal sources, he didn't accept the concept substance - as an explanation for our human life, and that he considered this kind of substantial-like God not at all human-like God, who we should not obey, or who we could not at all trust, or with whom we could be in any kind of mutual relationship.)

---

[21]

I think that there is a similarity between Spinoza and C.S. Peirce concerning the diminishing role of the single personality in the mind's perfection. In C.S. Peirce's **epistemology** (1) there are as competing components on the one hand love, and on the other hand reason, and the strive within them to be cooperatively synthesized into the one and only wholeness. From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 23) we get to know that C.S. Peirce's very essential idea that there are the laws of love and reason, which shall join together in a very distant future. But by this kind a view C.S. Peirce can be associated to Plato, too, who suggested to that counterpart of the human spirit is Eros, when we are striving for goodness and beauty. And if we are discussing beauty, we must take account also an art of *aesthetics* (2). We can find the term aesthetic almost in every turn, when studying pragmatism. This sounds to me like praising human-like knowledge, and that this kind of knowledge we **MUST** develop further, if we want to be accurate in our humanity.

There is a letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to W. James and which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (NOTES 24) where he has illustrated his new view on logic saying that *logic is anchored to ethics* (4), and this, in turn, is anchored to esthetics. But what does this mean, actually? I

think that there is just that emphasis the role of ethic and aesthetic nature of the whole knowledge, and that without that very nature we are not able to reach higher levels of knowledge at all, or reach our human nature.

Third, Spinoza has argued for that individual soul is limited, but it can be expanded. There are some lower levels in man's pursuit to the completeness of his understanding. In that lower level the principle that the rational action follows is necessarily egoistic, and there is nothing but the impulse of self-preservation. From **H. Sidgwick** (NOTES 25) we get to know that:

*"The individual mind, like everything else, strives so far as it is able to continue its state of being, and that effort is its very essence ... But the highest form of the self-realization or self-development consists in a clear comprehension of all things in their necessity order as modifications of the one divine being, and willing acceptance of all which springs from this comprehension ... This is the notion of self-realization as defined not only but for a philosopher".*

- 
1. (*Epistemology*: Theory of method or grounds of knowledge.)
  2. (*Aesthetics*: Philosophy of the beautiful; philosophy of art.)
  3. (W. James has explained in his *Pragmatism*, that there is an aesthetic unity with things, which is very much like teleological unity (1913, p. 96).)
  4. (*Ethics*: Science of morals; study of the principles of human duty, or treatise of this; moral principles; rules of conduct.)
- 

[22]

One consequence of this is that we cannot speak about our very own special personality any more as infinite, but instead finite. In its individual form also [our] soul is a kind of mode or limitation, because it can partly regarded as material one, but there is no strict boundaries to prevent it to enlarge itself to that spiritual dimension of it. Hence, we can state that any soul contains something of thought and something of dimension, as well as it has that infinite, and finite essence. But why our soul must contain both finite and infinite characters? Because one part of us must exist in finite collections or series of events, meanwhile that another part of us comes to existence to that spiritual dimension. We cannot live forever as persons, how sophisticated and wise they ever can be, and we have no firm future before us as modes or limitations. Is there the fact that we cannot reach as persons the true essence of God at all, and it is quite possible that we cannot have any eternal life in heaven? As persons, modes or limitations we cannot have any infinite existence. But there is a limitation within God Himself, too. The substance of God must maintain His certain characters in finite existences, notwithstanding that they are not such ones. Otherwise he could not exist at all in [our] souls. But we have still some hope. Namely,

Fourth, Spinoza has proposed for the possibility of the highest realization of the self-development. From **H. Sidgwick** (NOTES 26) we know that:

*"In this state the mind is purely active, without any admixture of passion or passivity; and thus its essential nature is realized or actualized to the greatest possible degree. We can see that man is forced to renounce the world which is accepted in the egoistic state and man must become an inseparable part of the totality".*

This is just according C.S. Peirce's ideas, which he has presented in his cosmology. But for now few words concerning C.S. Peirce's ideas concerning the essence of mind. According him both will and activity belong - as components - to the three classes of mind: **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 27), and some psychologists at his age, have described the mind consisting of feeling, cognition and volition (will).

As predecessors of the conception C.S. Peirce has referred especially to Kant, and also to his philosophical grandfather Tetens, as well as to the *ancient writers upon rhetoric* (1). According to **C.S. Peirce**:

*"those ancient writers instructed the orator to begin his discourse by creating a proper state of feeling in the minds of auditors, to follow this with whatever he was going to address to their understandings, that is, to produce cognitions, and finally, inflame them to action of will ... For rhetoricians, therefore, the triad named the three states of mind. But no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between different integral states of mind, and certainly not between such states as feeling, knowing and willing".*

There we have, again, those ancient philosopher, from whom somebody has "taken" something important. And there we have, again, the principle of synechism at hand - which comes very close to Spinoza's sentence:

*"actualization to the greatest possible degree"*

- where all things are bound together, and there is nothing apart of the totality. But what is especially important in there? There is the fact that we have used even our words to divide, and separate things from each others, and we have become blind what concerns their synechistic nature.

---

1. (*Rhetoric*: Treatise on the art of persuasive or impressive speaking or writing, also language designed to persuade or impress.)

---

[23]

It seems to me that Spinoza has emphasized the process, by which we can reach the (final) goal, and unity - and that there is something which makes the whole process possible. There are quite similar tendencies also in the philosophy of **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 28) who has regarded those features essential in his *grand cosmogony* (1), which is the philosophy to come.

Quite another point of view has had **Schopenhauer** (1), as well as other voluntary philosophers, which, as a term, refers to those who have emphasized in their philosophies one's own free will, or acting, and intentionality. But there must be remembered that most voluntarists have put will into the main role - even in the most general human enterprises, where it is difficult to say what we are actually willing, or waiting for. Anyway, there must be present something more than some blind tendency, or willing of organisms. This is, again, the deep question concerning human knowledge, and of its more general features.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 29) has described e.g. an *occult* (3) nature of *icon* (4) and diagram, which are something being at higher level, and being beyond the horizon of instance, and, in their way, independent, but in the same time, being as true levels of experience, which still remain unknown and hidden, because those higher levels are not fully apprehended. Now, what is important, is that there are such levels, if we understood them completely, or not. They have become to us, when we have brought something to them. That is - are we willing as hard as it is possible to will - it does us help to achieve those hidden, but true levels. We must have some other properties which to use as tools, too.

According to his Platonian realism, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 30) argued for that there is a larger cosmic process where both mentality and mind are nothing but cases within it, and that there are eternal forms and laws which make possible that which is potential can become actual, and revealed. Then there are the finalistic laws and causalities which - in every time and age - will favor certain kind of existences and deny others. Our mentality has its true existence in the world of the final causality, and not in the finite existences and strivings, where they occasionally seem to appear and disappear, and change their appearance, and where they are sometimes experiences as immediate feelings. All of their existences shall obey The Laws of Final Causality. The mentality and mind, as well as all cases in the phenomenon

which can be called life, can be seen to be only as the cases in the larger (cosmic) processes. For the reason, both thought and mind belong to the internal characters of the universe, which cannot be apprehended because they are something to come, or to be revealed. We are waiting something to come behind curtains of infinity.

I think that all of these references suggest to Spinoza's idea of man being inseparable part of the totality, too. But we must remind that C.S. Peirce did not mention or refer to Spinoza at these questions, however.

---

1. (*Cosmogony*: (Theory of) the creation of the universe. In astrophysics the term suggests to a branch of physics studying the origins and structure of the universe. With his Grand Cosmogony C.S. Peirce referred to the continuous creation, or becoming to something more complex than now (to something being created), and not to something which is already done)

2. ((1788-1860); ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER was the German philosopher, who has been described a pessimistic philosopher, and an author of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung.*, 1-2 (1818), and *Über den Natur* (1836). He considered himself as a follower of Kant, but he interpreted Kant's critical idealism into psychological idealism. He has taught, too, that the absolute reality is blind and restless will, that all existence is essentially evil, and that release can be attained only by overcoming the will to live. Among his followers are Nietzsche, WAGNER, and E. von HARTMANN.)

3. (*Occult*: Kept secret, esoteric; recondite, mysterious, beyond the range of ordinary knowledge; involving the upernatural, mystical.)

4. (Cf. *Iconology*: The study of icons, but also symbolical representation, symbolism. There is also the term Eikon, which has been used by theologians of Orthodox Church.)

---

[24]

**Fifth**, as we remind - according to Spinoza - we do not know all of the characters of God but only two of them, namely the thought and dimension - which are eternal and infinite. By these characters man is able to join to God. C.S. Peirce has tried to connect to each other both thought and dimension - especially when studying abstraction, and the essence of signs, but he has also been interested in processes and feelings, and the whole phenomenon, where we perceive something at its instancy. Of course there might be other influences, too. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 31) has described the abstraction as a certain kind of an expansive process, or centrifugal tendency of thought. There might be an interesting link to Descartes' *vorticism* (1), by which he tried to explain the development of the universe. It may be applicable in astronomy, and e.g. when explained the movements of galaxies which have black holes in their centrum, and alike, but **PERHAPS** applicable when discussing human abstraction, too.

This general principle of vorticism explains only associations, when applied into C.S. Peirce's model of the three integral states of mind, and especially into abstarction. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 32) has also suggested for that there are varitety of processes, which function to their own directions, and they are all present when we deal with our ideas. One of these directions is association; that ideas must consist of large associations, before they will be crystallized into the sets which remain such ones.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 33) has also proposed to that associations [or sets of ideas], which stay for a long time as they are, are mainly something like inherited, or spontaneously grown, but there are also accidental born sets of ideas. The rest of associations depend upon the principle that ideas once brought together into a set so that they also remain that set. These integrated stuctures have no central axis, or gravitation, or principle, which is maintaining any of sets, and therefore there is no room for vorticism. At least, they have not such intergated gravitation-like behavior at the moment. It seems to me that there are not influences in C.S. Peirce's philosophy from Descartes' *vorticism*, notwithstanding that both philosophers have emphasized that likelihood to natural forces when discussing thought, or such things.

There is not, yet, any stable mind created by us present, as such. If there is one, it is certainly not created by us intentionally, but it may be a result of heterogenous collection of processes, but which does not contain any cues to them any more. But of course there might be something internal, or "has been" or "shall be". But were the reason for the birth whatever it was, or the current status heavy or weak - it is true that when we are trying to explain how thought and dimension can exist, we cannot assume, for example, that the growth of *intension* (2) of all the terms is automatic, and that certain tendencies, or formations produce automatically meanings by extension, or by enlargenings. If we talk about the dimension, or some kind of expansion, or enlarging possibility, we do not talk about any sensible contents of a process, or deal with any meaning.

However, our thought is connected closely to the human mind, which we believe to be participating to the whole progressive development of the universe, and which - as we believe - can be regarded as an inseparable part of the internality of the whole universe, as we have discussed before. Let us remind that we have also discussed the human mind as an external sign, too, which is a carrier. But we cannot prove anything. In spite of this I want to propose for that the dimension thought is connected to human consciousness, too, and it is the business of future to prove this to be true or false.

- 
1. (*Vorticism*: The philosophical theory of vortex (vortices); in older theories of the universe, especially that of Descartes, (cosmic matter caried round in) rapid rotatory movement round centre or axis, supposed to account for origin and phenomena of terrestrial and other systems.)
  2. (*Intension*: (logic) connotation of a term, sum of the attributes, qualities comprised in a concept. Also: Intensity, high degree, of a quality, opposite to extension; stenuous exertion of mind or will.)

---

[25]

We can easily see that C.S. Peirce has tried to join functionally together both dimension and thought, and especially that part of the function of thought, which is able to create space, to where our thought can expand itself, as well as he has empasized the processes which make connections between ideas and can create new configurations, and by which we can have the phenomenon of consciousness and by which there shall become to existence the phenomenon of human mind. But for the reason of the function of the thought and dimension, there does not exist, one and only principle, by which the whole reality shall be arranged, but several ways, and stages, by which things shall be arranged, and re-arranged. As the result of them we can get us something which is quite independent of the processes by which the result is produced. But far more important than thought and dimension as such, are the possibilities of varieties, and potentialities, and in the same time there must become to existence more sophisticated thought, by which all of these enlarging varieties and potentialities can be developed and expanded to triadic connections, as well as rise them up to different levels, too.

Sixth, Spinoza has emphasized that we are migrating our faint selves to a kind of a larger self (there are larger cosmic processes, to which we shall join when we have joined our faint selves to another self, which is more complicated, and whose nature is to assimilate selves into it), and when we have reached those selves, we shall loose our egoistic ways of being, and by which we become able to reflect the world. I think that C.S. Peirce has derived his idea of the larger cosmic nature of symbolic process from Spinoza - especially when discussing the theme of all the components flowing together. But there were also other philosophers who tried to find traces which seemed to prove that there is something in the universe by its own, as a filed of possibility, which is just making possible the existences of larger selves.

From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 34) we get to know that also JOSIAH Royce tried to find an evidence from an absolute, whose essence is just being in the universe. Royce began from fragmentary experiences, and was forced to conclude that there is a larger self, but also that there might be present an error, too. Despite the presence of that error he concluded that there might be the absolute truth. According him, mind is such an ultimate reality which no subjective consciousness can recognize, because of their subjectivity. But despite of this - there must be present an absolute experience, because mind is the total intellectual

structure of the universe.

In the absolute experience all the things are present, as well as we can understand every finite experience in that very moment. I think that this is just the same which we know from C.S. Peirce, namely that there must indeed be something before any human enterprise, despite of the fact that we cannot reach those spheres right now. In his synechism, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 35) has used both an expression pure and infinitive Self, as well as the the expression poor individual self - when dealing with spiritual dimensions of man. From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 36) we have got to know that - according to **C.S. Peirce**:

*" we have a self which is not predetermined and which is not an entity, but it is developed in social contexts and will reach itself to the context and later outside of it. And further, the spiritual development of the (larger) self needs a vision which is more than any (temporal) self has at a certain moment in itself".*

[26]

But there are other references to self. When dealing with the human consciousness, and its processes **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 37) has used the expressions "self" and "not-self", which are opposite poles of the double-consciousness, which we shall discuss later in the current study. There is an idea of development, and also an idea of processes. This tendency of thinking is especially clear with **W. James** (NOTES 38) who has described the development of self as a chain of past selves, or as series of experiences, or feelings and thoughts. Moreover, **James** (NOTES 39) has explained in his Principles that spiritualists held that self is the same thing as immortal soul. When thinking James' philosophy, we can be sure, that this kind of an idea was not among his own favorites - because of his emphasis of developing self, which dies after new version of it comes into existence.

But what about the nature of things, which can be recarded as objects of our intellectual, or perceptual operations? What is their existential status? Have they characters, and have we any influence to them? From **W. Percy** (NOTES 40) we get to know that - according to **C.S. Peirce**:

*"there are real things out there whose characters are independent of our opinions of them".*

I think, that this does not refer to something which has been as it **HAS BEEN FOUND**, but instead to something, which **IS** as it is, because there are no alternatives. Our knowledge is not something before objects, but it is not due of objects, either. This citation above refers to an existential status of iconic level, ot that there is something, which can exist even without human specie.

The way, by which we apprehend something, may be due to the different *icons* (1), which, in turn, are an inseparable part of objects. We may suppose that, at least, that things, and some of icons have been in there before we have had any conception of them. Do not be so astonished with this, and not so full of human megalomany. Have we anything to do, or have we any role in the world evolution is an interesting question, but the possible answer depends of our own choices. The world is not as ready made as it seems to be, where there are certain prerequisites of actions, and where the mind is something independent of our temporality, and are we confronting fixed, and independent objects, or not. The truth, or result may be, that we shall never fully understanding their nature? And if so, the higher levels are there for some other species, and we are only losers of the whole universe. In human mind, there can be large references, as well as unities, to which carrier-signs have also referred to, when acting. From that reason, we tend to apprehend most things and objects as corresponding complexity, as to which references still seem to be suggesting - and as unities, when our object seems to have that property only. However, they might be, in fact, quite simple, as in the simple levels of feelings, because they cannot be something more. There are no secrets behind every experience, or idea. But in the same time we may make complex operations also with them. This is the case especially when we are striving for create something into more complex social settings, for which things themselves are not oriented to by their original nature. We must fill all the black spots with complex meanings, according our human nature. It may still be the fact that most of our complexity is quite illusory. But still some of these introduced new tendencies, which we have produced by our actions - are producing more general tendencies, and habits - which are adding our

importance, and writing a manuscript to the role of human mind in the development of the whole universe.

---

1. (According to C.S. Peirce, in the development of mind, there can be different types of icons in different stages. One of them is the stage of qualisigns [as different ereptions with their emotional tune]. At the second stage, there are iconic sinsigns [individual habits to describe cases with diagrams]. At the third stage there can appear iconic legisigns [which is a generalized characteristic]. However, during the whole progression symbols are an inseparable part of the internal nature of object (Peirce 1966, 228, 230))

---

[27]

For all of those reasons, it makes no sense to talk about any substances, or given, and for some unknown reason forever staying features in the world, even if we are referring to icons and diagrams, which may be temporal, or, perhaps, something to be developed to fulfill a temporal, and finite potentiality, but they can also be forerunners of law to come, or mind.

We just do not know. Hence, we are not connected with things, as they are, but we should behave with them as they might become to existence by their potentialities, and we should concentrate to our feelings of them, or to our sense of their immediacy, and then reflect them over and over thereafter. The whole human experience, and the altersensing and the medisensing departments of mind, in turn, are continuously changing and vivid ones, were their contents recollected or directly experienced. The philosophical problem which we have there is that we cannot be sure if there are any, or even enough potentialities by which to join the world together. In fact - we cannot be sure that there are any potentialities, or final ends. Instead we may have some illusory expectations, which don't have any chance to be realized. As an example we can wait for a kind of miracle to save us from Apocalypse Now. And if we are trying to propose for that all this our world is like chaos instead, we must reckon that from this we cannot develop any sophisticated system of mind, or anything complex - but only accidential forms, which do not mean anything. Of course we can admit that there is a lot of vividity in the world. But there are also alternatives to these tendencies of vividity. If we think e.g. mathematics, we cannot change even its eternal prerequisites by no way, namely those which make mathematics possible to exist and develop further. This is just the way of life of mathematics. If we make those changes, we have dealing with something else than mathematics - or we are interpreting it in a new way, or arguing: let there be this kind of mathematics with its brave new world (which unfortunately is not the same as we actually have). But if we accept the vividness of the whole world as a "general" principle, we must accept its consequences, too. One of the most decisive of them is that we cannot have any formal structures, or that we are able to have only a relatively fixed sturctures, or general cosmic features.

When **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 41) introduced his doctrine of synechism, he proposed for that one consequence of the doctrine is that we are not permitted to say that even the sum of the angles of a triangle exactly equals two right angles - but instead we can say that it equal that quantity plus or minus some quantity which we excessively small for all triangles can measure. But this does not suggest to that the sum of angles were now this, and then that, and that the difference between measures is so great that there is not any more a valid general rule, or principle which to apply in measuring angles. Another consequence of the doctrine is that we are not allowed to claim that space has strict accurately three dimensions but instead that any movements of bodies out of three dimensions are at most exceedingly minute. But are we now dealing with fundamental truths of mathematics? Yes, and no.

The answer is yes, if we consider mathematical sentences as such concepts which have certain practical bearings - namely that hey are followed other kind of sentences as predicted, and that with them we can test hypotheses. But we can also say no because we are discussing only certain kind of consequences, and of hypotheses, which are not directly concerning the essence of the live departments of the world evolution, as well as the consequences of the doctrine of synechism in that respect. In a good reason, we could make a hypothesis that the Euclidean Geometry is valid only and only if treated in its own, and

restricted context, within which we can determine with appropriate concepts. But applying synechism to the geometry in question, we ought to make Euclidean system only a borderline case, which has almost nothing to do with living world.

[28]

But we cannot conclude from our principles not much what the world is like, but only their consequences, or what kind of views we can get by them. This is the very heart of pragmatism - that we create hypotheses only to get different conclusions. We can have a view which says that tomorrow the whole mankind shall die and vanish, or shall be fixed to the everlasting round-and-round circle - because just tomorrow is shall reach its ultimate end. There is only a dirty man with his donkey in the middle of a desert wondering why all the people were hurrying with their cars to the south, and why the weather has become so cloudy, and the sky so dark. But this is not a hypothesis, only a prognose, and there are no special conclusions to be drawn, except stop wars, and violence. But if we put the question so that there is a cause - whatever cause it were - from whose consequence the whole mankind meets its end realtively soon, we can study the reasonableness of our life, ethics, and other similar questions. There are then consequences which are important, not a theory, or a good story of our future. Let us remind how **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 42) has emphasized in his doctrine of synechism - that:

*"a man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe, as a whole".*

This is not insisting that man shall reach this state in distant future, but instead that man has this opportunity - it is not a kind of automatic process, or inevitable state of things at future, whether we strived for it, or not. According the pragmatic maxim we must trace if there might be consequences of our concepts. It might seem, that we ought to think, what kind of object we are studying, having this or that strategy, but this is not important - only what are the consequences of our propositions concerning them, whatever they were in their decret inner nature.

But have objects any consequences as they are? That is: can they have any concequences in themselves, as totally left out of any control? Instead of studying objects, we might suppose that when giving different explanations, we might, or might not have the same object, but this is not important in the current stage. Some of our explanations which ww have derived from consequences might be wrong, which has several correcting consequences, when we have got better explanations, but not before. However, the question is not of the absolute rightness or wrongness but instead: have our concepts any practical bearings, whatever our concepts are like, or what kind of strategy we shall have if they have some consequences. We must remember that there might be several consequences even if we have we wrong explanation at hand, and that those consequences shall vary a lot when we are advancing to find out the among of wrongness. Accepting synechism as a common and valid principle, we cannot say that there are such and such kind of valid objects, from which we can get only one kind of explanations. Instead, we might suppose, that when we are dealing with valid explanations, with their valid objects, we are in close contact with the truths within both of them, if they have any. Because of that very principle of closeness, it might be true that we cannot strictly speak about totally independent objects, because we cannot even prove that such totally independent objects never exist, or shall ever become to existence - due of their lack of communication, or ours. And what comes to mathematical truths, in general, some of them might be true only if we have certain scope to them, or a point of view - and then they may be regarded as truths of their own kind - if there is a world which is their like.

Then there is the question the goal of an absolute accuracy, which we must reject, and instead accept that most truths are relative - which does not mean their weakness, or that they were false - but instead their readiness to be valid in quite different kind of futures, and an ability to master more complete modes of communication. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 43) has argued for certain non-materiality of the laws of universe in his *general psychognosy* (1), which we shall discuss at the end of the current study in detail. There is an idea that future shall be that kind, and not based on materia. There are several consequences especially the reasonableness of maintaining purely material values. It is very easy to show that we do not have that future at hand, yet, because nobody seems to be willing to live without his material welfare, and toys.

During the current chapter we have known by **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 44) about his concept of human mind - as well as the we have discussed the concepts of thought and idea, which are also corresponding terms to eternal laws - according Platonian realism.

But did C.S. Peirce try to prove an idealistic interpretation to be true? Definitely not, but he didn't try to prove any other school of philosophy as valid, either. His view is not something which emphasizes nothing-but interpretation of the world, or something which wants to deny all which is other kind of quality. He has insisted only that some of [our] ideas have consequences, and that most important of them have them, because it is a prerequisite of their true existence. And in general - this is the way, by which things will happen, and that our ideas, which have consequences, have their role in the general development of the universe, too. Nothing more, or less.

---

1. (*Gnosis*: Knowledge of spiritual mysteries, e.g. in the sect of gnosticism.)

---

[29]

But next I'm going to study Kant's philosophy - because of he had the concept substance in his ontology, too, and because C.S. Peirce has told to be taken some ideas from Kant. But what about "taking"? In general, this concept is just as illusory as somebody had made possible the phenomenon named "calculating" in general. But it is just a custom to say that one takes an idea from another. Even if you were an extreme materialist, you can claim that somebody has "taken", or "derived an idea" from you. There is quite seldom question of material things. And if we try to apply the principle of synechism there, it is not possible to avoid "deriving ideas" from somebody else - just because the social nature of our concepts and symbols.

Anyway. Few words about Kant's ideas of transcendence, and of his philosophical stages. There are two of Kant's terms, between which he made differentiation, namely *transcendent* (1), and *transcendental* (2) - which differentiation didn't make e.g. such transcendental philosophers as Schelling, Fichte, and Hegel. There are several other meanings between the terms by other philosophers which seem to be quite near to the interpretation by Kant, but which have different emphasis - admitting only that something goes beyond ordinary limit, and that there is just something *a priori* in experience (3). In Kant's philosophy, there are the two different stages, namely the pre-critical and critical ones. In the former stage he argued for that it is possible to get information of substance by the reason. He was convinced, too, that it is possible to give an *ontological* (4) proof of the existence of God.

At this stage he got a lot of influences from Isaac Newton's physics to his studies in natural philosophy. In the latter stage Kant was influenced by English **Locke** (5) and his *empirism* (6), which was the reason that he rejected his earlier speculations, as well as that he rejected the idea that we can get to know information of substances. But what kind of denied substances? Are there similarities to Scottish **Hume** (7), who has argued for that there are no substances at all outside our experience? But for what Hume referred by substances? **Hume** (NOTES 45) has argued for that all of our perceptions are different from each other, and that they are different from everything else in the universe, too. He regarded them distinct and separable, and suggested that they have a separate existence, and that they do not need anything else to support their existences. They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance. This suggests to, that for Hume substances were not just hypothetical, but instead an essential part of our perceptual world, or that world itself, and something fundamentally human.

---

1. (*Transcendent*: Transcending, altogether outside, unrealizable in, experience, out there.)

2. (*Transcendental*: Not derived from experience, a priori)

3. (Other philosophical meanings: *Transcendent*: That transcends ordinary limit, pre-eminent, supreme,

extraordinary - Transcendental: The meaning of the term generally based on recognition of a priori element in experience.)

4. (*Ontology*: Department of metaphysics, concerned with the essence of things, or being in the abstract.)

5. ((1632-1704); JOHN LOCKE was the English empirical philosopher, who had great influence on 18th-c. philosophy in general; and especially, he was an author of *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* (1690), and *Two Treatises of Government* (1690). In his *Some Thoughts on Education* (1693), he discussed on education, and emphasized that an educator must take in account the natural development of a child, and *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695), in which he discussed on the philosophy and religion. Well-known is an idea of soul as *tabula rasa* at its birth, which has first been introduced by THOMAS AQUINAS, who also regarded senses as the source of knowledge: "nihil est in intellectu, quod non fuerit in sensu".)

6. (*Empirism*: A philosophical meaning; refers to philosophical doctrines - cf. empiricism, which is relying on science)

7. ((1711-1776); DAVID HUME was the Scottish philosopher, and author of *Treatise of Human Nature*, and of *The Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1750). In his system of philosophical scepticism, human knowledge is restricted to the experience of ideas and impressions, and ultimate verification of their truth or falsehood is impossible. He regarded his scepticism merely academic, however.)

---

[30]

Kant expressed his new epistemology in his *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1781), which can be regarded as a reaction to English empirism. But Kant was not a pure empirist, and, perhaps, not at all *empiricist* (1), at least in his critical stage - instead he believed that we can surely become acquainted with true knowledge just by knowing, and we should take advantage with mind such things, by which can preserve, and maintain that knowledge. There are certain similarities to C.S. Peirce's ideas concerning human mind, and thought as something, which have principles of their own, and not direct connections to sensational world. But the very start of knowledge, and total immediacy we have when perceiving something in its continuity.

Hence, the only thing that Kant accepted from English empirism (e.g. by Locke) was that all our knowledge gets start from experience. But he emphasized that we cannot explain the essence of our knowledge just by our experiences, notwithstanding that there is a kind of reality which is produced by phenomena, which our experiences concern. But just by becoming acquaintance with that reality we cannot directly comprehend, that is, *Das Ding an sich*, or explain how the knowledge is, when being as it is, but which an essence we get from the mind *a priori* (2), we reach the true source of our general knowledge. There are such things as mathematics, which is *a priori*; it is derived from the mind, and not from experience. Mostly this is the same which C.S. Peirce had argued for, when discussing e.g. his *synechism*, and general *psychognosy*, namely, that there must be something above our presence, and that man has his true nature in other spheres than concreteness of material things. In his *Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft* (1786) Kant also dealt with knowing and its nature.

But now we don't discuss the topic of knowing [as something from its own nature] no longer, but instead some other similarities between Kant and pragmatism - notwithstanding that they are studied by many commentators before. From **Dewey** (NOTES 46) we know that C.S. Peirce took the term pragmatism from Kant, who made the clear difference between the terms *pragmatisch* (3), and *praktisch* (4); referring probably with the latter to something which has already an existence, and which we can use, and with which we can carry on practice. C.S. Peirce referred with the former to something, with which we can derive e.g. practical bearings of concepts. We can find the differentiation in Kant's *Metaphysic of Morals*, where the first term refers to the rules of function, and to the techniques which are common in human experience, and which we are able to change. Hence, the term *pragmatisch* is conducted to our everyday life. The latter term refers to the general moral laws and rules - which are *a priori* in their nature, and which we cannot prove to be true by human activities, and from which we cannot derive easily any

consequences. Instead - we must obey them, or accommodate our "behavior" to their nature, when we confront them, because they are waiting us as a kind of omen, or as our destiny at a near, or more distant future. Man cannot remove any of these rules, but man can decide to stop obeying them, nothing more - which is the same as somebody stops eating. It is not so easy to differentiate pragmatic and practical activities according to their moral properties. In fact, we can do a lot of harm by testing the consequences of our concepts by pragmatic orientation. If some of our concepts do not cause anything, we may evaluate them to be for nothing, for example.

In general, there is quite a similar emphasis of the role of morality [as well as aesthetics and ethics] in the philosophies of C.S. Peirce and Kant - when considering things, which are out of experience of our senses, or when considering things which are going to be realized at higher levels, or at future.

- 
1. (*Empiricism*: The practice of relying on observation and experiment, especially in the natural sciences.)
  2. (*A priori*: (Reasoning) from cause to effect; deductive(ly). [Tr. L., = 'from what is before'.])
  3. (*Pragmatic* [*pragmatisch*] - pragmatism: philosophical doctrine that estimates any assertion solely by its practical bearing upon human interests; concerned with practical results and values; treating things in a matter-of-fact or practical way.)
  4. (*Practical* [*praktisch*]: Concerned with, shown in practice; available, useful, in practice; engaged in practice [like religion, aesthetics, ethics, some doctrines of philosophy, etc.] - having already an existence for utilizing, or revealing it without human efforts.)

---

[31]

But what about C.S. Peirce's own, written opinions of Kant? From the letter, which C.S. Peirce mailed to Mario Calderoni, which has been written approximately in 1905 (NOTES 47), we get to know that C.S. Peirce has got also other philosophical influences from Kant. But he never told exactly which were the very ideas he "took" from him. In addition to this, he emphasized just at this letter that the essence of pragmatism was to be a philosophical method (that is just the term *pragmatisch* stands for). **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 48) has written that C.S. Peirce appreciated the way how Kant linked knowing to the constitution of the human mind, and accepted the way by which Kant restricted the field of experience which is possible to man.

Here and there in C.S. Peirce's philosophy we can meet the similar idea of insufficiency of man's present knowledge, or that man only has been interpreting instead of using final, and accurate signs, or that man has only a [restricted] rôle in the world evolution, but man is not a star in it. There is no need to test any concept if they already have their final form. But who tells us which are such concepts, or how near we are them now, or how we can be absolutely sure if we have some final concepts in use? This is extremely difficult because of the continuity of the (human) world which cannot be changed into its elementary fragments for viewing them. Or if done so, the result is not just a copy from an original experience, but something more complicated, and sophisticated.

One of these restriction is how man apprehends time.. From **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 49) we know that especially in C.S. Peirce's late philosophy, it has been an important thesis that time is both a continuum and [by virtue of its infinite divisibly] , and an infinity which we actually apprehend. We can see something like compact - which is **NOT** that kind, but instead like fractal which reveals innumerable details notwithstanding that we are approaching its "kernel" forever, and ever. Gullvåg has referred to **Chance, Love and Logic** (NOTES 50), too, but he didn't associate this C.S. Peirce's view to Kantian tendency, to which direction it suggests to. This is the case especially when we think the general meanings of the terms *intuition* (1), and *continuum* (2), and the special emphasis which both philosophers have had in their discussions - especially when explaining the essence of time, or the apprehension of time. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 51) has both criticized and interpreted Kant's conceptions on the time and

continuity - admitting that Kant was quite right when saying that every partitioning in time is time itself but he didn't understand quite well what he was proposing for, saying that time, in itself, is infinite, and that it does not consist of infinitely divisible parts. Hence, he did not make differentiation between two things. First: how we apprehend time, and second: what time itself is, in its infinite divisibility. Thought, Kant did not understand that there must take in consideration two different ideas concerning time - the one, which says that time, as intuited - can never be divided so that parts were times themselves - and the another, which says that in time there might be still something which can cause that we cannot reach all of its infinite divisible parts, as they are. Kant translated the Latin term *intuitus* into the German *Anschauung*, which could cause this misinterpretation. But what are the consequences of this? Although we can say that time is e.g. infinite divisible, or that we can intuit it as indivisible - we cannot master it at all - but we can only speculate, and make hypotheses concerning its essence, and ways of being! When considering Kant's proposition as a whole, C.S. Peirce has suggested that the conclusion of those two considerations should be that time, as intuited, has no separate parts. Kant did not illustrate the essence of [the whole] time, as such, whatever it is, or shall be. This kind of a view of time as an unanalyzable object C.S. Peirce accepted, too, and suggested that his own concept of *percipuum* (3) is quite the same as Kant's concept *Anschauung*, in this sense. But the term has also been used by Edmund Husserl, indicating to the principle of principles, which refers to all which is directly given, or seen.

- 
1. (*Intuition*: Immediate apprehension by the mind without reasoning, or immediate apprehension by sense, or immediate insight.)
  2. (*Continuum*: A whole, the structure of whose parts is continuous and not atomic.)
  3. (*Percipuum*: A finite-like target of observation, which is actually infinite, and indivisible. Cf. especially the meaning of Perceive: Apprehend with the mind.)

---

[32]

There is an interesting association to Wittgenstein in this question, too. From **Gullvåg** (NOTES 52) we know that Wittgenstein's argumentation that we do not grasp the infinity of time, or time as an infinitely divisible continuum - as a real extension, but only as a possibility, an intension. That is - we can give a name to a phenomenon "time", and associate it to several other groups of names, and enlarge its intension to the world of meaning - in spite of that we have not been able to restrict and map our target in a definite way.

Gullvåg suggested for that this argument was a reaction to C.S. Peirce's opinion concerning continuity of time, but, in fact, it does not add anything to it, or try to deny it, either. C.S. Peirce (NOTES 53) has emphasized, too, that there is not at all such thing as absolute immediacy, or something which were absolutely present, either accidentally or by confrontation. There we have, his doctrine of synechism - again - which means that we cannot escape thirdness, by which principle the [three] classes of mind are synthesized together. This very principle suggests to the fact that it is impossible to explain anything in its separate way of being, as a separate object, or as thing as *sich* - because the explanation is a second phase, or restructuring continuous but we may have an illusion that something separate is explained.

This is not a kind of geometric structure, or an illustration, according with the whole world consist of triangles - But instead a way to describe this phenomenon. We must clearly admit, too, that only by calculus we cannot overcome the world. The synthesizing tendency of mind and thought is necessary because there must be a new arrangement of elements before any understanding, and it must be independent from them. This is just because our thought needs to get rid of the presence of infinite, and still self-circulating finite-like continuums, and instead of it must build a new world.

But there are laws in certain, potential sense **BEFORE** they are fulfilled, and there must be much more than that, too. That is, the world of ideas is not the result of man's own enterprises, but something before - but not completely applicable, yet. We can conclude that there are perhaps more similarities between

Kant and C.S. Peirce but we don't discuss them in detail any more, but instead some topics concerning Hegel's philosophy: He named his whole doctrine by the name absolutic idealism, which stands contrary to Kant's and Fichte's [and some others'] more restricted subjective idealism.

Hegel considered the whole universum, as the system, which has been developing within one time system. Hence, the totality is, and will be able to give the whole meaning to its parts. Different ages follow each other in that one main system - as a dialectic continuum. The history, as a whole, can be considered as the manifestation of the eternal truth or Geist. But that manifestation takes time, and also ideas are, perhaps, at the beginning very dim ones [we cannot be sure if this phenomenon is only local, or an exception]. The great question is: Must there be somebody, who is capable to start immediately something more complicated, because that one is more developed? Is this necessary? And what if there are no more development in any corner of the "world" as the blind staff, or less that that? No hope or faith, or knowledge?

Hegel used, as his tool, the dialectical method which was developed already by Plato and **Zeno** (1). All of them supposed that we can elevate to the true world of ideas, by uncovering the contradictions of beings.

---

1. ((c. 300 B.C.); ZENO [of Citium] was the Greek philosopher, and the founder of Stoic school.)

---

[33]

The kernel of Hegel's philosophy is in his work *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1812-1816). It is almost impossible to put all the contents of Hegel's philosophy in a nutshell. However, he derived some of his ideas from Kant, especially when developing his idea of *antinomies* (1), to which direction our reason is continuously drifting. But Hegel considered these antinomies as existing in the objective reality. His interpretation was that out of our immediate sight there are some guidelines, or reason, before any actualization - But not as Thomas Aquinas have put it - that when something is taking place, *materia* gets its form. According to Hegel, the purpose of his positive dialectics, was to synthesize the antinomies and conflicts so, that there would be quite new and harmonic solution. For the problems which will arise due to them, Hegel introduced his negative dialectics. Hence, there was the leading idea of a dialogical solution in Hegel's whole epistemology. There were different dialogical solutions available to be applied to the philosophy of nature, and on the other to be applied to the Philosophy of Geist, because of the difference of their very nature. Hegel's world seems to be consisting of different, but still interacting elements, even in its higher levels, as an example antinomies, and contradictions, but also of different materials, from which they are made of, and the only answer to every problem was just a dialog. No blind fighting with each others any more, or blind tendencies, or origins from nothing.

But there is a difficulty, at least, which says that there are lot of things which cannot be solved with any kind of dialog, especially what concerns the development of society. But Hegel's philosophy is a good philosophy for the rationally behaving world with its rational beings, who are not destroying themselves with all their equipments, because it is silly, and who are not avoiding conversations, because they offer solutions. Unfortunately our own world, as we know pretty well, is a self-destructing one, or at least human beings have that characteristic, and that our branch of sciences are not migrating themselves towards a state of harmony. When thinking our history, it seems to me that only in Hegel'S own epistemology its concepts and ideas are supporting each other.

But why Hegel is so important there? Just because there was also the American Hegelian philosophy - phenomenon, which probably influenced to some pragmatists, too. Few words about its history. According the first *ENCY* (NOTES 54) the role of W. T. Harris in the development of the American Hegelian philosophy was a considerable one. He argued for abstract philosophy emphasizing the superiority of speculative method in relation to the methods of empirism, and *positivism* (2), and also to the view of *agnosticism* (3). Harris, and his counterparts, thought that only with pure reason it would be possible to get knowledge concerning an ultimate reality, and especially that Hegelian philosophy should offer a world view which could be widely acceptable, and which could be applied to ethics, religion, arts,

politics, law and pedagogic. According The third *ENCY* (NOTES 55) Harris studied at the first stage at Yale College Platonian philosophy, but he was not satisfied with the teaching style of that College, and soon he began his studying in St. Louis. There he met **Brockmeyer** (4). Since 1858 Harris, Brockmeyer and some other philosophers began to meet each others in Kant Club, and Harris also got a copy from Hegel's study on logic and encouraged Brockmeyer to translate in into English - but who made only some outlines for translation. In 1886 it was founded St. Louis Philosophical Society, whose chairman was Brockmeyer and whose secretary was Harris, and which had several American philosophers as members (5).

---

1. (*Antinomy*: Contradiction in a law, or between laws, or principles. When applied to a world which has been regarded as monistic system, there is a question of why there does not exist independent realities as a consequence of those antinomies.)

2. (*Positivism*: Philosophical system of Auguste Comte, recognizing only positive facts and observable phenomena, and abandoning all inquiry into causes or ultimate origins; referring to a religious system founded upon this.)

3. (*Agnostic*: One who holds that nothing is known, or likely to be known, of the existence of a God or anything beyond material phenomena. -adj. Pertaining to this theory. [Gk. agnostos (theos) unknown (god); taken by THOMAS HENRY HUXLEY f. Acts xvii 23].)

4. (HENRY C. BROCKMEYER: was of Russian origin, who was studied Hegel in Prose Writers of Germany which was published in 1874)

5. (As the members of that philosophical society were e.g. Denton J. Snider, George H. Howinson, Kroeger, and Thomas Davidson.)

