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Tämän väikkäriverision nimi olkoon **Yellow Book** (*Keltainen Kirja*), joka saa nimensä kannen keltaisesta väristä. Tämä painettiin Kuopiossa eräässä kirjapainossa, ja tein itse taiton. Tässä on hieman kehittyneempi viitejärjestelmä kuin *Punaisessa Kirjassa*. Mutta niin paljon turhaa työtä! Tämä kaikki, ja sitten ei mitään. Kaikkein hupaisinta oli se, että Jyväskylän yliopiston eräs silloisista professoreista yritti tolkututtaa, että viitteet ovat turhanaikaisia – ja miten paljon näin niiden luomisessa vaivaa. Tietokantojen rakentelu, ja jatkuva riippuvuuksien testailu! En saanut edes työn palkintoa. Ja samanaikaisesti joukko nuoria miehiä meni läpi siivilän että heilahti, ja saivat varmaankin kukin oman laitoksensa. En minä tällä sitä, että minä olisin kaivannut sellaista, sillä ei tuo akateeminen painiskelu nyt niin paljoa kiinnostaa. Olisi ollut vain huvittavaa että oltaisiin oltu ihan tohtorismiehiä – puhumattakaan maisterin papereista perstaskussa.

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## SUMMARY

This study views some philosophical relationships between pragmatism, and the other schools of philosophy, and isms, such as idealism, voluntarism, naturalism, humanism, and phenomenology. Then we are studying instrumentalism, and the role of experimental psychology in the development and pragmatism, and the role of **Wittgenstein** in the development of logical positivism, and his pragmatistic backgrounds. When studying **C.S. Peirce**, we find similarities between him and idealism of **Spinoza**, **Berkeley**, and **Kant**, and disagreements with absolutic idealism of **Hegel**. Of Voluntarists, one of the most close to pragmatism is **Vaihinger**, and quite near to it were also other voluntarists - but not without disagreements, however. Pragmatism has a close contact with naturalism and to its preparative stages. But we are studying also English empirism, and **Locke**, **Hume**, and **Mill**, because both **C.S. Peirce** and **James**, have similar tendencies. Among other phenomenologists, we are also studying the relationship between **Brentano** and **C.S. Peirce**, because both of them are advocates of Aristotelian philosophy.

We are studying also the different kinds of relationships within pragmatism, which were both warm and personal, as the close comradeship between **C.S. Peirce** and **James**, but they could consist of varying models of explanation in different times, as e.g. the stages in the philosophy of **Dewey**, or different of opposite interpretations, as for example in the question of humanism, which had, as a consequence, that **C.S. Peirce**

wanted to divorce his philosophy from that of **James'**, **Dewey's**, **Schiller's**, and **Papin's**. In addition to this, there were other disagreements.

This study is a conceptual analysis, and conceptual connections, too, which does not confine to pragmatism, but concerns also the schools of philosophy. But when discussing certain basic concepts, the analysis is merely as a complementary information. In addition to this, there is much of complementary information of other kind during the current study, as a preparative to the themes we are discussing. For example, there are short overviews of history with explanations, of ancient Greek philosophers, of the history of humanism, etc. However, because they are not essential for the purpose of the current study, they have a form of short texts with footnotes, in which there are short explanations.

The most important of the themes, which we carry on during the current study, is the doctrine of synechism, which is quite opposite to any ism. According to synechism, there is that synechistic tendency in every phenomena in the world. It is due of that synechism that I have chosen this kind of referential form to the structure of the study, too.

### **The Man of Pragmatism, and a Refugee of Pragmaticism**

#### **Should we choose isms for the orientation of the current study - or instead the doctrine of synechism**

At a first glance, every ism appears to us as an unit, and compact, and as such as some kind of a continuum

(Continuum: The term used by **C.S. Peirce**; c.f. his terms of percipuum, ponecipuum, and antecipuum.) in spite of the fact that all of them are inclined e.g.