---

[34]

From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 56) we know that most of the members of that Society were emigrants who had escaped because of the rebels of 1848 in Europe to America. But what kind of philosophy was that of W.T. Harris own? From the third *ENCY* (NOTES 57) we know that he used the parallel analysis and recognised three levels of knowing, and in the third level, he supposed, it will be achieved an individual independence. There is a smack of the very same idea which C.S. Peirce advocated for, namely that the development of mind, and man, has this kind of endpoint.

Further, Harris proposed for that gradually it will be realized that all things are dependent from each other, and that there is the governing principle of relativity in that process, where individuals by self-reflection shall get a sight of infinitive. Also this is according to C.S. Peirce's emphasis of sociability, and referential nature of man's concepts. It is only a question if things have that property by themselves, or is there a part of reality, in which it is an essence of all within it. But why there must be an individual being, then? Without that individuality the causality is not able to produce certain causes and effects. Hence, the causality is dependent of those self-activities, which are self-relative, independent, free, and creative. The only totally independent and original cause of all things is God, whose true essence is just reason. Like Hegel, also Harris believed that philosophy approaches [the ultimate] reason by the concept analysis.

From the third *ENCY* (NOTES 58) we know that in 1867 Harris began to publish The Journal of Speculative Philosophy - because his article " The mere dry husk of Hegelianism" was not accepted by the publishers of The North American Review. There must be emphasized that in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy it was published also some James', Dewey's and C.S. Peirce's articles.

**A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 59) has emphasized that C.S. Peirce respected Hegel's view on the nature of phenomenon, as well as his view concerning the nature of history, but he regarded his logic as poor. But, as we know from the C.S. Peirce's letter to James, which was dated at 12th June in 1902 (NOTES 60), he

regarded also J. Royce's logic execrable. Why? Probably for the reason that the world which they described, was only and one, and that logic was constructed to study just that kind of world, and didn't set a hypothesis that there might be also other kinds of worlds, for which there must be developed tools.

But there were Hegelian tendencies in C.S. Peirce's own logic. As we know from **Gullvåg** (NOTES 61), **Russell** (1) adopted from C.S. Peirce one part of his logical theory of relation, namely the part of external relations - but rejected its another part - the theory of internal relations, because it smacked too much of Hegel.

---

1. ((1872-1970); BERTRAND RUSSELL was an English philosopher, logician and mathematician. He was, with A.N. WHITEHEAD, an author of *Principia Mathematica.*, 1-3., (1910-1913) - where they presented their logistic thesis [accompanied with GOTTLOB FREGE], which says: mathematics is a part of logic, and that both of them can be expressed with logical calculus). Among Russell's other influential works are e.g. *Problems of Philosophy* (1912), and *Our Knowledge of the External World* (1914), but he has also written a lot of popular philosophical books.)

---

[35]

But can we - in regard to these references - consider C.S. Peirce really as an advocate of Hegelian philosophy. If he was - in what quantity? In a letter which C.S. Peirce has written to W.T. Harris on the 30th November in 1868 (NOTES 62) he criticized Hegelians for that they considered the philosophical doctrines, which have been presented during different ages, as true ones - in regard of certain time and context. Further he criticized them for their categorization of the knowledge of different ages. An interesting detail there is that C.S. Peirce is repeating the expression Hegelians - referring to followers of Hegel. Only critics, which he seems to be directing to Hegel himself, is the critics concerning his logic. But there are several cases, in which C.S. Peirce referred to Hegel's writings without directly criticizing them - e.g. when using the same examples as Hegel illustrating some of his own concepts. For example - **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 63) has used a similar example of Baccants when describing e.g. the nature of association. But there are also examples when C.S. Peirce has attacked against the whole philosophy of Hegel. From C.S. Peirce's letter to James, which has been dated on the 7th March in 1904 (NOTES 64) we know - in turn - that C.S. Peirce regarded Hegel's philosophy as nominalistic: only here and there it has a taste of realism. That is - Hegel cannot be regarded as a realist. There we must reckon the context, however, when evaluating these sentences: C.S. Peirce attacked strongly against nominalism saying that the one purpose of the pragmatistic doctrine was that of denying *nominalism* (1). But also other pragmatists were not immune from Hegelian thoughts.

There is an interesting relationship between Hegel's philosophy and Dewey - Let us study the topic more closely. From **S.R. Vaughn** (NOTES 65) we know, that there have been three different stages in Dewey's philosophy, which **Lewis E. Hahn** has described. The first of them was a phase of *Scottish intuitionism* (2), the second absolute idealism, and the third of the stages was instrumentalism (3). Dewey became an advocate of Hegelian philosophy when he was continuing his studies at John Hopkins. At the same time he was also studying experimental psychology by G.S. Hall, and those studies can be regarded to be as the most influential to his philosophical development. From **S.R. Vaughn** (NOTES 66) we know, too, that Dewey himself has said that his Hegelian stage didn't left any permanent effects. **E.G. Boring** (NOTES 67) has given us more information concerning Dewey's own role in the development of functionalistic psychology, as well as what kind were those influences which he got from it.

---

1. (see: notice of Frazer's Berkeley, in *North American Review*, October, 1871)

2. (*Intuitionism*: (General meaning.): The doctrine that in perception external objects are known immediately, without the intervention of a vicarious phenomenon.)

3. (C.f. *Instrument*: There are two meanings of the term, which come very close to where the term instrumentalism refers to: Implement, apparatus, used in performing an action, especially for delicate or scientific work. - also: Person used by another for his own purposes.)

[36]

At the beginning of the current chapter I made a simple question if there are any common features between idealism and pragmatism. The answer is both yes and no; the answer depends on question, and topic which we are discussing. There are no pretty good answers. Certainly we might consider all the philosophers we have been studying as *true philosophers* (1). However, we have only taken short snapshots, and we have not done any profound analysis, because there are also other schools of philosophy to study, and compare. But there are lot of studies, which have gone much deeper, I guess. There is e.g. **K-O. Apel's** (2) article, **J.H. Kepchar, Jr.'s** (2) work, and **Gullvåg's** (4) short article, which we have been discussing at the current chapter, and which have revealed also other connections of C.S. Peirce's philosophy to European philosophy.

---

1. (*Philosopher*: As lover of wisdom, or student of philosophy; as one who regulates his life by the light of philosophy, or one who shows philosophic calmness in trying circumstances.)

2. (Apel, K-O., "Von Kant zu Peirce: Die Semiotische Transformation der Transzendentalen Logik", in *Transformation der Philosophie., II., Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft.*: , Frankfurt am Main., pp. 157ff, 1973; see also: APEL, K-O., *Charles Sanders Peirce, Schiften., I., Einführung.*, Frankfurt am main., 1967-1970)

3. (Kepchar, J.H., Jr., *Kant, Peirce, and the Transcendental Method.*, Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms., International, 1984; Diss. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina, 1981)

4. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"., in *Wittgenstein-Aesthetic and Transcendental Philosophy.*, edited by K.S. Johannesen., and T. Nordenstam., Hölder-Pichler-Temsky., Vienna, 1981)

---

[37]

## NOTES 2:

1. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1, edited by Paul Edwards., New York., The MacMillan Company & The Free Press., pp. 85-86, 1967)

2. (Collected Papers of... , VII, §8., *Evolution of the Laws of Nature.*, .515, 1966)

3. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., *Synechism and Immortality*, .576, 1966)

4. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 6., p. 108, 1967)

5. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 4., p. 66, 1967)

6. (Bigge, M.L, *Positive Relativism, An Emergent Educational Philosophy.*, 1971)

7. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., pp. 86, 356-357, 1967)

8. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., *Correspondence.*, 1910, lett., from C.S. Peirce to Paul Carus, p. 171, 1966)

9. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., pp. 85-86, 1967)

10. (Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism.*, p. 190, 1968)
  11. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., *Correspondence.*, 12.6.1902, lett., from C.S. Peirce to W. James, p. 198, 1966)
  12. (*The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy.*, 4., p. 241, 1967)
  13. (James, W., *Pragmatismi, uusi nimitys eräille vanhoille ajattelutavoille.*, trans. by K. Silfverberg., Helsinki., Otava., 1913)
  14. (Royce, J., *The Conception of God.*, p. 292, 1897)
- 

[38]

15. (Dewey, J., "George Herbert Mead" ., in *Journal of Philosophy.*, XXXVII (1931), p. 311)
  16. (Morris, C.W., *Six Theories of Mind.*, Chicago., pp. 285-286, 1932)
  17. (Morris, C.W., *Six Theories of Mind.*, p. 285, 1932)
  18. (Morris, C.W., *Six Theories of Mind.*, p. 284, 1932)
  19. (Morris, C.W., *Six theories of Mind.*, p. 285, 1932)
  20. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., *Correspondence.*, c. 1905., lett. from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni, pp. 165-166; see also: *Bibliography.*, pp. 161-256, 1966)
  21. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., *Synechism and...* , .565-.576, 1966; see also: Peirce, C.S., manuscript: *Immortality in the Light of Synechism*, 1892)
  22. (Sidgwick, H., *The Methods of Ethics.*, London., MacMillan & Co., pp. 89-90, 1962)
  23. (Scheffler, I., *Four Pragmatists: A Critical Introduction to Peirce, James, Mead, and Dewey.*, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Humanities Press., New York., pp. 83, 87, 1974)
  24. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., *Correspondence.*, 25.11.1902, lett. from C.S. Peirce to W. James., pp. 188-189, 1966)
  25. (Sidgwick, H., *The Methods of Ethics.*, pp. 89-90, 1962)
  26. (Sidgwick, H., *The Methods of Ethics.*, pp. 89-90, 1962)
  27. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of Consciousness.*, .540-.541, 1966)
  28. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., *Notes of Science.*, p. 175, 1966)
  29. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., p. 283, 1966)
  30. (Collected Papers of ... , I., p. 96, 1966)
- 

[39]

31. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of...* , .544-.545, 1966)
32. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of...* , .548, 1966)

33. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., Forms of... , .550, 1966)
34. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., p. 86, 1967)
35. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synechism and... , .572, 1966)
36. (Scheffler, I., Four pragmatists. , p. 86, 1974)
37. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., Forms of... , .542-.543, 1966)
38. (James, W., The Principles of Psychology., Great Books of Western World 53., Encyclopedia Britannica., Inc., Chicago, (1890), pp. 146-154, 1952)
39. (James, W., The Principles of Psychology., p. 211, (1890),1952)
40. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , p. 80; C.f. also: Morris, C.W., Six Theories of Mind., Chapter 4., p. 284, 1932)
41. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synechism and... , .568, 1966)
42. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synechism and... , .576, 1966)
43. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Nomological Psychology., .233, 1966)
44. (Morris, C.W., Six theories of Mind., p. 285, 1932)
45. (Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature., bk. 1, pt. 4. §5)
46. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism"., in Twentieth Century Philosophy, Living Schools of Thought., edited by Dagobert D. Runes., New York, pp. 449-468, 1968; also: according the Finnish translation of Dewey's article by Timo Kinnunen.)

---

[40]

47. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., c. 1905., lett. from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni, pp. 165-166; see also: Bibliography., pp. 161-256, 1966)
48. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., p. 15, 1968)
49. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"., in Wittgenstein-Aesthetic and Transcendental Philosophy., edited by K.S. Johannesen., and T. Nordenstam., p. 75, Hålder-Pichler-Temsky., Vienna, 1981)
50. (Cohen, M.R., (ed.): Chance, Love and Logic, Philosophical Essays by the late Charles S. Peirce., New York, pp. 205ff, 1923)
51. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Philosophy of Mind., pp. 383-384, 1966)
52. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 75, 1981)
53. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Philosophy of Mind., pp. 383-384, 1966)
54. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., p. 86, 1967)
55. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 3., p. 416, 1967)

56. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., p. 86, 1967)
57. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 3., pp. 416-417, 1967)
58. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 3., p. 416, 1967)
59. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., p. 15, 1968)
60. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 26.6.1902, lett., C.S. Peirce to W. James., p. 198, 1966)

[41]

61. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 77, 1981)
62. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 30.11.1868, lett., C.S. Peirce to W.T. Harris., p. 185, 1966)
63. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Association., .388, 1966)
64. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 7.3.1904, lett., from C.S. Peirce to W. James., pp. 189-190)
65. (Vaughn, S.R., Pedagogical Experience and Theory of Meaning in Dewey and Wittgenstein., Dissertation., Michigan State University., Lewis E. Hahn's conception: p. 77; rejection of Hegelian idealism, p. 81, 1976)
66. (Vaughn, S.R., Pedagogical Experience... ... , pp. 79-80, 1976)
67. (Boring, E.G., A History of Experimental Psychology., The Century Co., New York, pp. 539-542, 506-507, 1931)

[42]

## The Man of Pragmatism, Chapter III

### The ancient philosophy, older empirism, and pragmatism

When speaking about ancient philosophy, and philosophers, one could say that everybody has "taken" or "derived" something from them. It is almost impossible to write something without citing their most famous ideas, or do it accidentally. Most philosophers in ancient Greece interpreted the world by emphasizing one of its basic elements, from which the world was made of, and they applied certain cues of instant reality, when explaining what kind is the world like. Those elements were well-known before them in different religions, as in Gnosticism, for example, and in different Genesis-stories. This Will to find basic principles, or elements is a tendency which we can easily trace in modern science, and philosophy, too. It is generally accepted that it is quite right to regard one basic hypothesis, or interpretation more valid than others - almost as a truth - and reject, or disregard other possibilities, and then to prove something as true according that accepted "more true than others" background. Nothing has changed. In ancient Creece there were, among others *eleatic* (1) [school], whose members were advocates of monism, because they thought, that such concepts as variety [plurality], not-beingness, movement, etc. might be problematic, when used in philosophy, because they would lead to contradictions.

An eleatic philosoher was **Parmenides** (2), but there were also Zeno, and **Xenophanes** (3), among others. More dynamic view was introduced by **Heraclitus** (4). However, these philosophers could not invent any applicable, and empiristic approach, because of their denying of the truth of things, which are in front of

us; they were just believing in unity, or the continuity of being. They did not discover that change, how illusory it might be, could be measured, and explained, or that there are no unchangeable facts. And then there was the *Pythagorean school* (5), or religion of numbers. The most famous of its advocates was **Pythagoras** (6), of whose person we have not much to tell about, because the sect held that the founder of school was divine being, and giving any intimate information of him was forbidden. At last the whole sect was destroyed in a revolt. Because of that mysticism concerning numbers, the school, or the sect, cannot be regarded as the forerunner of the idea of calculus.

- 
1. (*Eleatic*: Of, pertaining to, a school of Greek philosophers of the 6th c. B.C. founded by Parmenides and his successor Zeno at Elea in Lucania; these philosophers combated the anthropomorphic religion of the ancient poets and maintained that there was a single eternal god not resembling mortals in appearance or thought.)
  2. ((6th c. B.C.); PARMENIDES was the Greek philosopher of Elea (Italy); founder of the Eleatic school which believed in unity, and continuity of being, and unreality of change or motion. [see also Xenophanes].)
  3. ((c 576-480 B.C.); XENOPHANES was the Greek philosopher and poet, formerly thought to have been the founder of the Eleatic School of philosophy.)
  4. (HERACLITUS was the Greek philosopher of Ephesus; he wrote a work Concerning Nature (c. 513 B.C.), in which he maintained that all things were in a state of flux and that fire, the type of this constant change, was their origin. He accepted that there are contradictions, as e.g. wealth and illness, but somehow, they are one and the same.)
  5. (*Pythagorean school* was founded in 530 B.C.)
  6. ((6th c. B.C.); PYTHAGORAS was the Greek philosopher and mathematician of Samos; his philosophical teaching included the doctrine of the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and he evolved the idea that the explanation of the universe is to be sought in numbers and their relations.)

---

[43]

Then there were natural philosophers of Miletus, e.g. a mathematician **Thales** (1), who regarded water as *arkhe* (2), and as the material cause for the development of all which exists. He thought that at the beginning there was an enormous sea, from which fog ascended, and to which it descended as rain, forming the land, and all of beings. There we have certain echoes of the idea of the kind of development, which originated from a simple [natural] cause. **Anaximandros** (3) was the philosopher, who was trying to systematize his empirical findings, and who was emphasizing the physical nature of the universe.

Later there has been some of their successors, e.g. **Archimedes** (4), and **Hippocrates** (5), and **Aristarchus** (6), an inventor of solar system. But in addition to them there were many others, who have influenced strongly to the development of modern science.

In ancient Greece most of its gods were almost human, and human beings were (in many respects) near gods themselves, or at least interacting with them -as Ulysses in the story. This was due to that e.g. Zeus was not an original God, or one of them who was not born. and he was not one from Titans, either, but a lower case of them. Man was just having the properties and powers of those lower gods, at least, and going to reveal their secrets, and secrets of those, who had created the world. Man had his golden minute. Nothing was spoiled, and wilderness was still in its untouched state. The situation was quite different than later in The Middle Ages, when the Church had much more power than earlier, and later, and man began to destroy European forests with high efficiency. Philosophers thought that they were approaching wisdom, by which the whole mankind would become better.

But we know the end of the story now - that there is no wisdom behind, and no new lands to conquer with our present kind of knowledge. The question is: can we survive as a specie, or not. And we know, or at least we should, that we are not the noble ones, or the best of all the species. But this is the different story - but not less important.

1. ((end of 7th c. B.C.); THALES [of Miletus] was the Greek philosopher, and one of the 'seven sages', who believed to have founded the geometry of lines. He discovered several theorems, and advanced the study of astronomy; he regarded water as the principle of all material things - that is - the origin of them.)
2. ((Gk.) *Arkhe*: the origin of all which exists.)
3. ((610-547 B.C.); ANAXIMANDROS wrote a book on nature, in which he joined together his findings in astronomy, geology, and biology into the complete presentation of the physical universum. According to him, the whole universum was born from one of the elements, which is infinite, to apeiron, and which is unlimited, and the substance of all, and to where all beings shall return back. The natural order is essentially moral, as well as the law, according with all beings are born at certain time, and fall down to eternity another time.)
4. ((287-212 B.C.); ARCHIMEDES was the Greek mathematician of Syracuse, and a pupil of EUCLID. He studied at Alexandria, but spent the most of his life in Syracuse. He has said to have made many mechanical inventions, including the screw for raising water. Well-known is the principle of Archimedes = [physics], which is the principle that when a body is partly or completely immersed in a fluid the apparent loss of weight is equal to the weight of the fluid displaced.)
5. ((b. c 460 B.C.); HIPPOCRATES has been the most celebrated physician of Greek antiquity. [[Hippocratic = Of Hippocrates or the school of medicine named after him; applied to the shrunken and livid aspect of the countenance immediately before death, so called because described by Hippocrates] [Hippocratic Oath = Oath embodying the code of medical ethics, preserved in Hippocrates' writings (though probably of still earlier date), and still taken, in various modified forms, by those who qualify as doctors of medicine.]
6. ((c 280 B.C.); ARISTARCHUS was from Samos. He was an astronomer and mathematician; he maintained that the earth revolved round the sun, though he thought that its orbit was a circle.)

[44]

It was **Aristotle** (1), who made the most complete classification concerning sciences, and he was the founder of scientific approach. Then there was [another] **Aristarchus** (2), who, in turn, had certain role after the classic philosophers in the development of natural sciences and philosophy. Originally - according to Aristotle - there are theoretical, practical, and productive sciences. From those, theoretical sciences [as physics, mathematics, and metaphysics] were studying things which could not be otherwise than they were. The purpose of practical sciences [as ethics and political science] was, instead, to be as servant in human activities, and they studied those things which could be, perhaps, in other way than they actually were. Productive sciences were aimed to find out how to *prepare things* (3). If we now discuss about the role of physics in the development of philosophy, we must remind that the term natural philosophy has included especially physics - and that natural philosopher refers to physicist. But terms have also a wider meanings, which we shall discuss later during the current study. But if we discuss about the physics how Aristotle it classified - there is very clear association to theoretical science.

However, it seems to me, that Aristotle didn't interpret physics as something active, but instead he tried to find it in group of *axioms* (4). In Aristotle's philosophy the very essential feature is its axiomatic ideal of science, in which every branch of science should be rooted to certain axioms and universal truths. When now thinking those claims, by which C.S. Peirce's philosophy was a kind of copy from Aristotle's philosophy, one crucial difference between them is that C.S. Peirce didn't advocate that axiomatic ideal of

science - but that he wanted to create instead a philosophy of philosophies, or philosophy of creating. Then there was also **Euclid** (5) with his geometry, which was aimed to be as the universal model, too, but which was inappropriate, as such, to the new science centuries later. But why Euclid had this emphasis of geometry? Because it was a model of rationality, or how things should be arranged to be rational, in order to be accepted as universal truths, or proved to be true. And this is the case also in our modern science - when proving something, or explaining the state of things.

- 
1. ((384-322 B.C.); **ARISTOTLE** was the Greek philosopher, and a pupil of Plato at Athens. He became tutor to the young **ALEXANDER** of Macedon, but returned to Athens in 335. There he conducted a school which was known as the **Peripatetic** from his habit of walking up and down (peripaton) the paths of the Lyceum while lecturing. He wrote the Ethics, Politics, and Poetics, and works on zoology, physics, metaphysics, logic, and rhetoric. One half [or perhaps more] of Aristotle's writings has been known via translations from Arabic texts. An interesting is his doctrine of categories: the most fundamental of them he regarded the category of certain proportions. As we shall find out later during the current study, it has been proposed for that Aristotle had a strong influence to the philosophy C.S. Peirce.)
  2. ((c 217-c 145 B.C.); **ARISTARCHUS** was of Samotrace; librarian at Alexandria, who edited the Greek classics, and has been regarded as the originator of scientific scholarship.)
  3. (*Preparing things, making machines*: There is an interesting point that ancient philosophers, like Plato and Aristotle - didn't appreciate much e.g. machines, or preparing them, because it was the concern of slaves.)
  4. (*Axiom*: The self-evident truth, or established principle, or maxim [which is a general truth drawn from science or experience, principle, or rule of conduct].)
  5. ((c 300 B.C.); **EUCLID** (Eucleides) was the mathematician of Alexandria, and an author of a treatise of geometry (The Elements). Geometry itself is a science of properties and relations of magnitudes in space, as lines, surfaces, and solids.)

---

[45]

Later, there has been the school of *Neoplatonism* (1). From Neoplatonists I want to mention especially **Plotinus** (2), **Porphyry** (3), and after the Birth of Christ there was **Boethius** (4). But why just these philosophers should be important when discussing empirism? Because the whole Christian tradition was, at the beginning, deeply influenced by Neoplatonism, and because the early empirists were strongly influenced by that current of thought.

One of The Fathers of The Church, namely **St. Augustine** (5), derived some of his ideas from Neoplatonism, and later, in turn - he influenced to early empirists. Since 200 B.C. the Neoplatonian school has been influential, but as the originator of the school is regarded St. Augustine. However, the school stayed persistent for centuries. Hundreds of years later there was Henry More (6) et.al., who have been generally known as Cambridge Platonists. But what kind was that earlier Neoplatonism?

I will give a short example of it. In his cosmology e.g. Plotinus claimed that the eternal source of the all beingness is the infinite unity, from where all the variety *emanates* as light to an incompleteness and to indefinite. The very first source of that emanation is **Nus** which includes the infinite ideas; and it effects to the souls, and at last to the materia. The individual soul belongs in the same time to the spiritual and to the material world.

These ideas presented by Plotinus we can trace also in **C.S. Peirce's** (NOTES 1) *synechism*, where he has described e.g. carnal-, social-, and spiritual consciousness, and that we experience infinite nature - which themes we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study. But there is another way, by which Greek philosophy has influenced to most philosophers at the stage of their life, namely via Christianity,

and especially via Catholic Church.

1. (*Neoplatonism*: A philosophical and religious system, chiefly consisting of a mixture of Platonic ideas originated at Alexandria in the 3rd c.)
2. ((c A.D. 205-262); PLOTINUS was the Egyptian-born philosopher, and he has been regarded as the founder of Neoplatonism.)
3. ((A.D. 233-c 305); PORPHYRY [Porphyrius] was the Scholar and philosopher; originally called MALCHUS; by birth probably a Syrian; became a disciple of Plotinus at Rome; left numerous works in Greek.)
4. ((c 475-525); BOETHIUS [Anicius Manlius Severinus] was the Roman philosopher; consult under THEODOTRIC the Ostrogoth; was suspected of treason and confined to prison, where he wrote *De Consolatione Philosophiae*; the Neoplatonic and stoic ideas of his work had great influence throughout The Middle Ages.)
5. ((354-430); St. AUGUSTINE [Aurelius] was the theologian, and a son of a pagan father and Christian mother (St. Monica); he was for a time attracted by Manichaeism, but baptized as a Christian 387; became bishop of Hippo in North-Africa, 391; defended Christianity against ancient religions and philosophies and contemporary heresies in numerous writings, of which the best known are *De civitate Dei*, and *De Trinitate*, as well as his *Confessiones* (c. 400), which was an autobiographical work, and which was cited later by LUDWIG WITTEGENSTEIN. But there was later also another St. Augustine (d. 604), namely the first archbishop of Canterbury who led mission to England from Rome and founded a monastery at Canterbury.)
6. ((1614-1687); MORE was an English Platonist and philosophical poet. Other Cambridge Platonists were Ralph Cudworth, John Smith, and Nathanael Culvervel.)

[46]

The most famous of Scholastics was **Thomas Aquinas** (1), who was also one of The Fathers of The Church. He has got his Neoplatonistic ideas just from St. Augustine - but he has derived some of his ideas also from Aristotle.

The philosophy of Augustine was a kind of mixture of ancient Greek philosophy and the doctrines Christianity, and he has influenced strongly to them both. Seen as a whole: both Aristotle, and Plato, have influenced to Christianity. The former by St. Augustine, and the latter by Aquinas. As we shall see, most early empirists were strongly influence by both of them, and - in a way - early empirists tried to break the Locked situation which prevented all development.

But we must remind, however, that in Augustine's philosophy there were also such influences from Christian tradition, which was not yet written clearly, or *canonized* (2) - to a form in which we know Christianity now. By St. Augustine: there is the fundamental truth, that we cannot doubt logical and mathematical truths, and moreover, it could be quite impossible that there were no truths at all - because then it should be accepted, as the truth, that there is no truth.

This is one of the locks, which must be broken - but it was difficult. What should be the consequences if we rejected both of these propositions, as tautologies? If we think e.g. our modern science, we ought to reject all of its general conclusions, and speculations - because in science we have applied both mathematics and [formal] logic, when concluding something, and we have also believed to that there can exist truths. Of course we can say that if there are no truths, it makes no sense to argue for that there is still a truth that truths do not exist - because there is then a kind of situation that there is no sphere for propositions, or intellect - or for nothing.

There are also other logical argumentations quite similar to these, but we don't discuss them any more. Let's carry on. One of the early empirists, who was influenced by Augustine, whether one wanted to receive those influences or not, was **ROGER Bacon** (3), who was one of the predecessors of the new natural science. ROGER Bacon got his philosophical influences from Grosstete (4), who was an advocate of Platonian philosophy. At this point it can be mentioned that **Wittgenstein** (NOTES 2) has cited long passages of Augustine's work *Confessiones* (5).

---

1. ((1225-1275); THOMAS AQUINAS works were largely studied almost through the The Middle-Ages, but also later there have been a Scholastic school, which have been known as Neo-Thomistic school. He has used a lot of Aristotle's philosophy, and he has been known as empirist and rationalist. His basic work is Summa contra gentiles (1264), and explanative work Summa theologica (1265-1272), and Quaestiones disputatae (125-1273). The name of his collected works is Opera omnia (1852-1273))

2. (*Canonizing*: Formal definition of Christian faith was largely the achievement of the General [or Ecumenical] Councils of nicaea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451). In a way, all this sounds like **directives** of European Union.)

3. ((1214-1292); ROGER BACON was an English Fransiscan, and philosopher and a student of experimental science [especially optics] at Paris and Oxford; credited, then and later, with magical powers.)

4. ((1175-1253); ROBERT GROSSTETE was an Oxfordian teacher ROGER Bacon.)

5. (*Confessiones*: Wittgenstein used some examples of this Augustine's work when describing the learning of language - citing the book in question.)

---

[47]

ROGER Bacon was familiar with The Renaissance, and he anticipated those thoughts which were presented later by **FRANCIS Bacon** (1), and by Renaissance figure **LEONARD da Vinci** (2). We can say, in general, that ROGER Bacon was at crossroads where on the other side of it were the thoughts of the ancients and on the other side the world of natural science which was just coming to existence. ROGER Bacon has presented his ideas in *his three books* (3), which he wrote on the request of Pope CLEMENS IV. He made also several natural scientific experiments and he foretold e.g. that in future there would be constructed such mechanical things as aeroplanes and mechanical vaggons.

Man has wished to fly as long as we can trace written history, or mythologies - as an example in the story of Icarus. Thousands were the men, who tried to jump down from towers during The Middle Ages, and later - with their clumpy wings - with bad results [in a way they got what they wanted - namely an access to heaven]. But an important thing is that the idea of flying was not a new one.

ROGER Bacon emphasized that there ought to use experimental knowledge and experimental study in the science, and he also emphasized that the knowledge achieved should help to master the nature. This seems to suggest to very mechanical conception, but it is not that like. Mastering the whole nature was not the same as conquering it. According Christianity man must master both his weakness and nature, but he must master his surroundings by God's laws - not by man's own principles.

However, it was FRANCIS Bacon who introduced the new scientific way of thinking and he introduced the ideas of empirism far better that ROGER Bacon had done. But he has lived during different time. **C. Hartshorne** (NOTES 3) has appreciated FRANCIS Bacon one of the greatest names of empirism.

FRANCIS Bacon stated as a goal of his literal and scientific work to advance the human knowledge and the restauration in science itself. He also thought that we can master the nature just obeying it, and that knowledge and power are quite the same thing. He believed that with science we can change better the

poor conditions where people live, and he was in that sense the predecessor of **Comte** (4) and his positivism, which we shall discuss later. We can say that FRANCIS Bacon was also an advocate of *meliorism* (5) - a term used by **M.L. Bigge** (NOTES 4) - when he described the essence of the school of positive relativism - the school including also pragmatism. Further, **FRANCIS Bacon** (NOTES 5) said that we cannot trust to our senses and make generalizations by them. In addition to this, we have certain idols, as the idols of the tribe,- cave,- market place,- and theatre - as we know from *Novum Organum*.

These propositions seem to be quite modern, but they must be interpreted against the age they are presented, however. The most important of these findings was that idea of idols, and that untrust on senses, and intellect as such - which were something new, as a scientific strategy. This is true even if we accept that false beliefs, and their recognition are as old as the whole mankind - because they could now be categorized in a new context - which was new. Something similar we can find in C.S. Peirce's philosophy, namely when discussing the role of doubt, and similar concepts.

- 
1. ((1561-1626); FRANCIS Bacon was Baron Verulam and Viscount St. Albans, and Lord Chancellor of England (1618-1620), and a philosopher who introduced the inductive method into science. FRANCIS Bacon has written such works, as *Essays* (1597-1625), as well as the pedagogic *The Advancement of Learning* (1605), and also *Novum Organum* (1620), which is a part of his *Instauratio Magna*, which he didn't get ready, and then we have his *The New Atlantis* (1626).)
  2. ((1452-1519); LEONARD da Vinci was the Italian painter, sculptor, architect, engineer, man of science, and writer of prose and verse. He planned such things as helicopters, but he had no mechanical motors, by which to run his equipments.)
  3. (ROGER Bacon'S works: *Opus majus*, *Opus minus*, and *Opus tertium*.)
  4. ((1798-1854); AUGUSTE COMTE was the French philosopher, and founder of the positivistic system. We shall discuss this system later during the current study.)
  5. (*Meliorism*: The doctrine that the world may be made better by human effort.)

---

[48]

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 6) has emphasized that a portion of false beliefs, or stubborn habits in our knowledge is remarkable. He has also connected most fictions to an ignorance in the ordinary life, as well as they can be found in science. But why this emphasis of ordinary life? Because everyone learns first his ordinary surrounding, and by it variety of meanings, which he is not able to criticize - because he is still a child. Therefore fictions can be connected to all the beliefs, which were accepted generally, and without any doubt, as being knowledge and truth, notwithstanding that they might be false.

He seems to have emphasized the ignorance of the whole mankind, and argued for, that most of its fictions are associated to our everyday ignorance. It seems to me clear that there is the similar tendency between FRANCIS Bacon's idols, and C.S. Peirce's ordinary life ignorance in this question.

But what are the consequences of this. We cannot trust a simple induction, which is still widely used before more complicated forms of reasonings - in which we only list things, which we happen to have at sight, one after one, this after that - which - as an operation - **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 7) has described as *rudimentary induction* (1). This is just what FRANCIS Bacon has been warning us, that we ought to avoid listing, and not trust to it, and we should not hurry to make generalizations from our perceptions. We should classify the facts which we have found, analyze them, and after that - we should go step by step to more general arguments, towards to the right knowledge, concerning the laws and the more general shape of phenomena. We should eliminate all the competing *hypotheses* (2), until we can get the right conclusion. C.S. Peirce has presented just similar ideas when e.g. describing induction, and abduction, which is not the same as working according to *ex hypothesi* (3), but instead - according to what

kind of hypothesis we might get by conclusions *de facto* (4). That is: what kind of hypothesis is that we really need, according the few, surprising facts we have, in order that the facts shall be explained, and the other facts, with which they are connected, shall be revealed in their true essence. - For the very reason, we should not choose a pre-determined hypothesis, which were suitable for the facts - according to habit and tradition, or a point of view in science.

The very essence of pragmatism is that nothing in the whole world is certain, and most of it is proved to be true only from a point of view - but an explanation which we have got may be useful even if it is false, when trying to search truth which is hidden. We can be right at a quantity, but not totally.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 8) has suggested that certain kinds of induction are statistical in their nature, that is, we cannot easily find any representative observation which in such were reliable one, and that we cannot rely on the predictions or verbal descriptions either - in spite of how logical they are, and how a compact system they seem to produce. He has emphasized in the third genus of induction that we must test a hypothesis by sampling the possible predictions that may be based upon it. But if we do not have any hypothesis in mind [or we cannot make any prediction, either, as we generally do by induction] we should use abduction. We should find a hypothesis, to which the surprising facts seem to be referring. Those surprising facts are the facts which we shall find when starting to study something which might have an explanation - they are not the facts which we already know. It is like a detective were trying to find out who is a murder of a body.

---

1. (*Rudiment*: First steps or stages [of an art or science], or earliest form, of which a later development is or might have developed; imperfectly developed part; - also: elements or first principles of, or of knowledge or some subject - hence: the rudimentary induction belongs to our everyday life. It is known also "Pooh-Pooh" -argumentation (C.S. Peirce).)

2. (*Hypothesis*; pl. hypotheses: Supposition(s) made as basis for reasoning, without reference to its [or their] truth(s), or as starting point(s) for investigation.)

3. ((L.) *Ex hypothesi*: From the hypothesis, from the facts advanced.)

4. ((L.) Litt. *De facto*: From the fact(s); in reality.)

---

[49]

Of course, there are differences between C.S. Peirce and FRANCIS Bacon, too. But these might be due of better mathematics and statistical theories - which C.S. Peirce could use. Among them was especially one of the concepts - namely the concept of probability, and especially the method of calculation based on it - which was not known in FRANCIS Bacon's age. It was not easy to conclude that accidental cases follow certain statistical rules, to which they certainly have any other explanative relationship than being treated like dot, or a numeric value - whatever they seem to have obeying, or whatever they are like. Why some people win at a game, and somebody not? They might have been know a similar sequence, or *arrangement of things* (1).

But it is also true that various things may happen, and that they also do so, whether we make predictions or not, and if we have some consequences at hand, they may be due of some other reasons which we do not know. There might be an explanation which is lying in a reality we do not know at all - that is: there is a form of a hypothesis we cannot trace, because of that we are this or that kind of beings. Notwithstanding all of this, or the state of things that most of our reality is not available all together, or as a compact scenery, we must concentrate to the facts which we can recognize, and try to see if our concepts can have any consequences to their behavior, or that our concepts behave in a way we have predicted.

We can read at *Chance, Love and Logic* (NOTES 9) on the importance of practical bearings, or consequences of the predictions or descriptions we are able to formulate concerning the surprising facts -

as C.S. Peirce has stated them in his famous pragmatic maxim. As a consequence: whether I want to add to this or that to any phenomenon to get an enlarged explanation, or to get a new variant, there must always be something within it - which causes that the new features shall behave as predicted. We must reckon the possibility that there might have become to existence quite new features into the world, due of the development of the mind and the universe. However, there must still be present those practical bearings. But it is also allowed that there might be something without any practical bearings - and then it is the case of phenomenon which doesn't just have them, and it is just their true essence - and still they can have a place in our explanative systems, a kind of exception. It is no wonder that C.S. Peirce criticized later his earlier writings and their emphasis of practical results only. In a letter to William James, which was dated on the 13th March in 1897 (NOTES 10) he was conscious of the difficulties, when we try to have the facts, which he expressed in *Chance, Love, and Logic* (NOTES 11):

*"Facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones most easily discerned".*

From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 12) we know that C.S. Peirce was not an utilitarianist - that is - he didn't try to find only the consequences from which we have an instant utility. We can find his non-utilitarian tendencies when he is speaking e.g. the utilitarian tendencies in the field of education, which should be avoided. We shall discuss this later during the current study.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 13) regarded FRANCIS Bacon as very scientific and experimental person, who also died as a consequence of his last experiment. C.S. Peirce did not consider that very consequence very brilliant one but it proved the originality of FRANCIS Bacon's intelligence. But what kind was that experiment. From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 14) we know that when FRANCIS Bacon was studying how chicken would preserve in snow, but he died by the consequence of test catching a cold. Very enthusiast scientist, one could say! FRANCIS Bacon's theory of the eliminative induction influenced to John Stuart Mill, who has been said to adopted the theory in question, and assimilated it to his rules concerning experimental study. From Dewey (NOTES 15) we know that later William James derived some of Mill's ideas, which topic we shall deal with later.

---

1. (*Probability*: as a probability-like behaving things are e.g. that summer becomes more probable after spring than after Fall - but this is because of causality, and not because there were several other alternatives, which were all probable. People were not in Bacon's age able to prove that something is more probable because they had not appropriate set of concepts.)

---

[50]

But now few words about **John Stuart Mill** (1) in general. He was employed at The East-Indian Trading Company during the years 1822-1858 and 1865-1868. He had also got positivistic influences from Comte - a philosopher whom we shall discuss later in the current study. Mill has been known an advocate of *utilitarianism* (2), too. In General, the time between 1837-1901 was **Victorian era**, during which England was powerful empire, and during which there was a strong development in industry. For the reason, some philosophers of this era were thinking how to divide the welfare, or how to utilize different resources. Many philosophers tried to accommodate and assimilate e.g. the questions of ethics and moral to utilitarian tendencies in the society.

There is an interesting philosophical relationship between Mill, and **Bentham** (3), and other philosophers, because there was something better to wait for in future, too? **H. Sidgwick** (NOTES 16) has given a description that Mill tried to establish a logical connection between the psychological and ethical principles, which a view he shared with Bentham. All of this was connected to the principle of *universal hedonism* (4). **H. Sidgwick** (NOTES 17) suggested that notwithstanding that Mill has developed Bentham's doctrines he didn't accept them as such. There is an utilitarian thesis by Bentham (5), which says: the ground of morals and legislation should be their utility, and that covering principle there should be common pleasure and hedonism. During **ADAM Smith's** (6) and **DAVID Ricardo's** (7) lifetime there

were also other activities to add the social welfare, and one of them was the work of John Wesley with his methodism. His activities concerned the English working class. However, methodists denied most of pleasure as a goal, and instead emphasized systematic, and enthusiast religious life.

- 
1. ((1806-1873); JOHN STUART MILL was the English political economist; As a political economist, he has written Principles of Political Economy (1848), which concerned ADAM Smith's and DAVID Ricardo's economical views. There is also Mill's System of Logic (1843), where he has emphasized the role of induction in scientific study. He was also an author of On Liberty (1859) and Utilitarianism (1861).)
  2. (*Utilitarianism*: Utilitarian principles, doctrines, etc., especially as expounded by Bentham and Mill.)
  3. ((1748-1832); JEREMY BENTHAM was the English utilitarian philosopher, and writer on ethics, jurisprudence, and political economy; prison and poor-law reformer; he believed that the end of life is happiness (which he identified with pleasure) and that the highest morality is the pursuit of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.)
  4. (*Hedonism*: The doctrine of ethical theory that pleasure is the chief good, or proper end of action; originator of the school is EPICURUS.)
  5. (E.g. in Bentham, J., An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.)
  - 6 ((1723-1845); ADAM SMITH was the Scottish political economist; an author of The Wealth of Nations (1776), which established political economy as a separate science.)
  7. (1772-1823); DAVID RICARDO was the English political economist of the free-trade school, and an author of Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, which deals with the causes determining the distribution of wealth.)

---

[51]

From **H. Sidgwick** (NOTES 18) we know that Bentham has presented these ideas in detail in his Memoirs, too, but also something concerning individual pleasure. However, let us remind, that Bentham didn't discover that principle. We know that the doctrine of hedonism has been derived originally from **Epicurus** (1), whose role in the development of atomistic philosophy has been discussed e.g. by **J.C.A. Gaskin** (NOTES 19). But we cannot say that these were the only influences that Mill adapted from his contemporary philosophers, when developing his ethical, and other theories. It was also Hume's utilitarian orientation on the questions of ethics, which influenced to Bentham's, as well to Mill's philosophies, as to ADAM Smith's economical theories.

From **H. Sidgwick** (NOTES 20) we know that Hume criticized Smith's certain conceptions. There is still a factor which must be taken account when discussing utilitarianism - namely that utilitarian orientation and attitude is a concern of those who own something from which to have an utility. Most poor people cannot utilize that much, despite their wages - or wishes. But back to the topic. In fact, I do not have much to tell about those philosophical influences, which C.S. Peirce has adopted from Bentham. Some of C.S. Peirce's commentators have suggested to that influence- as **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 21), who has proposed for that C.S. Peirce's philosophical strategies were similar to Bentham's: both of them were willing to give several answers to an argument, and both of them were continuously seeking different points of views to any case they were studying.

From **A.W. Burks** (NOTES 22) we have some support to this: when he has described the whole edition process of Collected Papers he has told that they found often several versions which dealt with the same theme, but any of them was not final. It was not possible to imagine what kind a version should be the final one. We shall discuss the edition process in detail later during the current study. But what comes to

the tendency in question - might it be due to which A.J. Ayer has just suggested for? We must carefully take in consideration, too, that C.S. Peirce was not always in the situation, where he could put his ideas to paper without any disturbances, or economical difficulties, and continuous argumentation against his followers, but we shall return to the topic later.

---

1. ((c. 300 B.C.); EPICURUS was an Athenian philosopher who held that pleasure (the practice of virtue) is the highest good. He didn't suggest to that we should have a maximal pleasure, but that we should maintain medium among of pleasure. Later LUCRETIUS wrote Epicurus ' ideas to De rerum natura. Very interesting link to C.S. PEIRCE we can find studying such EPICUROAN claim that logical sentences concerning future cannot be proved to be wrong, or true until at future. A similar link we have at claim which says that induction is a good mean to find out the truth, too.)

---

[52]

**C. Hartshorne** (NOTES 23) has regarded Locke as one of the greatest empirists. From a letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to Mario Calderoni approximately in 1905 (NOTES 24) we can read that C.S. Peirce valued Locke high, and appreciated his ideas - referring especially at the letter to Locke's famous Essay, and to its IV chapter.

Locke made a difference between those things of outer world, which we are not certain, and all of the provable things, as mathematics, and *moral philosophy* (1) - which both can be proved to be true, however. According to him, we can prove the existence of God by logic, but, as a contrary, we cannot find out a true knowledge concerning the characters of God. That is: we can prove, but not describe in detail. If we just use logic, e.g. when studying cause and effect, it is relatively easy to state that there must be *terminus a quo* (2), if we think that something has once began to take place, and there must also be *terminus ad quem* (3), if we think that something has its end in time.

But the question is not that simple - because something may have as something taken place, when there is still flowing time, and it cannot be denied that it has once been, and it can be reconstructed, if needed. The situation is just the same when time has reached its ultimate end: also then there is the fact that it has included something before its end. We should now find a dimension, from where it is possible to see time as taken place when it doesn't exist any more. One of the possibilities is that time, as everything else, belong to infinity, which has no start, end, either, and that we are able to create there something other kindness - from which finite collections can be explained. Let us remind our previous discussion during the current study concerning Kant's conception of time.

This is quite enough if considering most human activities, and natural events. There must have been something before any time, and any case existed. But why? If we now accept as the main principle of the world *ex nihilo nihil fit* (4), there must always be something, whatever it is. Further, accepting the existence of God, we accept that there is something *jure humano* (5), and that there is something out of its reach, or beyond its horizon - *jure divino* (6). Other possibility is to accept materialism, and that the whole universe is something everlasting - due of that materia never vanish. But we must be inclined to the former alternative, when searching explanative dimensions, because materia itself explains nothing, in its simple beingness. Now, let us think that God is omnipotent, and that man is not, we can easily see that we cannot ever apprehend Him, or His laws, whatever they are. We can state several prerequisites, or demands for truth, when proving something to be absolutely true. But the conclusion is always, what comes especially to human beings, that they cannot possess any absolute truths - because of their temporal existence. If we try to imagine the very beginning of all, for instance, it is rather difficult to us to imagine what kind of characters may be needed to create the whole complex world, or how to maintain it, and prevent it to collapse back e.g. to nothingness, or diffuse state of being - as the beginning of all might appear to us - something less complete. If there was [at the beginning] nothing but God himself - what kind of being we ought to discuss, and what kind of life and personal characters?

1. (*Moral philosophy* (general meaning.): A study of principles of human action or conduct.)
2. ((L.) *Terminus a quo*: The starting point; the earliest date possible.)
3. ((L.) *Terminus ad quem*: The goal or end; the last date possible.)
4. ((L.) *Ex nihilo nihil fit*: Nothing comes from nothing.)
5. ((L.) *Jure humano*: By man's law.)
6. ((L.) *Jure divino*: By God's law.)

[53]

Before Locke there have been several advocates of natural philosophy, after the ancient natural philosophers, whom we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current chapter. Of the more modern natural philosophers was, in a way, **Agrippa** (1), a kind of mystic, who wanted to explain things which are something beyond the scientific scope. After the **Era of Locke** there has been several natural philosophers, quite another kind, and one of them was **Cavendish** (2), a pure natural scientist and physicist, in the strict sense of empiricism. But is it correct to speak natural philosophy at all, when discussing of the thoughts of physicists, or advocates of pseudo- science, like mystics? There are two meanings of the term above: an **older meaning of natural philosophy** (3), which is referring to the branch of science, namely to physics. And there is also **wider meaning for natural philosophy** (4), which has much more to do with the philosophy of Locke, and his disciplines. However, we must be careful when using the term in question, because there seems to be several philosophers, quite different kind, to whom it is referring.

Locke was a physician, and a politician, and he has written a lot of works, which we have discussed at previous chapter during the current study. In his *Two Treatises of Governement* (1690) he expressed his political philosophy, suggesting e.g. that there is the natural code of procedure which is independent of legislation. In his most important work *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* (1690), he rejected philosophical speculation and tried to prove [especially against Descartes] that we have no inborn ideas at birth, and for the reason, our soul can be regarded as *tabula rasa* (5). All of the works of Locke are, among other things, considering such human enterprises, in which human beings are interacting with each others.

---

1. ((c 1486-1535); AGRIPPA [of Nettesheim] was the mystic and German natural philosopher and writer; he was an author of *De Occulta Philosophia* (1531), which dealt with astrology, music, geometry, and magic, and tried to find a common rational basis to them. The students of occultism adopted the book in question as their handbook.)

2. ((1731-1810); HENRY CAVENDISH was the English natural philosopher; he discovered the constitution of water and atmospheric air; experimented on electricity and the density of the earth. His name is commemorated in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge for physical research, founded in 1847.)

3. (*Natural philosophy*: (old use) physics.)

4. (*Natural philosophy*: (wide) System of thought resulting from such a research of knowledge.)

5. ((L.) *Tabula rasa.*, Litt.: A smooth or blank tablet; often used figuratively of a person's (empty) mind - as by LOCKE, but quite similar expression, and in the same sense has been used by THOMAS Aquinas.)

---

[54]

C.S. Peirce was, in turn, a physicist, who philosophized his empirical findings. He used a lot of concepts which were derived from physics - which was not always a good idea, because philosophy is not alike physics. From **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 25) we know that C.S. Peirce published a lot of writings and reviews in scientific and philosophical journals. **A.W. Burks** (NOTES 26) has presented similar information concerning the quantity, but he added that those writings by C.S. Peirce concerned the study in natural science, and that some of those writings have been rather long; they were made mainly at The United States Coast Survey, and they dealt with astronomy, geodetics, and psychology. His only empirical book, which was published, was *Photometric Researches* (1878), which can be associated to the field of physics - but he didn't become any leading figure in the study of natural science, notwithstanding that his studies in astronomy were original, and his colleagues ranked his studies in photometrics rather high.

**A. W. Burks** (NOTES 27) has proposed for that C.S. Peirce derived his pragmatist theory of meaning from his empirical studies in natural science, which [theory] can be considered as an overview on the scientific practices of his age. And further, he derived his indeterminism from the empirical works at Coast Survey, too. And his studies on psychology has influenced to his theory of mind. And moreover, his experiences at laboratories have influenced to those parts of his theories, where he has referred to [restrictions of] laboratory conditions.

Is it that simply? It is true that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 28) applied certain physical, and natural forces to describe the nature of abstraction, which he expressed as separative process - namely the centrifugal tendency of thought, and applied them to describe the study of The Great Law of Association [fusion], but there was also mutual attraction of all ideas - as analogy to gravitation in physical world, as **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 29) suggested in his general psychognosy [psychology]. But it is not only an emphasis of natural processes, because there is something more than natural phenomena per se.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 30) has argued for that when we advance further and further into science, the aid that we can derive from the natural light of reason becomes, no doubt, less and less. Nature doesn't help us to achieve something more complicated than it is in itself in a moment. But C.S. Peirce (NOTES 31) believed, that there are natural born icons and diagrams which suggest themselves, at first dimly, but later clearly to us. These structures have not been consciously planned to be this, or that kind, but they are **NOT** automatically born, either, or ever been.

C.S. Peirce was interested in the role of nature in the development of human knowledge. From C.S. Peirce's letter to John Dewey, which has been dated on the 9th Juny in 1904 (NOTES 32) we know that he had to write an article which was concerning Dewey's work *Studies in Logical Theory*. I do not deal with the article, but I say only that he informed Dewey for his intention to comment the book in *The Nation* - which he also *did* (1). In the letter in question C.S. Peirce outlined shortly how to solve the problems of normative science, and suggested that instead of the idea of normative science we must develop the idea of natural history.

---

1. (*The Nation.*, 79., (15 Sept 1904), pp. 219-220.)

[55]

Locke considered the task of philosophy to study the origin of human knowledge, its character and extension, and he has emphasized there that natural reasoning is something which happens according the natural laws, but which still can include something, by which it is possible to evaluate whatever we are reasoning. That is, there must be certain extra features present, which are still [by their one feature] according natural laws, but also something more. There might be a connection to C.S. Peirce in this question, and we know, that he also recognized quite well that he has derived some of his ideas from Locke -e.g. the ideas of natural law and the idea of meaning?

It might be true that the finite beings of the nature do not come to their existence for that reason, that the nature is going to prove something, but instead that man has this very need to do so. Nature is not going to prove that it is capable to create different beings, and that nature itself will be valid and reliable at the end. If we think the concept of natural law, and the meaning we should refer to those cases in which something takes place notwithstanding the presence of human beings, but when we are explaining an expansion of those laws, and the laws concerning man, we must concentrate to man's own activities to make new features more sensible. Therefore, if we think about human beings - and especially their rationality - we must come to the conclusion that human beings belong to the world - as its conscious department, and nature belongs to the other, where things are tend to stay as they are. Nature is not becoming more conscious, or more complicated in rational sense, but shall remain still as basis of presence.

Hence, functioning just according natural laws there could not be any more sophisticated features of the world. But when thinking rationality - are there any similar rationalities in nature, as know been introduced by human beings, and if there is - are they more advanced in some respects than human activities? - Could we ask - as well - that are some of human rational activities against the well-being of rest of nature, and strongly against the welfare of the whole mankind? Accepting that also human beings must be covered with natural laws, and causalities, we must decide if there is also some other kind of reason which is characteristic right to man. There certain violent tendencies which can be explained only by the existence of human reason, and that it has lost its close intimacy to nature, and that there is a lack of common sense.

But are there some special mental equipments which only the human reason can use? This is closely connected to the question, how natural laws could cause the expansive development of the whole nature without the presence of man, or form a complete background referential system without that aid? We cannot answer to these questions because of several reasons. Nature do not at all behave like mathematics, or just according our prognoses, and expectations. There are innumerable ways to manage its things - but not because it were continuously conflicting with itself, but instead because of its great variety. By mathematics, and by logic it can be produced mainly such creatures which are predictable, or under certain rules also creatures whose essence is chaotic behavior. But this kind a given, or alternative situation is impossible in the nature, because things happen in one way - were alternatives as innumerable as possible, and there are not coming into existence all of them, and all of them shall not fulfilled. But still within nature, and its laws there is a continuous process where quite new beings come to existence with their new rules, which are partly out of its direct control. Nothing which exists in nature right now, is not the final truth itself - because there is continuous process of association between different fields, and one of them is a live nature, and other is a live human mind. - For the reason C.S. Peirce emphasized those live processes in his philosophy. Mathematics is something which is a kind of truth in itself, and its nature is to prove something to be true or valid according accepted premises. Hence, we should consider mathematics as a simple game, or as a special kind of world, or a form of life, which has no external connections and interferences to any reality, but only that familiness of reason, and being logical, but without true, and independent reason in itself.

But there might be another explanation, too, namely, that there is something which does not obey physical laws, and does not disappear when all the physical dimensions do that, or when there is no time and space any more, or matter. There might be the truth of the whole story, and how to build, and tear the whole stuff from nothingness to something, and back again. Right now, in man's world, there are several cases where somebody is trying to prove and explain something, as well as there are still such phenomena which **SEEM** to be purely given - and there are alrge areas between which there is are nothing: there are no messages between an information apprehended by us.

---

[56]

And further, it cannot be choosen just the right moment when a feature is coming to its existence, or eliminate the existing collections in order to have just the right mixture of them. And also then, all the new existences shall be given by something which gives to them their role, and their ways of being. It might be proposed for that these new features are as natural as all the previous occurrences, and that we

have had for a long time any pure, and simple nature, but instead an aggregate of different categories, which we still consider nature.

Let's take an example of that aggregation. **R.E. Grinder** (NOTES 33) has described Aristotle's and Plato's conception of soul. According to him, Aristotle divided soul into three levels. **De Anima** stimulates e.g. plants to grow and gives to man and animals their biological appearance, and is the cause, by which all beings in the biosphere preproduce themselves, and at the process in itself there are no acknowledged feelings. Then there is **Sentient Appetive** which includes movements, feelings, and hope. And then there is **Rational**, which is typical only for man, and which makes him the highest form on the earth. In general, Aristotle emphasized the role of experience in the development of man, because he regarded soul as a goal, and soul must be developed by education. However, soul is not something apart from the rest of the totality, notwithstanding that soul is fundamentally different than body. An education of soul is something, by which it can be made to realize that it is just soul.

Perhaps also Locke suggested the same thing when describing soul, and he did recognize those lower levels of soul - which are prerequisites to the higher development of it, and which are already present at birth. When Locke has described soul as *tabula rasa*, he implicitly referred to the absence of the higher levels of it at the beginning of the development of soul. For the reason there must be education.

From **W. Percy** (NOTES 34) we know that C.S. Peirce named the entity, which *symbolleins* (1) [things together] as e.g. "interpreter", "interpretent", "asserter", "mind", "I", and "ego", but also with the name "soul". Notwithstanding that he has not given us information concerning the beginning of the development of soul [except in his cosmology, according to which there was no active consciousness in the beginning, or in his psychognosy, where there are described several lower levels of mind] - he might have accepted that it might be empty, as well as the possibility to be something more complete.

Perhaps both Locke and C.S. Peirce have referred to the very same thing, namely to that there must be a medium of a self, who is an agent of understanding. We may dispute endlessly, if soul is due of God or not - but if God can be regarded as a kind of presently born "natural cause", just affecting through souls, we do not discuss about a hypothetical construction in philosophy or religion, with which we use God, or a hypothesis of soul only to make our sentences complete. However, we do not have soul because of better context of sentences only. We know pretty well that there are thousands of things which can be done quite well by man, and without any mental element. Further, man is not able to perceive all the things of the world by his senses, and able to get all kind of direct information by his senses - but man can convert their possible meaning appropriate to his senses, and migrate them into rationale.

---

1. (*Symbolleins*: Throw together word and thing.)

---

[57]

**Locke** (NOTES 35) has tried to solve the problem of meaning saying that the use of words is to be sensible marks of ideas. He argued for that the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification. But does this indicate that whenever we use our words - all kinds - it is also a proof of the presence of ideas? Are all of our words such that we can be convicted that they indicate to the true existence of some idea? Let us remind what **W. Percy** (NOTES 36) has already proposed for at an earlier stage in the current study:

*"there two kinds of natural events in the world, namely dyadic and triadic".*

But there are also such as **complexus of dyads** used by animals - which must be just predecessors of the more complicated triadic events, but still without an independent form of existence - in a sense, that we could speak well-developed consciousness. Of course, we don't know that, but this is a kind of temporal hypothesis, at least. It seems to be very fact that there is not only a simple geometric triangle-like structure, which could explain all.

In triad we must usually have an agent who uses certain symbols, namely man himself, and we must have also present, and as functional certain social setting of ideas, and - perhaps - the element of feeling. The question of single mental images and sensations is not important, if we think those phenomena which can come to existence quite freely in the nature, and perhaps for the reason that they are simultaneously connected to the two kinds of natural events which have been discussed by **W. Percy** (NOTES 37).

But how? Because if we use that expression of being natural, and accept that the meaning is something larger than an image, or a sensation, we are able to get the essence of the aggregate called "nature" by triad, too. However, in single triads they are just special kind of natural events, or names of them, but because they are associative meanings, too, they are more that which is something just right there. Hence, we can easily present certain images or general ideas by an art, and by literature, for example, as well as we can discuss our experiences - referring with them to something not-there. We can present in immediacy our thoughts and ideas, and get other people to understand them.

If we try to prove, as Locke, that there are natural laws- and events, which explain everything, we must conclude that man has also an essential part of nature, and that nature has something rational within it. Locke has regarded both reflection and sensation as natural events. But there are still several questions as open. If we understand reflection as a sequence, or arrangement of elements, which is going to organize itself in mind as a new kind of being, there must be something organizing elements in them by their connections, and interferences. However, we can still have corresponding sensations to a single something. There is then no crucial difference between animals and man - the former can utilize the connections, which may take place by **complexus of dyads** - and the latter also with triads - which terms C.S. Peirce used.

But mind is something more than these things. According to C.S. Peirce, it is connected to non-functional characters of the universe, which join it to the world of final causation (or to that functional part of the whole universe), but mind is also a result of natural born laws and events - which have developed according to the circumstances in actu, and therefore mind is an aggregate, too. Locke has emphasized that we can have an instant experience only of our mental images - because of we don't have certain knowledge on the creatures and beings of the outer world as such. All of the mental images arise from either sensations or reflection, but if we discuss reflection, we are studying a far developed phenomenon in comparison to sensation. Anyway, we have a good reason to ask how those mental images can arise into our soul which is quite empty at birth? There must be something which makes possible the receiving the first perceptions, and arrange them, or some automatic processes, as complexus of dyads - and from result of them there can come to existence somebody who perceives. And - who is the first teacher recognized during the process, or the very first teacher ever existed in the development of the whole universe? How that somebody could be developed from emptiness, where there was nothing but nothingness? Were those mental images, or their state of things before any mental act - in which somebody recognized those mental images as informative? What kind a difficulty would arise on the question of meaning there, if we think that there cannot be any meanings in nature as such - how complex it is?

---

[58]

We cannot prove our mental images to be true because these are natural events, and true when existed. There is no need to prove them in no way; they are governed by the natural laws, and therefore it makes no sense to speak about truth, but instead that something is going by its own way, whether we did something to it, or not. If we try to influence to it, it goes some other way, but still by its own. This could mean - at least - that mental images are inseparable part of the nature, and for that reason, we cannot force them to behave as mathematical creatures, which have their own reason, and where we have a **NEED** to prove them to be false or true. Let us state, again, that mathematical creatures have been made to cooperate with similar kind of creatures, and if they are forced to behave strongly against some of them, it is because of their supporting role in a theorem. A remarkable difference to any mental image is that a mathematical creature cannot have any other roles than it has in a task, while mental image must have innumerable references, and appearances, because it is their essence. And they must be vague, too.

But still mental images seem to be given to us - as they are at certain moment, in certain manner, and in given context - but in the same time they seem to flow, in a way they do, as long as we expect fluidity. We do not have such mental images which can hold some meaning as the same - notwithstanding the situations and contexts, or in spite of more general changes which explain that mental image to us. But then the question is: if we have received our sensation in different contexts, how we can make such mental image which are appropriate to them all so that there is no doubt about the validity? We simply do not know what of our senses have been decisive role when we have got a mental image - to which we have given some meaning, and we do not know if it is right one at all? And what about our memories and dreams, then?

If the essence of natural events is just change, must we accommodate them, and there shall be always a clean table, on which the whole reality lays on. There is no need to wonder about history, or earlier stages, because just right now we have an only and one valid world, and tomorrow we shall have another kind. But - if we are captured to actuality by mental images, which correspond to things in a place and time - we are not able to reach more universal structures of the universe, because there are not such ones, and they are not needed.

But there must be in the nature such more general principles, or tendencies which human reason can take advantage. But this means that mental images we have are not unchangeable entities but instead we something which cannot stay untouchable - they must interact with each other somehow, and they must have new roles and meanings during interaction. We can also say that we have in the same time one of the possible meanings in hand. But this does not suggest to that illusion that we had some meaning in itself, as an entity. We approach very Peircean view there, and just his emphasizing to the sociability of the language, and human beings as a whole, where no single mental image cannot, as such, contain some stable meaning. We cannot be sure that the context, in which certain mental image was born, shall be just the same at next time. And if not, to where mental image is referring? The decisive elements of stable meanings are such as e.g. ability to interference, habit taking, generalizing tendency, by which our senses are shaped to receive more selected and stable sensations. But what about the relationship between materia and its effects to us? Mental images, if they are not like entities, or if they are not something which has been given in predetermined way - are not able to contain the stable meanings: they are something interpreted, and they cannot be regarded as signs. Hence, any kind of a meaning we can have [as humans] is not the same as achieved by **complexus of dyads**, as such, but instead by their expanding and changing relationships as triads. And this is the very essential character of the whole universe - signs, when captured, have much to do with true objects - for the reason that signs are able to interact with each other in that way that they can refer to the objects which do not fade away soon after our consciousness has oriented to other objects. That is: the whole universe is carrying on information - as an essential feature of it. Ot at least - it has this feature right now.

---

[59]

Hume's view concerning instant experience, and the instant connection of the meaning to it, as discussed previously, is at certain points quite similar to the view C.S. Peirce advocated for. Namely, we cannot escape certain intimacy, instancy and presence of our experiences which can guide what we are able to understand and how we shall advance in our enterprise in knowledge. But it is not the question of direct interpretations of our experiences - as such - because they do not contain any complicated meanings. There must be some kind of judgements of them before. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 38) has argued for perceptual judgments - when describing the state where we are knowing something concerning the meaning of our percepts. We can perceive different influences, and that something resists our strivings, or that percept is organized in certain way. We can see all that as totality. But perceptual judgments are not yet present when we "are" actually in instant experience. All we are perceiving is a kind of totality, which we can call **percipuum** - which refers to its continuity, but also to that there is something which forces perceived something to take certain form of presentation. But there are no elements - at the moment - which we could call for. There are also certain physiological processes, to which we cannot do a much, as well as we cannot help if we experience hallucinations and we get false percepts. From **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 39) we know that James emphasized that in function there is thought as participant by that role which it is playing, and by that function percept has been differentiated from thought. We can think that

thought has a task to explain, or transform percept, and make the concept, with which thought operates, which is a kind of percept, still, because it is explaining other percepts - notwithstanding that they are simpler kinds, and that they do not include complicate meanings. This concept [of thought] shall migrate them also to other relationships, as they naturally can have.

This is very important to take in notice - that percepts are proceeded in a way that the process adds to them some new hooks, with which they can anchor to other concepts, and that this process is partly automatic, and not conscious. In fact - we do not actually know how we are thinking, and what we are actually doing when thinking. The crucial difference to percepts seems to be that the scope of thought is expanding when it is becoming more and more abstract, and more and more general, in the same time as percepts [as they are] are left as they were in their simple way of being. But these general tendencies could not mean anything to us, if we had no special contact with them - as persons.

**W. James** (NOTES 40) has argued for, too, that always when we are intellectually dealing with a pure experience, we are doing so because we can get more pure experiences, and in the same time we can get more and more concrete levels of being. This concreteness, as we can see, is not something like materializing tendency, but instead a process to be revealing the world, and make concrete also those features, which are not yet even known, or recognized. This indicates to that we have some utility of our intellect, because by it we can make us sensitive to the fields of immediacy of other kinds, and by them introduce ourselves more and more contact surfaces to the reality. But it is not because of our intellect that there is a pure reality to experienced. It may be possible, too, that we have been estranged from life, or alienated from immediacy of the world.

**James** (NOTES 41) has also written that knowledge and truth express themselves as those relationships which concepts and percepts have, as well as by those states of things, which are born as results of our person-guided activities, and which are made to be present - when we are studying those results. In this way percepts, which describe cases, are an essential part of a follow-up system, by which a concept-guiding apparatus can see causation in empirical world, and by them can guide itself further in personal manipulation of that reality. I think that this James' view emphasized the mutual dependence of concepts, percepts, thought, and person, and there are certain similarities to **C.S. Peirce's** (NOTES 42) concept of percipuum. This concept in question illustates how we can build meanings from continuity by making them as blocks, which are not any more continuous. But unfortunately our conceptions can be twisted according certain maintaining false structures - which, in the same time - prevent us to escape them. These structures function according natural laws, by which our perceptions try to hold their appearance to us - is it sensible or not in regard of our rational strivings. Psychologically this means that we may have an inborn strategy of perceiving in certain situation, and we are tend to use that inborn strategy with similar situations by trasference - which may be totally invalid way to perceive certain things, because the new situations should be expained otherwise than we are used to explain the old and familiar one, and by the aid of that new explanation we could perceive them as they are.

---

[60]

The most important idea which Locke has had is that we have no inborn ideas. But what are the consequences of that idea?. How we can start, or maintain our well-developed knowledge concerning ourselves, and nature, if we have nothing at the beginning of every individual's development. And how there can exist so complicated forms beforehand. Are there some tendencies instead of ideas, by which we can find the ideas we need? Locke has emphasized e.g. in *Some Thoughts of Education* that we must take in account the natural development of a child? This is quite sensible if we think that there are certain sequences, and phases in the development, but if we accept that most of the development is not natural - that is - there are elements which have been unkown in nature before cultural revolution, then we ought ot admid that this is not enough.

It seems to be that he has thought that there are some biological principles in nature which are not like *tabula rasa*? If Locke has referred, by his empty schedule of soul, to the fact that it is necessary to start almost from nothing, in order to maintain continuous development, his idea is very reasonable. It might be difficult to achieve higher levels in knowledge, if we must live hundreds of thousands years, and have

a burden of old knowledge preventing us to see the world as fresh, and new one.

And if so, there is a link to the plasticity of individual's mind, and mind in general, as well as to the tendencies in the world - and Locke has made then a similar interpretation as **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 43) has done, when discussing evolution of the laws of nature, especially when regarding that there are natural laws, which have developed more or less complete, and they are continuing their evolutionary progress - according to the principle, which in itself will be of the nature of a law. That is - law is not as a rule of special case, or a family of similar cases, but instead a tendency to become more and more developed, and that just this is the very essence of law. This kind of a principle, or law is explaining the part of reality which is still plastic. Among the most plastic of all things is the human mind, and next after that comes the organic world.

But from where this plasticity comes from? I think that we have that plasticity because we must be ready both to accidental changes and development, as well ready to reject our previous models of thinking - which might be a risky operation, but necessary for the expansion of thought. If we just try to maintain the past - regarding a thing as an entity which seems to cause that something fixed meaning symbolleins together an object and its meaning, we might have any progress. Therefore we have something, which is empty before every new connection, as well as something, which just have an ability to symbolleins, but which has no fixed target, and which itself is not fixed. But this does not indicate to an empty soul.

But for now we shall discuss relationship between another English empirist and pragmatism. Hume's philosophy has been regarded as a modification of Lockean empirism but there are certain dissimilarities, too. **C. Hartshorne** (NOTES 44) has appreciated Hume as the most important of English empirists, perhaps. But for what reason? We can find quite similar philosophical tendencies also elsewhere. Hume has regarded philosophy as science on the human nature, but so did also Plato, who has argued for that the most noblest of all things is the study of man. Hume had a tendency of scepticism. He had his famous thesis is that scepticism is the only one of the right philosophical attitudes.

But there is also Descartes and his *Cartesian scepsis* (1), and also some other philosophers who had this attitude. But Hume has influenced to other philosophers very strongly, and he had also other ideas which were interesting. He adopted an utilitarian orientation on the questions of ethics emphasizing the benefit of the society, which in turn influenced to Bentham's and Mill's philosophies, and to Smith's economical-, and other theories - as we can remind from an earlier stage of the current chapter. From **H. Sidgwick** (NOTES 45) we get to know that we cannot regard Hume as an originator of utilitarianism but instead Cumberland. Was the origin this or that, there was **NOT** enough scepticism concerning the high morality of those who has a political, or religious power in society, or concerning their social responsibility.

---

## 1. (*Cartesian scepsis*: in Discours de la méthode)

[61]

Hume emphasized that induction cannot be validated with induction itself. When he considered induction he proposed for, too, that we just believe in it by habit or routine. Why do we so? The possible answer is that causal reasoning can be regarded as original form in thinking, because it has been connected to the ordinary life - where we rely on the laws of causation. But what is wrong with this? The way by which we accommodate, or assimilate to behave under causality, or try to use its laws, is not logical. Causality is valid only if an explained situation remains same for long time. But when we speak about reasoning there is no help from causality - because reasoning expands our knowledge from perceived to not-perceived, where we have no support we have in our immediacy, and at last it is the sphere of its own principles, which have not been present in the pure world of causality.

There we have some associations to C.S. Peirce. In general, we might propose for that causal laws are some kinds of currents of space, which are running partially through unknown sceneries, perhaps. Usually we can apprehend only some fragments of those currents - and we might regard them as being continuous

- at least in a sense that they are repeating themselves endlessly. C.S. Peirce has especially emphasized **Habit Taking** as a characteristic feature of the whole development of the universe, and therefore it is characteristic also to our thought. When thinking to **Habit**, we must admit that it is something lesser than a law, and something more than them, because it can maintain itself because of its selfness. **An the most important feature of it is that things could be aranged in quite another way, too.** This is not the situation when things are behaving according a **Law**.

But if we rely on induction because of habit, was it reliable or not, does this tell us that we have also harm because of **habit-taking**? Does different habits produce most of meanings? If there are just events which repeat themselves - is their meaning connected to their recurrences somehow? Is is possible that there is no sense in those strings? This is certainly not the case, because Hume argumented stronly against that only the recurrence of events could be their explanation; this is the case also with the ordinary life - when using common sense. Repeating something over and over - whatever it is - does not introduce anything new information, and if we mix already known series of things, we do not get any fundamentally new. There are such recurrences and habits also in the human mind, which are rather barriers to the further development, especially when we try to understand something whose own habits are partially unknown - or they are different from our current habits. But just from old habits in the human mind new habits will emerge, and they will expand until there are born new ones whose turn is to overrun the old ones.

But what about scepticism? In general, there are several reasons for scepticism. If we maintain our mind only by those habits, which can produce nothing but similarities, we can doubt if there has taken place any development - but we should not methodologically doubt everything, either, because there is always some useful, and pretty well-developed habit-takings. But for what scepticism stands for? Because there is unvalid elements in every case, and in every thought - which we should eliminate. We might to say, too, that there was an emphasis of agnosticism also in C.S. Peirce's philosophy, but - as a whole - there was a strong emphasis of gnosis, too, especially in his general- and special psychognosies - which we shall discuss later. **J.E . Smith** (NOTES 46) has suggested that C.S. Peirce's indeterminism was due of that he didn't ever accept those explanations, where the probable state of things was fixed before. According to this strategy: we should not accept beforehand any well-constructed explanation as inevitable truth, and choose according to a blind, but well-constructed principle beforehand the cases which we shall reject as false. This is a trap in a nice theory. C.S. Peirce has an emphasis of the fluid nature of the world, as well as human mind, because ithey are not just pretty well determined. We can conclude that the kind of agnosticism which emphasizes fluidity of the world and mind at the moment is one of those things which C.S. Peirce has derived from Hume, but there was also a demand for determinism, too. That is - it must be invented, it there was not the one. Let us remind how Hume regarded philosophy as a science on human nature. Also **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 47) regarded the role of the human mind very important - even in the development of the universe, because of its plasticity and fluidity, which we have been discussing. But he waited to come also **Grand Cosmogony** - the philosophy of creation. But **Hume** (NOTES 48) considered human individuals also:

*"as a bundle of collection of different perception, which will succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and they are in a perpetual flux and movement. The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situation".*

From **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 49) we have got to known quite oppostite interpretation, which regards man as relatively intelletual, and sensible; that man is a participant of a drama of creation, where "actors are identifying by their rôle to author" - the better they can do that, the better they are able to understand the manuscript.

---

[62]

However, in spite of this, it seems to, me that there are certain similarities between Hume and C.S. Peirce, notwithstanding that the latter has described very positively e.g. cosmological characters of the human mind, and some elements of human consciousness, of which there were present at the very beginning of the world evolution - in the form of feelings, which can be considered as a bundle of collection, which an

expression Hume used before. But it was long time ago. And C.S. Peirce has expressed also an attitude that man cannot be regarded as saint, either.

**W. James** (NOTES 50) included Hume's description concerning human individual, into his Principles of Psychology. But there is also something from C.S. Peirce. As we know from **M. Fairbanks** (NOTES 51) both James and Wittgenstein have agreed with this question of vagueness - that it is according them - a thoroughgoing epistemological state concerning all human experience. This is not like Hume's interpretation which we cited above, but only a remark that there cannot be find any definite, and clear structures in mind - and in the same time all of its component referred to in one and single moment.

**J.C.A. Gaskin** (NOTES 52) suggested for that there are certain evolutionary tendencies in Hume's philosophy - citing also his *Dialogues* (1), in which there are ideas of blind vagueness that we have been discussing, but also blind fight between species. These philosophical ideas have been presented a nearly hundred years before CHARLES R. Darwin's famous *The Origins of Species* (2).

Hume has argued for that there are instant impressions, and the ideas, which we have in mind, and they can be reduced to these impressions. But are there any similarities to C.S. Peirce's thoughts concerning the question of reducibility of ideas? Let us study the question more closely. We have referred repeatedly to C.S. Peirce's concepts **dyad**, and **triad**. In general, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 53) categorized those departments [or levels] of the world, and human experience belonging to **Kainopythagoran categories**, that is, which are enumerable. They include three (sub)categories, which he has called **dyad**, and **triad**, but in addition to them there is the category of **monad**, which includes such experiences, which can be perceived without any inconsistency, notwithstanding that there were any other perceivable things present. The category of dyad suggests both to somebody, who is perceiving, and to a perceived object in a direct observation. The category of triad suggest to understanding, as well as to the experiences, in which different experiences are joined together. But is there any reducibility between them?

---

1. (Hume, D.: Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion., Part VI, 1779)

2. (Darwin, C.R.: The Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859))

---

[63]

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 54) described e.g. how we perceive purple, and how we experience that quality. There is no beginning and end when perceiving, or the continuity, in which we could experience both the concept "purple" and pure color, and still that purple is that color what has be seen. As we know, there is not that kind of color in spectrum. We cannot observe the quality of sensation, in its all pureness, because in our sensation, there are several other elements present which modify our sensation and feelings.

Because of our sensation is restless, and there are several disturbances, it is clear, that the way, by which we can qualify our sensation, is all what we can know about it. This qualification of sensation is, in itself, simple, and it is not an object, and it is not connected to any special object, either, but instead, it is a state of consciousness. However, the quality, which we have, can be connected to objects, and we are able to give to it different meanings.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 55) described a sensation, when presenting the three integral states of mind. He suggested to, that:

*"Remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it - for thought there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. The verb feel is indispensable, because to actually sense a sensation is very different from remembering or imagining it. Notwithstanding that it is usual to put sensation under the head of knowledge, it is not the right classification".*

Let us remind, again, how **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 56) has described e.g. the centrifugal tendency of thought. It is a process, by which any idea by following out its own development becomes separated from

those with which it is connected, and this process can be called abstraction - which belongs to medisense, which has several other varieties. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 57) described also an opposite influence, by which, when one idea has its vividness increased, it gives an upward impulse to a number of other ideas with which it is connected so that it forms one set with them. As we shall see later during the current chapter, this (kind of) set is durable, and not reducible. Hence, there seems to be an abyss between what is directly experienced and what is comprehended, and between the equipments of perception and understanding - there is no way to reduce things, which we have in medisense, back to feelings and sensations, as they once were in their instancy. But this is not a problem, because this is another side of nature, and thus not something apart of it. As we have seen, Hume has presented that ideas can be reduced to impressions.

From that version of *Collected Papers* which was edited by **Hartshorne** and **Weiss** (NOTES 58) we know that C.S. Peirce did not anchor his argument to the statement that abstractions must give an account to themselves, and that they must do it in terms of concrete experience according to older empirism - in which it has been considered that abstract generalities could be affirmed in terms of mere qualities of sensation and emotion. There seems to be no room for reduction in C.S. Peirce's philosophy. Let us remind what **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 59) argued for:

*"all that we can get are the qualities which are not the same as our restless sensations which are not connected to certain circumstances".*

---

[64]

I think that this argument is not very Humean one, because we have that Hume's sentence that there is no demarcation line between ideas and impressions. However, this kind a view also C.S. Peirce advocated for, in a measure - when discussing e.g. his doctrine of synechism, but only referring to certain vagueness of the world. But there are several different fields of sensing: **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 60) made the categorization of consciousness, which has distinct departments [but which still can be regarded one and the same]. There is a field of primesense, in which we have feelings which are momentarily present contents of consciousness - but apart from anything else. Then there is altersense, in which we have sensations and will, which are consciousness of directly present other. Then we have the field of medisense, where we have the consciousness of thirdness, but which we can regard also as a medium between primesense and altersense. In addition to these, there is an element, which C.S. Peirce has called **fatigue**, from which our mental life and health depend to a far greater extent, that it would be guessed upon the action of it.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 61) emphasized that feelings obey certain principles, or rules. There are two kinds of intensity. The first kind of intensity is the intensity of the feeling consciousness, and the second kind of intensity is the intensity of altersense or assertiveness of feeling, which can be called the second vividness. Hence, we can say that there is the intensity of feeling itself, by which e.g. loud sounds are distinguished from faint ones, and the other kind of intensity is the intensity of consciousness that "lays hold" of the feeling, which makes e.g. the ticking of a watch actually heard infinitely heard more vivid than a cannon shot remembered to have been heard a few minutes ago.

But how is it possible "lay hold of the feeling" if feeling, in itself, does not have any specialty, or it cannot be recognized as a specialty? Because the consciousness has the intensity, as a whole, that is, there is no separate department, in which we e.g. feel something, and another department, in which we just reflect. We shall discuss later a phenomenon double consciousness - which does not refer to an existence of any true departments, which were durable structures.

Hume believed that instant impressions can, as such, produce more developed ideas in one or another way, and that ideas, when comprehended, must be in a continuous interaction with instant impressions. C.S. Peirce did not consider the relationship between them direct one.

---

[65]

At previous chapter of the current study we have discussed Hume's conception of substance. **Hume** (NOTES 62) has argued for that since all of our perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and they may be considered as separately existent, and they have no need of anything else to support their existences, and, therefore, they are substances. C.S. Peirce did not consider ideas, or perceptions as substances, or something like separate departments of reality. They are derived from an instant continuity instead, but soon after being sensed - they have been differentiated and integrated by more sophisticated processes to the form, which only seems to be substance, or something, which has always been, or which has a definite form

We must return to his concept of feeling for explanation. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 63) described:

*"feeling itself as continuous recollections which are inseparable until they shall be picked into pieces by reflection",*

but C.S. Peirce (NOTES 64) has emphasized vividness with abstraction, too:

*"where one idea can have its vividness increased giving an upward impulse to number of other ideas, with which it is connected so that it forms one set with them".*

This set, which has been formed, is not a substance, but the staff, from which it has been derived, during a processes of abstraction, or association. In fact, there are no such staying structures in that staff, which just exist forever, because if there were those structures an sich, the shouldn't be any need for sets. And in general, in our present level of knowledge there are only few such things which are still left at the end of the whole world evolution. Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 65) also discussed the concept of continuity just by his concept of feeling, especially when he considered the role of it in his three states of mind. In his cosmology, floating, and separate feelings have had a decisive role in the world evolution, making the continuity with simple connections, like an intermediating media, which originally made possible that there existed the first simple relationships, and connections, and then feelings kept on that continuity, but it has also got certain new roles. In his three states of mind he proposed for that sensation is not a feeling, but an element of it. Because they have joined to each other, we are able to be somewhere in time, and we can also have the sense the assertiveness of feeling. It seem obvious that also ideas can take advance of that continuity.