((L.) Exempla gratia (abbreviation = e.g.): For example, for instance.) divide the world into the two separate portions and recognize only one of them as true one. There can be also other conflicts, which cannot be solved at all. And there can be the questions which, perhaps, are never raised up - because of that they would break the illusion of unity, if ever solved.

But still those isms can be considered as active participants of complex unity. By this kind of continuity, say, idealism

(Idealism: The system of thought in which object of external perception is held to consist of ideas [in various senses]), for example, seems to become capable to see materialism

(Materialism: An [philosophical] opinion that nothing exists but matter and its movements and modifications and that consciousness and will are wholly due to material agency) as an antithesis of it, and as restricted interpretation, notwithstanding that idealism cannot falsify materialism, or deny that very presence of materia in the world. In fact, idealism doesn't deny that there are also material things but it tries to claim that these are not like infinite ideas are.

And further, that ideas we actually have are some kind a reflection of them, or shadows on the wall of our cave - that is how **Plato**

(**Plato** was the Greek philosopher, pupil of **Socrates**, and author of Dialogues based on the teaching of **Socrates** and the doctrines of **Pythagoras**; the principal of these dialogues were Protagoras, Gorgias, Parmenides, Theatetus, Sophist, Philebus, Timaeus, Laws and the Apology. At his Symposium, Republic, Phaedrus, and Phaedo, he introduced his doctrine of that only the ideas are real, as well as the metaphora, according with the ideas, we actually have, are like shadows on the wall.) has described them. Hence, the term Platonism

(Platonism: The philosophical system of **Plato**, of which central conception is existence of a world of ideas, divine types, or forms of material objects, which ideas are alone real and permanent, while

individual material things are but their ephemeral and imperfect imitations>. But in the same time idealism, and also all of its counterpart views have argued for that there is only one kind a reality which is stable and enduring fact.

**Joseph P. Fell** (Loppuviite)<sup>1</sup> has written that before **Plato** ideas had been regarded as the forms of the presence of physis, and that aletheia was a carrier of ideas. But **Plato** regarded ideas as absolute an eternal. We may say that by the process since then both textual and contextual have been covered with enduring facts, or ideas, which are aimed to explain both of these spheres, from the point of ideas. And because of that, if we are idealists, we must explain any case only trough ideas - and vice versa

((L.) Vice Versa: The order being reversed.), if we are materialists, there is nothing but materia and its derivates. But is this the case by accident, or due of that there are certain tendencies which make an illusion of order and certain laws, or consciousness?

If we argue something against materialism we suppose implicitly that there is a view which we can prove or disprove, whatever that view has stood for, or is there something real at all, for which it had argued. Anyway, we must regard something as true, notwithstanding that we are trying to prove something an illusion. **Martin Heidegger** (Loppuviite)<sup>2</sup> has written:

"... if the truth itself is an illusion, there is still some ground, by which it could be proved to an illusion".

If we consider the [whole] world per se

((L.) Per se: by itself; by its own nature.) as a fiction, or illusion, consisting illusory of innumerable continuums which do not have any common explanative spheres with each others, we cannot speak about the world at all, and any general concepts either, by which to describe it. There might be no room for pure relativism

(Relativism: The doctrine that knowledge is of relations only.), either.

We may become an advocate of dualism

(Dualism: E.g the doctrine of Rene Descartes that mind and matter exist as distinct entities. In moral philosophy, dualism refers to the doctrine that there are two independent principles, good and evil.) if we admit that there might be two different kind of spheres in the world, or we may become an advocate of monism

(Monism: Any theory denying the duality of matter and the mind, as distiction from dualism and pluralism.) if we think that there exists only one of these speres, and the rest, which seem to be existing belong to nothingness, and any explanations which are derived from it are only false ideas about the world. But we can choose also pluralism

(Pluralism: The system that recognizes more than one ultimate principle.) which seems to avoid the confusion of the previous alternatives, but then we have only restricted validity at hand, and, perhaps, not at all any universal truth.