Let us study two sentences in *Chance, Love and Logic* (NOTES 66):

*"A Continuum of ... feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but still embracing innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal, entirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in its absence of boundedness a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt".*

[66]

But we find also another sentence in *Chance, Love and Logic* (NOTES 67):

*"in the presence of this continuity of feeling ... there /can no/ ... longer be any difficulty about one idea resembling another, when we pass along the continuous field of quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we have marked".*

I think that this means that ideas has certain startpoint, or continuous birth, or status of being in continuity, and we can imagine that without that continuity they would not enlarge themselves at all, because they must be present most of the time. But we cannot say, however, that continuity is all that we must have to explain all that seems to be at a state of discontinuity.

But what about Locke with his concept of mental images and C.S. Peirce's opinion concerning them? As **S.R. Vaughn** (NOTES 68) puts it, Locke has claimed for that all of the mental images arise from either sensations or reflection. That is, expressions have certain meanings because they indicate to definite ideas in the mind of speaker - but as we have seen - C.S. Peirce advocated a different point of view: he did not

consider lower levels as e.g. primesense such one that it is directly connected with sets of medisense. They belong to the one but they are something different, too. When thinking the very essence of the human mind, there are, for sure, several associations which have nothing to do with sensations as such, notwithstanding that there are several elements which are derived originally from sensations [at least in a sense that we associate something as "seen", and something as "heard"] - with which lower-level associations work. But most of the meanings have their true explanation only through higher social settings of concepts, and not because of being particular sensations, or thoughts of an individual. But it is true that without impressions - which a term Hume has used - and without the continuous instancy of feelings - which term C.S. Peirce used - we could not develop any true ideas. We know that we have now a lot of well-developed ideas, notwithstanding that we cannot trace anyway how they have been perceived, or developed at distant history. We may also have had dreams and illusions, which might refer both to those well-developed ideas, to the actual sensations we have had - as well as to imaginative or virtual sensations we have had in the world of dreams. We may also have dreams, which we cannot explain at all with our valid ideas, and they seem to have still some rational essence in them, or messages.

Hence, we cannot speak about ordinary meanings, or the essence of our interpretations like entities or substances, but we cannot deny or prove either, that there were not something which could exist in itself, and which has always been. We can have e.g. an idea of the evolution of the whole universe, and it can be true in this special way, or we can have an idea of omnipotent God, who has created the whole world, and who is its substance. Adding to that a hypothesis that we cannot comprehend that substance, we make it impossible to prove it false or true. But is this only a logical trick we cannot be sure. But what is the most important thing when dealing with these kind of beliefs, is that they have no special consequences.

---

[67]

From **M.P. Ford** (NOTES 69) we know that Hume can be regarded as an advocate of associative theory, who have denied the existence of substantial mind. But for what this actually refers to - if we think his proposition that perceptions are like substances? - When saying that the mind is not substantial, we consider it something which is changing, and becoming to something else than it has been at the beginning, or is at the moment. The explanation is very simple, and very much like C.S. Peirce's theory: if our perceptions are like substances, it is referring only to that they cannot be divided into details, and they are much like feelings, and if our mind is not substantial, it suggests to the fact that it is developed in its own ways, and it is not close connection to perceptions any more, and it cannot be explained by them.

Our associations can vary a lot, and there are any definite structures in them, in a sense that we had found the final explanations by their exact percepts. According to the very nature both of the mind and associations, they cannot be explained by any distinct and separable perception, or referring to it, but instead by [other] ideas. And if Hume has just referred to the fact in question, when discussing the reductibility of ideas into sensations, we have, I think, a similarity to C.S. Peirce, if we think just that they have their very origin in sensations, and they have it still. Therefore: there are probably still available similar sensations, or feelings, which were available centuries ago. They are stocked, in a way, into their simple package, and they have their authenticity still left.

**I. Scheffler** (NOTES 70) has described C.S. Peirce's model of the doubt and the belief, and science as social context. According it there are several things which we can doubt, as well as there are things which we ought not doubt at all. Further, we have still left all of our misinterpretations, and, perhaps, those original sensations, which can still guide us to wrong direction. For instance, it is wise to doubt personal motives of scientists, or that they use science as a tool to have more property, and status, or we can suspect their morality, and the validity of their scientific findings, as well as motives of those, who have given a permission to scientific programs [as e.g. politicians and economists] - but we must believe to man himself, and to science, as a whole enterprise, which is aimed to make our life better.

But nowadays, I think, there are several reasons to believe that we ought not to trust to the current motives of science, and there is no room for meliorism. If we just think that the most important factor of the whole reality is change, as well as chance, and if we regard human beings as agents of that change, and overrunner of the whole phenomenon named chance, we must presuppose that there must be

continuous interaction with man and the world. That is, chance is not due of man's stupidity, but due of the way of present being of the world. And that man has special role in diminishing it.

But what about the role of Berkeley in the development of the older empirism - e.g. in the philosophy of Hume, and pragmatism? Few words on the topic. From **Dewey** (NOTES 71) we know that W. James' philosophy has had a close contact with Berkeley's philosophy, who has been regarded as an subjective idealist - which an orientation we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study. There are some common features in Berkeley's and C.S. Peirce's philosophy, too.

Let us remind a letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to Mario Calderoni approximately in 1905 (NOTES 72), where he has written that he has got from Berkeley the most brightest influences.

---

[68]

**C. Hartshorne** (NOTES 73) considered Berkeley one of the most important empirists. That may be due of that Berkeley criticized that law of causation, and preindicated the critics which was presented later especially by Hume. From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 74) we know that Berkeley visited also in the New World and he influenced to Samuel Johnson, who accepted his views but argued for, too, that there are also *abstract archetypes* (1), and that we can be conscious of them. Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 75) has used quite similar term, namely archetypal idea - referring to the possibility of our final and fundamental spiritual consciousness, especially in his synechism, insisting that the idea in question can never fail. This topic might not essential for the purpose of current study, perhaps, but it is true that Berkeley was known in the New World before C.S. Peirce's philosophical career, and that there were presented similar ideas as archetype before, and also later.

However, there are some indicators to a similar conception of matter and mind in C.S. Peirce's philosophy as Berkeley had. It seems to me, that any philosopher can be classified only to one philosophical school, and that there is instead a synechistic tendency in philosophy. But what can we say, after all, the philosophical relationship between older empirism and pragmatism? Jus that, that there have been several, but rather complicated influences, which are not direct, in every case. Most commentators have referred just to these philosophical influences, and emphasized of those the influences from English empirism.

---

1. (*Archetype*: Original model, prototype; also especially in the psychology by CARL GUSTAF JUNG: universal symbol, and mental image given by inheritance.)

---

[69]

### NOTES 3

1. (Collected Papers of... , VII., Synechism and Immortality, .574-.576, 1966)
2. (Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophische Untersuchungen - Philosophical Investigations.*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe., Oxford., Basil Blackwell, §1, 1953)
3. (Hartshorne, C., *History of Philosophical Systems.*, edited by Vergilius Ferm., New York., Littlefield, Adams & Co., Paterson., p. 253, 1965)
4. (Bigge, M.L, *Positive Relativism, An Emergent Educational Philosophy.*, 1971)
5. (Bacon, F., *Novum Organum.*, I., xxxix, 1620)
6. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Science., 7.49-7.50, 1966)

7. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §6., Three Kinds of Induction., .111, 1966)
  8. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §6., Three Kinds of... , .110-.120; .208-.216; also §8., Abduction., . 218-.220, 1966)
  9. (Cohen, M.R., (ed.): Chance, Love and Logic, Philosophical Essays by the late Charles S. Peirce., New York, pragmatic maxim: p. 45, 1923)
  10. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 13.3.1897, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 186-187, 1966)
  11. (Cohen, M.R., Chance, Love and Logic., New York, p. 237, 1923)
  12. (Scheffler, I., Four Pragmatists., critics concerning utility of science and practical bearings: p. 85, 1974; - see also: (2) Cf. C.S. Peirce, review of 'Clark University' (1889-1899): 'Decennial Celebration' (Worcester., Mass., 1899., in Science., n.s. (20 April 1900), practical bearings: pp. 620-622)
- 
- [70]
13. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Science., .7.54, 1966)
  14. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., pp. 235-236, 1967)
  15. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism", in Runes, D.D., (ed.): Twentieth Century Philosophy, Living Schools of Thought., New York, pp. 449-468, 1968)
  16. (Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics., London., MacMillan & Co., p. 85, 1962)
  17. (Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics., p. 94, 1962)
  18. (Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics., p. 10, 10ff, 10fff; see also Index., p. 517, 1962)
  19. (Gaskin, J.C.A., The Quests for Eternity, An Outline of the Philosophy of Religion., Bungay, Suffolk, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England.,. Benguin Books., Ltd., Printed R. Clay (The Chaucer Press) Ltd., p. 51, 1984)
  20. (Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics., p. 424, 1962)
  21. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., p. 14, 1968)
  22. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introduction, pp. xiv-xv, 1966)
  23. (Hartshorne, C., History of Philosophical Systems., edited by Vergilius Ferm., New York., Littlefield, Adams & Co., Paterson., p. 253, 1965)
  24. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., c. 1905., lett. from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni, pp. 165-166; see also: Bibliography., pp. 161-256, 1966)
  25. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., p. 16, 1968)
  26. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introduction., pp. viii-xiv, 1966)
  27. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introduction., pp. viii-xiv; see also examples of laboratory conditions: 5.411-5.412, and indeterminism: 7.21-7.35, 1966)

[71]

28. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., Forms of Consciousness., .544-.545, 1966)
29. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., General- and Nomological Psychognosy., .233, 1966)
30. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §8., Abduction., .220, 1966)
31. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., p. 283, 1966)
32. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 9.6.1904, lett., C.S. Peirce to John Dewey., p. 180, 1966)
33. (Grinder, R.E., Adolescence., New York-London-Sydney-Toronto., Maine, pp. 17-18, 1973)
34. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , 1989, p. 86)
35. (Locke, J. Essay Concerning Human Understanding., §1, ch. 2, bk. III)
36. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"., 1989, p. 81)
37. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"., 1989, p. 81)
38. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Philosophy of Mind., pp. 379-381, 1966)
39. (Morris, C.W., Six Theories of Mind, Chicago., p. 289, 1932)
40. (James, W., Essays in Radical Empiricism., New York, p. 97, 1912)
41. (James, W., The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to Pragmatism., New York, p. 132, 1909)
42. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Philosophy of Mind., pp. 379-382, 1966)
43. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §8., Evolution of the Laws of Nature., .515, 1966)
44. (Hartshorne, C., History of Philosophical Systems., edited by Vergilius Ferm., New York., Littlefield, Adams & Co., Paterson., p. 253, 1965)
45. (Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics., p. 423f, 1962)

---

[72]

46. (Smith, J.E., The Spirit of American Philosophy., New York, pp. 3-37, 1966)
47. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §8., Evolution of the Laws of Nature., .514-.515; see also: Notes of Science, p. 175, 1966)
48. (e.g. Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature)
49. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synechism and... , .572, 1966)
50. (James, W., The Principles of Psychology... , p. 227, (1890), 1952)
51. (Fairbanks, M., "Wittgenstein and James"., in New Scholasticism 40., pp. 331, 335, 1966)

52. (Gaskin, J.C.A., *The Quests for Eternity...* , p. 72, 1984)
53. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Chapter 4., *Consciousness.*, .528, 1966)
54. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Chapter 4., *Consciousness.*, .530, 1966)
55. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of Consciousness.*, .542-.543, 1966)
56. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of...* , .544-.545, 1966)
57. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of...* , .548, 1966)
58. (Peirce, C.S., *Collected Papers by Charles Sanders Peirce.*, V, edited by CHARLES Hartshorne and P. Weiss., Cambridge-Mass., p. 177; see also: "Editorial note" to 5., 1931-1958)
59. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Ch. 4., *Consciousness.*, .530, 1966)
- 

[73]

60. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of...* , .551-.552, 1966)
61. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of...*, .544-.545, 1966)
62. (Hume, D., *A Treatise of Human Nature.*, bk. 1, pt. 4. §5)
63. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of...*, .540, 1966)
64. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of...*, .548, 1966)
65. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., *Forms of Consciousness.*, .540-.543; see also: VIII., *Correspondence.*, 29.8.1891, Lett. from C.S. Peirce to Christine-Ladd Franklin., pp. 214-215, 1966)
66. (Cohen, M.R., *Chance, Love and Logic, Philosophical Essays by the late Charles S. Peirce.*, p. 224f, 1923)
67. (Cohen, M.R., *Chance, Love and Logic.*, p. 225, 1923)
68. (Vaughn, S.R., *Pedagogical Experience and Theory of Meaning in Dewey and Wittgenstein.*, Dissertation., Michigan State University., p. 15, 1976)
69. (Ford, M.P., *William Jame's Philosophy, A New Perspective.*, Amherst., The University of Massachusetts Press., p. 11, 1982)
70. (Scheffler, I., *Four Pragmatists.*, pp. 85-86, 1974)
71. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism"., in Runes, D.D., (ed.): *Twentieth Century Philosophy, Living Schools of Thought.*, New York., pp. 449-468, 1968)
72. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., *Correspondence.*, c. 1905., lett. from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni, pp. 165-166; see also: *Bibliography.*, pp. 161-256, 1966)
73. (Hartshorne, C., *History of Philosophical Systems.*, edited by Vergilius Ferm., New York., Littlefield, Adams & Co., Paterson., p. 253, 1965)
74. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., p. 84, 1967)

[74]

## The Man of Pragmatism, Chapter IV

### Four views to pragmatism: Voluntarism, naturalism, humanism, and phenomenology

#### Voluntarism and pragmatism

At this chapter we shall discuss the philosophical relationship between Hans Vaihinger and pragmatism - especially C.S. Peirce. We shall search as well similarities as differences between them - and as a result we shall have a view which is full of inconsistency. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 1) has argued for:

*"We are continuously reacting against the outer world, and our sensation consist of feeling, but also of the sense of its assertiveness, or being compelled to have it; there is always present the compulsiveness of actual sensation".*

But to where these ideas are referring, and what is their philosophical background? We must seek the origin of these ideas from *voluntary philosophy* (1) or voluntarism. From **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 2) we know that voluntarists emphasized that an organism takes in its usage mentality - because of the utility it offers to mentality in surviving. There are certain influences from the early evolution philosophy, and psychology. This kind of view has been called also modern irrationalism, that is, more important than reason there is the pure will, which does not need to be rational, but a blind emotion. Voluntarism stands for behaviorism, and not for idealism. C.W. Morris (NOTES 3) has categorized **Nietzsche** (2), Schopenhauer, and **Vaihinger** (3) as advocates of that kind of organic functionalism, and instrumentalism.

Schopenhauer has urged in his *On the Will in Nature*, that the great deal of which we regard as intellectual, is something objective, and secondary explanative, and merely as a means of will, and we can find all of this prius - as the means of intellect, but the intellect itself we can trace only a posterius, as the products of intellect. There are certain similarities to **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 4), especially when he described the forms of consciousness, and the role of willing.

---

1. (*Voluntary*; Done, acting, able to act, of ones free will, also purposed, intentional, not constrained; (of bodily action, etc.): controlled by the will - **OTHERS** (music) : original meaning: Extempore performance, especially as prelude to other music, contemporary meaning: organ solo played before, during, or after any church service; music composed for this. - Cf. Evolution theory and philosophy; That the (organic and mental) development consists of sequential phases from simple to more complicated - which is an idea that some voluntary philosophers also advanced for.))

2. ((1844-1900); **FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE** was the German philosopher, voluntarist, and an originator of idea of 'superman' and of doctrine of perfectibility of man trough forcible self-assertion and superiority to ordinary morality.)

3. ((1852-1933); **HANS VAIHINGER** was the German philosopher, and an author of *Die Philosophie des Als Ob* (1911). He developed a theory of fictions, according with which science, morals, and religion work mainly with fictions, which are necessary, but consciously untrue. His theory have been said to have some features similar to pragmatism. See: Vaihinger as am advocator of relativism and pragmatism: Hollo, J.A., *Kasvatuksen maailma.*, WSOY., Porvoo., p. 111, 1952.)

[75]

It seems to me that C.S. Peirce has not been as advocate of a kind of instrumentalism of Schopenhauer - notwithstanding that he accepted the presence of will, and regarded it as an important factor of human mind. But it is not enough - there must be present something more than just willing, or being familiar with its basic instinct mechanism, because there must be also knowing for the more sophisticated knowledge. Let us remind, that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 5) regarded human mind as an essential component in the whole (evolutionary) development of the universe - because the human mind is still developing department of it, and because it is the most plastic of all things. This is certainly not the case of instinct-like willing, despite of the fact that man has achieved its role because of being plastic, or a part of all active protoplasm, or having a general tendency to take habits. It is only because this fluidity, and as its counterpart also habit-taking happens to be applicable also at higher levels of development. Therefore C.S. Peirce tried to describe also more general features of the development of human mind - namely **The Great Law of Mind, The Law of Association, and The Law of Habit Taking**. These features are only more general but their true essence is still that they could be behave in another, and alternative ways!

There is not only merely biological will, but also certain tendencies which are not dependent from it any more. An interesting question considering general tendencies is that what may happen when they have reached their ultimate limits - when there do not exist plasticity any more? We might only guess, that the whole universe is developing so that there are, at last, the fulfillment of all laws, and, hence, the death, because there is not any more fluidity, change, chance, or accidents.

From a letter which C.S. Peirce mailed to W.T. Harris, and which has been dated on the 30th November in 1868 (NOTES 6) we know that C.S. Peirce regarded mind as virtual, and not as something which is being in time-space, or not as something whose essence would be solid at a given moment. If we think all of this closely, we come to the conclusion that mind is something between, and above, and that it is not purely rational, yet, but not biological, either. In fact, it can simulate whatever in its own kind of reality, and there can be also elements which are taken with only for joy. We cannot regard mind as something which has been derived from materia, either - according with prerequisites which materia can have in itself.

Mind is not something which has always been, but man has always had will to have something, as well as his fellow-animals have had that ability. But now there are with us future expectations, or fulfillments of them at distant future. Because all which we can have as explanation of things, cannot be completed at our currency, or cannot be derived from past, either. There shall be always something which can be apprehended later, deep in time. For the reason - mind is always something more than we know it to be, or which could be derived from the cases in which it has been present, or from actions of willing. But mind it is also something less than **Geist**, or omnipotent creature, but it is not had its existence to be become that kind, who have all abilities and power, but instead because to be become as active participant, and co-operative element in the world evolution.. Hence, mind can be regarded as something which is not spatio-temporal, and as something not yet ready.

Further, mind [or explanation] is not something becoming automatically after the action of willing existing, because there are several things, which are, and become to existence without any act of willing, and their true meaning has nothing to do with the acts of willing. And we can will at the bottom of our hearts, but we still may not have better mind - or morality. That is, we do not succeed to get just wishing, or willing e.g. that certain sets shall take their best form, and we cannot wish to have e.g. the most complete world, or the most fulfilled future, because we do not know what kind that world, or future should be - when being the best-fulfilled one. Further, we have right now one of the possible futures at hand, which could be derived from the past from some of its expectations - but unfortunately we cannot trace those actions of willing which have lead to our presence any more. If we consider mind as an instrument which has lead to our present existence, we ought not to forget that it carries always within it our possible future expectations, and the new forms of willing, which are possible only at future. I think that **Frege** (1) came very close to C.S. Peirce in the question of the essence of mind, and meaning. Frege made a differentiation between the concepts **Sinn** [the mind of linguistic expression] and **Bedeutung** [the meaning]. There can be found a linguistic expression which has a meaning, whatever it is, but its mind is always quite another kind than the sum of single meanings.

---

1. ((1848-1925); GOTTLOB FREGE was the German philosopher and mathematician, and one of the founders of modern logic. He agreed with BERTRAND Russell and A.N. WHITEHEAD in logic thesis, that is, mathematics can be derived from logic by its terms.)

---

[76]

**Juho A. Hollo** (NOTES 7) has proposed for that the same kind of theories like American pragmatism, were constructed in Europe by **Bergson** (1), **Vaihinger**, and George Simmel. From those philosophers Bergson had some similar ideas than pragmatists had, and perhaps Simmel, but they were similar because of their relativism. However, we don't discuss those European interpretations of Simmel and Bergson just now, and in the current study. Let us study instead the claim that **Vaihinger** was an advocate of pragmatism. We can doubt this interpretation because his philosophy grounded on such kind of philosophical schools, whose general claims C.S. Peirce tried to prove as false.

**Vaihinger's** own "learning history" was quite different, too. But of course, it can be said, that **Vaihinger** developed a theory of fictions - which has certain similarities to pragmatism, and to the concepts "doubt" and "illusion". But there were also others who studied fictions - as **Bentham** who was acquainted with fictions; he wrote a book which associated to them, as well as to the themes of general linguistics.

A similarity to pragmatism we have where **Vaihinger** (NOTES 8) assumed, in his short description of the philosophy of 'as if', that science, morals, religion, etc. deal with fictions which are consciously made as false ones, but these fictions are in the same time quite necessary. **Vaihinger** (NOTES 9) claimed that **FRANCIS Bacon**, **Berkeley**, and **Hume** didn't have a clear and acceptable conception on fictions. However, **Vaihinger** was studying the philosophies of **Hume** and **J.S. Mill** between 1874-1876 - and in his autobiography he said to have appreciated their ideas.

C.S. Peirce ranked high all of those philosophers above, and especially the philosophical schools of English empirism and Scottish realism. At the letter, which he has written to **Mario Calderoni** in 1905 (NOTES 10) he expressed his appreciation to those philosophers, and schools, referring especially to **Locke** and to his *Essay*. From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 11) we know C.S. Peirce's model of the doubt and belief associated closely to **Hume's** scepticism. Here and there in his text we have references to incompleteness of human concepts, and to false beliefs.

---

1. ((1859-1941); **HENRI BERGSON** was the French philosopher who regarded reality as change and movement, 'becoming' rather than 'being'. He was influenced by evolution theory, but he tried to approach it as "seen inside" - as subjective experience, and he thought that changing individual is a change itself, and that *élan vital* in individuals makes both change possible, and it the cause for change. An interesting idea was also his conception of time, as non-absolute, but changing according individual experiences.)

---

[77]

But from where **Vaihinger** derived his concept of fiction? As we know from the autobiography of **Vaihinger** (NOTES 12) he based his philosophy just on English nominalism, which was also an essential part of Scholastic philosophy. Namely, he argued for that there were indicators that just in English nominalism it have been recognized the nature of fictions properly, and he mentioned here specially of **Occam** (1), who has described the fictitive nature of general ideas. Let us remark, however, that by the nominalism of **Occam**, the outside world of language and thought consisted of individual things. But if this is the case it certainly seems to me that in English nominalism fictions and their role will certainly have seen quite another way than in that Scholastic realism, which a view C.S. Peirce, and his philosophical grandfather of that realism, **John Duns Scotus**, advocated for.

**Vaihinger** (NOTES 13) mentioned in his autobiography that also Hobbes (2) has described excellently the nature of fictions, too. Hobbes wanted to interpret human behavior, and individual psychology according to Galileian physics; he thought, for example, that suitable conceptions to psychology were gravitation and centrifugal force - which is almost the same as Descartes' **philosophical theory of vortex** (vortices). Both describe the same forces which **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 14) accepted into his theory of mind, and that he described with them abstraction and association.

But there are also certain differences between C.S. Peirce's and Hobbes' orientation, too. C.S. Peirce was certainly not an advocate of determinism and materialism, as we know from **J.E. Smith** (NOTES 15), and just they were the general tendencies in Hobbes' philosophy. Let us just remind C.S. Peirce's synechism, which is something "between" idealism and materialism. But there is also Hobbes' nominalism, which regarded the universal concepts as products of human mind - are the separate reality of their own, and which have no real things corresponding to them. Let us remind that C.S. Peirce attacked strongly against nominalism - e.g. in his letter to James which is dated on the 7th March in 1904 (NOTES 16), in which he demanded to that one main purpose of the pragmatistic doctrine was that of denying *nominalism* (3).

In Another letter to James, which was dated on the 13th March in 1904 (NOTES 17) C.S. Peirce considered nominalism a kind of test, before a [final] move to realism. Let us remind, however, that C.S. Peirce considered mind, and such things as abstraction unreducible, and therefore something separate, but not unable to be in contact to objects.

---

1. ((1290-1349); **WILLIAM of OCCAM** was a Fransiscan, theologian, and an English scholastic philosopher, and a founder of a speculative sect reviving the doctrines of nominalism. Well-known is **Occam's Razor**, that is, the principle that 'entities' must not be unnecessarily multiplied. There was something new in his nominalism, namely, that it was possible to test concepts in their own reality with its own principles, and there was not necessary to find continuously corresponding object, before accepting concepts.)

2. ((1588-1679); **THOMAS HOBBS** was an English philosopher, who had, as a philosophical model, **GALILEIOS'** physics. In his political philosophy he was an advocate of social contract. According to his *Leviathan* (1651), man is a naturally selfish unit, however. By his philosophical orientation, he was materialist and determinist.)

3. (*Nominalism*: A doctrine of Scholastics that universal or abstract concepts are mere names, without any corresponding reality; see also: Notice of Frazer's Berkeley, in *North American Review*, October, 1871)

---

[78]

**Hans Vaihinger** (NOTES 18) named Kant the person who gave him considerable philosophical influences to his own philosophy of fictions; he has mentioned especially Kant's **heuristic fictions** which were presented a hundred year before they actually could be understood. Vaihinger was and advocate of Schopenhauer's psychological idealism [subjective idealism]. According Vaihinger, it was just Schopenhauer, and not Kant, who described the most beautifully how man can be both practical creature, and a being, who has will. Especially in his later philosophy Vaihinger tried to synthesize Schopenhauer's interpretation, which was associated to evolution philosophy, when describing fictions from the point of view of willing. From Kant he accepted the explanation of those antagonisms, with which human thought shall be acquaintance, especially when one is studying metaphysics

At the beginning of 1876 **Vaihinger** (NOTES 19) started to write his first version of his *Philosophie des Als Ob*, and concentrated first to Kant. When studying his texts, he used philological method, and discovered that certain pages in *Prolegomena* were in wrong order. It seems to me that Vaihinger wanted to make the perfect blueprint from the target he was analyzing - that every topic must be presented in certain order, and at certain time - in order to be fully understood. C.S. Peirce was not the same kind a person; he wanted instead to hasten the growth of the knowledge, say, the evolution in the language, and

the growth of mind - just introducing several alternative explanations. Some of them might be valid, and some not, but they should certainly have any sequential rationality. The old expressions which were not, as such, good enough, were not invalid because their sequence in time, but because they have foreseen future in a wrong way. But some of them might still be valid. Hence, the only sequence which is important - is to drop out unnecessary explanations, and to search the new ones. It is like picking a piece here and there.

Let us remind, however, that C.S. Peirce appreciated Kant, as we have seen at earlier stages in the current study. There is e.g. C.S. Peirce's letter to Mario Calderoni which has been written approximately in 1905 (NOTES 20), in which he expressed his indebtedness to Kant.

**Vaihinger** (NOTES 21) read also at Benedict (Baurd) de Spinoza, when he matriculated to university, and admired especially at Spinoza's conceptions concerning the structure of the universe. Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 22) appreciated Spinoza, too, and told that he had derived the brightest ideas from him. Hence, both Vaihinger and C.S. Peirce seem to have had similar admiring philosophical relationship to Spinoza.

**Vaihinger** (NOTES 23) appreciated also Plato's Dialogs and Apology, which he has read in 1868. Little later he became acquainted with Republic and Phaedrus. He suggested to, too, that the ideas of Greek natural philosophers have certain connection to evolution philosophy, and he studied especially Anaximandros' and Aristotle's writings when he matriculated to university. We get to know that he studied Latin, and because of those studies, and because of his excellent teacher, he could make an accurate philological analysis of the texts he examined.

From **Walker Percy** (NOTES 24) and **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 25) we have known that also C.S. Peirce derived some of his ideas from Aristotle. According to **Percy**, he was acquainted with medieval language, from which he translated several concepts into the modern English, in order to make the terms more comprehensible. Hence - both Vaihinger and C.S. Peirce seem to have taken their philosophical influences from the same sources also in this respect - but they have interpreted them in a different way. Vaihinger tried to make an accurate philological analysis concerning the original meaning of terms, that is, treating concepts and words in nominalistic way, but C.S. Peirce instead tried to derive his new terms from medieval language, and migrate them into his own new epistemology, and root them into their new language-system of English, and its language-use. But he also derived many of his concepts from ancient Greek philosophers, and it is clear that he was not just aiming to explain their original meanings.

---

[79]

William James and Vaihinger had a similar attitude when emphasizing the role of psychology in the development of philosophy. **Vaihinger** (NOTES 26) proposed for that without psychology both philosophy and methodology would remain as methodic abstraction. He referred to **Herbart** (1) and especially to Avenarius, whose psychology became as a part of him. James didn't appreciate these persons as much. Herbart held that the method is the most characteristic to philosophy, not the target which it may have. Philosophy must start from the concepts, which can be experienced as clear and bright. Only starting from those concepts it is possible to make propositions, and from them, in turn, it can be drawn conclusions. This kind of mechanistic view Herbart applied to pedagogics, too. From **K. Grue-Sørensen** (NOTES 27) we know that Herbart maintained that there are the laws of associations, and certain rules, which control the way, by which mental images come to consciousness. As a consequence of this, the work of pedagogics is just to organize the mental images, and when their meanings have been organized, they are learned.

John Dewey advocated the view that thought is not possible by mechanical input, but it is instead essentially adaptation to the outside world, but still real world, and we ought to change the world to such, as it is wished and hoped to be. We cannot learn at all what kind the outside world is like, if we just organize "mental images" - as Herbart suggested us to do - Dewey supposed to that also the inner nature of our experiences must be organized in a new way. And if we think C.S. Peirce's scheme of the laws of association, there is not much similarity to Herbart's view, either.

**Vaihinger** (NOTES 28) has referred, as an influential person [in psychology] to ADOLF HORWITZ whose work *Psychologische Analysen auf physiologischer Grundlage* he studied between 1872-1873. In the book in question Horwitz pointed out that psychology rests upon the responses of reflexive schemes, and upon their study with stimulation. Vaihinger got convinced, that the human thought is nothing but a means, by which man can fulfill his strives - which identical to Schopenhauer's philosophical view. In 1875 Vaihinger was as a teacher in Leibzig, in the same time as **Wundt** (2) began to teach there philosophy. Wundt's first lecture concerned logic. But isn't it strange that **Vaihinger** (NOTES 29) does not emphasize Wundt's psychology very much in his autobiography, though he mentions that Wundt came to Leibzig September in 1875 and that he was himself interested in Wundt's lectures on logic, and for that reason he wished that he could stay in Leibzig. But he must go to Berlin, where his first *philosophical work* (3) was published - which consisted of lectures at Academic Philosophical Society - and which concerned the history of philosophy. He was oriented, in this stage, to study e.g. the Kantian tendencies of **Lange** (4), as well as other themes.

---

1. (1776-1841); JOHAN FRIEDRICH HERBART was the German philosopher, educationalist, and psychologist. His main work was *Allgemeine Pädagogik*. He was not an advocate of German Idealism, but a scepticism. And further, every appearance is referring to an object, which is real, but they are not able to interpret them properly. Not even the inner side of our soul, as the contents of consciousness they present, are not able to reveal the essence of our soul. There are certainly many similarities to C.S. Peirce's philosophy in his views, and one of them is that when man has reached the explanation with logic, man must enlarge the field achieved with metaphysics, and with intuition - and as result we have aesthetic - which in turn includes ethics.)

2. ((1832-1929); WILHELM WUNDT was the German philosopher and psychologist, who wanted to approach psychology by the methods of classical psychophysics. He was a founder of an institute of experimental psychology in Leibzig. He was an author of *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, 1-3 (1847), *Logik* (1880-1883), and *Völkerpsychologie* 1-10. (1911-1920).)

3. (Vaihinger, H., Hartmann, Dühring, and Lange, *A Critical Essay on the History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century.*, Berlin., 1876.)

4. (FRIEDRICH ALBERT LANGE was the German philosopher, and an author of *Gesichte des Materialismus* (1857/1873).)

---

[80]

As an conclusion, we can say, that Vaihinger got his only influences from the very early experimental psychology in his philosophy, and later he was not much concerned with it, but instead such themes as material positivism and metaphysics. We must remind that at the beginning of 1876 Vaihinger started to write his first version of his work *Philosophie des Als Ob*, and that he started his project from the philosophy of Kant. It can be mentioned here, that the very early version, which he wrote between 1877-1879, was later included to the second part of his work. But why this arrangement? Because Vaihinger was forced completely to stop writing his work of 'as if' temporarily in 1879, and he could continue it in 1906, and there were some lectures between. When Wundt founded in 1879 the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Leibzig, Vaihinger was finishing his first version of 'as if'. Philosophically Wundt derived his ideas from Descartes and Locke.

Let's remind how negative attitude **Walker Percy** (NOTES 30) had when describing the difference between *res extensa* [physical], and *res cogitans* [mental], which categorization Descartes introduced. In short - of this philosophical interpretation pragmatists couldn't be enthusiasted. Especially C.S. Peirce could strongly condemn this kind of interpretation. We shall discuss the views of Wundt later in the current study.

But what about the necessary conclusions of the philosophical relationship of pragmatism and

voluntarism - which Vaihinger advocated for? There are certain agreements between voluntarists and pragmatists, especially with the question of the applicability of evolution theory, and of certain "organic basis" of human knowledge: **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 31) described e.g. science as living being, and as the concrete life of men, who try to find out what is the truth. Further, he has emphasized that such branches of science, as e.g. physical chemistry, archeology, and alike, are not only words, but also objects who have their concrete way of life, which the social group of facts maintain, in their relationships to their objects. He has compared them to the functions of human body; sciences are living and active in their very essence.

According to **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 32), the voluntarist philosophy of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Vaihinger, has been, for the most, only **pre-functionalistic**, because of its emphasis of the biological utility of human knowledge, and the very decisive role of will. But the very kernel of that interpretation is that we have our present knowledge, because of we have achieved certain advances with it, and better position, especially in respect to other biological species. C.S. Peirce didn't advocate for this narrow interpretation - as we have seen during the whole current study, notwithstanding that he has that emphasis of the organic structure of human knowledge. But he didn't refer to biological structures, or to living organisms, but instead to organic-like -behaving functions.

From **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 33), **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 34), and from **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 35) himself we know that he emphasized non-utility, even in science - that the true science must study mainly the useless things, and that science should not deal with the useful things, which have been carried on with commons, just without consultation of scientists. From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 36) we know, too, that C.S. Peirce considered science the most rational of all enterprises which man can have, and that he proposed for that the only thing, which makes the continuity of the whole human race valuable, is just that rational ideas can developed, as well as the rationalization of meanings between objects and things shall advance further and further.

Hence, C.S. Peirce has not just seen the whole human knowledge as an useful mean only - but instead that it has that property because of it makes our ordinary, and wretched life for nothing, and as for something to get rid of.

---

[81]

## Naturalism and pragmatism

Pragmatism has a close connection to Scottish realism, which was introduced to American philosophical audience by John Witherspoon and Samuel Stanhope from Princeton University: this realism tried to join together teleology and empirical explanation - as pragmatists tried to do, too. But why to discuss other schools of realism, or naturalism, if we have this close connection? Just because there was a process of rearrangement in philosophy, in which pragmatists participated, and by which pragmatism can be explained from another points of view.

From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 37) we get to know that from pragmatists C.S. Peirce and William James were advocates of New realism, or to which they have given their sympathies. New realism was a preparative stage before naturalism, and it was a strike back to idealism - like Scottish realism. **Perry** (1), who was an advocate of new realism, and also presented the main ideas of the movement .But as the movement new realism was when **Perry, and some others** (2) have written an article in 1910. But there were also **Cohen** (3), and **F.J. E. Woodbridge** (4) as advocates of that school, and there were several other advocates of lesser importance of that *pre-movement of realism* (5). In general, new realism rejected the *epistemological subjectivism* (6), but its advocates didn't agree with the question of error.

---

1. (RALP BARTON PERRY was an author of *The Ego-Centric Predicament* (1910), and *General Theory of Value* (1926.) which are associated to New realism.)

2. (Perry, R.B, MONTAQUE, W.P., HOLT, R.B., SPAULDING, E.G., MARVIN, W.T., and PITKIN, W.P., "The Program and the First Platform of Six Realists", in the Journal of Philosophy., 1910.)

3. ((1880-1947); MORRIS RAPHAEL COHEN was also one of the leaders of American naturalism, known also as an editor of *Chance, Love, and Logic*, which was the first version of *Collected Papers* by C.S. Peirce.)

4. ((1867-1940); WOODBRIDGE was also one of the leaders of American naturalism.)

5. (E.g. E.B. McGilvary, J. Lowenberg, and J.E. Bloodin.)

6. (*Epistemological subjectivism*: the rejection of the conception that our knowledge is nothing but phenomenological, and thus not accepting that the world appears to us as seen through Kantian epistemology: any thing is given to us, only after it has undergone changes through a priori mechanisms. Hence, new realism is rejecting the subjective nature of grounds of knowledge, but instead emphasizing that things exist whether we were conscious of them, or not. - C.f. *Subjectivism*: Any philosophical theory which holds that all knowledge is merely subjective.)

---

[82]

The next stage in that development of realism there has been regarded the stage of Critical realism. It had some new interpretations which led to other types of difficulties. **Santayana** (1) was one of the advocates of it, and his work *The Life of the Reason* was also influential in the development of naturalistic movement - which had a corresponding *naturalistic school in literature* (2). Philosophically critical realism advocated for *epistemological dualism* (3) - because it considered the arrangement of objects different than their explanations. As a consequence, the question that Descartes and Locke were not been able to solve, became actual again - namely that how we can be sure that those objects, which are not at all given to us, really exist. According to epistemological dualism, all kinds of objects can exist, because of their independence of mind, or because of the secret reasons to exist of their own. We can have this idea, that there are lot of unknown objects, and shall always be. But if they are not given to us, that is, if they do not have any equivalents in mind, we cannot recognize them even when perceiving - and vice versa - have we any idea, which has some relevance to mind, but which doesn't have any given, material object, we cannot prove it false. When doing so, we must deny the whole relevance of all the ideas without given objects. But there are several other problems, too. The one is that any idea - which might have some validity according to the coherence, and self-explaining features of mind - is not necessarily given. We cannot be certain how complex the reality of objects can be, and are our complex ideas identical equivalents of them, especially if the object of complex ideas cannot be given to us as complexes at all - but instead as single cases of them. But there is another question, too.

It might be true that all which exists can be given to us, as they are. But why should we need e.g. induction, if there were already given the complex ideas, as they are, with all of their references - and if there is no longer need to their development? - There are the topics in C.S. Peirce's philosophy which can be associated to this. When describing e.g. experience and inference, he has dealt the question belonging to vagueness and unlimitedness of experience.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 38) suggested that experience is:

*"a sum of those ideas, which irresistibly, emotionable, and strong experientable have been born within our existence, overwhelming all freely playing thought, accompanied by the tenor of our lives with chorus"*.

We cannot restrict the power of experience; it is the river, against which nothing can stand for a long time, and emotional experience is an authority, which rules all of the other experience. When an idea, which is born in experience, and by experience suggests to other ideas, which has its origin in experience, to, is carried forward with the context of those other ideas, there might be born the third kind of idea, a sum, which has a derivative authority to both of them, but it has less vividness. This kind of suggestion

belongs to the law of association with divide inference into inferences by continuity and inferences by resemblance, which is not derived from the occult inward nature of ideas, or soul.

1. ((1863-1952); GEORGE SANTAYANA was a Spanish origin, new realist, and an American pragmatist philosopher, who was as professor at Harvard in 1889-1912 - and an author of *The Life of Reason.*, 1-5., (1905-1906), in which he proposed that which belongs to the reality we can perceive with our senses - and only it can be considered reality.)
2. (C.f. *Naturalism in literature* is the extreme form of realism, and it is represented e.g. by Frank Norris (1870-1902), and Sherwood Anderson (1876-1941), and more recent writers are e.g. Thomas Wolfe (1900-1938) and John Steinbeck (1902-1968).)
3. (*Epistemological dualism*: Of the ground of knowledge, which can be explained with two separate principles, or with antitheses which might have validities of their own, that is, because there is that general dual nature of reality, which is a consequence of that mind and matter exist as distinct entities.)

[83]

This is a [kind of] biological interpretation - since, and it has an emphasis of the very presence of physical world, but it has references to something which may have its own way of life. C.S. Peirce has emphasized also very clearly that whenever we are discussing direct experience, and the ideas, which have been derived from it - they are the kinds, or specie of ideas, which support other kinds of ideas the same origin. This is an origin of families.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 39) has referred to also other "river" -like causations - that science, for example, is an unavoidable consequence of certain physical, chemical, and biological prerequisites - but it has become later mostly independent of them, and now it has a life-style of its own. A letter which has been dated on the 9th Juny in 1904 (NOTES 40) - which C.S. Peirce mailed to Dewey, dealt generally with the problems of normative science - there was a sentence, according with the term normative science should be replaced by natural history. This suggests to the school of Naturalism, which is our next topic, and to science as living creature, which we have discussed before. One of the American naturalists was **Thoreau** (1). Both from the first and eight *ENCY* (NOTES 41) we know that he proposed for that the most important relationship, which any individual can have, is his relationship to nature - and by that relationship an individual is able to find the principles of morals, as well as to develop his imagination. Thoreau's principle **Civil Disobedience** was the model and the doctrine which **Gandhi** (2) applied when he returned from the South-Africa to India, and started a rebel against English colonialists.

We can easily see that Naturalism [even in politics] was something similar as doing things according nature, as a contrary to confront dead structures, or categories. It was just behaving just as "river".

From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 42) we know that Dewey was one of the writers of the book *Naturalism and Human Spirit* (1944). Naturalism has been regarded one of the most characteristic of **The Golden Age** of American philosophy, which had its correspondinc *naturalistic school also in literature* (3). From the first and fourth *ENCY* (NOTES 43) we know that **The Golden Age** of American philosophy was between 1880-1940, and during the time have lived almost all pragmatists, and such idealists as Josiah Royce and A.N. Whitehead, who both had a certain role in the development of pragmatism. During **The Golden Age** of American philosophy Naturalism was still strongly antireductivistic. This was just an idea that within nature there are fields which are independent of [lower] levels - and therefore reduction to the most simplest elements was not possible. This kind of interpretation was characteristic also by C.S. Peirce.

**Ernst Nagel** (NOTES 44) has suggested that there are, in the nature, as many characters as we have present in our human experience, and we cannot reduce the nature by the doctrine "nothing but" to its elements. To this argument can be associated to the principle of contextualism which says that there is no separate - or at least sensible reality behind context, and that context can be perceived by its own

phenomena. But there were also some notices concerning them. Nagel argued for that there cannot be a context which were existing only for itself. Every quality and case is a genuine expression, and it owes references and functions which can be explained, too.

- 
1. ((1817-1862); HENRY DAVID THOREAU was an American naturalist, and an author of the books *Life in the Woods* (1854), and *Civil Disobedience* (1849) - hence the term.)
  2. ((1869-1948); GANDHI [Mathama (Mohandas Karamchand)] was the Indian nationalist leader; he has been regarded as an originator of 'passive resistance', as a form of political action.)
  3. (**The Golden Age**: when we speak about literature - the early nineteenth century was the Golden Age, which was marked by the rise of imaginative literature - fiction and poetry. James Fenimore Cooper was the first American novelist to gain a reputation in Europe, and he described frontier life in numerous of his works. And there was HENRY WADSWORTH LONGFELLOW with his *Hiawatha*-epos, which was inspired by Finnish *Kalevala*. Then there were Washington Irving, HENRY DAVID THOREAU, Nathaniel Hawthorne, Oliver Wendell Holmes, John G. Whittier, Herman Melville, William C. Bryant, RALPH WALDO EEMERSON, Edgar Allan Poe, and James Russell LOWELL.)

---

[84]

In the year 1945 the center of American Naturalism was New York, and there especially Columbia University. Before The Second World War the leaders of the movement were J. Dewey and F.J.E. Woodbridge - as well as M.R. Cohen who was employed at City College. After The War there was **J.H. Randall, Jr.** (1), who has derived his ideas both from Dewey and Woodbridge. And there was also E. Nagel, whom we just discussed. From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 45) we know that there were also **R.B. Perry** (2), and C.I. Lewis - the latter has been known as an advocate of the doctrine of the conformity of value judgements, expressed e.g. in his work *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (3). Many Naturalists have criticized English **G.E. Moore** (4), especially his *Principia Ethica*, in which Moore has, in turn, criticized strongly against their naturalistic fallacy, and against C.I. Lewis, too, who has argued for that we can confirm our sentences, by which we express values, just like the sentences of empirical sciences. Moore has suggested instead that our moral sentences have not only one and fixed meanings.

One of Naturalists was **Schneider** (5), and there have been many naturalistic philosophers since those, just mentioned above (6). In general, we can conclude that of pragmatists, Dewey's and Santayana's role in the development of Naturalism, during the all of its stages, was more apparent than the role of other pragmatists. We cannot categorize them only to naturalists - as we cannot manage with James and C.S. Peirce. But there are certain common features between pragmatism and naturalism. One of the most important of them is that idea of living world, which is unreducible, and that nothing there cannot be fixed beforehand.

- 
1. (JOHN HERMAN RANDALL has been known as an author of historical overview *The Career of Philosophy: From The Middle-Ages to the Enlightenment.*, New York., Columbia University Press., (1962.))
  2. (Perry has also written on pragmatism, e.g. in *The Thought and Character of William James.*, Boston., 1953.)
  3. (LEWIS, C.I., *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.*, La Salle., Illinois., 1962.)
  4. ((1873-1958); GEORGE E. MOORE was an English philosopher, and an author of *Principia Ethica* (1913), and who, with B. Russell, was an enthusiast rebeller against idealism.)

5. (HERBERT SCHNEIDER wrote History of American Philosophy, which was published in 1946.)

6. (E.g. such as James E. Creighton, William E. Hocking, Willbur Urban, and personalistic philosopher Edgar S. Brightsman )

[85]

## Pragmatism and humanism

It seems that the humanistic tradition is very long. It is quite obvious, that there has been also humanistic elements in philosophy during centuries. Humanism is a very fruitful start when we start taking about what is inside pragmatism, and its disagreements. There have been several advocates of *humanism* (1) in literature.

Among them are e.g. **Cicero** (2), and **Horace** (3). Then there were also **Ovid** (4), and **Virgil** (5). These early advocates of humanism were admired especially after the 14th century, as well as an Italian **Petrarch** (6). Petrarch insisted that the masters of Roman literature were important, not only by aesthetic reasons, but because their new attitude of life, too. Among Platonian humanist there was **Mirandola** (7). During the Renaissance humanistic ideas spread to *Gallia transalpina*, and one of the most famous of the advocates of humanism was **Erasmus** (8), who influenced in the 15th century. Most of these humanists derived their ideas from Greek philosophers, and they were studying also *rhetorics*.

---

1. (*Humanism*: System of thought or action concerned with merely human interests (as distinction from divine) or with those of human race [as distinction from individual]. See also other meanings: 2. Literary culture, especially that of Humanists. 3. Devotion to human interests.)

2. ((106-43 B.C.); CICERO [ Marcus Tullius ] was the Roman republican orator, and a humanist philosopher, who popularized the thoughts of Greek philosophers to Romans.)

3. ((65-8 B.C.) Quintus HORATIUS Flaccus, i.e. HORACE was a Latin poet and an EPICUREAN philosopher. His work includes the Satires, Odes, Epodes, Epistles, and Ars Poetica. Well-known is his phrase *Pulvis et umbra sumus* ["We are dust and shadow", in Finnish: "Olemmehan vain tomu ja tuhka"].)

4. ((43 B.C.-c A.D. 18); Publius OVIDIUS Naso, i.e. OVID was the Roman poet, and an author of Ars Amatoria, Metamorphoses, Fasti, etc. he was a poet of love, and described women's mental- and emotional life.)

5. ((70-19 B.C.); .Publius VERGILIUS Maro, i.e. VIRGIL was the Roman poet, whose chief works were Aeneid, the epic poem of the Roman people, recounting the adventures of Aeneas and his Trojans - associating to Odyssey. The book has certain structural similarities to the stories by HOMER. There is also his Georgics, a didactic poem on agriculture and rearing of cattle and bees. The book has derived its influences from HESIODOS. Then there are his Eglogues or 'Bucolics', which are pastoral poems.)

6. ((1304-1374); Francesco BETRARCA, i.e. PETRARCH was an Italian poet and humanist, who has been known for his odes and sonnets to 'Laura')

7. ((1463-1494); Giovanni Pico della MIRANDOLA was an Italian humanist, and a Neo-Platonic philosopher, who was a pioneer in the study of Hebrew philosophy and the Cabbala.)

8. ((1466-1536); Desiderius ERASMUS was the Dutch humanist, who e.g. prepared the way for reformation by his version of The New Testament. His condemnation of Church abuses in *Moriae Encomium*.)

Then we have the new humanists in the 18th century. Among them the most famous are **Goethe** (1), and **Schiller** (2). At previous chapter we discussed Vaihinger, who has referred to one of Schiller's verse (in *Huldigung der Künste*, 1905) when describing his own **philosophy of Als Ob**.

We can easily see, that humanism have been a long history since The Early Renaissance. It based as well as on the literature of ancient Creece, as Roman authors, which we have discussed before. Nowadays the advocates of it were tend to trust human reason, and they try to introduce methods, by which to expand our empirical knowledge, and they also emphasize reasoning based on probability. We can find als humanism in C.S. Peirce's philosophy, especially when he is evaluating, and describing man's inabilities, and weakness. This kind of human approach he has e.g. when he is describing science, and its ways of being as organic structure, and co-operation of scientists.

If we want to undestand disagreements within pragmatic movement in America, we cannot do it without considering humanism. There were disagreements on how C.S. Peirce, James and F.C.S. Schiller have described humanism in pragmatism. Unfortunately I don't know if that pragmatist Schiller have any relationship to that German poet Schiller, or is the name just the same by accident.

From **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 46) we get to know that C.S. Peirce used the modified term **pragmaticism** to dissociate himself from the interpretations of James and Schiller. Also **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 47) has given similar information - that C.S. Peirce began to use the pragmaticism for the reason that other pragmatists, as James, Dewey, Papini and Schiller, changed his original ideas, and because the original term pragmatism had become known by them in a twisted form. Hence - he gave to his "system" a new name which he considered ugly enough that nobody would not to kidnap it any more.

The new term pragmaticism we can find in a letter which C.S. Peirce wrote to Mario Calderoni probably in the year 1905 (NOTES 48) in which he tried to correct the misunderstanding, namely that pragmatism could be regarded essentially as a philosophical system. He wanted to reject this interpretation saying that pragmaticism was rather a method of thinking - continuing that Jiliano il Sofista [who was a friend of Calderoni], was quite right when saying that the ideas within pragmatism were not new ones in philosophy. C.S. Peirce told to Calderoni that he had presented those ideas thirty years ago.

Just the similar information on these thirty years we can find also from **W. James'** (NOTES 49) article in The Nation. According to C.S. Peirce's letter to W. James, which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (NOTES 50), Mr. Schiller had lost the very essence of pragmatism - and that he himself has failed to make such a system, with whose aid:

*"it should no longer be possible to create other kind of concepts than pragmatic ones",*

but C.S. Peirce felt himself as **dethroned**, and too weak to create the complete system, which were so compact that he wished it to be. From this letter [and from several another letters] we know, however, that C.S. Peirce's and James' personal [and also philosophical] comradship was a good one.

---

1. ((1749-1832); Johan Wolfgang von GOETHE was the German poet (perhaps the greatest), and also scientist, and statesman in the duchy of Weimar. he was an author of many lyric poems, dramas, and novels, of which Faust, a dramatic poem of a man, who sells his soul to get power and welfare, but who regret his choice, and tries to correct it, and the novels The Sorrows of Young Werther and William Meister are the most famous.)

2. ((1759-1805); Johan Cristoph Friendrich von SCHILLER was the German writer, who has written a lot of books, and especially plays, of which Don Carlos (1787), Wallenstein (1800), and Wilhelm Tell (1804) are the best known.)

[87]

C.S. Peirce mailed to James a letter which, in turn, has been dated on the 7th March 1904 (NOTES 51) in which he regarded that the humanistic element in pragmatism very impressive, but he did not believe, that the doctrine of pragmatism could be proved like Schiller has suggested. C.S. Peirce accused both James and Schiller that they have developed pragmatism to far that he could accept it any more. C.S. Peirce didn't want to explain the essence, and role of man at the level of ordinary life only - and that man is human only because of his ordinary life.

There is an interesting link to Kant in the question of humanism. From **Sidgwick** (NOTES 52) we know that Kant has stated that:

*"all rational beings as such are ends to each",*

which is similar to that:

*"humanity exists as an end in itself".*

According to **Sidgwick** (NOTES 53) he also argued for, that so long as one confine himself to mere non-interference with others, one do not positively make humanity his end; his aims remain selfish, thought restricted by this condition of non-interference with others. One's action, therefore, is not truly virtuous; for virtue is exhibited and consists in effort to realize the end of reason in opposition to mere selfish impulses. Therefore, as we can read at **Grundlegung** (NOTES 54):

*"the ends of the subject, which is itself an end, must of necessity be my ends, if the representation of Humanity as an end in itself is to have its full weight with me".*

There are certain themes in C.S. Peirce's philosophy which are not very far from those above which have been presented by Kant - e.g. what concerns the meaning of the end. From C.S. Peirce's letter to W. James which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (NOTES 55) we know that C.S. Peirce considered the term reaction something which is both "be-all" and "end-all", where the end is something which sanctions action, and where it belongs essentially to the third category. He suggested further that this kind of thinking leads to synechism, and further that aesthetics, ethics, and logic, as normative sciences, are corresponding by their psychological aspect to the categories of feeling, reaction and thought. This is just the same as admitting the human nature of our knowledge.

[88]

But, there was another direction in C.S. Peirce's philosophy, namely the recognition of the social nature of human activities, which is also a kind of human character. This kind of view he expressed also in his synechism. But what is important is that human beings cannot be explained only by their psychological, or biological aspects, or by their social settings. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 56) emphasized the sociability of self, arguing for that synechist should not say that:

*"I am altogether myself, and not at all you",*

continuing that kind of metaphysics of wickedness must be abjured, because, in the first place:

*"your neighbours are, in a measure, yourself, and in a far, greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe! Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most part, the vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place, all men resemble you and are in analogous circumstances, in a measure, though not in the same way in which your neighbours are you".*

These cross-social features are quite familiar to man, but also to other species, as to man's fellow animals. But there are features, which are, perhaps, familiar only to man himself, or, at least, to the best of men.

Let us remind what we have discussed at the beginning of the current study, where **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 57) has suggested in his synechism:

*"a man is capable to assign him a rôle in the drama of creation, and so far he shall lose himself to that drama, he shall identify himself with an author".*

But these features are familiar also with our fellow-animals - when our dog is trying to behave according "our manuscript", for example - according which he thinks his master is preferring, and from this point of view this role-taking is nothing but obeying, but also doing things as others do - according to an imagined manuscript of a drama. It is possible to teach animals by **cueing** them, or by **shaping**, or -if we want to say - teaching how the whole manuscript is telling how to do.

This is something concerning the end, or being something more than everyday experience as such - or just a possibility. It might be that due of this sociability, and other kinds to come, too, - we are able to perceive something, first at an elementary level, and later at higher levels, as well as we become perceived by others at different levels, and by very different creatures too. If we discuss humanism, or its implications to ourselves, there must always be a possibility to the more complicated interaction, and moral choices. And if we want to talk about perceiving, or being perceived, there must be present that interaction, too, which is conscious, or felt. Whenever we talk about human perceiving, we talk about sociability, and the communication of different kinds of perceiving and perceived selves, which are complex and developed, and something in itself, too. But those complexes might be illusory, if they really had no common-accepted ordinariness, or reference. This does not make any illusory experience untrue, however, but denies only their general validity within common-acceptability. But We must remind that any error is human. Nature does not make errors, because there is no principle within how to make just this or that kind of things, instead of these, which are as probable as those over there.

---

[89]

## **Pragmatism and phenomenology**

We have discussed Wundt, when we dealt with voluntarism at the current chapter. He was criticized already during his lifetime by many opponents. One of those opponents was **Franz Brentano** (1), who have been associated to the early phenomenology, has asserted to that sensation must not be described as an idea, but as function.

Phenomenology starts from immediately given, and introspection, and the method has certain similarities to Descartes' way to put things. The start is non-empirical, that is, description, whereafter we analyse thing, and study if there is any intentionality present. But it is important that a phenomenologist does not take in account to those departments of reality, to which intentional acts seem to be referring to, and he must concentrate only to acts themselves.

From the fourth and sixth *ENCY* (NOTES 58) we know that the philosophical father of phenomenology has been considered **Husserl** (2), who influenced mainly at Halle, Göttingen, and Freiburg in Germany. C.S. Peirce has said to have used the term phenomenology already in 1902, when discussing a description of the object, which is under [our] observation. According to C.S. Peirce, we ought to describe the meanings of object, and we must take in consideration all that precedes the mind. This sounds to me like phenomenalism, as well as C.S. Peirce's description concerning feelings, and their immediate way of being.

When introducing his synechism, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 59) used the term phenomena, in a sense of phenomenalism. He emphasised, that phenomena are not perfectly regular, and that we can say about physical and psychical controversy that all phenomena are, of one character, more mental and spontaneous, and others more material and regular. The **phenomena** are the mixture of freedom and constraint, which makes them to be teleological and purposive. That is - there is that dimension of intentionality, but some phenomena have it not at all. But there were no intentionality without that

element of freedom, I suppose. According to C.S. Peirce, sensation is the function of mind, and not an idea; it is an event in which a feeling is forced upon the mind in a particular occasion - as a consequence of the consciousness of compulsion in sensation.

From **Tuomo Aho** (NOTES 60) we know that Brentano - according intentional inexistence - considered psychical phenomena as experiences, and claimed [according Scholastic philosophers] that only psychical phenomena can be intentional, and that only they can concern something. There is something like "freedom" which we have discussed above, and because we know how C.S. Peirce emphasized the role of person, or self in the development of knowing, it seems to me clear, that this "freedom" belongs to its category. Hence, there is a similarity between Brentano and C.S. Peirce in this respect.

- 
1. ((1838-1917); FRANZ BRENTANO was the German philosopher, who, on the contrary as the most philosophers of his age, was an advocate of Aristotle'S philosophy, and not that of Kant. He took from Scholastic tradition the concept intentional inexistence, because he considered that psychic phenomena differ from all of other phenomena; in psychic phenomena the mind is directed to an object, which has [in that phenomenon] intentional inexistence. He has influenced to EDMUND HUSSERL and MEINONG.)
  2. ((1859-1938); EDMUND HUSSERL was a German philosopher, and the founder of phenomenism. His influential work is Phenomenology, which C.V. SOLOMON has translated in English [Encyclopaedia Britannica., Vol XVII, pp. 699-702, (1927)], and which, by him, influenced also to American philosophy. W.R. Royce GIBSON, in turn, translated HUSSERL'S work Ideas, which was printed in New York in 1931.)

---

[90]

By **T. Aho** (NOTES 61), there are two kind of theories of intentionality.

**First.** We can consider Brentano as an advocate of *object theory* (1), that is, object stands for meaning . **D.W. Smith and R. McIntyre** (2) has categorized Brentano to this category. Next we study if there is something of this theory in the philosophy of C.S. Peirce. As we know from **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 62) had C.S. Peirce an interpretation that object precedes its interpretation - and that - sign does not be defined from itself but from object, which influences to person with its effects. At first glance this seems to be just according object theory. But this is not the case, however, because object does not stay for a long time as it was just during its effect, **and that it may become continuously something more that it is right now**, and object is not at all compact, either, but instead it may have innumerable ways of being, and it can be referential in innumerable ways. Object only precedes its meaning, which shall be made in mind, which is dealing with results of perceptions, which have been processed further, and they are no longer reducible to objects. Hence, the meaning is not exactly the same as the first, and successful contact with object, or some other late variation of them.

There is always an interpretation of object, and its effects to us, and it is dependent of those effects how clear conception we can have about object, but not from object themselves. In a way, we determine ourselves, by our acts, to understand something about object, and the object we try to understand, in turn, may give certain restrictions to our activities, partly because the effects, which it just has to us at the moment, and partly because of the effects, which it has not at all to us right now. Thus, we cannot be sure that we have a complete meaning right now, and that we have interpreted object [or a group of them] properly - or even if we have, or have not, interpreted the object which we ought to be interpreted. There is no definite way, by which object is influencing to us, and there is no definite meaning involved within the contact we have.

From **Percy** (NOTES 63) we know that C.S. Peirce's argument:

*"there are real things out there, whose characters are independent of our opinions of them".*

We cannot say that we create any object by our activities, but we cannot say, either, that our activities are such as they are only because of object. Object are something, which are preceding their explanation - was the explanation valid or invalid one. And there are several kinds of interactions between us and objects, and only one of them is understanding the meaning of them, because they may have also slight influences, which remain relatively vague, too. And we shall never trace them again, perhaps, when trying to explain them with our better understanding. Therefore, C.S. Peirce cannot be regarded as an advocate of object theory.

**Second.** From **Tuomo Aho** (NOTES 64), we know that Brentano has been regarded as an advocate of *content theory* (3), too, and exponents of this interpretation are **A. Marras** (4) and **R. Richardson** (5) in their writings concerning Brentano's view to intentional inexistence.

I think that C.S. Peirce was an advocate of this theory - but only in a sense, that we accept as goals relatively wide explications. If we think his doctrine of synechism, and his contextualism - especially in his theory of mind, or in his **general- and nomological psychognosies**, we can - and cannot have this very proof. And if we think his discussions concerning action of willing, we have only occasionally a certain content within it - which sometimes tells us, to where our current action is oriented to. But it is just not the special case which tells us the meaning, because it is nothing but a vague feeling that there must be an explanation of some kind. And when we are acting intentionally, e.g. when we are behaving according a manuscript of the world evolution, and we know that we do just that - there is no need for an explanation of a special act, which tells us, that just this or that is our temporal target - but instead we may have the very feeling that most cases we have at this level of experience, are suggesting to the final goal, which we shall be acquaintance with in future, but it is not because of this special case, but because of the level we shall have, and because of our higher knowledge when achieved that level.

Therefore, we cannot say from intentional acts themselves, for which direction they have been directed for, but we can do that from higher level understanding of them - and hence, we cannot consider C.S. Peirce as an advocate of content theory, either. And if we want to bridge a link to C.S. Peirce's epistemology, we must consider Brentano as an advocate of wider "content theory" - that "content" is not just something evolved into every single case we can have, but instead that there is an appropriate scope to them. But in the same time, we might to suppose that there is no such link to C.S. Peirce, because he didn't put his explanations just to certain models of understanding objects. The possible positive answer depends just on the level, on which we consider that "content". By the doctrine of synechism, there cannot be any meaning, which is totally apart from things, which we explain, but it is only saying that we must take in account everything when explaining, and that we should not restrict any meaning to a single person, or to a single phenomenon, or like. Hence, the all elements of our consciousness must belong to "content", or to the preparation of an explanation of it.

- 
1. (*Object theory*: An intentional act is a relation between object and subject, and that an object determines what kind an act is in question.)
  2. (Smith, D.W., and McIntyre, R., *Husserl and Intentionality*., Dordrecht., 1982)
  3. (*Content theory*: An intentional act has as such a content, which says to where act is directed for.)
  4. (MARRAS, A., "Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality"., in McALISTER)
  5. (RICHARDSON, R., "Brentano on Intentional Inexistence and the Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena"., in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie*., 65., 1983)

---

[91]

But what about our sensations, and our activities of willing, which we have discussed already? **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 65) has explained, that our sensations contain two radically different kinds of elements of

consciousness:

*"one part is feeling, and the other part is the consciousness of being compelled to feel upon that particular occasion. This consciousness of compulsion has, in turn, a general resemblance to the consciousness of willing, and in that process of willing, there are present both self-consciousness and the consciousness of some exterior force, and the self and not-self are separated in this sort of consciousness".*

But this suggests only to that there might be a relatively simple contents in this process, or none. This is only a description of a division of our consciousness into two distinct departments, which is temporally appropriate arrangement, when we are approaching some new departments of world, and adding something into our mind. One part of us is reaching to something more complex, and one part of us is still there which we know already. Despite we have this double-state, we have no special references to any goals, or we have any definite intentions to any "still" inexistence-status-having departments of world.

But C.S. Peirce's view according to the content theory at this point? Not necessarily, because there is the presence of exterior force, which is not necessarily rational, or which does not present necessarily any purposiveness in itself, and there is also that breaking into two departments, which have no core-understanding level above them, yet.. There is only an action in which something is to be consciously willed, and that somebody is just willing in order to shall reduce a tension - when it shall be achieved something. And this goal the one knows from experience, not from the current situation, of derived from one's current self. There is no goal-oriented, and special content in willing, as such, but when joined to other elements of consciousness the action of willing has a content. But what about the differentiation of self and not-self? We cannot say this or that, but if there were something which is explainable only from outside, or which is having no definite existence, it could be impossible to prove this external reality to exist. But we cannot say that there were something which were reasonable only from inside, because if we were outside of this department, we had no right to argue anything for reason, or stupidity. But there must be more stable, and mutual structures, if we want to join to them to any contents, or understand them. But this stableness does not indicate to something ever-been structures.

From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 66) we know, that, according to **C.S. Peirce**:

*"the self is not predetermined, and not an entity. Instead, it will be developed in social contexts, and will spread itself first to the whole context, and later outside of it. And further, the spiritual development of the self needs a vision, too, which is more than the self is at a certain moment in itself".*

I guess, that these passages above are much more like ideas of Scottish realist **Hamilton** (1) than of Brentano's ideas, especially what comes to the roles of self, and not-self, especially in the development of knowledge. But what about, if we discuss only single persons, or finite processes? If we accept, as the fact, that during those finite processes we can use, at least, temporary concepts, or interpretants, and that we occasionally really know for what they are referring to, there is still a question, from where we have got this information. Further, have we created our signs during process, or have they been somewhere already before, or is there somebody who have known them for a long time ago? From **C.S. Morris** (NOTES 67) we know, that, according to C.S. Peirce, there cannot be any final meanings in any of those processes, by which we produce something, whose concepts are merely interpreted, and from which process we cannot conclude what kind the possible final meanings should be - if we are considering only processes or finite developments. But if they are not something achieved, there is a question of their origin, as well as the question of the origin of mind and thought, which are not results, and which we shall have when using signs, because both of them are internal and non-functional characters of the universe.

---

1. ((1788-1856); Sir WILLIAM HAMILTON was a Scottish philosopher, who held that all knowledge is relative, and it concern the things, of which we just happen to know something, because of the presence of certain prerequisites and conditions. Hence, the absolute truth is unknown to us, and our knowledge of it is negative, because our knowledge is based on the difference between self and not-self, which a state

we create when knowing. The self, where knowledge is something more structured, is continuous confrontation against not-self, whose reality and possible structure is outlined according to which we have in self.)

[92]

The ideas, which we bring up by ideas, are [always] well-developed contents, notwithstanding that they are not final ones. But they are not connected to feelings, or sensations any more, either. On the other hand, those higher contents should not be possible at all, if there were not present those previous [preparatory] actions of willing. This is definitely true, as we know already from history of mankind. Man has not always had his most brilliant ideas, but instead man must have struggled with them for thousands of years, or at least for centuries. Somebody must have willed definitely what he has been had going to get, whatever it was, and one of the consequences was, that there was since then this division into self and not-self. We may say that - in common-sense meaning - willing is quite the same as taking a direction, or that there is then a movement towards something. But -of course - this is not the same as willing to have a bottle of whiskey.

The differentiation of self and not-self makes, in turn, room for "our" contents and "our" surroundings, but also a special kind of a room, or level, from which it is possible to see them. But what is there which precedes the mind? There are *percepts* (1), and *perceptions* (2). The latter may be illusory, or imagined, or they may be dreamed, too. C.S. Peirce has emphasized, in many of his writings, that we have an illusory way of perceiving and apprehending the world, but he didn't want to make illusions worthless. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 68) has e.g. proposed for, that there is no fundamental difference between true perceptions and hallucinations. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 69) has put imagination, vividness, and belief to the category of association, and other rational functions in his special psychognosy.

But why? One of the possible explanations is the decisive role of future in knowing. When **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 70) has studied the relationship between present and future, he has used expressions like quasi-conjectures, and dreams, when describing them as our expectations for future. He has also proposed for that such things as illusions and dreams are the equipments of philosophy, too, but that we should not accept them forever and ever. From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 71) we know that in C.S. Peirce's model of human knowledge there was a claim that the whole science is inspired by doubt and belief - which a view can be associated to empirism, and to Hume scepticism. According to C.S. Peirce - any true proposition is conditional for future; and it is general just at a measure, in which it can be judged to join adequately to human practices in future, where it shall express its rationality. That is, there must take in consideration also other perspectives than our currency. There are a lot of indicators which are suggestive to that influence of empirism. Let us remind - again - that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 72) has regarded:

*"science as an organic phenomenon, which (science) is, in the same time, a kind of a form of life, whose name is knowing and who operates analogically as an organic body and its limbs."*

But are there any evidences suggesting to phenomenology. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 73) has suggested to that mentality and mind are only cases in the phenomenon of life, and they are part of larger processes. An further, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 74) has used the term phenomenological pneumatology in his general psychognosy, when describing the essence of mind, and the law of final causation, which are non-biological. In the same context, when describing the aim of general laws of concert and strict, he has used the term special phenomena [as constitution of society and law], to which these laws can be applied. But these terms do not refer to phenomenalism, but instead e.g. to evolution philosophy, as well as to his own psychognosy, but also to such branches of science as to physiology, psychology - but also to certain ideas introduced by Plato. The English word phenomenon is quite common, and there is nothing special secrets in it.

Those who are interested to researches concerning the relationship of phenomenalism and C.S. Peirce, there is a study of **Wells-Hantzis** (3).

1. (*Percept*: Object of perception; mental product, as opposite to action, of perceiving.)
  2. (*Perception*: Action by which the mind refers its sensations to external object as cause. See also: Act, faculty, of perceiving; intuitive recognition (of).)
  3. (HANTZIS, C.W., Peirce on Logic: Phenomenology as the Basis for Normative Science., Facs. - Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1984; Diss.: University of California, Berkeley, 1981)
- 

[93]

#### NOTES 4

1. (Collected Papers of... , VII, §2., Forms of Consciousness., .541-.543, 1966)
  2. (Morris, C.W., Six Theories of Mind., Chicago., p. 273, 1932)
  3. (Morris, C.W., Six Theories of Mind., p. 278, 1932)
  4. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2. Forms of... , .540-.543, 1966)
  5. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §8., Evolution of the Laws of Nature., .514-.515, 1966)
  6. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 30.11.1868, lett., C.S. Peirce to W.T. Harris., p. 185, 1966)
  7. (Hollo, J.A., Kasvatuksen maailma., WSOY., Porvoo., pp. 110-111, 1952)
  8. (Vaihinger, H., The Philosophy of 'as if', (Die Philosophie des Als Ob., 1911)., translated by C.K. Ogden., London., Routledge & Kegan Paul., Ltd., xlvi-xlvii, 1968)
  9. (Vaihinger, H., The Philosophy of 'as if', autobiography., 1968)
  10. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., c. 1905, lett., from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni., pp. 165-166, 1966)
  11. (Scheffler, I., Four Pragmatists., pp. 83-84, 1974)
  12. (Vaihinger, H., The Philosophy of 'as if', autobiography., 1968)
  13. (Vaihinger, H., The Philosophy of 'as if', autobiography., 1968)
- 

[94]

14. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., Forms of Consciousness., .544-.545, 1966)
15. (Smith, J.E., The Spirit of American Philosophy., New York, pp. 3-37, 1966)
16. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 7.3.1904, Lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 189-190, 1966)
17. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 13.3.1904, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 186-188, 1966)
18. (Vaihinger, H., The Philosophy of 'as if', autobiography., 1968)

19. (Vaihinger, H., *The Philosophy of 'as if'*, autobiography., 1968)
20. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., c. 1905., lett. from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni, pp. 165-166; see also: Bibliography., pp. 161-256, 1966)
21. (Vaihinger, H., *The Philosophy of 'as if'*, autobiography., 1968)
22. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., c. 1905., lett. from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni, pp. 165-166; see also: Bibliography., pp. 161-256, 1966)
23. (Vaihinger, H., *The Philosophy of 'as if'*, autobiography., 1968)
24. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , p. 81, 1989)
25. (Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism.*, p. 15, 1968)
26. (Vaihinger, H., *The Philosophy of 'as if'*, autobiography., 1968)
27. (Grue-Sørensen, K., *Kasvatuksen historia.*, II., translated by Kaila., WSOY, Porvoo, pp. 125, 240-241, 1961)

---

[95]

28. (Vaihinger, H., *The Philosophy of 'as if'*, autobiography., 1968)
29. (Vaihinger, H., *The Philosophy of 'as if'*, autobiography., 1968)
30. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , pp. 78, 80-81, 1989)
31. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Science., science as concrete life of men: 7.50, science as organic body, and social creature: 7.52-7.53, 1966)
32. (Morris, C.W., *Six Theories of Mind.*, Mind as Function., 1932)
33. (Morris, C.W., *Six Theories of Mind.*, p. 283f, 1932)
34. (Scheffler, I., *Four Pragmatists.*, p. 84, 1974)
35. (Peirce, C.S., *Lessons from the History of Science*, 1896)
36. (Scheffler, I., *Four Pragmatists.*, p. 86, 1974)
37. (The *ENCYclopedia of Philosophy.*, 1., New York., pp. 88-89, 1967)
38. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Association., .388, .424, 1966)
39. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Science., .7.50, 1966)
40. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 9.6.1904, lett. from C.S. Peirce to John Dewey., pp. 180-181, 1966)
41. (The *ENCYclopedia of Philosophy.*, 1., pp. 85-86, 1967; see also: *The ENCY*, 8., pp. 121-122, 1967)

---

[96]

42. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., pp. 88-89, 1967)
43. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., p. 87; see also: The ENCY, 4., p. 241, 1967)
44. (Nagel, E., Naturalism Reconsidered., Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association., vol 28., 1954-1955)
45. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., p. 90, 1967)
46. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 80, 1981)
47. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., pp. 13-14, 1968)
48. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., c. 1905, lett., from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni., pp. 165-166, 1966)
49. (James, W., article in The Nation., 78; 3.3.1904, pp. 175-176)
50. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 25.11.1902, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 188-189, 1966)
51. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 7.3.1904, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 189-190)
52. (Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics... , Note, pp. 389-390, 1962)
53. (Sidgwick, H., The Methods of Ethics., Note, pp. 389-390, 1962)
54. (Kant, I., Grundlegung., p. 59)
55. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 25.11.1902, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., p. 189, 1966)

---

[97]

56. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synechism and Immortality, .571, 1966)
57. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synechism and... , .571, 1966)
58. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 4., p. 97; See also: The ENCY., 6., p. 135, 1967)
59. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synechism and... , .568, 1966)
60. (Aho, T., "Brentanon suhteesta fenomenologiaan"., presented at The International Conference on Phenomenology (Phenomenological Symposium)., in Jyväskylä university on the 8th May in 1989)
61. (Aho, T., "Brentanon suhteesta fenomenologiaan")
62. (Morris. C.W., Six Theories of Mind, p. 284, 1932)
63. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , p. 80, 1989)
64. (Aho, T., "Brentanon suhteesta fenomenologiaan")
65. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., Forms of Consciousness., .542-.543, 1966)

66. (Scheffler, I., Four Pragmatists., p. 86, 1974)

67. (Morris, C.W., Six Theories of Mind, p. 284, 1932)

68. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., p. 644, 1966)

69. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Special Psychognosy., .233, 1966)

70. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., pp. 667-668, 1966)

71. (Scheffler, I., Four Pragmatists., p. 84, 1974)

---

[98]

72. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Science., .7.50-.7.53, 1966)

73. (Collected Papers of ... , I., p. 96, 1966)

74. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., General Psychognosy., .233, 1966)

[99]

## The Man of Pragmatism, Chapter V

### The triangle of positivism, instrumentalism, and experimental psychology

(and their role when understanding pragmatism)

#### Positivism and pragmatism

As we have read cursorily at an earlier stage during the current study - Comte can be regarded as the originator of positivism, which - as a term - can be associated to the title of his one work, namely *Cours de Philosophie positive*. As a meliorist Comte believed, that man, who has an autonomous reason, can develop himself and his society without any restrictions to the stages, which are far better than any of the previous stages. The first steps of the technical breakthrough, which were taken during Comte's age, seemed to offer reason enough for a kind of optimism ...

Further, Comte supposed that if man just knew the laws of nature, he should certainly master nature - and just by knowing those laws he was going to be able to regulate nature better and better. He believed that there will be the final positive stage in the development of science, as a whole, and correspond to it, there will be an industrial society, where scientists are the highest class - as the clergy in The Middle-Ages. As we can see, there is lot of megalomania in his views, and they are similar to those views which were held by ancient Greece.

It seems to me that C.S. Peirce had a similar interpretation concerning the the stages in the development of science - as by Comte - and especially what comes to human knowledge. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 1) has used - as an illustrating example - the model of geological succession - concerning the development of the branches of science, especially in his lectures at Lowell-Institute during the years 1892-1893. Then he discussed the birth, and growing of the heart of science, which is a nucleus of science - but which shall enlarge itself to other departments of science in the course of time.

---

[100]

Comte has suggested to that there are three main stages in history which he categorized:

1. *teleological*, (1)
2. *metaphysical*, (2), and
3. *positive*.

But, in addition to these, there are certain synthesizing tendencies, especially in history, which he considered to be general ones. For example, he supposed that polytheistic religion will be replaced by monotheistic religion, and it will be, in turn, replaced by metaphysical philosophy, that is, by philosophical speculations. In the course of time, those philosophical speculations will be replaced by science, and by scientific way to think. This is just the same idea which C.S. Peirce has proposed for to be explanation of the development of science. But of course there are several other philosophers, who have dealt with the idea of successive models, or metamorphoses. In addition to these tendencies Comte made a categorization of sciences: that there are sciences from abstract to concrete, and they can be seen as a system, where the highest level is that positive one. This is a kind of Aristotelian idea, but slight modified, however. Further, he suggested for that mathematics can be seen as an example of those sciences which has achieved that highest positive level. An interesting claim is that sociology will achieve that level lastly.

It seems to be that Comte's aim was to deny metaphysics and instead of it to create monistic system - which is characteristic leading feature of his epistemology. There was something in Comte's philosophy, which didn't exist any more in later logical empirism, namely, the emphasis of philosophical speculations, after the stage of doubting beliefs, and movement towards the scientific way of thinking. This kind of description is very general with empirists, and not very original one.

But an interesting idea is that he put sociology [in the whole development of knowledge] to the lowest level in the whole current development: the study of the social contexts of man are very far from complete, but sociology, as well as all other branches of science, which are diffuse now, shall achieve the highest positive level at the end. There are no exceptions, what concerns the human knowledge and its specialities. Only some old religions have no possibilities - in such - at future world, or any chance to achieve the highest levels.

There is certain kind an emphasis of fluidity in Comte's view, too. Namely, that there shall be a variety of different stages, which are still able to produce something monistic. We can find that view of the fluidity in C.S. Peirce's philosophy, as well as a emphasis of the crucial role of doubt in the development of human knowledge - as well as the expectations for more fixed future, which is explained ad infinitum, as a whole system, and as all details. The result of all is within one and only system - which is - in a sense - monistic.

Let us study his letter, which he mailed to Christine Ladd-Franklin, and which has been dated on the 29th August in 1891 (NOTES 2), in which he suggested that we are living right now partly in spontaneity, which resists laws, and which has not yet reached their full conformity - we live only partly according fixed habits [but merely under the principle habit taking]. Those habit takings and generalization [tendency] shall grow and develop continuously partly from spontaneity, but also from some more fixed habits. Generally it can be said that gradually we shall have more and more fixed groups of habits, notwithstanding that they have originally been derived from the world of pure chance - in which there cannot be any sophisticated meanings.

- 
1. (*Teleology*: Theory, teaching, or belief, that events and development are due to the purpose or design that is served by them. Oppose to the mechanistic theory of the universe - adj. Teleological.)
  2. (*Metaphysical*: adj. Of metaphysics - Metaphysics: Branch of philosophy dealing with first principles

of things, including such concepts as being, substance, space, time, and identity, etc. - See also: Metaphysician: (Gk.) *ta meta ta phusika*; the works (of Aristotle) placed after the Physics by ANDRONICUS of RHODOS)

[101]

Few words about doubt, and how it can have been derived just from Comte, and not from Hume. From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 3) we know that C.S. Peirce has used an expression **positive doubt**. In general - man can learn something new by mistakes, but that man can advance only through positive doubt, especially concerning twisted signs, and their vague interferences - which may have some definite references to something, or to objects which are just not yet seen. Man shall learn to separate those positive doubts from the doubts which are purely imagined, and twisted themselves, and which shall never have any definite object, or belong to any consensus of the meaning. This very differentiation between these two kinds of doubts seems to me very Comtean one.

But there are also some differences between C.S. Peirce and Comte. For example - **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 4) has e.g. explained, how by logic we can research, and finally get the positive facts, and not by the aid of mathematics. Hence, mathematics is not the most noblest of sciences in this respect, and not the most advanced one. We shall discuss this detail on the next page.