If we suppose that only eternal ideas are true ones, we have the question from where we might get them. If we accept that Platonian interpretation, that our everyday experience is very faint form of ideas, and that the continuums we might have are not at all valid ones, in respect to each others, or wide enough, and if our interpretations of ideas do not resemble in any way to the ideas, which might be undeniable - we have no use of those ideas especially in science and philosophy.

And if our ideas in science and philosophy were ultimately true, we should have no living companionship with them. If we are not able to get overlapping ideas, and if the only idea that we can get is that the world is splitted into two, as in dualistic view, or partly unintentionally, as by the controversy between idealism and materialism - there might always be only a part of the world concerning more the truth than another

part, and, therefore, because this dualism, there is always certain part of the world, which we cannot accept, or comprehend, as it is, when seen and accepted from another point of view of an opposite ism. But we cannot deny, were we advocates of this or that view, that there are other alternatives, too, which are equal to the view we advocate, when studying e.g. their [logical] formal structures, or that there exist several alternatives, and they do so, notwithstanding that we deny their truthfulness time after time. I think, that this suggest to that we have an illusory way of being, because we have not yet got any pure ideas, with which to make any other alternatives vanish, and because of this, the nature of our experience is quite illusory.

In that kind of splitted world, or plurality, we cannot prove any possible continuum as false one, because the continuums we can bring into our consciousness are not universally true ones, but instead somehow valid in themselves. Hence, by them we cannot prove any of other continuums as absolutely false. But should we conclude from this that our own, familiar continuums, as well as those other ones are not at all reliable, and they never will be, notwithstanding that we have experienced something all the time, as well as survived with our weak understandings and intellect trough the all previous ages?

And does it mean, if we accept, say, idealism as a true one, that our illusory experience do not have any meaning, and it does not make sense to talk about our everyday continuity and its continuums, or immediacy?

(Immediacy: Our scientific observations have their fundamental basis in the world of immediate experience; every reading of any indicator ,or a meter is made by senses. We might to construct a measuring instrument, which were quite free from any disturbances of reading, and which were free of the restrictions of human senses, and which would just measure for itself, and make absolutely objective reports, and nothing less - but we should have any utility of it, because we are, and will stay, to, restricted beings, who make mistakes.) Does this mean that all of our scientific arguments and achievements live their own life?

What does it mean that we can still discuss innumerable false beliefs which are not like ours, or that we can set innumerable isms to describe another points of view? Does it make sense to say that we cannot have any true ideas, or that we are continuously proving something to false by the ideas we only believe to be true? What are we doing? The answer is, probably, that we are doing nothing, if we do not have any well-developed ideas like ad infinitum

((L.) Ad infinitum: to infinity; and so on to its logical conclusion.) at hand. But we cannot claim that we have done just nothing, either. We can have a very feeling that we are doing something, even when we are asleep, and we can be sure that something has happened and caused results in certain part of reality, and we have not had this or that belief but instead the very feeling of their presence and immediacy. There will be arisen several what concerns dreaming or believing, as well as living, if we think that our everyday experience is just nothing, and that dreaming must be more less that it?

What are we actually doing with our faint facts in our everyday life, which is like an illusion? And if we accept that those facts are valid ones, what are we doing in our dreams, or when believing to supernatural beings or eternal ideas? What are we doing when believing to be right? When we can claim that we have, at last, known exactly what is the phenomenon of believing, and what is its role in human understanding, and so on. There are no fundamental differences between different mental states, such e.g. waking and sleeping, from which **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>3</sup> has suggested that:

"... When you sleep, you are not so largely asleep as your fancy that you be".

But, obviously there is that demand, for which **Ludwig Wittgenstein** (Loppuviite)<sup>4</sup> has argued in his late philosophy, that somebody must have "teached" us something which is, and which can be considered - in the same time - as an unreducible rock bottom, and the foundation of our concepts and forms of life

(Forms of life: = Germ: Lebensformen), which we can also regard as the final ground for communication.

But what for synechism stands as an alternative? The term in question has been derived by **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>5</sup> (who has derived many of his terms from ancient languages, e.g. from Latin and Greek) from the Greek word:

sunecismoz

whose root is the word:

sunechz

which means continuous. But there is a larger meaning, which has been produced by that English term synechism, which signifies to the general tendency in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy to regard almost everything as continuous, and not as splitted. By the new term he considered especially the existing isms saying:

... "for two centuries we have been affixing -ist and -ism to words, in order to note sects which exalt the importance of those elements which the stemwords signify. Thus materialism is the doctrine that matter everything, idealism is the doctrine that ideas are everything, and dualism is the philosophy which <MIU>splits everything in two".

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>6</sup> has given us an information that he has been endeavoring to develop this idea a long time, and he has also written some of his results in *The Monist*. He insisted further that continuity governs the whole domain of experience in every element of it. Accordingly, every proposition, except so far as it relates to an unattainable limit of experience (which he has called by the term absolute) is to be taken with an indefinite qualification; for a proposition which has no relation whatever to experience is devoid all meaning.

I will emphasize just here that most philosophies have produced a lot of speculation on the true essence of the world but I think that there are certain, perhaps originally human antitheses. Thus, on the one hand you can see (if you want to) the world as ideal in its nature, and on the other hand you can see it as material. But what about physicality and psychic phenomenons?

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>7</sup> wanted to root up also physical and psychical controversy insisting that all phenomena are such of one character, though some are more mental and spontaneous, others more material and regular. Still, all alike present that mixture of freedom and constraint, which allows them to be teleological or purposive. It is no wonder that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>8</sup> has argued for, too, that there is no fundamental difference between a self and another self

(We shall return to the question of the close relationship of self and anotherself later during the current study.).

And then there is the question of larger personality. It seems obvious that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>9</sup> has wanted to broad the barbaric conception of personal identity quoting a brahmanical hymn in *Collected Papers* as follows:

"... I am that pure and infinitive Self, who am bliss, eternal, manifest, all-pervading, and who am the substrate of all that owns name and form".

continuing that this expresses more than humiliation - the utter swallowing up of the poor individual self

(Self : Cf. above pure and infinite Self, which, as a concept, has an important role in the philosophy of **George Herbert Mead**, whose influence to **John Dewey** (E.g. "George Herbert Mead" 1931, 311) we shall discuss later in the current study. From those influences we have also support by **C.W. Morris** (1932, chapter IV). But also **William James** (1952, 146-154) has described self in Principles, as waves, current of thought, or a chain of past selves, which associates to **C.S. Peirce's** conception of self, as something not-preetermined, and that its spiritual development is due by a larger vision, which is beyond the current self (**Scheffler** 1974, 86.) in the spirit of prayer.

There seems to be some evidence of that **C.S. Peirce** might have derived some elements from hinduistic philosophy to his synechism, too. We can find e.g. at Bhagavad-gita (Loppuviite)<sup>10</sup> almost similar sentence than the quotation above, and at Veda we can read further that only the person who fully dedicates to worship the highest can understand him.

This comes very close to the question concerning the rôle of man in the whole development of the universe - where **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>11</sup> has argued for that:

"... all communication from mind to mind is through continuity of being! A man is capable of having assigned him a rôle in the drama of creation,

(Role, as a concept, has also an important "role" in **G.H. Mead's** epistemology.) and so far as he loses himself in that rôle, -no matter how humble it may be, -so far he identifies himself with an author".

There must also be discussion on the nature of immortality, to which **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>12</sup> has suggested to, when studying that possibility in carnal,- social,- and spiritual consciousness, and when referring to **Edward Stanton's**

(Dreams of the Dead., 1898) and **Freytag's**

(Lost Manuscripts., Leibzig, 1869) books for further information, when insisting that:

"... synechism refuses to believe that when death comes, even the carnal consciousness ceases quickly. How it is to be, it is hard to say, in the all but entire lack of observational data! Here, as elsewhere the synechist oracle is enigmatic ... But further, synechism recognizes that the carnal consciousness is but a small part of a man. There is, in the second place, the social consciousness, by which a man's spirit is embodied in others, and which continues to live and breathe and having itself being very much longer than superficial observers think ... A man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole. This is an <MIU>archetypal idea (that can never fail; and in the world to come is destined to a special spiritual embodiment".