Also William James has derived some of his ideas from positivism, whether he ever wanted to do it, or not. We know, for certain, that he has derived some of his ideas from those philosophers, who have been known as advocates of evolution philosophy - but also positivism. James appreciated especially **Spencer** (1) - who has been known as evolution philosopher - but who got a lot of influences from Comte's philosophy, and who has suited Comte's ideas into his own philosophy. From the first and seventh *ENCY* (NOTES 5) we get to know that Spencer has also derived some of his philosophical ideas from J.S. Mill, and from Scottish philosopher Sir William Hamilton, as well as from Hume and Kant, whom we discussed at previous chapter, and their philosophical influences to C.S. Peirce.

But **James** (NOTES 6) expressed his appreciation concerning the philosophy by Spencer, and that he had no enthusiasm to coarse-grained positivism as a doctrine, and philosophical style of positivists. Thus, we can conclude that James was not consciously an enthusiast advocate of positivism of that kind. However, there are unintentional influences. From the first *ENCY* (NOTES 7) we know that James derived from Spencer three principles, namely, integration, differentiation and determination into his theory of the development of the knowledge.

But was it C.S. Peirce, who has expressed the most purely, and with the greatest originality the positivistic tendencies in his philosophy? **Paul Weiss** (NOTES 8) has written in his *Dictionary* in 1934, that C.S. Peirce has been the most important logician and philosopher through all the ages, and that he can be regarded as an individualist in that area, too. This does not prove anything, because every man can argue this or that special person to be the very best. But that Weiss had that emphasis, is worth of something for other reasons - because Weiss was one of those who edited Collected Papers.

This kind of information can be found also from several other sources - and especially that C.S. Peirce was an original thinker - But also that he had not much to do with the development of positivism. However, C.S. Peirce was the first who introduced **the truth tables**, and it was just his interpretation concerning the nature of logic and philosophy, by which he can be associated to positivism, as well as to empirism. And if we regard young Ludwig Wittgenstein as positivist, we must remind that he had later quite similar idea of the main task of philosophy being a therapy, because of our certain twisted concepts.

---

1. ((1820-1903); HERBERT SPENCER was an English philosopher, who sought the unification of all knowledge on the basis of the single principle of evolution; the principle of his philosophy was laid down e.g. in his Programme of a System Synthetic Philosophy (1860), to the elaboration of which he devoted the rest of his life.)

[102]

In general, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 9) regarded logic, as a science, and as experimental, and positive, because it is common for all human beings, and because it is part of our experience. Logic tells us about the positive facts, and how they are arranged in the universe. And further, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 10) proposed for that logic is a part of philosophy, which is also experimental and positive. And there is an interesting notice, that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 11) has used the term positive, when discussing Newton's physics.

But it is not easy to trace certain ideas from C.S. Peirce's writings. Sometimes it is hard to see if C.S. Peirce is using purely physical concept, or is he emphasizing some unknown psychological or philosophical aspect - but it is clear that he has an empirical interpretation of the concept positive. But **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 12) has not only used the term **positive** when discussing the methods used, but also when describing the role of facts, or surprising facts, which both lead to the new hypotheses. Those new hypotheses can, in turn, be regarded as positive ones, too, because of their experimentality.

Further, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 13) has emphasized - e.g. in his writing concerning philosophy and science - that practice comes always before theory - which is **NOT** quite the same thing as pragmatic maxim, according which our concepts must have practical bearings. These are the both sides of an mirror, but seen from different point of views. He concluded further in his writing concerning philosophy and science that we should not learn logic from the books, in a sense, that only by logic we were able to verify, or deny something. This is because things may find their ways also otherways than which books tell us. A consequence of this - all possible material of positive science must form the latitude and means of science. However, we cannot do much just teaching the methods of positive science - notwithstanding that we knew the whole current science with its objects, and perhaps something more than that. That is, only by using the methods of science we cannot find out what kind the new science shall be.

Thus, when we are saying that "practice comes always before theory", we do not mean that there are all the necessary tools available right now in our braches of science - But instead we mean that all new equipments we find must be tested before a comprehensive theory explaining truths. And that our concepts must be such ones, which have practical bearings. Another important thing, which we ought to pay attention to, is that, our destiny seems to be making mistakes, and, perhaps, learning by them. From the very first version of Collected Papers, which was edited by **Hartshorne and Weiss** (NOTES 14), we know that abstractions must give an account to themselves, and they must do it in terms of concrete experience. But does this suggest to that our thought is concrete in that way we can understand e.g. physical things - physis - right now, and that we use similarity to understand something equal kind? No, because it suggest only to that our abstractions must have consequences in empirical world, and that empirical is referring to all what exists. The good answer to the question of concreteness, or empirical depends on what we shall mean by concreteness, or empirical in future. If we think that mutual interaction between our thought and experience have been, and shall be inseparable during all the ages, we may conclude, that when we get advanced in our knowledge in future - we shall regard quite new things as concrete ones, and which may be right now only some of our hypotheses, perhaps. Then we shall have new tendencies and habit takings at hand, and the new kind of reality conception. But - of course - it may be that we have got nothing, and that we are fallen into the **Stoneage** back again.

[103]

From **Dewey's** (NOTES 15) article concerning American pragmatism we know that - as an empirist [and as an empiricist] C.S. Peirce appreciated for the study of *phenomena* (1) in given, or natural circumstances, which cannot be repeated in any laboratory. That is - we cannot get all in closed systems, with their choosen elements, and with their simplified interactions. Because of that he emphasized those natural and living contexts, and wanted to accommodate his methods according to them. He didn't want to call his method practicalism - or maintain that all what we can do is nothing but passive obeying of the eternal rules and laws, which had been given, as a final experience, and its explanation, before all, and all

that we must do is to be obeying that kind of necessity. Let us just remind what we have discussed before from whom C.S. Peirce derived the term pragmatism, and which was its recommended use and meaning. Positive facts are reflecting to something concrete, but not necessary to something nothing-but materia.

From **R. Rorty** (NOTES 16) we know that great many philosophers have regarded pragmatism as a muddle-headed step to positivism - which - according to the brave new philosophers - can be regarded as the prelude to the epos of man. Rorty said, too, that we ought not name C.S. Peirce by that naughty term "**muddle-head**", and if we dare to do that, we should just think his enormous work with logic. And if we are going to use the term in question, we should call him schizophrenic, too. But from where is that unpolite expression muddle-headed derived from?

An astonishing thing is that we can find the expression when rearing at C.S. Peirce's very own texts. From **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 17), and also from ***Chance, Love, and Logic*** (NOTES 18) we can read:

*"... there can be question that a few ideas are worth more than many confused ones. A young man would hardly be persuaded to sacrifice the greater part of his thoughts to save the rest; and the **MUDDLED-HEAD** is the least apt to see the necessity of such a sacrifice ... It is terrible to see how a single unclear idea, a single formula without meaning, lurking in a young man's head, will sometimes act like an obstruction of inert matter in an artery, hindering the nutrition of the brain, and condemning its victim to pine away in the fullness of his intellectual vigor and in the midst of intellectual plenty. Many a man has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea, too meaningless to be positively false; he has, nevertheless, passionately loved it, has made it his companion by day and night, and has given to it his strength and his life, leaving all other occupations for its sake, until it has become, as it were, flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone; and the he has waked up some bright morning to find it gone, clean vanished away like beautiful **MELUSINA OF THE FABLE**, and the essence of his life gone with it. I have myself known such a man; and who can tell how many histories of circle-squarers, metaphysicians, astrologers, and what not, may not be told in the old German story".*

---

1. (*Phenomenon*; pl. -ena: (litt.)That of which a sense or the mind directly takes note, immediate object of perception; remarkable person, thing, occurrence, etc. - also : thing that appears, is perceived, especially thing the cause of which is in question.)

---

[104]

MELUSINA of the fable? From **J. Brent** (NOTES 19) we get to know that C.S. Peirce's first wife was Zina Fay. However, in ***Collected Papers*** (NOTES 20) there is quite different name - MELUSINA FAY - whose name C.S. Peirce associated to "*beautiful MELUSINA OF THE FABLE*", perhaps. Isn't it beautiful?

But we have also an alternative point of view to the relationship of positivism and pragmatism - namely through J.S. Mill, who as a young man became an advocate of Bentham's utilitarianism - but later he became, as well, an advocate of Comte's positivism. It was just Mill who has written a book which concerned Comte's positivism, also referring to it by its *title* (1). But Mill can be regarded as a kind of phenomenalist (1) - but also as an empirist, too. **William James** (NOTES 21) used Mill's conception when considering together the concepts theism and materialism, and concluding that God has stated the absolutic references to good and evil. In his Pluralistic Universe, for example, James discussed the problem of the human suffering, as well as the role of evil in the world using Mill's schemes.

But there are some American philosopher, through with William James got positivistic influences. From the first ***ENCY*** (NOTES 22) we know that Chauncey Wright, who has been known as evolution philosopher, has also presented in his writings such themes, in which it has been anticipated verification principle, pragmatic truth criterion, and naturalism. He has also criticized those enterprises, in which some philosophers tried to applicate evolution theory to the metaphysics explanations of the essence of the world. and as we get to know, Wright was one of the members of James' intellectual society.

---

1. (Mill, J.S., Auguste Comte and Positivism., 1865)

2. (*Phenomen(al)ism*: Doctrine that phenomena are the only objects of knowledge - Phenomenology: The term, which JOHAN HEINDRICH LAMBERT introduced in 1762, to name the doctrine of appearance, in German Schein, as opposed to the doctrine of the truth, in German Sein. EDMUND HUSSERL didn't understand the term as the negative counterpart of absolute truth, but for him the principle of all principles was the directly given, or seen, in German Anschauung, and the task of the new phenomenology was to investigate everything that could be given, or seen in this way.)

---

[105]

## Logical positivism and pragmatism

In general, logical positivism derived its ideas from those empirical methods which were in use on the both sides of the 19th and 20th centuries - concerning e.g. the ideal of science. From the fourth *ENCY* (NOTES 23) we know that later logical positivism had three emphases, or orientations, namely social,- evolutionary,- and critical positivism. This is an illustrative example of how any ism tries to enlarge its original scope to the areas where it does not succeed to explain things any more. This is just according *The Law of Mind*. But this "Law" does not say which kind a phenomenon we have at hand. but only its principle - to become something more than just now..

Logical positivism was in close companionship with *conventionalism* (1). If we think now conventionalism as a kind of theory, which includes the consensus concerning social relations - and agreement concerning meanings, we should wait for a regulated interference between meanings, too. We can say that pragmatism has adopted some features of such conventionalism, and it is an advocate of that view - But pragmatists didn't emphasize a lot of conventions, when discussing meanings, because they didn't interpret meanings as being controlled only by man, and by his society, despite there were present those social settings of concepts. We shall discuss this later when dealing with instrumentalism.

From **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 24) we know that according to W.W. Bartley III, also late Wittgenstein can be regarded as conventionalist, too. There is a similar emphasis of the sociability of language, as well as the sociability of human knowledge, as with pragmatists, but Wittgenstein emphasized clearly certain types of concrete social settings as examples, and models, and that without agreement between members of a society there were no true meanings.

But what about the question of methodology? **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 25) emphasized, that his age was the era of methods, already. It was due of method, that there was the modern science - and not because of certain types of societies.

What is a difference between agreement of how manipulate concepts, and interpret them, when compared to a method in science. The crucial difference is that most of men must be able to manipulate concepts accurately, but it is not necessary to master scientific methods, or its concepts, and that man can live his life without them, and he gets no special troubles when doing so.

But there must be something else than a scientific method. Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 26) thought that the material of positive science must scope the whole area of science, which material is also a wechile of science. Let us remind, to, that it was not only pure logic, which could be taken in account. Before them there must be well-organized series of phenomena, which are proceeding their contents in some controlled way, and they are repeating their recognizable operations as many times as it is needed for to complete a task. Only after this it makes sense to use logic, or conclude something, and after them to create theories. That is - there must be something like rational occurrences in nature, despite that there cannot exist as such rationality. There **MUST** be present rational agents - as man - and something which man has created, with the aid of something, which is to be revealed, and who shall be developed into

more complete rationality - and only [and only] then there shall become into existence something which is very appropriate to manipulated with logic. And this is not due of conventions beforehand, because before man there were no rational agents planning something, or making agreements and conventions. We are just new-borns, and we are just starting to make them, and therefore we have all to loose - in every second, and minute, and something to win, too, if we have a luck.

---

1. (*Conventionalism*: The view, which emphasized that the meaning of things depends on conventions, which we have concerning meanings - that is - meanings do not depend on supernatural, or natural sources. Conventionalism suggests to that we must have an agreement of what is truth, and that we must have common tools, by which we prove things to be true ones. - Conventional: Depending on convention(s), not natural, not spontaneous.)

---

[106]

From **M.L. Bigge** (NOTES 27) we know that - according to logical positivism [or empirism, as he called the doctrine], the physical world, which human beings are experiencing by their senses, is a real one - not fictitious. This world has its true existence, in spite of that there were no conscious human beings experiencing and apprehending it.

This sounds clear, and indispensable, but only when we deal with extremely simple components of reality. But this is impossible, because when trying to find rational characters, or denying them we are not elementar beings ourselves, but something more complicated, and rational - whether we wanted to be it or not. Always when somebody is analyzing something, and there are present more complicated structures, whit their rich referentiality, there is a kind of reason present within them, and whenever this kind of remark has been done, it has been done by a rational agent, who is conscious. Therefore - it is not important how simple element one is analyzing, or how far one is reasoning, but instead that one does just that. In general, it makes no sense to say that e.g. mathematics has no rational within it, because it consists of component, which have no definite objects to which they are referring to, because man has created the whole system, and man is rational.

According to Comte - there is a hierarchy within science, as seen as a whole, and on the top of there are objective sciences, which are the most reliable ones, what comes to the validity of their empirical methods. But was this planned beforehand - or as a result of our enterprises? It is clear that now we discuss something being very rational, as well as very conscious. But the very essence of logical empirism was not to prove our knowledge to be fact, or something rational. There is a claim in logical empirism, which is more important, and which saya: if something has an existence, we should be able to measure it.

There are also other claims, e.g. that reality, which goes on by natural laws, and which can be described by truth definitions, do not change. But this is only because laws are laws for the reason, that there is sometring durable, and repeating series of thing - which laws explain, and if a law is extremely valid, there must be series of thing, which are behaving according its rules so, that one can predict their beavior with extreme accuracy. In this sense laws are always evident ones. Logical positivists believed, that if we find out the true principles of epistemology and logic, we can succeed to overrun all metaphysics. And, as the result, the epistemological monism would, in turn, produce that unity of science, and there would no longer be any room to the questions of ultimately true values and metaphysics within science. There was - as a background - the situation where idealistic tradition tried to maintain their speculative methods, and this was a kind of response to them.

Austrian **Schlick** (1) has been put as the originator of modern logical positivism. He was as professor in Vienna, where he founded the famous **Vienna Circle** - as it has been told to us. He had a thesis that the truth is dependent of the equivalence between the facts and their descriptions. This suggests to the *correspondence theory* (2), which has been presented by many philosophers before - that facts stand for objects. These ideas we can find also in Wittgenstein's *Tractatus* (3), but there was also an expression

that descriptions were pictures drawn from objects.

How can we be sure that **Vienna Circle** ever existed? There are lot of writings concerning it, e.g. *Werksausgabe* in 8 Bänden (4), in which Friedrich Waismann - whose name has been associated to Vienna Circle [Der Wiener Kreis], too, has explained Wittgenstein's role in **Vienna Circle**. But it was not any kind of compact society with its regular meetings.

- 
1. ((1882-1936); MORITZ SCHLICK was the German-Austrian philosopher, who advocated the view that physicalism is the solution to psychological problems. He was an originator of Vienna Circle.)
  2. (*Correspondence Theory*: That is, Picture Theory of Meaning, i.e. that the words are corresponding images of objects they describe.)
  3. (Wittgenstein, L., *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.*, transl. by D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness., with the introd. by Bertrand Russell., Repr., London., Routledge & Kegan Paul, This transl. first publ. in 1961)
  4. ("Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis"., *Gespräche.*, aufgezeichnet von Friedrich Waismann., in *Werksausgabe* in 8 Bänden., Bd. 3., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp., Taschenbuch Wissenschaft., aus dem Nachlass hrsg., von B.F. McGuinness., 1984)

---

[107]

Schlick has suggested that the most important task of philosophy was to analyze logically the propositions of science. It is no wonder that there were several mathematicians, who were interested in Vienna Circle - as e.g. **Gödel** (1) who tried e.g. to prove [when he was just 25-years old] that the absolutic truth in mathematics do not exist. Other members were e.g. G. Bergmann, H. Feigl, P. Frank, H. Hahn, R. Carnap, and O. Neurath, and as Finnish member, Eino Kaila. Perhaps the most famous of all was **Carnap** (2), who was an advocator of reductionism, when discussing phenomenal experience, which is - according to him - a start point when we outline the world for something.

But from where is that idea of reductivity derived from? Let us remind that naturalism was at its early stage antireductivistic, but later it had that interpretation. We have this idea of reductivity already in classical atomism, but not exactly in the same sense, however. In atomism this referred to process, which was to be happen anyway whether we understood it or not, or were we able to explain it. And there is the fact that after the complete reduction of complicate things there is no meanings left - when reduced into atoms. But the idea of reduction in logical positivism referred to our intellectual enterprise to reduce things into their original state.

Also Hume had an idea of reductivity from ideas to perceptions. But it is clear that perceptions are still relatively complicated creatures, and not even very close to atoms. It is the very fact that if all things really could be reduced to their simplest elements - also them who try to reduce intellectually something - there could not be any explanation. What shall be left after that total kind of reduction to the most most simplicity of all. It might be eternal, but not conscious any more. This is not according *cosmism* (3). Let us study the question closely. An essential thing there is that when the final and complete reduction had taken place, there are no conscious activities or reflection left, which could still understand something, and realize what had actually taken place. If there shall be a new kind of cosmos after the end of our world - it is not our cosmos, and we have no role in it. That is, we cannot check afterwards, that there were any rationality after the total reduction, and if there were something like that, after all, the fundamental hypothesis of atomism should be rejected.

It can be easily seen that this is a kind of intellectual trick, or pure mental trip. But it seems clear that it makes no sense to talk about eternity of atoms, as reduced to their true essence as atoms themselves. But as a result of conscious, logical operation, or as something apprehended it makes more sense. Then we can ask how there can be born any kind of intellect from nothing?

However, are we living right now in this, or that kind of rational cosmos, and for now it is quite possible to propose for that the world consists of atoms, or that every cosmos will be die, or that it shall stand forever, notwithstanding what is the case. But what says the classic atomistic theory concerning the topic.

- 
1. ((1906-?); KURT GÖDEL was an Austrian logician, who immigrated to The U.S. in 1938, and became a professor at Princeton in 1940. He was an author of *Über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I* (1931), which changed completely the conceptions concerning of the formal systems, which were accepted to the basis of mathematics. He was also an author of *The Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis* (1940). In general, he has studied mathematics, logic, as well as theory of relativity.)
  2. ((1891-1970); RUDOLF CARNAP was an Austrian origin philosopher, and an advocate of logical empirism; an author of *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928), in which he introduced formal language, and, as a method, methodological solipsism, by which we start from individual psychological phenomena, and enlarge the results to other individuals, others. Because of the influence of NEURATH, and others, he tried to develop a language of physicalism. He also presented the famous verification principle.)
  3. (*Cosmism*: Conception of the cosmos as a self-existent, self-acting whole.)

---

[108]

**J.C.A. Gaskin** (NOTES 28) has written that the very first advocates of atomistic philosophy were **Leucippus** (1) and Democritus. From Democritus we have got only few writings. The best way the atomistic philosophy was presented was that by **Lucretius** (2). In addition to this, it is known the collection *Vatican Sayings*, which was written later, and was founded in 1880. Hence, we do not have much literal remains, as a whole, concerning atomistic philosophy. But what is important remark there is that, in the cosmology of classic atomistic philosophy, there was room enough for reason. - **J.C.A. Gaskin** (NOTES 29) has written that in the atomistic system of Epicurus and Lucretius the universe consisted of bodies and void, that is, of material things and emptiness. The former ones can be perceived by senses, but the latter one is just a space, where material things can move and where they have their location. That emptiness is still something which is out there. It is even possible that void is a kind of manuscript, according which bodies can be arranged as space, or that void is really something, which is not at all in our universe.

The classic atomistic philosophers regarded cosmos as relatively stabile, and they thought, too, that cosmos consisted of configurations of such material things which could not last forever - all the configurations should be spred to out there into atoms soon after they were no longer be able to maintain their existence as configurations. This kind of erosion of cosmos shall take place continuously in the universe, as well as new configurations shall emerge instead from simple atoms. The classic atomistic philosophers thought that the total among of atoms must be infinite, that is, that atoms themselves are eternal ones. But some of their configurations, as cosmos, for example, cannot be eternal, notwithstanding that it seems to be as an essential part of the whole universe, and our reality. And furher, in the universe, there cannot be any beginnings or ends in it, or any centrum and fixed boundaries.

But, of course, this cosmology has nothing to do with Carnap's phenomenal reductionism, or with elementarism in logical positivism, or with concept of object in it. They are the necessary concepts, which are needed when analyzing things into their elements, which we can manipulate when testing a phenomenon. These are not much to do with the great lines in the world becoming to something, or falling to nothingness. We can imagine a phenomenon which is simple in its own existence, and which we make complicated by our explanations - but - according to the classical atomism - this is nothing but doing things which are characteristic to our cosmos, or which are possible to do there - because it certainly does not prevent us to do this. There is no sense to reduce complicated things totally back to their original state, because it is not the very nature of cosmos.

Thus, reduction in the case of cosmos is not the same as complicated things were totally falling down to simple atoms. If we reduce, or analyze something, we do it in certain amount, and we have not some physical, and extremely tiny objects, with which we deal with, but instead an aggregate of mental "atoms", or a kind of tool with its trimmers, which we can control when proving something true or false. We are not dealing with physical atoms if we discuss any of our complicated objects, with which our language deals with. They must be consisting of huge masses of atoms, which are always more or less complicated configurations. A concept atom is not exception: it is referring to the smallest possible particle, but only with other concepts, and not without their presence. These kind of concepts we can use in some relationship to each others in cosmos. There cannot be any experience concerning atoms themselves, in their simple ways of being, or afterwards points of view, if the prognosis of atomistic philosophy happens to be valid.

---

1. ((5th c. B.C.); LEUCIPPUS was the Greek philosopher who has been regarded, with Democritus, as founder of the 'atomistic' theory that the universe is composed of a vast number of invisible particles moving and combining in space.)

2. (c. 99-55 B.C.) Titus LUCRETIUS Carus i.e. LUCRETIUS was the Latin poet, and an author of *De Rerum Natura*, in which he tried to show that the course of the world can be explained without resorting to divine intervention.)

---

[109]

From **J.J. Katz** (NOTES 30) we know that Carnap accepted the fact that there are no object sentences in human contexts. Because of that, there must take in advantage two forms of them. On the one hand, there is that material form of sentences, which refers to the things and objects which are experienced, as actual, and to which we can give name pseudo-object sentences. On the other hand, there are formal sentences which refer to the linguistic constructions and relations.

According **J.J. Katz** (NOTES 31) Carnap got his model to his syntactic originally from **Hilbert's** (1) metamathematics but he wanted to expand it taking two additional things in consideration.

**First**, there must be **semantics** which concerns the relations between linguistic entities and cases, and between things and objects in the world. That is: we must know the circumstances of their use, if we want to know if the sentences are true or not (2).

**Secondly**, there is **pragmatics**, which includes such things as psychological motives and the reactions of hearers (3).

**Thirdly**, there must be also **syntactics**, where we must get in use the rules of designation- and truth.

But why this expansion, then? Because there is the fact that it is impossible to describe natural language by its own terms, and words, and what words may mean in every context. But what is important is that the situation does not get better if we succeed to describe the logical form of the sentences used. The natural language is something larger and fluid one than syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics as such, or it cannot be explained without different point of views. Mostly the descriptions we are able to form, are systematic ones, and they emphasize that in sentences there must be systematic reason, and that there must be strivings for something, or have a motive. There is no sense to analyze a sentence which is only repeating something which has no content. As an example nursery rhyme. **Is is paradoxal that these rhymes behaves very much according some rules.**

If we think syntactics, and its truth rules, our sentences may be true in that sense that they obviously seem refer to certain explanative circumstances, but in the same time they can be also false, because we wish actually to refer by them to another kind of explanative circumstances, as we do when ironizing. We should have a rule which explain that tendency, and when we are making irony. Then there is also our

"small talk" which seems to refer to certain circumstances, but actually does not that. What is the truth in "small talk"? Is it that our sentences do not mean anything more; that they refer only to this kind of nonsense pragmatic use? Is it possible that we have nothing to say, or that we have no message?

---

1. ((1862-1943); DAVID HILBERT was the German mathematician, who influenced strongly to the development e.g. of the invariance theory of algebra, and the theory of integral calculus.)

2. (But we have a problem if we have not the right circumstances at our scope, or we are unable to see the right aggregate of things.)

3. (We have a problem if we have not understood which are the adequate psychological motives, and the reactions of hearers in different contexts.)

---

[110]

There were several mathematicians as advocates of logical empirism. Well-known was Warsawan school, whose grandfather was **Tarski** (1) who had an idea, namely so called **Banach-Tarski paradox** which was presented already in 1924. This paradox can vanish when we admit that such things as volume, mass and density can be applied only to certain mathematical entities because they are not physical objects.

These notes concerning the defects of mathematics are identical to which **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 32) advocated for, especially when he explained the fundamental difference between mathematics and logic - which is quite opposite to logistic thesis. According to C.S. Peirce: If we accept that, in mathematics, it is question of deduction by purely hypothetic constructions, that is, the things which we use in deduction belong to hypothetic structures, we can only conclude, therefore, that we cannot apply logic to mathematics, which is a kind of a science, to which logic is not relevant. There are certain areas in mathematics, however, where we can apply logic, especially when we ought to find out with mathematical methods the state of things, whatever it is, is too diffuse. But why to use logic right there? Partly because of, in mathematics they do not call their conclusions into question, if they only seem to obey the rules accepted. An partly because of we cannot pick up by the rules and principles of mathematics the right facts from the pool of vaguety, but we can do it by logic, and make, at least, experiments. Logic is experimental, and as science, positive - not because of the observations made by it, but because of it is common part of experience to all human beings. As a consequence [as we can remind] is, that when we use logic, we deal with the positive facts, and find out how they are arranged in the universe".

These passages of the development of logical positivism, which we have been dealing with - were taken place long time after C.S. Peirce's and William James' death. Hence, we can only search the possible influences from pragmatism to logical positivism. These kind of evidence cannot be found easily. It was not until in 1930's, when Ernest Nagel, and some other philosophers, brought positivistic ideas from Vienna, and introduced them to American philosophers. Thus, there is no need for discussion that influence from logical positivism to pragmatism. An interesting detail is that Nagel was a student of M.R. Cohen, who - in turn - had an important role as an editor of C.S. Peirce's literary remains, and who was an advocate of pragmatic and experimentalistic rationalism, and realism. Another interesting fact is that Nagel didn't accept the ideas of Cohen. That is: we have no traces to get from this direction.

---

1. (1902-?); ALFRED TARSKI was a Polish, and a philosopher and logician, who worked first in Warsaw as a professor from 1925 to 1929, when he immigrated to the United States. His *Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen* (1936) has been an important work for semantics. His other works were *Cardinal Algebras* (1949), *Logic, Semantics, Methamathematics* (1956), and *The Completeness of Elementary Algebra and Geometry* (1967).)

---

[111]

There have been a lot of studies concerning the philosophical influence between C.S. Peirce, and school of pragmatism. This is quite natural because it is easy to study how similarity can be found within similarity.

One of the commentators has been **C.W. Morris** (1) who has written a lot of published articles and books concerning pragmatism. But of course - there have been several other studies after these writings, but it is the fact, that their writers have not been so close to the subject than Morris. There is another difference between him and later commentators. That is, we are, perhaps, too far from the age of pragmatism, and its **meliorism**, and we have not right attitude in regard of its aim to defence the view it advocated for - against the other interpretations of time.

Now, if we try to apply the doctrine of synechism right there, we can see, that the very essence of any ism, is continuous interaction with other isms of ones own age, and before, but any ism is quite helpless to the deviant interpretations made in future. Therefore, if we try to explain any of the former philosophies now, our explanation seems to be partially outside of both explanations and expectations which they have had. None of the old philosophers couldn't imagine the reality, in which we live now. As I noticed, we have lost most of those melioristic expectations concerning future, and we are tend to interpret pragmatic method as a concrete way of solving buzzles of ordinary life. In that sense, there is no room for synechism, or continuity of the tradition of philosophy - but instead we should to apply a kind of quantum theory - because of that abyss which divided past and present. At the next subchapter we shall see that there were lot of influences from pragmatism to the school of logical empirism. But there is a difficulty caused by "river" -effect - namely that the philosophical climate started to change radically, and there were very complicated currents of influences since the glory days of Vienna Circle.

---

1. ((1901-1979); CHARLES W. MORRIS is known as positivist (BURR 1980, 196, 374), but also an advocate of scientific empiricism, and semantic. He is published a lot of studies concerning the philosophy of C.S. Peirce, but also other themes, e.g. concerning the relationship of pragmatism and logical positivism. C. W. Morris has written several books and articles as e.g. "Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing"., in *The Monist.*, 38 (1928), pp. 494-510), and "Pragmatism and metaphysics"., in *Philosophical Review.*, 43 (1934), pp. 549-564), and "Professor Schiller and Pragmatism"., in *The Personalist.*, 17 (1936), pp. 294-300), and "The Concept of Meaning in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism"., in *Actes du Congre's International de Philosophie Scientifique.*, Pd. 8., Paris (1936), pp. 130-138), and *William James Today, Commemoration of William James.*, Hg. V.H.M. Kallen., New York., pp. 178-187, 1942), and *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism.*, Paris., 1937), and "Foundations of the Theory of Signs"., in *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.*, Bd.I., No. 2., 1938; see also: "Signs about Signs, and Signs"., in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.*, 9., (1948)), and "Semiotic and Scientific Empiricism"., in *Actes du Congre's International de Philosophie Scientifique.*, (1935))

[112]

## The early and late philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein, positivism, and pragmatism

Wittgenstein owed *Tractatus* to his friend, **Pincent** (1). *Tractatus* can be seen as a derivate of *Principia Mathematica*, but not as dependence of its *logistic thesis* (2). Let us remind that one of the authors of *Principia Mathematica* was Bertrand Russell - Wittgenstein's early philosophical tutor (3).

Russell has written an introduction to one of English translations of *Logish-philosophische Abhandlung* . By Russell there is an interesting link to pragmatism, and to C.S. Peirce, especially when discussing logic. **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 33) has regarded C.S. Peirce as the founder of logical theory of relations - although he says that there were some influences from **Morgan** (4), too. Let us remind, too, that that Russell

appropriated only one half of C.S. Peirce's theory - namely the one of external relations, but he rejected the idea of internal relations, because feeling that it smacked too much of Hegel.

But **Russell** (NOTES 34) has espoused some ideas from William James, too, as he has told in his *The Analysis of Mind*, and moreover from **Watson** (5), who was the originator of behaviorism. We can now easily see why we must discuss Russell and Wittgenstein, and also some other philosophers there - in spite of the very fact that they have lived before, or later than pragmatists. We know pretty well that early forms of behaviorism were not alike Watson's own, but they were important sources to pragmatists, and Dewey had an opportunity to derive some of his ideas also from new behaviorism, and thus, there was something from both of them within pragmatism, too.

According to **S.S. Hilmy** (NOTES 35) were Russell's opinions concerning behaviorism negative still in 1919 but in 1921 his opinions were changed to positive; then he introduced his causal theory of meaning, which he called to mnemonic causation. But why this term "mnemonic"? Because he used also R.W. Semon's writings, *Die Mneme*. The book in which **B. Russell** (NOTES 36) has presented his causal theory was his *On Propositions*. He might be referred to the kind of method, which was aimed to improve memory, and which is known as mnemonics. Usually one can use for example verses when remembering irregular declensions of conjugations. This is very much like utilizing the "river" -effect. And the most famous "river" philosopher was - of course - Heraclitus.

- 
1. (DAVID Hume PINCENT died on the 8th March in 1918.)
  2. (*Defence of logical thesis* [or not]: There is an idea in *Tractatus* that ordinary language overwhelms its logical structures. But it might still be possible to imagine a language - which were able to express purely the logical syntax which ordinary language has. Unfortunately logical sentences are - as such - tautologies, or contradictions, and they are merely truth functions. Tautologies are not pictures, because they allow all the states of things, which pictures don't do. If we want to see if our sentences are valid, we must understand them - and if we manage to do so, we have understood the world, because the world consist of facts, not of entities. - That was the idea of *Tractatus*, and not that defence of logical thesis.)
  3. (Wittgenstein became Russell's student 18.10. 1911 at Cambridge, after he has made a short philosophical essay, which Russell valued very high.)
  4. ((19th c.); AUGUSTUS de MORGAN was the British logician and mathematician.)
  5. ((1878-1958); JOHN B. WATSON was an American psychologist, and an originator of behavioristic school, and he was especially an advocate of the most strict materialistic interpretation, who wanted to deny all mentality, and emphasize pure reflex schemes and conditioning.)

---

[113]

**I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 37) regarded C.S. Peirce as the original father of the pragmatist theory of meaning, but more important than this general characterization was, however, that he emphasized his decisive role in the development of Frank Plumpton Ramsey's philosophy. **Ramsey was the person who influenced strongly to Wittgenstein** (1). But isn't it strange, that Ramsey has alluded to the pragmatist theory of meaning - without mentioning C.S. Peirce but instead Russell, especially in his *Facts and Propositions* (2), which has been printed in 1927. There is the fact, however, that references, as well as C.S. Peirce's name occur frequently in Ramsey's later writings. There are even long passages, which are expositions of C.S. Peirce's ideas, and there is the fact that Ramsey has mentioned his name in *Truth and Probability*, which has been printed in 1926. But why this special connection should be taken in consideration? **K.T. Fann** (NOTES 38) argued for that Wittgenstein derived some of his philosophical ideas from Ramsey - who in turn got lot of influences from C.S. Peirce. From **R.B. Braithwaite** (NOTES 39), who was the editor of Ramsey's papers after his death, we know that Wittgenstein was one of those Ramsey's friends

who gave advices, how to select his papers. That is - he probably knew something of their contents.

**I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 40) has told that Wittgenstein and Ramsey met each other twice in Austria, namely in 1923 and 1925. There has been both live mutual interface, and respect - as we can see from a sentence in Ramsey's *Facts and Propositions* (NOTES 41), in which he expressed his indebtedness to Wittgenstein. And vice versa, Wittgenstein (NOTES 42) referred to Ramsey at the preface in his *Investigations*. But what about Ramsey's claims that Russell was the main source of his ideas concerning pragmatism? **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 43) has doubted Ramsey's own references in this respect. But Wittgenstein has been claimed to have been other possible influences derived quite from outside of philosophy. From **K.T. Fann** (NOTES 44) we know that he derived some of his ideas concerning his doctrine of language games from Piero Sraffa. - In addition to this **N. Malcolm** (NOTES 45) has written that Wittgenstein has told him face to face that **Neapolitan** Sraffa suddenly made him feel that picture theory and his account of the proposition in *Tractatus* were both inadequate.

But again - there is an opposite interpretation by **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 46), who has doubted the decisive role of Sraffa - as an explanative factor in the philosophical development of Wittgenstein.

---

1. (When Wittgenstein dealt with themes time, infinity, possibility, and chance, he used an expression *Die Ramseysche Auffassung*. But his style was not Ramseyan, but - according to GULLVÅG, very Peircean origin (GULLVÅG 1981, 75; se also: *Philosophical Bemerkungen*, §§143, 163.)

2. (Ramsey, F.P., "Facts and Propositions"., in: R.B. Braithwaite., ed., *The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays by Frank Plumpton Ramsey.*, London (1931))

---

[114]

There is an analogy between Wittgenstein and Sraffa, however. Let us study them closer. **P. Sraffa** (NOTES 47) has used [at an introduction of his book] as one of his tools - simple and imagined society, to which he gradually added new features. From the preface of the book we know that his central ideas have been formulated at the end of 1920's. That is before Sraffa and Wittgenstein even met each other.

**Wittgenstein** (NOTES 48) has also used some simplified examples, which he has gradually sophisticated - as e.g. in *The Blue and Brown Books*. But this may be an illusion, or accident, because the method from simple to complicated has been widely used by many philosophers.

We can try to find also other sources of influences. There was an interface between Russell, and C.K. Ogden, and also Wittgenstein during 20's. But what kind? From **S.S. Hilmy** (NOTES 49) we know that Wittgenstein has met Russell in Innsbruck in 1922, and moreover - that Wittgenstein has also visited in England in 1925.

There was also available the work of **C.K. Ogden and I.A. Richards** (NOTES 50) - namely *The Meaning of Meaning* (1), in which it was presented 16 definitions of meaning, as well as the causal theory of meaning. The theory by Ogden and Richards was quite identical with Russell's theory, notwithstanding that they emphasized the role of images. But what is important, is that their book influenced to Wittgenstein, who didn't accept but criticized its causal theory in his late philosophy. There is an evidence, that Wittgenstein has become acquaintance with *The Meaning of Meaning* - he mailed a letter to C.K. Ogden, which has been dated March in 1923 (NOTES 51):

*"The meaning of meaning" reached me a few days ago... I have not yet been able to read your book thoroughly. I have however read in it and I think I ought to confess to you frankly that I believe you have not quite caught the problems which - for instance I was at in my book (whether or not I have given the correct solution)".*

---

1. (OGDEN and RICHARDS have probably adopted the name of their book from a symposium, which was taken place three years before, and whose name was quite identical. The nucleus of the symposium was Russell's article [See: RUSSELL, B.:, "On Propositions: What They are and How They Mean", in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1919, suppl. vol. II.], where Russell introduced the very first version of his causal theory, and to which he two years later gave more complete expression in his work *The Analysis of Mind* (1921).)

---

[115]

When Wittgenstein at the first time had become acquaintance with C.S. Peirce's ideas? **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 52) has presented two interesting points in Wittgenstein'S philosophy concerning relations: The one is that he used this differentiation of internal and external relations in his *Tractatus* but did not there apply it to intentionality; while in *Bemerkungen* he precisely did that. The other is that he has been acquainted with B. Russell since the publication of *Principia Mathematica*. Now, let us remind that Russell took something from the logical theory of relations by C.S. Peirce, and that rejected one half of it. The very good question is: why Wittgenstein should not have some knowledge of the ideas of C.S. Peirce already at this time.

But was it possible to have any, or another influences from pragmatism during these early years? From **K. Oehler** (NOTES 53) we know that William James' **Pragmatism** has been translated in German by Wilhelm Jerusalem already in 1908, and during the same year there was an international conference in philosophy in Heidelberg - which concerned mainly pragmatism. But it seems to me plausible that Wittgenstein did not yet follow those conferences, because he was, perhaps, just planning to start his studies in philosophy. Anyway, the fact is that there was available material.

There is no need to discuss how decisive, or deep was Wittgenstein's role in the development of logical empirism - or doubt it - in spite of that there are certain indicators that Wittgenstein didn't advocate e.g. the views of Russell, and others, concerning their *causal theory of meaning* (1). But the ideas which he expressed in *Tractatus* before that criticism, were accepted by the most members of **Vienna Circle**. But when thinking that late Wittgenstein's influence e.g. to the development of the philosophy of education was remarkable (2) and the fundamental revolution in his philosophy, there were also other influences, which were quite opposite to his early influences to other philosophers. And just these new ideas of wholeness, continuity - and such kinds - he derived from pragmatism, but also from **Gestalt Psychology**.

---

1. (One of the themes in *Philosophical Bemerkungen* was a criticism of causal theories of meaning like the ones proposed by OGDEN, RICHARDS, and Russell (GULLVÅG 1981, 77).)

2. (ALLMAKER, A. M., "Wholeness" in the Philosophy of the Later Wittgenstein and its Applicability to the Philosophy of Education., Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1984., State University of New York at Albany, 1972)

---

[116]

## **Instrumentalism and pragmatism**

According to the introduction of **Dewey's** (NOTES 54) acticle concerning development of American pragmatism, Dewey told that he was derived his own instrumentalism from Neo-Kantian background, but carefully migrated it into other context, and then developed it further into a reaction against Bradley's and Bosanquet's idealistic interpretation, and finally associated it near to J.B. Watson's *behaviorism* (1). This sounds quite similar than Bertrand Russell's philosophical development, in a sense. There were also other possible influences to be adopted.