All of these passages comes very close to the world of Bhagavad-gita, as well as Veda. But I shall not discuss the topic any longer now, but I shall return generally to the theme later in the current study. But for now, some words of dualism. **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>13</sup> has considered the difference between mental and physical and emphasized there especially the role of **Rene Descartes**

((1596-1650); **Descartes** was the French mathematician, physicist, and philosopher, and especially he was an author of Le Discours de la Méthode (1637), in which he e.g. expounded a quasi-mechanical conception of the universe, which he reduced to space, matter and motion, operating under mathematical laws. But there was his famous (L.) Cogito, ergo sum: I think, therefore I exist. Famous has also become his other doctrine, namely the doctrine of Cartesian scepticism, which he introduced in his Méthode, too. Well-known is his differentiation between res cogitans and res extensa.) and his categorization of the world to be consisting the different departments, on the one hand of res extensa, and on the other hand of its [opposite] counterpart res cogitans, and his proposition that only the God know what one had to do with another. There **Percy** has referred especially to English nominalism

(English nominalism: The philosophical doctrine of Scholastics, according with e.g. universal, or abstract concepts are mere names, without any corresponding reality. We shall return to the theme later in the current study, because there is an opposite theory of **John Duns Scotus**, whose Scholastic realism was well-known by **C.S. Peirce**.)which has split off the words and ideas from things. He continued, that there is difference of similar kind between European materialism and idealism.

But further: more interesting at this context is what **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>14</sup> uttered on natural events [according to **C.S. Peirce**]:

"... there are not one but two kinds of natural events in the world", and

one of them is dyadic

(Dyad: The number two, or group of two, couple.) and the other is triadic

(Triad: Group or set of three. in music: Chord of three notes. in chemistry: Group of three chemical elements, having similar properties, as e.g. iron, nickel, and cobalt.). In addition to this there are also complexus of dyads, which can be associated to conditioned learning by animals. If we want to find a gap in the world, we must seek it from the difference between these two kinds of natural events, but this does not mean, however, that they are independent from each others, or that they split the world in two.

There are other themes which can be joined to the principle of synechism. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>15</sup> has described feeling, knowing and willing as the three integral states of mind - according to **Immanuel Kant**

((1724-1804); **Kant** was the German philosopher, and metaphysician, and the founder of the school of transcendental philosophy, of which one of the fundamental principles is that knowledge of the external world depends upon sense-impressions co-ordinated or synthesized by reason, employing such categories or laws of thought as quality, quantity, causation, etc. However, **Kant** had two stages in his philosophy, from the early metaphysics, and absolute interpretation of the ultimate reality: he proposed for, that we can have the knowledge from substances by reason. Later he became more critical, and insisted that substances are beyond man's horizon. He reacted against **Hume's** scepticism, insisting that it is only Das Ding an sich, from which we cannot have certain knowledge. He also reacted against **Locke's** empirism, according with we cannot have knowledge concerning substances, arguing for that the knowledge concerning universals is derived from the mind, and it is a priori, but the knowledge, which we have after experience is a posteriori. In 1860's there were Neokantian philosophy, whose advocates were e.g. **Liebmann, Helmholtz, Cassirer, and Rickert.**) and **Tetens**. The doctrine and principle of synechism gives also support on that very fact that we cannot produce any remarkable views on reality without other people - which refers to sociability [of the concepts] - and that we must suspect strongly the possibility that there existed that kind of individuality that were rather independent from other individualities, that is, that there were single truths, which were independent from others, and something in themselves. In addition to this, we ought to expect that the difference between mental and material is not at all real one.

We don't know the whole world, whatever it is, and we are participants of the world, which makes us unchallengeable witnesses. If there were something absolutely out there, from where it could be possible to evaluate the world, we have nothing to do with it, anyhow. And if there is God, who knows all, He certainly has not told us what He knows, or made us as representatives of that truth of His own. Namely, if we were such truth at hand, we should not make so much mistakes that we have done, because of Wisdom, and shared omnipotence. But now we shall leave this metaphysic topic, and instead try to study those social settings, to which **C.S. Peirce** participated.

**C.S. Peirce** could not work quite alone, or develop his ideas. There has been a kind of synechism of social settings. I refer especially to **C.S. Peirce's** correspondence with **William James**

((1842-1910); **William James** was the American philosopher and psychologist, and one of the formulators of theory of pragmatism. According **A.J. Ayer** (1968, 190), **James** has written an introduction to The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James, [**Henry James Sr.**] who became his "intellectual father", and

influenced to **James** so that he got deep religious attitude. According to the fourth **ENCY** (1967, 240-241), James was sent with his brother to Europe twice, and he became and advocate of Charles Renouvier's personalism. From **I. Scheffler** (1974, 85-86) we know that the reason, why their [biological] father sent them to Europe, was its free philosophical climate (see also: **R.B. Perry** (1935)). One of the [possible] consequences was that he also informed **C.S. Peirce** for the institutes of European universities, which **C.S. Peirce** valued high in that respect. According to **Ayer** (1968, 183), **James** was first as instructor in physiology at Harvard, after his studies in Europe, and later, in 1880, professor. He was a close friend of **C.S. Peirce** almost the whole of his life (1968, 13-14).

and others. **William James'** younger brother, **Henry James**

((1843-1916); **Henry James** was an American novelist, and the younger brother of **William James**. He has been regarded also as realist novelist at the end of 19th c., with **William Dean Howells**, **Edith Wharton**, and **Villa Cather**. **Henry James** settled in Europe from 1875, and he was naturalized as a British subject in 1915, but most of his books are psychological interpretation of American high-society. As the realist views there are also the novels of American farming, whose advocates are e.g. **Hamlin Garland**, and the Norwegian-American author, **Ole Roelvaag**.), was also an author, and they made e.g. together two journeys to Europe with each others, but we shall discuss them later, and I refer only to footnotes at the current page. From **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>16</sup> we know that nobody could challenge **William James**, what comes to vividness and large imagination, and the freshness of his sense of humour. But trying to get more audiences than his collagues, he emphasized mainly vivid and psychologically effective features, and not critics, and was was apt to maintain his own attitudes, and emphasized the philosophy which was a kind of view of life.

From the correspondence between **William James** and **C.S. Peirce** we get to know that they did not send to each others only letters, but also some manuscripts and articles, as well as books. From Collected Papers (Loppuviite)<sup>17</sup> we e.g. know that **James** has red that **C.S. Peirce's** manuscript which is known by the name Telepathy and he also has made several marginal notes on it.

There were other themes, too, which can be associated to synechism. For example, at the letter which **C.S. Peirce** mailed to **William James** on 13th March in 1897 (Loppuviite)<sup>18</sup>, he praised **James'** ideas of tychism, but considered it only a part, and corollar to the general principle of synechism, which he told to have been studying already for 15 years.

But what an earth does this theme of telepathy at this context? Especially when we discuss pragmatism

((Pragmatism: (according a narrow pragmatic maxim): a belief or a theory that the truth or value of a concept or assertion depends upon its practical bearing upon human interests. C.f. the narrow term Pragmatic: concerned with practical results and values, and treating things in a matter-of-fact or practical way.) which has been considered very empirical and also as very pragmata in its nature? We know that especially what concerns the questions on religion and metaphysics **C.S. Peirce**, as well as other pragmatists kicked very often over the traces. **J.E. Smith** (Loppuviite)<sup>19</sup> has written that when **C.S. Peirce** studied the questions of the philosophy of science he also studied the existence of God, and he tried to use the theory of hypothetic reasoning in the questions of religion.