It is quite possible that more important than school of behaviorism were the influences which Dewey

derived from sociology, psychology, and from the field of education, because in behaviorism, in itself, there was not much philosophy to apply. It is very easy to describe its philosophical contents, and now it is very boring, or its heart - but it was not Boring then but instead something new, and a great challenge to philosophy.

**Dewey** (NOTES 55) has described in his *From Absolutism to Experimentalism* the change, and migration process, which took place in his thinking from Hegel's idealism to instrumentalism, especially emphasizing his experiences in the field of education at the end of the last century, and at the very beginning of our century. He has also described his interest to the relationship between values and scientific beliefs, and his interest to James' psychology, and to social categories, when explaining the meaning of participating activities.

There are interesting similarities especially between Dewey and G.H Mead, what comes to their emphasis of sociability of language - which - as they thought, makes it possible to have any concepts, and they focussed especially on the biological and sociological nature of language. From **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 56) we get to know that both of them saw language as a tool, and that:

*"its primary function being the realization of cooperative activity"*.

---

1. (Since in 1910 WILHELM WUNDT'S pedantic study on sensations appeared to be as old-fashion one. There were born two schools of psychology; the one at that time, and the other almost immediately after it. J.B. WATSON was the person, who founded behavioristic school in the United States in 1913. The other school was the school of Gestalt Psychology, which was originated by MAX WERTHEIMER in 1910, and whose other developers were WOLFGANG KÖHLER and KURT KOFFKA. The school of Gestalt Psychology influenced a lot, in turn, to KARL BÜHLER, who was a professor in Vienna, and who has published *Geistige Entwicklung des Kindes* (1918), which was a course book in the New Education Institutes, from where also Wittgenstein qualified as teacher, and where he must read BÜHLER'S book in question.)

---

[117]

According to **C.S. Hardwick** (NOTES 57), this view was quite familiar to Wittgenstein's concern with the uses of language, and with the description of language as a form of life, notwithstanding that Wittgenstein was not concerned to propound an explicit theory of language. At **Dewey's** (NOTES 58) article, concerning G.H. Mead, which has been published in *The Journal of Philosophy* it was clearly expressed an indebtedness to Mead. But there was also told that Dewey'S ideas has been derived mainly from C.S. Peirce, and Josiah Royce - but only by and after G.H. Mead - as he emphasized himself.

C.W. Morris has discussed in his *Six Theories of Mind* (1932) largely of those influences. According to him, in all of the most essential questions Mead agreed with Dewey. One similarity they both had was that mind consists of the symbolic functioning of cases. According to Morris, there are other similarities, too, e.g. when **G.H. Mead** (NOTES 59) thought that thinking is a method to maintain the contact with such a world, which is not yet given, but to which we have a kind of contact, by which we know something about how it has been given. This kind of situation we have, for example, when proceeding pioneering scientific research, during which the process of knowledge shall be born due of the new kind of contact - and during which, in turn - something is supposed to exist, before the exact knowledge on what it is, and how we become to get it. **G.H. Mead** (NOTES 60) thought, too - like Dewey - that evolution in nature, where the culmination point is sociability - is the principle and form, by which the symbolic function comes out. **G.H. Mead** (NOTES 61) comes very close to Dewey also when arguing for, that human life is mostly the enrichment of intellectual features. But these ideas are much alike C.S. Peirce's ideas - too much alike to be very original, and to have been developed only by Mead and Dewey.

In his *Six Theories of Mind* (1932) C.W. Morris has linked together both C.S. Peirce and G.H. Mead, especially when discussing concepts and conceptual systems, and the generalization [tendency] within

them, and deepening meanings. Hence - I think - all of these thoughts above were very familiar to C.S. Peirce, too, and I dare to propose for that he has presented them far before G.H. Mead. Now, if we think the term instrument, and how it has been used by C.S. Peirce, we get an idea concerning something which is not-yet-ready, or something which somebody is processing using something, which has been used as means to reach something more complete. Let us remind that - according to **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 62) - that in mind there is a continuous flow of ideas, or objects, of whose presence we have no understanding, before they become to our consciousness as recollections, but only after they have associated together, and got through several changes. These recollections, notwithstanding that they are not accurate, are accepted as true. We can combine ideas into sets, and separate from each other the material, which is available to cognition, and the choice, of which to constitute a set. We have the relative freedom:

*"The potential idea of form of the set is operative, because it is an instrument, without which it wouldn't be possible to make (any) association in the mind. It can be described by mathematical diagram, as something rational in itself".*

There is that emphasis of the presence of rationality in every, more or less complete group of association, namely set, which we can have in the mind. And this rationality doesn't stand for the fulfillment of our temporary purposes, as organisms, or persons, but instead it is something for itself, and it is such as it is because the essence of the world. But is this something concerning only mind? **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 63) has described an organism as an instrument of thought - which gives to it a role as an equipment of thought. But there is something more, namely, that we are discussing something which is intellectual. At an earlier stages during the current study we have discussed his cosmology, where human beings have the role they have in the world evolution because of their rationality. In his synechism there is a clear idea of sociability, and especially clear it is in his Psychognosy - which is a set of families. All this comes very close to the ideas of Mead and Dewey, or on the contrary.

---

[118]

Some of the followers of C.S. Peirce have claimed that there are no natural born sets of ideas, but instead something we must develop further. From **J.E. Burr** (NOTES 64) we know that C.I. Lewis, in his *Mind and World Order*, synthesized his concept of mind, using as one of its components Kantian epistemology, and he has described the mind as natural instrument, too, by which man organizes phenomena of the world. He has used the Kant's categories of thought, when explaining the question how. When studying logic, epistemology, and the value theories in his *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, C.I. Lewis didn't hold that there is something a priori in human mind, but that there must be present [or gathered together] some organized [and learned] meanings, before man is able to verify something. The idea of instrumentalistic nature of human mind was in the use of other philosophers, too.

Among them was **Wittgenstein** (NOTES 65), who regarded language as instrument, as well as he regarded its concepts as instruments. It is possible that he got his ideas from pragmatism, but this idea has been presented by voluntarist philosophers, too, as an example by Schopenhauer. Then there is a question of the relative independence of the means. If we now think that we use different means, or instruments, are they themselves without any other meaning, than we might conclude of their current use? Does it make any sense to speak about meaning of a tool? Is it only the goal, or purpose, for which they serve, the only meaning, that we ought take in consideration, when discussing meaning of any thing? Or is it the case that, when discussing instruments, we are dealing with things, which are suitable to be used in those kind of functions, or activities, when trying to mean something? And if somebody is just understanding our message, isn't it quite silly to give a demand that he must take in his notice also the equipments we have used?

However, we don't discuss these difficulties just now, but I want only mention that there are certain problems concerning any instrument, or its use, and possible meaning in itself. Those, who are more interested in the question, I refer e.g. to **May Brodbeck** (2), who has studied the problems of purpose and function.

[119]

## William James and experimental psychology

From **Dewey** (NOTES 66) we can read that James has derived his ideas from Locke, Hume and Mill - especially when he was defining both the correspondence and coherence theories of truth, or when he was defining his concepts of habit and mind - using a pragmatic method. But, in addition to these influences, he derived some of his ideas also from **ALEXANDER Bain** (1), and **SHARWORTH Hodgson** (2).

From the first **ENCY** (NOTES 67) we know that Hodgson was as member in his intellectual society, too. Scottish Bain insisted that psychological phenomena can be reduced to brain functions. **Bain** (NOTES 68) has written on pleasure and pain in his *Principles of Psychology*:

*"Pleasure and pain, in the actual and real experience, are to be held as identical with motive power",*

and **Bain** (NOTES 69) has also written in his *Mental and Moral Science*:

*"our pleasurable emotions are all liable to detain the mind unduly [through the] atmosphere of excitement [with which they are surrounded, carrying the mind] beyond the estimate of pleasure and pain, to the state named passion [in which a man is not] moved solely by the strict value of pleasure [but also by] the encroaching power of the excitement".*

---

1. ((1818-1903); ALEXANDER BAIN was the Scottish philosopher, and an experimental psychologist, and an exponent of a system of psychology which traces psychological phenomena to the nerves and brain.)

2. (SHARWORTH HODGSON was an author of The Philosophy of Reflection, and he has also studied metaphysics e.g. in his Metaphysics of Experience.)

[120]

**Bain** (NOTES 70) has also written in the same book:

*"acute pleasures and pains stimulate the will perhaps more strongly than an equivalent stimulation of the massive kind".*

I think that there are certain similarities both to C.S. Peirce and James in the question of the role of the concepts we know as the passion and the will.

When explaining e.g. memory, imagination, and love, in his *Principles of Psychology* - **James** (NOTES 71) cited the association laws of Bain, and **DAVID Hartley** (1), but he has applied them, too, when explaining language. But what is important there is that he has cited in the same book the scientific discoveries of **FRANCIS Galton** (2), and Wundt. But we have also some knowledge of James' critical attitudes concerning the ideas of Wundt. From **E.G. Boring** (NOTES 72) we know that James did not accept elementarism, as well as Wundt's certain concepts.

Further, **J.R. Wilson** (NOTES 73) has written, in a popular series, which has been published by The Time, that James considered the whole German psychological tradition very Boring, but admitted that it would be very difficult to disprove Wundt's theories, by splitting them into smaller parts, without that those parts still were alive like short pieces of a worm.

From **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 74) we know that in the year 1872 James was an instructor in physiology at Harvard Medical School, and that he was the leader of the first course on experimental psychology in the United States in 1875. It was because of his work that Harvard became later as an important center of psychology. But psychology at those days was not the same as it is now, because most psychologists had some philosophical knowledge, which disturbed, or advanced the development of that branch of science.

---

1. ((1705-1757); **DAVID HARTLEY** was an English physician and philosopher; regarded as the founder of the English (associationist) school of psychologist.)
  2. ((1822-1911); **FRANCIS GALTON** was an English anthropologist, geneticist, and psychologist, and the cousin of **CHARLES R. Darwin**. He was the founder of **eugenics**, by which which was aimed to make the human race genetically better. He suggested e.g. that we ought to choose parents. He used a lot statistical methods.)
- 

[121]

Let us remind the role of experimental psychology in Dewey's philosophy, which we have dealt when discussing his relationship to Hegel at the chapter of idealism, but also during the current chapter. However - once more - Dewey rejected his Hegelian tendencies, when studying experimental psychology by Hall (1) - as we have known from **S.R. Vaughn** (NOTES 75). For more information I refer also to **E.G. Boring** (2).

But C.S. Hall [as the most of psychologists of his age] had a great variety of professional contacts, also when he was at an older age - as we know e.g from **B. Kleinmuntz** (NOTES 76), who has presented a well-known photo, where psychologist C.S. Hall met **Sigmund Freud** (3), and **Carl Gustaf Jung** (4), and some other psychiatrists at a meeting in Clark University.

But if we think these passages, Dewey, and the stages in later experimental psychology, there is a question: why he didn't join some of the new currents of thought, and scientific interpretations to his philosophy - as for example psycho-analysis. And then there were available in 1930's Clark L. Hull's electrochemical models, as well as his model of maze learning - which does not seem to have influenced much to Dewey's philosophy. From the whole correspondence between C.S. Peirce and William James we know that they had a lot of discussions about experimental psychology, as well as philosophical themes since 1870 and long after that date. We have a letter, which C.S. Peirce mailed to James on the 3th October in 1904 (NOTES 77), in which he referred to several psychological books, which he had used at his previous letter to James - which in turn was dated on the 28th September in 1904 (NOTES 78).

At the letter which C.S. Peirce mailed to James, and which was dated on the 25th November in 1902 (NOTES 79), there was a reference to psychological aspects of aesthetics, ethics, and logic. What is important there, is that all of these things took place long after C.S. Peirce has left [of was forced to do that] Coast Survey and the whole brave world of universities. But we shall discuss this eremitical stage of his life at next chapter - that is - the stage of being as refugee.

But it seems to be true - in general - that pragmatists were not advocates of the new psychology, or that they were not inclined to research the new currents within psychology.

---

1. (**G. STANLEY HALL** was an advocate of the school of Wundt. But there were more dynamic influences, too, which were more important to the development of Dewey's thinking: 1) An individual goes through the history of human species during socialisation and cognitive development. 2) Nature is always right. 3) Physical growth is more essential than cognitive, because all which has been fluid before, is just repeating the previous stages of mankind, as fixed form of them. Then there were some later ideas, which were derived both from **FREUD** and evolution philosophy, whose possible influence is more

questionable, such as: Every change, which is a true step forward in evolution, takes place in the population of adolescence. We may apply catharsis-hypothesis, and the concept of storm and stress, and generally we can accept that there is the nascent-period, during which there is overflow of hereditary energy. (GRINDER 1973, 20-24.)

2. (Boring, E.G., A History of Experimental Psychology., The Century Co., New York, pp. 539-542, 506-507, 1931)

3. ((1856-1939); SIGMUND FREUD was an Austrian specialist in neurology, and the founder of psycho-analysis. The ideas have become popular especially in U.S., where even every man of streets MUST have an psychoanalyst of his own.)

4. ((1875-1961); CARL GUSTAF JUNG was the Swiss psychologist, and a follower of FREUD - for a time. Later he founded a school of analytical psychology, differing from psycho-analysis in its use of the concepts of unconscious and libido and in its advocacy of a complex classification of types of personality.)

---

[122]

## NOTES 5

1. (Collected Papers of... , VII., Notes of Science., p. 175, 1966)

2. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 29.8.1891, lett., from C.S. Peirce to Christine Ladd-Franklin., pp. 214-215, 1966)

3. (Scheffler, I., Four Pragmatists., p. 83, 1974)

4. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Chapter 4., Consciousness., .524, 1966)

5. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1, p. 388; see also: ENCY 7., p. 523, 1967)

6. (James, W., Pragmatismi, uusi nimitys eräille vanhoille ajattelutavoille., trans. by K. Silfverberg., Helsinki., Otava., pp. 125, 180, 1913)

7. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., p. 388, 1967)

8. (Weiss, P., Dictionary of American Biography., 1934)

9. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Chapter 4, Consciousness, .524, 1966)

10. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Chapter 4, Consciousness, .526, 1966)

11. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Relative and Absolute Motion., .486, 1966)

12. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §8., Abduction., .220, 1966)

13. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Science and Philosophy., pp. 63, 69, 1966)

14. (Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers by Charles Sanders Peirce., V, edited by CHARLES Hartshorne and P. Weiss., Cambridge-Mass., p. 177, 1931-1958)

---

[123]

15. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism". , New York., pp. 449-468, 1968)

16. (Rorty, R., "Pragmatism, Categories, and Language", , in Pragmatism and Language)
17. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , pp. 81-82, 1981)
18. (Cohen, M.R., (ed.): Chance, Love and Logic, Philosophical Essays by the late Charles S. Peirce., New York, p. 36f, 1923)
19. (Brent, J., Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life., Boomington and Indianapolis., Indiana University Press., 1993)
20. (Peirce, C.S., Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Bibliography, pp. 255, 1966)
21. (James, W., A Pluralistic Universe., p. 124, 1909)
22. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 1., p. 87; - see also: The ENCY., 4., p. 241, 1967)
23. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 4., pp. 414-418, 1967)
24. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 70, 1981)
25. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Science and philosophy., p. 61, 1966)
26. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Science and philosophy., p. 69, 1966)
27. (Bigge, M.L, Positive Relativism, An Emergent Educational Philosophy., 1971)
28. (Gaskin, J.C.A., The Quests for Eternity... , p. 49, 1984)

---

[124]

29. (Gaskin, J.C.A., The Quests for Eternity ..., p. 51, 1984)
30. (Katz, J.J., The Psychology of Language., New York, London., pp. 29, 34, 1966)
31. (Katz, J.J., The psychology of Language., pp. 44-46, 1966)
32. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Chapter 4., Consciousness., .524, 1966)
33. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 77, 1981)
34. (Russell, B., The Analysis of Mind., George Allen & Unwin., London, pp. 6, 86, 201-202, (1921), 1961)
35. (Hilmy, S.S., The Later Wittgenstein, The Emergence of a New Philosophical Method., Basil Blackwell., Padstow., pp. 116, 273-274, 1987)
36. (Russell, B., On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean., Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society., 1919., suppl., vol. II)
37. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 74, 1981)
38. (Fann, K.T., Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy., Oxford., Basil Blackwell., p. 46, 1969)
39. (Ramsey, F.P., "Editors Introduction"., in The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays by Frank Plumton Ramsey., edited by R.B. Braithwaite., London, p. xiv, (1931))

40. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , pp. 73-74, 1981)

41. (Ramsey, F.P., "Facts and Propositions"., in *The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays* by Frank Plumton Ramsey., edited by R.B. Braithwaite., London, p. 155, (1931))

---

[125]

42. (Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophische Untersuchungen - Philosophical Investigations.*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe., Oxford., Basil Blackwell, Preface, 1953)

43. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 74, 1981)

44. (Fann, K.T., *Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy.*, Oxford., Basil Blackwell., pp. 49-50, 1969)

45. (Malcolm, N., *Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Memoir.*, Oxford., p. 69, 1962)

46. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 75, 1981)

47. (Sraffa, P., *Production of Commodities by Means of Commodities, Prelude to a Critique of economic Theory.*, Cambridge University Press, Preface., 1960)

48. (Wittgenstein, L., *The Blue and Brown Books.*, Basil Blackwell., Oxford., p. 77, 1969)

49. (Hilmy, S.S., *The Later Wittgenstein, The Emergence of a New Philosophical Method.*, Basil Blackwell., Padstow., pp. 111-112, 1987)

50. (Ogden, C.K., and Richards, I.A., *The Meaning of Meaning, A Study of the Influence of Language upon Thought and of the Science of Symbolism.*, Routledge & Kegan Paul., London, see: pp. 186-187, (1923) 1972))

51. (Letters to C.K. Ogden, 1973, 69)

52. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 77, 1981)

53. (Oehler, K., "Einleitung"., in James, W., *Der Pragmatismus.*, Philosophische Bibliothek., band 297., Felix Meiner Verlag., Hamburg., pp. xxvii-xxx, 1977)

54. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism". , New York., pp. 449-468, 1968)

---

[126]

55. (Dewey, J., "From Absolutism to Experimentalism"., in Bernstein, R., (ed.): *On Experience, Nature and Freedom.*, pp. 14-18, 1966)

56. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , p. 71, 1981)

57. (Hardwick, C.S., *Language Learning in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy.*, (The Hague 1971); cf. p. 10, pp. 33ff.)

58. (Dewey, J., "George Herbert Mead"., in *Journal of Philosophy.*, XXXVII (1931), p. 311)

59. (Mead, G.H., "The Genesis of the Self and Social Control"., in *International Journal of Ethics.*, XXXV, (1925), pp. 254, 257)

60. (From the manuscripts of the Paul Carus foundation lectures, delivered in 1930 under the title 'The

Philosophy of the Present')

61. (Mead, G.H., "Scientific Method of the Moral Sciences", in *International Journal of Ethics.*, XXXIII, (1923)
62. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introspection., .424, 1966)
63. (Peirce. C.S., *Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, II, p. 157)
64. (Burr, J.E. (ed.): *Handbook of World Philosophy, Contemporary Developments Since 1945.*, London, Aldwych Press., pp. 375-376, 1980)
65. (Wittgenstein, L., *Philosophische Untersuchungen - Philosophical Investigations.*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe., Oxford., Basil Blackwell, §539, 1953)
66. (Dewey, J., "The development of American pragmatism"., New York., pp. 449-468, 1968)
67. (The *ENCYclopedia of Philosophy.*, 1., p. 87, 1967)

---

[127]

68. (Bain, A., *Principles of Psychology.*, §125., ch. ix, Part. II)
69. (Bain, A., *Mental and Moral Science.*, §4., ch. iv, Bk. iv)
70. (Bain, A., *Mental and Moral Science.*, §8., ch. iv, Bk. iii)
71. (James, W., *The Principles of Psychology...*, Association., the laws of association of Bain and Hartley., p. 367; see also: the same laws applied to language., p. 364, (1890), 1952)
72. (Boring, E.G., *A History of Experimental Psychology.*, New York., The Century Co., p. 498, 1931)
73. (Wilson, J.R., in *The Time.*, Inc., The United States., 1971)
74. (Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism.*, pp. 13-14, 183-185, 1968)
75. (Vaughn, S.R., *Pedagogical Experience and Theory of Meaning in Dewey and Wittgenstein.*, Dissertation., Michigan State University., pp. 77, 79-80, 1976)
76. (Kleinmuntz, B., *Essentials of Abnormal Psychology.*, New York, Harper & Row, Publishers., p. 128, figure 6.1, 1974)
77. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 3.10.1904, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 200-201, 1966)
78. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence, 28.9.1904, Lett. C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 199-200, 1966)
79. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 25.11.1902, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 188-189, 1966)

[128]

## The Man of Pragmatism, Chapter VI

Introspection to pragmatism: some remarks of C.S. Peirce's life, literal remains, and of some philosophical themes

### Edition process of *Chance, Love, and Logic*, and *Collected Papers*

If we discuss both the edition and publishing process of C.S. Peirce's literal remains, there is the fact, that we have several collections, or the stages of them, and that most of material is still unknown. But if we are discussing his *Collected Papers*, which have been published after his death, we can divide roughly the whole process into two different main stages. And in addition, it might be suggested, that the third stage of those *Papers* is the stage of the late followers, or commentators, who seem to know, nothing more or less, what C.S. Peirce was just really saying here and there, or intending to do, or was he worthy of nothing, or muddle-headed, or something worse than it.

From **I. Gullvåg** (NOTES 1) we know that *Chance, Love and Logic* (1), was the first version of *Collected Papers* by Charles Sanders Peirce, which was much larger, and was called the ***GREAT HARVARD EDITION*** (2). But there have been also later editions, which are more complete, but still essentially the same.

I have regarded, as the most important source, the 7th and 8th volume of the later *Collected Papers* (3); the former deals with science and philosophy, and the latter deals with reviews, correspondence, and bibliography. There is the fact, that lot of C.S. Peirce's essential writings can be found in them.

---

1. (Cohen, M.R., (ed.): *Chance, Love and Logic, Philosophical Essays* by the late Charles S. Peirce., New York, 1923)

2. (Peirce, C.S., *Collected Papers* by Charles Sanders Peirce., I-VIII, edited by CHARLES Hartshorne & P. Weiss., Cambridge-mass., 1931-1958)

3. (Peirce, C.S., *Collected Papers of ...* , Vol. VII/ Science and Philosophy, Vol. VIII/ Reviews, Correspondence, and Bibliography., edited by ARTHUR W. Burks., Cambridge-Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., 1966)

---

[129]

There we can find an introduction to "*A Treatise of Cosmology*" (1), and an article concerning Lady Welby's "*What is Meaning*"(2) - and many other interesting writings.

**A.W. Burks** (NOTES 2) has written that when editing *Collected Papers*, some of C.S. Peirce's writings has been adopted from philosophical newspapers, and that some of those writings were quite homogenous with others concerning similar topics. But there were also writings, which didn't agree with each others, notwithstanding that they dealt with the same themes. And then there was a question of the final version: editors found often several versions of writings, which concerned the same theme, by their titles, or by their contents - but any of them was not final. - It was not always possible to imagine, what kind might be the version, which could be accepted as the final. It was no wonder that often editors must synthesize the possible solution from different materials, which were available.

But that couldn't guarantee, that in the text accepted, there were not any more fragmented elements, or that the final version were any comprehensible that the individual, fragmented texts, from which it was synthesized. This is [and will be] the case concerning any acceptable edition of C.S. Peirce's literary remains. Accepted solutions are, and shall always be, a result of the current policy of editor's. For example, one of the most influential factors concerning the policy [in the case of *Collected Papers*], was

the possible public interest, or attractiveness of the accepted writings.

This fragmentary of C.S. Peirce's writings, presented as the fact, is just according to **Dewey** (NOTES 3), who proposed for that C.S. Peirce did not write down his philosophical findings systematically, and that he did not succeed to make any homogenous theory of pragmatism - and for the reason, James, and Dewey must do the rest of work. Let us remind, however, our previous discussion concerning the birth of the new term pragmatism, and for what pragmatism was aimed to stand for; We have studied the letter which C.S. Peirce wrote to Mario Calderoni probably in the year 1905 (NOTES 4) where C.S. Peirce proposed for that pragmatism [pragmaticism] was not aimed to be a philosophical system, but instead a method of thinking. I think that there is no special contribution which James and Dewey have been adding into a method, however.

But what is the crucial difference, when discussing method, or theory. In a nutshell, a general theory has not necessary any special consequences, or practical bearings, but still it may be formally, or logically quite correct - had it any empirical consequences or not. A method must have consequences, and if a method has no consequences, it should be rejected. However, there might be a theory which says that any method which has no practical bearings is not valid - but that theory cannot cause any of those consequences in itself, because it is too common for the purpose, and it has no special consequences in itself.

---

1. (Peirce, C.S., *Collected Papers of ...* , VIII, edited by ARTHUR W. Burks., Cambridge-Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., Introduction to "A Treatise of Cosmology"., in *Reviews.*, pp. 148-154, 1966)

2. (Peirce, C.S., *Collected Papers of ...* , VIII, edited by ARTHUR W. Burks., Cambridge-Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., An article concerning Lady Welby's "What is Meaning"., in *Reviews.*, pp. 131-140, 1966)

---

[130]

C.S. Peirce planned to write a short book concerning pragmatism - as we know from a letter which he mailed to James, and which has been dated on the 7th March in 1904 (NOTES 5), in which he told to James that he was going to write a 150-sided book on pragmatism. He planned to join to it some of his earlier writings concerning same themes with critical notes. But there were economical, and other difficulties, which prevented him to realize these plans.

In a letter which C.S. Peirce mailed to W. James, and which has been dated on the 28th September in 1904 (NOTES 6) he has used an exclamation mark (!) when describing his "library". Unfortunately I do not know who was that person [or an institute] who has bought his books in this time [his brother bought his books at least once, but he gave them later back]. From *Collected Papers* (NOTES 7) we know that C.S. Peirce sold hundreds of his books to the library of John Hopkins University, as well as the material which he had written.

There were also some private collections, to where his books were archived. It is no wonder that **A.W. Burks** (NOTES 8) has written, that for localize C.S. Peirce's literal remains, editors worked a lot, and a part of the material, which was found, was unknown before. But it was not only because of the enthusiast efforts of editors, that those literal remains became as a part of work. There were several *éminence grise* (1), without which the edition work couldn't be possible (2). But from where the editors got all of those literary remains, and other materials? From *Collected Papers* (NOTES 9) and its Bibliography we get to know that at Harvard University Houghton Library there have been twenty boxes and bundles, but they have not been catalogized, because of their fragmentary. However, every single finding have been examined carefully by editors, and by those people, too, who have personally known C.S. Peirce, or who have been acquainted with the texts in question.

Then there will be arisen an eternal question, how the editors of C.S. Peirce's literary remains did succeeded to create such an enormous work as *Collected Papers*, which has its own way of life, if there were no system in C.S. Peirce's writings? And further, if there were no rational in those writings, how editors could make them more sensible and reasonable than they were originally?

- 
1. ((Fr.) *éminence grise*: Eminence. Something staying behind, but supporting an enterprise.)
  2. ( - such as Rockefeller Foundation, Department of Philosophy of Harvard University, and Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies of the University of Michigan.)
- 

[131]

**A. W. Burks** (NOTES 10) proposed for that fragmentary of material was partly quite illusory, and too apparent, because of editors tried to put writings under [their] pre-determined headings, according to their current policy. Those headings has been stated mostly by editors, but is some cased they have used C.S. Peirce's own headings. However, in general, editors have used his own way to use punctuation marks, spelling, or underline, but they have made some corrections, too.

From *Collected Papers* (NOTES 11) and its Bibliography we know that at Harvard University Widener Library there were sixty boxes and bundles, of which **Knight W. McMahon** (1) has made a catalogue, as follows:

I Science of Discovery

A. Mathematics

B. Philosophy

1. Pragmatism and the categories

2. Normative sciences (logic)

3. Metaphysics

C. Idioscopy

II Science of review: Classification of the sciences

III Practical science and miscellaneous

IV Book reviews

V Life and letters

A. Bibliography

B. Correspondence

1. Personal

2. Professional

3. Business

4. Official: Coast Survey (The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey)

5. Application

---

1. (McMahon, K.W., Catalogue of C.S. Peirce Manuscripts, December, 1941)

---

[132]

However - if we study only Chance, Love, and Logic, we can find most of those ideas of C.S. Peirce, which are well-known, and accepted as the kernel of pragmatism. For example, in ***Chance, Love and Logic*** (NOTES 12) there is the famous pragmatic maxim:

*"Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object",*

but there is no critics, which can be found from other references. Then, there is a reference to the *thought-sign-theory* (1), which holds that thoughts are signs.

The thought-sign-theory was not properly presented just in ***Chance, Love and Logic*** (NOTES 13), but it mentioned in M.R. Cohen's bibliography. Then, in ***Chance, Love and Logic*** (NOTES 14) there is an idea of the irritation which is produced just by the doubt, and which is the only motive in that striving, where we will find out, that we are believing to something (and not knowing), and that striving comes to its end, when there is no doubt left.

This, in turn, indicates to certain Humean tendencies in C.S. Peirce's philosophy, but there are also other alternative interpretations, which we have discussed here and there during the current study. However, if we read nothing but Chance, Love, and Logic, we get an impression of logician, and mathematician, and not mystician, or cosmic philosopher, which kind a philosopher C.S. Peirce quite apparently was, too.

---

1. (*thought-sign theory*: Presented e.g. in the article "Signs", which is in BALDWIN'S Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.)

---

[133]

## **The personality, life style, and philosophy of C.S. Peirce**

From **W. Percy** (NOTES 15) we know that C.S. Peirce was a difficult and eccentric man. But what kind was that difficulty or eccentricity? Let us start from his poor academical career. Both **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 16), and **J.E. Smith** (NOTES 17) has given an identical information that C.S. Peirce didn't succeed to have any permanent academical post, notwithstanding all of his efforts - but they do not explain much of those reasons, which ruined all of his efforts to have academic career at Harvard and John Hopkins.

From **J. Brent** (NOTES 18) we get to know e.g. that C.S. Peirce did not succeed to have an influential academic position at Harvard and John Hopkins, because of his way of life - which was too intemperate to the academic world and to its permanency. But - as a consequence of his lack of academic status, he could not be as influential as e.g. professors Dewey, and James.

From **J. Brent** (NOTES 19) we get to know, too, that C.S. Peirce was an enthusiast user of cocaine, and morphine, as were also **Edison** (1), and **Grant** (2) in U.S., and **Verne** (3), who was French origin. As we know from **Grinspoon et. al.** (NOTES 20) there was a large acceptance of cocaine in the field of medicine at the beginning of 1800's (4). At the end of 1800's, it was Paolo Mantegazza, who influenced a

lot to that Sigmund Freud became a cocaine addict. Thus, we might say, at least, that C.S. Peirce was not quite alone with his problem with drugs and alcohol. but the use of cocaine at those days was not at all understood as a problem, but instead a new, and wonderful medicine. And we shall never get know the role of the drug use in the development of C.S. Peirce's philosophy, or in the development of the psychology of Freud.

However, gradually C.S. Peirce became a morphine and cocaine addict and he was forced to take larger doses to get an impact which was enough.

- 
1. ((1847-1931); THOMAS A. EDISON was an American inventor of the phonograph, and [with Sir J.W. SWAN (1828-1914)] of the incandescent electric lamp.)
  2. ((1822-1885); ULYSSES E. GRANT was an American general, who fought on the Federal side during the American Civil War. He was also 18th president of U.S. between 1869-1877.)
  3. ((1828-1905); JULES VERNE was a French-born novelist, who achieved popularity by combination of adventure with popular science in his *Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea*, etc.)
  4. (E.g. by JOHAN JACOB von TSCHULD, CLEMENTS MARKHAM, and H.A. WEDDEL, for instance, who praised cocaine very high.)

---

[134]

However, I am not going to emphasize those misappropriations and the problems with alcohol and drugs, which C.S. Peirce has had, as we have known from **Joseph Brent** (NOTES 21). But instead I want to emphasize certain conditions of other kind might be more decisive - as e.g. certain social relationships, and philosophical climates, which were available, and which didn't agree with each other, and from where philosophers could derive their ideas from. Nobody can learn philosophy only by drinking or taking doses.

We know that C.S. Peirce didn't deal with the philosophy of drug use, or philosophical points of view to alcoholism, or morality in stealing money, but instead he has emphasized that somebody can steal the whole scientific work, or ideas from another. From **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 22) we know that C.S. Peirce has lectured occasionally at Harvard, but also at John Hopkins university for five years on logic. But how he actually got those vacations? Because of his intellect, perhaps? From **J. Brent** (NOTES 23) we know that it was due of C.S. Peirce's father, **BENJAMIN Peirce** (1), that C.S. Peirce had that opportunity at all to lecture first at Harvard, and later at John Hopkins. BENJAMIN Peirce was an influential figure at those days in the United States, and C.S. Peirce's mother was Sarah Hunt Mills, who was a daughter of senator Eliah Hunt Mills. Hence, C.S. Peirce seems to have had good resources for a good life - he was as a member of better folks. But this was the case with most American philosophers: **they were not advocates of mob** (2), or men of streets. Such kind of a higher social class produced also pragmatists George Santayana and William James. Thus - in general, philosophizing was not a poor man's profession - until a wealthy man happen to become poor, for one reason or another.

According to J. Brent, there were several different stages in C.S. Peirce's personal life, and one of them was the self-destructive stage in 1880's, which Brent has called Fall of Man, according to **J. Milton's** (3) *Paradise Lost*. After C.S. Peirce had lost his vacations at universities and Coast Survey (4), he wrote more philosophy than during his earlier years. From **A.W. Burks** (NOTES 24) we know that there were the two sessions, during which C.S. Peirce's was employed at Coast Survey. During the sessions at Coast Survey, and especially after them, there was growing self-critics, which we must especially reckon, when dealing with the correspondence between C.S. Peirce and James.

---

1. (BENJAMIN Peirce was e.g. one of the founders of the Academy of Sciences [with LOUIS AGASSIZ and senator HENRY WILSON in 1863, with the patronage of ABRAHAM LINCOLN]. In addition to this, he was the leader of the foundation which was aimed to advance science, and he was the supervisor of The United States Coast Survey, which, in turn, I guess, facilitated to that C.S. Peirce got a post at the institute in question.)
2. (There is an expression "**general mob of writers**" in C.S. Peirce's text (Cohen 1923, 43f))
3. (1608-1674); MILTON was an English Puritan poet, and author of the epics *Paradise Lost* (1667) [consisted of 12 books, and described the battle with heaven and evil], and *Paradise Regained* (1671).)
4. (C.S. Peirce has been employed two different sessions at The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey. The first of them began on the 21th September in 1859 and lasted on the 1th June in 1860. The second session began on the 1th July 1861 and lasted on the 31th September in 1891.)

[135]

An example of the critics is one of C.S. Peirce's letter to James, which has been dated on the 13th March in 1897 (NOTES 25) - which dates after both of the sessions mentioned. At the letter C.S. Peirce criticized his earlier writings and their emphasis of practical results. I wonder if his pragmatic maxim has been formulated at these early years? Five years later, in a letter, which has been dated on the 25th November 1902 (NOTES 26) he has expressed also criticism concerning his earlier philosophical ideas - which he had had e.g. in 1877 or during Cambridge lectures.

From the letter in question we can find [a kind of] supporting information to the claims which **A.W. Burks** (NOTES 27) has given - namely how C.S. Peirce's experience in empirical science influenced to his philosophy. It is quite obvious that he recognized via his experiences, and experiments, how far we actually are from the accuracy of the explanation. He derived a lot of his ideas and examples especially from physics - for example when he was an instructor at Cambridge in 1898, where one of his themes during his [two] lectures was the term habit, especially on the 7th lecture, during which he referred twice to his father's book (1) - and he used his father's examples during those lectures, too. During 1883 C.S. Peirce made measurements in gravity, and invented that there were some physical instabilities in the measurements which were used to use earlier.

At the same time he participated to psychological experiments at John Hopkins university. We can read at those psychological studies in question at *Memoirs* (2). The active participants of those studies were C.S. Peirce and Joseph Jastrow. We can information of those studies also from *Collected Papers* (NOTES 28).

But when C.S. Peirce and James actually have become acquainted with each other? **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 29) has affirmed that C.S. Peirce and James were close friends through their whole life, since the year James has started his studies at Harvard. In the same time C.S. Peirce has been employed to Coast Survey. But it is plausible that C.S. Peirce and James did not contact much face to face during the first session when C.S. Peirce worked at Coast Survey. But for what reason? From the fourth *ENCY* (NOTES 30) we know that James has been studying in Europe during the years 1855-1860, because his father had sent him, as well as his brother HENRY, to Europe - according to **R.B. Perry** (NOTES 31) - to get some impacts from German and French cultures. According to the fourth *ENCY*, James wanted later to study more psychology, and he went again to Europe, especially to Germany, in 1867, where he studied widely the books of science and philosophy, until he got emotional crisis in 1870. And it is quite obvious - as **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 32) has suggested for - that James told about those voyages to his close friend, C.S. Peirce, who travelled to Europe little later.

---

1. (Peirce, B., *Analytic Mechanism*)

2. (Peirce, C.S., *Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences.*, 3, Part I (1884), pp. 73-83)

[136]

Let us remind that C.S. Peirce's second working session at The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey began on the 1th July 1861 and lasted on the 31th September in 1891. After this last date there were no professional contacts between Survey and C.S. Peirce. But what was actually the reason why C.S. Peirce must leave his work at Coast Survey?

**J. Brent** (NOTES 33) has given us an information that C.S. Peirce was discarded from Coast Survey by the Commission of the Senate - partly because of his drinking, and partly because of his misappropriations of money - but his close friend William James didn't reject him for the reason.

From **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 34) we know that at first James was an instructor in physiology since 1872, and he was elected to an office of professor in 1880, when he had already degree in medicine. He had a fortune, or more golden minutes.

From **J. Brent** (NOTES 35) we know that C.S. Peirce's academic career ended at John Hopkins in 1884 - a year later that he has got married with his new wife - JULIETTE ANNETTE Peirce. His first wife, ZINA FAY Peirce, was left him already in 1876. C.S. Peirce himself visited in Berlin in 1875, only a year before Zina left him. But what comes to Zina Fay - we have discussed quite different name during the current study, and it is certainly enough. **Women!**

But was it due of C.S. Peirce's own visit to Europe, or his conversations with James that C.S. Peirce had a positive attitude towards European universities? From **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 36) we get to know that C.S. Peirce expressed publicly his appreciation to the universities of The Middle-Ages, as well as universities in Germany and new colleges in England - because of they have done so much for personality of students.

And what about James's emotional crisis we have discussed before? From the fourth **ENCY** (NOTES 37) we get to know that he had his emotional crisis in 1870 - but that he could be cured from it only by the belief to the free will. When James was in Europe, he studied e.g. Charles Renouvier's influential *Essais de Critique Générale* (1), which was already available during James' first journey to Europe. James has derived a lot of his conception of freedom from Renouvier. Later James also personally met Renouvier - who joined to his intellectual society.

From the sixth **ENCY** (NOTES 38) we get to know that Renouvier had got published his *Le Personnalisme* in 1903, and it might be quite possible, too, that James knew also something about this book, or became acquainted with its ideas. But this is a hypothesis. However, James (NOTES 39) owed one of his books to memoriam of Renouvier. And we have some evidences of that C.S. Peirce and James have discussed Renouvier and that both of them have been acquainted with his literal production.

We can meet Renouvier's name at C.S. Peirce's letter to F.C.S. Schiller - which is dated on the 10th November in 1906 (NOTES 40) where C.S. Peirce referred to a Renouvier's work, which he, for some reason, named to *Essais de Critique Philosophique* [... or something like that]...

---

1. (RENOUVIER, C., *Essais de Critique Générale.*, 4 Vols., Paris., 1854-1864)

[137]

C.S. Peirce seems to have at least one concept from Renouvier, namely the concept "real" - which has originally been presented by John Duns Scotus, whom we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study.

At a letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to James on the 23th July in 1905 (NOTES 41) he praised for

James' fluent French - that the rhetoric qualities of French produce to James' expression a clarity, which were not present in his English expressions. C.S. Peirce made a remark, that nearly always, when James has written something in English, he has not quite understood James's purposes, or what he was going to say. Just at that time James has published an article "*La Notion de Conscience*" (1). But there was also later philosophical interaction between French philosophy and pragmatism - after the death of James and C.S. Peirce.

From **J. Brent** (NOTES 42) we know that 90 years later there was a great interest to semiotics by French philosophers to C.S. Peirce's ideas. However, C.S. Peirce was not from French origin because the first advocate of his family became from Norwich in 1637, and the name of that grandfather of family in question was **JOHN PERS**. But this is a quite different story

Hence, there are several indicators which suggest to that C.S. Peirce lived economically unstable life, and we can make a hypothesis that it has affected on it how much he has produced philosophical texts. This question is not at all that simple, since he had written really an enormous amount of texts - in spite of his poor economical status. The collectors and editors of his writings found his writings all around but they were fortunately untouched. Let us remind our discussions during the current chapter about the edition process of Collected Papers by **A.W. Burks** (NOTES 43), and especially that editors must trace his literary remains from here and there.

---

1. (James, W., *La Notion de Conscience.*, Archives de Psychologie 5., June., 1905; see also: *La Notion de Conscience.*, in New York Evening Post., 31.7.1905)

---

[138]

There are a lot of information concerning C.S. Peirce's poor economical situation - by **J.E. Smith** (NOTES 44) and by **J. Brent** (NOTES 45), and by many others. It is no wonder that C.S. Peirce got repeatedly a direct economical support from his friends, and from his family. For example, soon after C.S. Peirce has got married with JULIETTE ANNETTE Peirce in 1883 they bought a farm in Arisbe MilFord, which relatively quickly began to fall into disrepair - because they lost their money, with which to maintain it, and to get their living. In order to get money C.S. Peirce sold his books to his brother, as told before.

JAMES MILLS Peirce gave the books back soon after he has given the price of those books. It is quite clear that it was not loan, but instead a present. Notwithstanding this monetary support C.S. Peirce didn't succeed to keep his library for a long time, and he was short of money also later over and over again. From his late years there is his letter to Paul Carus which has been written in 1910 (NOTES 46) in which he gave thanks to money he has got - and C.S. Peirce also told that his wife was unhealthy, and that they tried to prepare their house. All of this seems to suggest to that family Peirce lost all they owned, including almost all of Charles's books. But C.S. Peirce had probably some dictionaries in his use, as well as other books - from time to time, at least, as we know by the letter which he wrote to James on the 23th July in 1905 (NOTES 47), in which he told that he was forced to consult 23 books in order to answer the question of entity. And, as he told, he didn't count to them Baldwin's Dictionary and Eisler. Those poor social conditions may be negative and punishing - and unfair, if one has tried his best. It is surprising that there are not much of their valuation, or feeling sorry for lack of money - which may be due of that those kind of deeply personal letters are not included to Collected Papers, or there may be some other reasons. But of course - no philosopher has began his writings with a comment:

*"I'm a poor man, and an alcoholics and I must get my daily dose!"*

Anyway, the themes, which the most letters deal with, are philosophical. But there is still something left in them, namely the very feeling the general rejection of his philosophy, and ideas by other philosophers, even by his own "school". I shall take a letter in consideration which expresses very well his own feelings of the receptiveness of the whole philosophic audience concerning his ideas. As we know via his

correspondence - e.g. by a letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to James on the 12th June in 1902 (NOTES 48), in which he complained, that almost at every turn he must hear that all what he has said is incomprehensible, and nobody has taken a notice to his careful and long duration studies with language. He continued that also James has autosuggested himself to believe, too, that:

*"all what C.S. Peirce says is unintelligible ... I know quite well that my expressions are gauche, but my recluse life (1), which has lasted twenty years, has made them such ones".*

At the end of the letter he has used an expression:

*"Forgive the garrulity that comes from my eremitical life, and God bless you".*

---

1. (*Recluse life*: Live like a hermit. See also: An expression eremitical life, which refers to hermits, who in early Cristian times lived alone)

---

[139]

There can be found quite similar information also by commentators what concerns C.S. Peirce's tendency to use his own terminology. For example, **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 49) has described C.S. Peirce's style using an illustrative term "crabbed", and he has also noticed his tendency to use his own terminology, too. - But Ayer didn't explain closely why C.S. Peirce had that tendency. Then there are the different personal characters of James and C.S. Peirce. **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 50) has given to James a lot of positive attributes, and he has described him as a person who had a sense of humor, and whose lectures were vivid, and who had a lot of enthusiastic students, because of his sympathetic personal characters.

James was a sociable person; he had a kind of intellectual society, too, which we have referred during the current study. Hence, we may conclude that he was quite different than difficult and eccentric C.S. Peirce. If we think C.S. Peirce's poor economical status now, the question which arises there is: is it possible that his obvious poor economical status could have influenced to his philosophical ideas - or to his productivity in general?

**J.E. Smith** (NOTES 51) has supposed to that C.S. Peirce's spirit was quite free of his own poor economical and other circumstances alike.

And from **J. Brent** (NOTES 52) - but also from others - we know that C.S. Peirce has written a main part of his writings during the last twenty years of his life - just when he had the worst economical status, and lot of other difficulties than ever. Notwithstanding all this C.S. Peirce referred quite seldom to his own poor economical status e.g. at his letters [which were accepted to published]. There are only few such references available, and these which we have, are indirect ones - as an example the exclamation mark (!) when he described his "library", which we have discussed during the current study. But it may be true, anyway, that if he [or anyone] had owed more resources, he should have been capable to collect his writings himself, and that we might have now quite different kind of Collected Papers available.

An interesting question, which shall arise is: what kind of motive drives a philosopher to have more and more knowledge, or explanations, which, perhaps, only future generations shall understand. It might be possible that nobody shall be interested in their findings. And in general, in future there could be nobody, who were interested in complicated explanations, and instead of them only simple phrases, and nothing but only in instant pleasure, or a life of others in electrical, or virtual worlds. There is a lot of expense of all human powers in poor conditons, and a lack of all benefits which one could to have realized with the aid of money. The only result a philosopher can have is that he shall be accused to be as muddle-headed at distant future, or as stupid person, who gave all of his findings to the use of other philosophers? Any philosopher shall never know how future philosophers shall interpret his ideas, or are them only philosophical dead ends - which have no value to anybody. I think that this is far more important question, than have a philosopher got money or not. If one has no ideas, money does not help to get them

- but if one has money, he can buy the ideas he need.

[140]

C.S. Peirce discussed the general themes of economics and effectiveness very often - also in his writings - but it was the concern of the money usage of other people, or science. For example - **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 53) insisted that the true hypothesis is only one out of innumerable possible false ones [when he discussed with hypotheses and criterions by which we are choosing them] - and therefore - it must be taken in consideration of the questions of economy, of enormous expensiveness of experimentation in money, time, energy and thought. He also suggested that economy, in general, depends upon three kinds of factors which are cost, the value of the thing proposed, in itself, and finally its effect upon other projects. But there is the principle of simplicity, too:

*"As we advance further and further into science, the aid that we can derive from the natural light of reason becomes, no doubt, less and less; but still science will cease to progress if ever we shall reach the point where there is no longer an infinite saving of expense in experimentation to be effected by care that our hypotheses are such as naturally recommend themselves to the mind, and make us just the impression of simplicity, - which here means facility of comprehension by the human mind,- or aptness, or reasonableness, of good sense".*

This may sound to us as there were a businessman telling about his quite narrow visions. But we know that C.S. Peirce wasn't a such one, or that he didn't succeed with his business - and for that reason he could mean only that there are certain boundaries around the human activities, which can dictate how far the human beings can reach as individuals, and as groups, in spite of their extraordinary intelligence and effectiveness. And for certain, that simplicity does not mean that we can easily access those more advanced truths.

But there has been also soft tendencies in C.S. Peirce's philosophy. According to **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 54) - C.S. Peirce had an urge for the larger education, and for developing the personalities of students, as English colleges, German universities, and the great universities in The Middle-Ages, which we have discussed during the current chapter. C.S. Peirce also insisted for that the economical utility itself must be banned and instead of it there must be emphasized that students would find the truth - He has used the expression meagerness to describe the result which may be followed from the purely an Utilitarian orientation.

We have also **C.S. Peirce's** (NOTES 55) article which was published in Science, in which he attached strongly against the pure pragmatic view in education and criticized also the economical productivity as a reason for choosing professors to American colleges and suggested instead to aiming to the theoretical orientation and studies. He supposed that we should not to see reality only measuring it trough the economical wins. He argumented so that money, productivity and utilitarianism belong to the wrong pedagogic orientation, and to its criterions, when ranking succeeding in educational enterprises. An yet there is one critical comment on utility - which we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study, which is considering specially the very nature of science, in which **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 56) has uttered that, in general, science should concentrate to those things which have no instant utility, because the useful ones are carried on much better without the consultation of the scientists. This is just according Aristotle, and his classification of sciences.

[141]

At the letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to James, and which has been dated on the 13th March 1904 (NOTES 57) he has told to James that in his former writings he emphasized too much the narrow pragmatic view, which wanted immediate results. This is something against his pragmatic maxim. However, his new view can be linked to what he has - according to **I. Scheffler** (NOTES 58), argued for better education - which we have discussed before. At the letter C.S. Peirce admitted, that in his younger days he made him quilt to that too pragmatic view, considering pragmatism and also the duty of science

by an Utilitarian way, but as an older he wanted instead to ask what an usage, and practical bearings themselves could mean. It can be clearly seen that there are certain discrepancies in C.S. Peirce's thoughts concerning the question of utility. But for what reason? It is because of the philosophical development of C.S. Peirce and because of the different themes and contexts, in which he applied his method. In addition to this he emphasized different things in his younger days than older. For that reason there seems to be different seasons in his thinking.

An illustrative example of this is the development of his thoughts concerning logic, for example via C.S. Peirce's letter to James, which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (NOTES 59), in which he evaluated his view in 1877 as rough, as well as the view he advocated for when he lectured at Cambridge. According his new view the foundation of logic is in ethics, which in turn has its foundation in aesthetic. All of these passages suggest to the philosophy of change, and acceptance of the new influences, and the points of view, as far as they are not offering only one kind of explanation, or fixing the reality far before the beginning, and becoming. It might be possible, that man with one kind of life, can never adopt this kind of acceptance.

---

[142]

### **C.S. Peirce: inventor of the term pragmatism**

When I have read the correspondence between C.S. Peirce and James them, it has began to seem to me quite obvious that James appreciated C.S. Peirce in a way, by which any other pragmatists seldom, or never did. I shall present three different contexts where James clearly expressed his indebtedness to his philosophical grandfather.

First I consider the term pragmatism. At the letter which has been dated on the 10th November in 1900 (NOTES 60) C.S. Peirce inquired from James the person who originally invented the term pragmatism. He was at that time illustrating to Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology* (1) those philosophic ideas, which could be associated to the character "j". James answered to C.S. Peirce with a postcard dated on the 26th November in 1900 (NOTES 61) saying that he regarded C.S. Peirce as the inventor of the term in question - and told that he has given an honor to his close friend, C.S. Peirce at his lecture on "Philosophical Concepts and Practical Results", and that he sent two copies to him two years ago.

Secondly. There are also other graduations concerning C.S. Peirce's role in the development of American pragmatic movement. James has given an honor to his friend in some of his articles, too. For example, **James** (NOTES 62) told that he has described C.S. Peirce's philosophy, as a whole, in his article concerning F.C.S. Schiller's humanism, which was published in *The Nation* on the 3th March in 1904:

*"Quite recently the word pragmatism, first used thirty years ago by our American philosopher, C.S. Peirce, has become fashionable as the designation of a novel way of looking at the mind's relation to reality",*

of which C.S. Peirce, in turn, gave thanks to James by his letter on the 7th March in 1904.

---

1. (There is an article "Signs" in BALDWIN'S Dictionary of Philosophy, where C.S. Peirce has introduced his thought-sign-theory.)

---

[143]

Thirdly. One occurrence of those references to C.S. Peirce, we have in *The Will to Believe*, which concerned religion, from which theme those close friends so much discussed, and where **James** (NOTES 63) has written:

*"To My Old Friend, CHARLES SANDERS Peirce, to whose philosophic comradeship in old times and to whose writings in more recent years I owe more incitement and help than I can express or repay".*

But, of course, these kind references are only kindly references, and especially this reference does not tell us, which were the ideas in C.S. Peirce's "writings", which James felt valuable, and how he has associated them into his own philosophy. In that sense, we have only kindly words, and not the doors to the development of pragmatism. But all of these passages suggest to the fact that James has greatly appreciated C.S. Peirce, and that their comradeship was warm. Also **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 64) has also emphasized their close comradeship which lasted almost through their whole life. I think that there is no doubt about this friendship, but it doesn't tell us much, if we think their philosophies, which were not so much alike, as e.g. **Dewey** (NOTES 65) has proposed for when saying that James just continued C.S. Peirce's work.

If we think all of those similarities in their philosophies, however, it seems quite clear that we can categorize them under the common term pragmatism, notwithstanding what we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study concerning disagreement between C.S. Peirce, and his followers, James, Dewey, Papini, and Schiller. I think that we must seek alternative, and complementary tendencies from certain single doctrines within pragmatism - such as the doctrine of synechism, for instance, which seems to me more universal and applicable than a school of pragmatism, or pragmatic method as such.

Finnish writer and professor **Juho A. Hollo** (NOTES 66) has categorized pragmatism belonging to the school of relativism, and he has promoted James to the father and the developer of pragmatism. I think, that this kind of proposition is due to that Hollo didn't recognize C.S. Peirce's decisive role as originator in the whole development of pragmatic movement.

But as we can remind was this kind an attitude - concerning C.S. Peirce's lesser role in the whole development of pragmatism - familiar to **Dewey** (NOTES 67), too, who has written that James reduced C.S. Peirce's philosophical method, but in the same time, enlarged the field of application of pragmatic method. According to Dewey - in 1898 it was James who started up the new philosophical movement with his "Philosophical Concepts and Practical Results" (1), which we discussed at the previous page - and in which James gave an honour to C.S. Peirce.

---

1. (James' lectures "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" became later published in *Collected Essays and Reviews*.)

---

[144]

Those ideas which James introduced, were not very original. There were such kinds of claims that *beliefs are the true rules for action* (1), or that *every idea we have concerning an object, is due of the influences of that object to us* (2), which are both very Peircean heritage. In addition to this, James emphasized clearly special consequences of object, as well as special consequences of ideas. But is it quite natural to trace special consequences of objects and ideas, if we think about any special circumstances, from which we are enlarging our experiences to more general ideas, as e.g. in elementary education, and in religious experiences - where James has used his method, too. However, we cannot avoid the general, or merely social consequences of them both. There are other similar reviews concerning the lesser importance of the role of C.S. Peirce. When discussing C.S. Peirce's educational and religious ideas.

**I. Scheffler** (NOTES 68) has generally argued for that C.S. Peirce didn't succeed to join together the strivings of human intelligence to the other human activities by his logic and by his other means - which were inadequate for the questions of pedagogic. I think that these kind of negative general judgments may be the reason that C.S. Peirce's ideas were not much appreciated in the large pedagogic fields then, and that they are appreciated now. But there are obviously other reasons, too.

But isn't it strange that J.A. Hollo didn't recognize C.S. Peirce as the founder and grandfather of pragmatism, and just the person who strongly influenced to James. From **J.A. Hollo's** (NOTES 69) short version of *Kasvatuksen maailma* we know that he has written the larger version of it already in 1927. But what are the necessary conclusions of this? We know that C.S. Peirce was not yet generally known and accepted as an originator of pragmatism - James was an exception. However, Hollo's shorter book in question has been published in 1952, when there should have been enough knowledge concerning C.S. Peirce and his role in the development of pragmatism.

Most of those books, which included C.S. Peirce's own thoughts, seems to have been published far after C.S. Peirce's death, including his postume "logical" book *Chance, Love and Logic*, dealt with logic, signs, relations, chance, and such themes, and for that reason, I guess, he was known, for a long time, as a logician, but also as an enthusiast advocate of philosophy of science. For the reason, there are lot of books concerning the theme, e.g. a study by **J.E. McCarthy** (3) on C.S. Peirce's normative science. And we have also a study by **R.A. Brown** (4) on C.S. Peirce's normative conception of truth.

---

1. (C.S. Peirce, *Collected Papers...*, 7.49-7.50; see also VII, p. 207)

2. (OGDEN & RICHARDS ,1923, 442-443)

3. (McCarthy, J.E., *Peirce's Normative Science.*, Facs. - Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1984; Diss.: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980)

4. (Brown, R.A., *Peirce's Normative Conception of Truth.*, Facs. - Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1984; Diss. Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University, 1979)

---

[145]

## **Grand Cosmogony - the philosophy of creation, and the scheme of the general- and nomological psychognosies**

When C.S. Peirce was an instructor at Lowell-Institute 1892-1893, he gave lectures, which were named "The History of Science". Between those years at Lowell-Institute he presented some traits of his Grand Cosmogony, which was, as he insisted, something to be realized in future. We know that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 70) has emphasized the view that human thought has been developed from generation to generation, and that the development still continues. He regarded that development - almost like Comte - as geological successions. The development can be seen clearly at art, religion, and politics, and at certain institutions - but also in the individual minds and organisms. They have produced all that which is to come to actual existence, crystallizing all the time the fundamental laws of matter and the mind. And because of those preparatory stages and prerequisites, we can also wait to come in future such as **Grand Cosmogony**, which can be called the philosophy of creating.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 71) tried also to formulate a kind of high philosophy, when he considered the relationship between logic and metaphysics. He wanted to outline a system which consisted of different levels, and one of them, namely high philosophy, linked the whole system to the level of ordinary life and experience. We know that it was Aristotle, who has introduced the syllogistic logic, brought into use also variables. In addition to this, there was that idea of the change from potentiality to actuality, as well as the idea that all of the possible essential forms shall, one after another, become to existence.

There are such causations as material,- formal,- and final ones. Both Plato and Aristotle have also made a classification what comes to the levels where human beings perceive their experiences.

First. They can perceive their instincts and feelings.

**Secondly.** They can also perceive spiritual level such as perseverance and heroism. These previous two levels are common with humans and animals.

**Thirdly.** Only man is able to reach **Nus**, which is pure reason and being inseparable part of the universe.

Let us remind our previous discussion concerning the topic. These ideas can be associated to C.S. Peirce's cosmology, too, as well as to his scheme of general- and nomological psychognosies. But there are some differences between Aristotle and C.S. Peirce. One of them is that the former regarded the system of biological organisms unchangeable, and that there was no place to evolution in it, which a view the latter did not advocate for. There are some common elements between Aristotle and C.S. Peirce, but the only thing which seems to be common in **General Psychognosy** is the idea of systematizing, and the whole scheme refers to Plato, and not so much to Aristotle.

---

[146]

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 72) has made the classification by the aid of the concepts *general* (1) and *nomological* (2) - which are the concepts which belong to his psychognosy - which he obviously aimed to be a hierarchy, to which he did want to put most of his philosophical findings:

#### GENERAL PSYCHOGNOSY

##### FAMILIES:

I Essence of Mind and The Law of Final Causation (non-biological), phenomenological pneumatology.

II How Final Causation works on the development of biological stocks.

III How The Law of Final Causation can be applied to biological individuals and their consciousness.

##### DEMONOMY:

IV Applications and Associations as professions, etc.

##### SUBFAMILIES OF GENERAL PSYCHOGNOSY:

V General Laws of Concert and Strict

- Apply to these principles of special phenomena as constitution of society and law, also the wealth

---

1. (*General*: Refers to certain internal characters of the universe, from which we do know nothing but their generality, or that there is a principle which we can apply but what we cannot localize to certain place or time.)

2. (*Nomology*: Refers to the theory, and to the general legitimacy, as well as to that we can make such theories which we can legitime.)

---

[147]

#### NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHOGNOSY OF SPECIAL PSYCHOGNOSY

Treat Laws of Mind

[laws of process], in which Association is subordinate to The General Principles of Causation.

## FAMILIES:

Study of The Great Law of Association [fusion] or mutual attraction of all ideas (as analogy to gravitation in physical world)

## SUBFAMILIES OF SPECIAL PSYCHOGNOSY:

Association per se

Association as modified by Association

- Habit, Imagination and Vividness, Generalization and Reasoning, Recognition and Belief.

The Laws of the Growth of Mind in individual and in the society or stock:

- Relating to general laws; Growth of Morphogeny; Growth of Consciousness of Mind; Laws of Growth of Social Consciousness

## STUDY OF THE CONNECTIONS OF BODY AND MIND SUBFAMILIES OF THE CONNECTIONS OF BODY AND MIND:

Elementary Laws:

Psychophysics, Sensation, Volition, Impulse, Control, Controlled Volition.

Laws of Peculiar States of Mind: Dissolution and Double Consciousness, credenciveness, Suggestion, Passion.

---

[148]

## Short excursion to C.S. Peirce's semiotics by his correspondence with Christine Ladd-Franklin and William James

**J. Brent** (NOTES 73) has suggested that C.S. Peirce formulated his first versions of semiotic theories already during 1860's, but that he got the final version of it twenty years later. There are lot of studies concerning this field, and therefore I do not deal with in detail.

However, a hundred years later C.S. Peirce was promoted with Swiss-French **Saussure** (1) to the grandfathers of semiotics by French philosophers. **Walker Percy** (NOTES 74) has promoted C.S. Peirce to the founder of semiotics, which is the science of signs. Let us remark especially that Percy has used the term semiotics, and not semantics, or the term semeiotics. **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 75) has suggested to that C.S. Peirce can be regarded as the grandfather of modern symbolism, because he has made an extensive analysis of symbols, and stated sign as the fundamental category: all that is thought, can also be expressed as signs, and as a consequence, the whole human nature is symbolic.

I am not intending to examine in detail the modern symbolic logic, semiotics, or semantics, such as they exist now. But I am interested in certain consequences which can be derived from his interpretations. **C.W. Morris** (NOTES 76) has emphasized certain cosmological point in C.S. Peirce's view - namely that the sign of signs is referring to man himself. We must consider mind as sign, too. But when analyzing those units, we can find out that they consist of three components, or characters: object, its effects, and person. And, in addition to this, there are certain universal features. In the course of the development, during which what is interpreted, gradually becomes, or approaches to **sign ad infinitum** - what is personal becomes to non-personal and infinite. These general features are essential when understanding the essence of signs.

---

1. ((1857-1913); FERDINAND de SAUSSURE was the Swiss linguistic, and a professor in Geneva since 1891. He was an advocate of modern descriptive linguistics, and an author of *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916). He made a difference between diachronic and synchronic research, and he regarded language as a social institution, and in it parole (speech) precedes always langue (language). There is also the difference between the structure and materia of language. In general, SAUSSURE'S ideas are the basis of modern structural linguistics, and there were born several schools, as Geneva school, and Glossematic school in Copenhagen, and the school of Praha.)

---

[149]

C.S. Peirce mailed the letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin, which has been dated on the 29th August in 1891 (NOTES 77), in which he explained, that his work in philosophy consisted of the strict analysis of ideas, and that he has tried to prove what is essential when studying the target of analysis. But it took a long time. From the letter, which C.S. Peirce mailed to James on the 3th October in 1904 (NOTES 78), we know that he had for a long time carried on the study which concerned the essence of language, and he wondered why other philosophers had not understood them. And further, C.S. Peirce wrote to English semantic **Lady Welby** (1) several letters concerning semantics, and some other themes, too. C.S. Peirce wrote her a long letter, which is only partly been spared. This letter in question has been dated on the 12th October in 1904 (NOTES 79), in which C.S. Peirce discussed the theory of signs and categories. He also explained that he was forced to develop totally new terms and words to describe his findings.

In addition to this **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 80) has written an article to *The Nation*, which was concerning Lady Welby's "What Is Meaning". Unfortunately, many of C.S. Peirce's writings concerning semantics has been just synthesized from different sources, and we have not a clear idea of the total view he [possibly] had. However, those who are more interested in semiotics I want to refer to the work of **Umberto Eco** and **Thomas A Sebeok** (2) who have adopted a logical approach in their *Sign of Three* to C.S. Peirce. But why they were interested in him? In linguistics it has been used C.S. Peirce's model of abduction-deduction-induction, when explaining e.g. the development of linguistic constructions of children, who abduce first what kind of rules to apply, and then they deduce the rule accepted to the different usages.

Quite similar situation we have when a detective tries to trace behind diffuse hints any rational activity, which a criminal has actually done when doing a crime [a criminal is always rational being in these contexts, and he has also a motive, were he e.g. mentally sick, psychopath, or corrupted genius - he has always some rationale].

---

1. (Lady WELBY; She was an English scientist, and Maid of Honour to Queen Victoria)

2. (Eco, U., and Sebeok, T.A., *The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce.*, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, (Advances in semiotics), 1983 - Cf. The book "Sign of Four")

---

[150]

## **Scholastic-, and philosophical realism, and pragmatist idealism**

Now we shall discuss Scholastic tradition, in which there were two ways in explaining the essence of our language: The one was the nominalistic way, which Occam advocated for, and the other Scholastic realism by John Duns Scotus - as we can remind. The latter criticized especially Aquinas - emphasizing that there is fundamental difference between [the sentences of] faith and knowledge: that is, propositions for the existence of God, or for an immortal soul, are not at all provable by reason.

Scotus was an early voluntarist philosopher, because he thought that our will presences our understanding, and that our will determine what we are understanding. From **A.J. Ayer** (NOTES 81) we get to know that C.S. Peirce appropriated Scotus especially because of Scotus was an advocate of Scholastic realism. Let us remind our previous discussions during the current chapter, and how C.S. Peirce referred to Renouvier's *Essais De Critique Philosophique* when explaining that there are two kinds of concepts: the technical concepts, which are defined before they are actually used. As an example of those technical concepts is the concept real, which have been introduced by Scotus. Then there are the concepts of common sense, which are mostly naturally born - but to which philosophers must give their exact meanings.

From **Dewey's** (NOTES 82) article concerning American pragmatism we know, that every concept seems to have an ability to regulate itself - not because of certain conditions, but instead because of which is the most appropriate function to the concept, which seems to give to it an ability to control itself, in every situation, and in every purposive use it may have. Hence, here is an optimal position to every concept. But, of course, there are no such kind of concepts, which just control themselves, or include control-system - without an aid of any "external" agent; there must always be such an active agent behind every self-controlling activity of concepts.

---

[151]

But what does this mean? Are there certain abilities which concepts have, for which reason we can use them for our purposes, whatever they are - if our purposes are within those abilities? If so - this does also mean, that we can construct our concepts to be applicable in certain uses, if they have those self-controlling features - if we want to. But to where this 'self-controlling' refers to, then? It suggests to the referentiality of concepts, that is, without any referentiality of them we cannot have any functional or meaningful concept. Hence, there is no mechanism within which we could use, but only a feature to be associated to others. There we are approaching the phenomenon of association, which, in turn, is in certain relationship to the centrifugal tendency of thought, by which we can make intension deeper. When describing the forms of consciousness, and especially the formation of the sets of ideas, i.e. association, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 83) has told us:

*"A great many associations are inherited. Others grow up spontaneously. The rest depend upon the principle that ideas once brought together into a set remain in that set. Many associations are merely accidental".*

There are the words 'inherited', and 'accidental', which suggest to naturally born concepts [of common sense, perhaps], which have no consciousness within them, or conscious control-mechanism - but there is also the word 'principle', which, in turn, suggest to a similarity, or familiness, by which we can create [perhaps] more complicated concepts - or according with they become created, but not only by their own inner laws, but instead from their constellations. When seeking the [fina] ground, to which C.S. Peirce wanted to base upon his pragmatist idealism, we find several propositions. On the one hand, **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 84) assumed that human mind might be such a media where evolution and generalizing tendency is still at work. That is, we are a kinds of living agensts. On the other hand, he has believed also that the laws of universe have been formed under a universal tendency of all things towards generalization and habit taking. That, in turn, is, that even the blind stuff we handle has certain potentialities, and because of it the stuff has an ability to become more than it is now. The generalization is an expansive process, and habit taking tries to make the new areas of the reality stable; both those processes support each other.

But what is important there is that there must be plasticity in the areas which are developing, and also that future is something which depends greatly on plasticity of the world. Let us remind what **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 85) has argued for that plasticity of mind - even when it is connected to the living influence of diagram and icon to us. And further that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 86) has put the human mind - as a plastic unit in the development of the universe. Most laws in physics, as gravitation, have already reached their ultimate limit, and therefore, they cannot create as such a different and to more complex, and further developing future. There **MUST** be another direction, from which to try to find an explanation for

development. There is **C.S. Peirce's** (NOTES 87) doctrine of synechism, which we have discussed repeatedly at earlier stages during the current study - and especially the sentence which says:

*"a man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole",*

---

[152]

which, in turn, suggests to that generalizing tendency has close connection to the eternal verities by that spiritual consciousness. C.S. Peirce has considered the human mind really as a very important factor in the development of the universe, almost too important, perhaps. In a way - the human concepts are byproducts of mind, in spite of that the mind produces nothing - but it exist - and it has an influence from its existence. The concepts, or what has been interpreted, are available, because of that there is human mind, and its possibilities and potentialities, and gradually within it we can expand our concepts logically ad infinitum. There **MUST** be born something other kind than dead matter itself, to enlarge the universe.

But what is the mechanism? From a letter which C.S. Peirce has mailed to James, and which has been dated on the 28th September in 1904 (NOTES 88) we can read about pragmatist idealism in which the reality is experienced as future by *mellonization* (1). In C.S. Peirce's epistemology the term suggests to that logical operation, by which something, which is considered as *parelythose* (2) - is in fact regarded as repeating and expansive infinite, from which space we are going to which shall always be. The mellonization states no marginal conditions - but at the same time - it is a form to receive something.

*"There are still writers" - as C.S. Peirce continues - "who want to restrict our consciousness to which can be regarded as past - which those writers still consider present. Those writers think that the problem is whether we accept the external world alone as "real", or call we the internal world as fiction. Just this kind of illusion shall vanish, if we consider past as repeating and expanding infinity. In this kind of a process we also use the double consciousness, where we go from that part of it which causes compulsion to the part what is infinitive".*

It seems to me that the question of pragmatist idealism associated to the essence of time - as breathing creature, who has a sight to every possible dimension - and whose multi-dimensionality is also the essence of mellonization. **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 89) has argued for that any present percept is only once special case, when discussing perceived things and time. No principle should prevent us to talk about antecepts which mean things perceived in future, or to talk about ponecept which are things perceived in past. And there are corresponding continuities to them, whose concepts are percipuum, antecipuum, and ponecipuum, which all mean together the direct and uncontrolled interpretation of percept, antecept and ponecept.

But what about the perception of time as a whole? Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 90) has derived his concept of intuited time from Kant - with slight modifications - as we have seen at an earlier stage in the current study, and that he also regarded his concept of percipuum as identical to intuited time.

---

1. (*Mellonization*: The term is derived from Greek where it has ment same as "intend to do something", "exist" or "suffer".)

2. ((G.k.) *Parelythose*: Has been)

---

[153]

If we think what we have presented right before, there seem to be different kind of continuities. Obviously ponecipuum, for example, will be seen in the process of mellonization, as "expansive infinite".

We do not apprehend time only as a percipuum, but instead different kind of percipuums, however. For the other explanation which have been presented during the current study I refer also to **C.S. Peirce's** (NOTES 91) general psychognosy, and there especially to the law of final causation, and to the laws which are the eternal forms, and to their role in the development of the whole universe. But I want refer to his special psychognosy, too, and there especially to the laws of the peculiar states of mind. Both of them together explain the dual role of mellonization.

But from where is C.S. Peirce has derived his philosophical realism. We have an evidence that is was Aristotle. As **W. Percy** (NOTES 92) has written:

*"The great contribution of Charles Peirce, a rigorous scientific realist, was that he preserved the truth, as he saw it, of philosophical realism from Aristotle to the 17th century, salvaged it from the medieval language of scholastics which is now all but incomprehensible to us, recast it in terms familiar to scientists, to the most simple-minded empirist, and even to us laymen. It, Peirce's realism, cannot now be escaped or fobbed off as scholastic mumbo jumbo".*

That is pretty good thing, but C.S. Peirce is not the only philosopher, who has made those translations. But he has tried to explain them, or make them more comrehensible. But we have been discussing such term as double consciousness, which I wan to make more clear with few words. Because of the presence of feeling in the sequence. At the letter, which C.S. Peirce mailed James on the 28th September in 1904 (NOTES 93), he suggested to that feelings have an intermediate role in double-consciousness.

**C.S. Peirce** (NOTES 94) has also proposed for that feelings have two kinds of intensity:

The first one is that **intensity of feeling itself**, and the second one is that **intensity of altersense consciousness**. This suggests to that feelings can be, as a component, both of sensation and will, and thus a part of human activities. But they have had a role also in the deepness of past. It seems to me that by feelings, in a way, we can join to the continuous creation, as well as to an intima contact to instancy and continuity. As we can see, this kind of realistic view, concerning human consciousness, and other things - is a little bit confusing, and moreover - that there are elements which seem to be far away from realism, as we interpret the term now, in our cold world. But it may be due of that we have lost the world of feelings, as well as intimacy and continuity, and we have nothing to wait for.

---

[154]

## NOTES 6

1. (Gullvåg, I., "Wittgenstein and Peirce"... , Notes: abbreviations used: p. 74, 1981)
2. (Collected Papers of... , VII., Introduction, p. xiv, 1966)
3. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism". , New York., pp. 449-468, 1968)
4. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., c. 1905, lett., from C.S. Peirce to Mario Calderoni., pp. 165-166, 1966)
- 5.(Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 7.3.1904, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 189-190, 1966)
6. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence, 28.9.1904, Lett. C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 199-200, 1966)
7. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Bibliography., p. 255, 1966)
8. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introduction, p. xiv; see also, VIII., Bibliography., pp. 253-254, 1966)

9. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Bibliography., pp. 253-254, 1966)
  10. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introduction, p. xv, 1966)
  11. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Bibliography., pp. 253-254, 1966)
  12. (Cohen, M.R., (ed.): *Chance, Love and Logic, Philosophical Essays by the late Charles S. Peirce.*, New York, p. 45, 1923)
  13. (Cohen, M.R., *Chance, Love and Logic.*, Introduction., xxvi; see also, p. 309, 1923)
- 

[155]

14. (Cohen, M.R., *Chance, Love and Logic.*, p. 16, 1923)
  15. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , p. 80, 1989)
  16. (Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism.*, p. 13, 1968)
  17. (Smith, J.E., *The Spirit of American Philosophy.*, New York, pp. 3-37, 1966)
  18. (Brent, J., *Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life.*, Bloomington and Indianapolis., Indiana University Press., 1993)
  19. (Brent, J., *Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life.*, 1993)
  20. (Grinspoon, L. & Bakalar, J.B., *Cocaine, A Drug and its Social Evolution.*, New York., Basic Books., Inc., Publishers., 1976)
  21. (Brent, J., *Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life.*, 1993)
  22. (Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism.*, pp. 13-14, 183-185, 1968)
  23. (Brent, J., *Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life.*, 1993)
  24. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introduction., xiii-xiv, 1966)
  25. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 13.3.1897, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 186-187, 1966)
  26. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 25.11.1902., lett. C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 188-189, 1966)
- 

[156]

27. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introduction., see also: *Habit.*, a reference to Benjamin Peirce's *Analytic Mechanism*: p. 289, a reference to Benjamin Peirce and to the experiments with pendulums: pp. 295-296, 1966)
28. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., *Experimental Science.*, on physical instabilities in the measurement of gravity: pp. 3-12; on uncertainties in observation of distant objects: pp. 13-27; on experiments, to which both C.S. Peirce and Joseph Jastrow participated at John Hopkins: pp. 31-34, 1966; See also: Peirce, C.S.: *Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences.*, 3, Part I (1884), pp. 73-83)
29. (Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism.*, pp. 13-14, 183-185, 1968)

30. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 4., pp. 240-241, 1967)
  31. (Perry, R.B., The Thought and Character of William James., Boston., 1953; see also: Strumpf, K., William James nach seinen Briefen, Leben, Character, Lehre., Berlin, 1927)
  32. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., pp. 85-86, 1968)
  33. (Brent, J., Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life., 1993)
  34. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., pp. 13-14,183-185, 1968)
  35. (Brent, J., Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life., 1993)
  36. (Scheffler, I., Four Pragmatists., critics against Karl Pearson and his utilitarianism, welfare and success: p. 85; meagreness and American educational institutions, as an opposite to European and Medieval educational institutions: pp. 86-87, 1974; see also: Wiener, P.P., and Young, F.H., (eds): Studies in the Philosophy of C.S. Peirce., Cambridge-mass.: Harvard University Press., the development of mind, liberal education and logic: pp. 289-290, 1952)
- 

[157]

37. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 4., pp. 240-241, 1967)
  38. (The ENCYclopedia of Philosophy., 6., p. 107, 1967)
  39. (James, W., Some Problems of Philosophy, A Beginning of An Introduction to Philosophy., New York., Greenwood Press Publishers., p. v, 1968)
  40. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 10.11.1906, lett.,C.S. Peirce to F.C.S. Schiller, p. 216, 1966)
  41. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 23.7.1905, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., p. 190, 1966)
  42. (Brent, J., Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life., 1993)
  43. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Introduction, pp. xiv-xv; see also Bibliography., pp. 253-254, 1966)
  44. (Smith, J.E., The Spirit of American Philosophy., pp. 3-37, 1966)
  45. (Brent, J., Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life., 1993)
  46. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 1910, lett., from C.S. Peirce to Paul Carus, p. 171, 1966)
  47. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 23.7.1905, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., p. 190, 1966)
  48. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 12.6.1902, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James, pp. 195-198, 1966)
- 

[158]

49. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., pp. 13-14, 1968)

50. (Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism.*, pp. 183-185, 1968)
51. (Smith, J.E., *The Spirit of American Philosophy.*, pp. 3-37, 1966)
52. (Brent, J., *Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life.*, 1993)
53. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VII., §8., *Abduction.*, .220, 1966)
54. (Scheffler, I., *Four Pragmatists.*, p. 86, 1974; see also: Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism*, p. 190, 1968)
55. (Review of Clark University., 1889-1899: *Decennial Celebration.*, Worcester., Mass., 1899., in *Science.*, n.s., 20., Apr., 1900, pp. 620-622) and which was also included in the *Decennial Celebration of Clark's University 1889-1899* publication)
56. (Peirce, C.S., *Lessons from the History of Science.*, 1896)
57. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VIII., *Correspondence.*, 13.3.1904, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 186-188, 1966)
58. (Scheffler, I., *Four Pragmatists.*, p. 86, 1974)
59. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VIII., *Correspondence.*, 25.11.1902, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 188-189, 1966)
60. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VIII., *Correspondence.*, 10.11.1900, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., p. 188, 1966)
61. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VIII., *Correspondence.*, 26.11.1900, *Postcard.*, from William James to C.S. Peirce., p. 188, 1966)

---

[159]

62. (James, W., an article in *The Nation.*, 78; 3.3.1904, pp. 175-176; See also: *Collected Papers of ...* ., VIII., *Correspondence.*, 7.3.1904, lett. from C.S. Peirce to William James., in which C.S. Peirce gave thanks to James of his kindly reference., pp. 189-190, 1966))
63. (James, W., *The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy.*, 1897)
64. (Ayer, A.J., *The Origins of Pragmatism.*, pp. 13-14, 1968)
65. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism". , New York., pp. 449-468, 1968)
66. (Hollo, J.A., *Kasvatuksen maailma.*, WSOY., Porvoo., pp. 110, 178, 1952)
67. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism". , New York., pp. 449-468, 1968)
68. (Scheffler, I., *Four Pragmatists.*, pp. 87-88, 1974)
69. (Hollo, J.A., *Kasvatuksen maailma.*, Alkulause, 1952)
70. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VII., *Notes of Science.*, p. 175, 1966)
71. (*Collected Papers of ...* ., VII., *Chapter 4.*, *Consciousness.*, .526-.527, 1966)

72. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., General and Nomological Psychognosy., .233, 1966)

73. (Brent, J., Charles Sanders Peirce -- A Life., 1993)

74. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , p. 80, 1989)

75. (Morris, C.W., Six Theories of Mind..., Modern Symbolism., pp. 283-284, 1932)

---

[160]

76. (Morris, C.W., Six Theories of Mind., pp. 284-285, 1932)

77. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 29.8.1891, lett., from C.S. Peirce to Christine Ladd-Franklin., p. 214, 1966)

78. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 3.10.1904, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 200-201, 1966)

79. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 12.10.1904, lett.,from C.S. Peirce to Lady Welby., 1966)

80. (Peirce, C.S., article in The Nation., 77., (15 Oct 1903), pp. 308-309; see also: Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Reviews., pp. 131-140, 1966)

81. (Ayer, A.J., The Origins of Pragmatism., p. 15, 1968)

82. (Dewey, J., "The Development of American Pragmatism". , New York., pp. 449-468, 1968)

83. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §2., Forms of Consciousness., .550, 1966)

84. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §8., Evolution of the Laws of Nature., .515, 1966)

85. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., p. 283, 1966)

86. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., §8., Evolution of..., .515, 1966)

87. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Synechism and Immortality, .576, 1966)

88. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence., 28.9.1904, lett., from C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 199-200, 1966)

---

[161]

89. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Philosophy of Mind., pp. 381-382, 1966)

90. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., Philosophy of Mind., pp. 383-384, 1966)

91. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., General and Nomological Psychognosy., .233, 1966)

92. (Percy, W., "The Divided Creature"... , p. 81, 1989)

93. (Collected Papers of ... , VIII., Correspondence, 28.9.1904, Lett. C.S. Peirce to William James., pp. 199-200, 1966)

94. (Collected Papers of ... , VII., p. 322, 1966)