But what seems to me very important, is that both **William James** and **C.S. Peirce** have tried to synthesize different areas of human knowledge together, and seek tendencies between them which are synechistic, and on the other hand, live and flexible. And just this tendency and strive is the very heart of the doctrine of synechism. I think that this tendency might be useful when dealing with the current study, too.

But if we accept that man has not got any essential features, or ideas in regard of the real world, and that he never will, is he believing or knowing something - concerning knowledge or other beliefs? What are the necessary consequences of that. One of them is that there could be no difference between science and religion

(This kind a view e.g. **John Duns Scotus**, who was the one of those Scholastic philosophers, and an advocate of Scholastic realism, which **C.S. Peirce** appreciated high, as we shall see during the current

study.), or between accidental [chance] and lawfulness

(These are the two opposite poles in **C.S. Peirce's** cosmology, where the former illustrated the state of beginning, and the latter the state of the end. This can be applied to single concepts, and to their development, too, from interpreted to sign ad infinitum.). But what makes it possible that we can still discuss the concepts of false and true? Let us suppose that we have apprehended all of the ideas which are true. Then the question is: why those false things have been in front of us, and what has been their role, and should we conclude that there has taken place some development?

And what makes it possible that there are certain spheres and directions, to where we can develop ourselves? We can conclude further that there must be a possibility that both false and true things and ideas are able to interact with each other somehow, and that also those false ideas must have some characters which we can find in true ideas. I suppose that every ism can be proved to be true or false, notwithstanding that there were no eternal and infinite ideas available, but it does not mean, however, any validation but instead the use of temporal rules. It might be the case that ideas are not enough developed, yet, and that the very nature of them cannot be explained until the end.

If we now think to choose isms as the model of orientation, we ought to remember the very reason, why they have been constructed. First of all, they are made for explanation, and for categorization; they are not entities

(Entity: A things existence, something with real and separate existence, as distinction from its qualities or relations.). When discussing, instead, synechism, we have at hands a possibility, by which the world might be made of - or we have a strategy to apply. I shall prefer of these alternatives synechism, but I shall use the categories of isms, too, as the useful equipments, or tools, for the purposes of current study.

I want especially to emphasize the role of future in knowing. That is, we have, not yet, any explanations concerning the philosophy of **C.S. Peirce**, but few footnotes. If future is a powerful agent in knowing, it shall reveal its faces during the current study. But what are we studying, then? Let us now think that pragmatism [if it is a school of philosophy at all] has such a collection of ideas, which have been derived from different philosophical schools, we have pointed out, that the question of schools as isms, is illusory. Instead, there might be several philosophers, who have been choosed by pragmatists because of their ideas have been interesting, and not because they have certain origin in a choosen ism.

**C.S. Peirce** has emphasized the view that the most important, and explanative is a distant future, if we discuss what our concepts and inventions might really mean, say synechism, or have it any importance in a course of time, notwithstanding that it might have it right now, for the current purpose we have in our currency. That is, we cannot measure the absolute validity of the concepts, but only use it. This, in turn, means [If we think the current study] that any new idea, which we shall have during the study, concerning the results we might have, if carrying on beyond the horizon of the study is, in a way, nonsense, before we shall have the results, which are another kinds. Hence, there are several ifs before any further explanation, and the most decisive of them is, that whether the mind [to come] becomes capable to handle with the new surroundings [to come], or not. As a consequence, we cannot set as to our purpose to overrun any ism, before we have really the surrounding which makes this enterprise possible. And we have this scenery or view, yet. If we have any ism in the world to come, we have not reached the world, to which the development has been aimed to, but a kind of future, or something in posse

((L.) In posse: In potential existence; possible.), that is, in imagination. And if we have, after all, the world, which we have just expected, already now, and which we have predicted in detail, we have, in fact, lost the whole game before it has began. To avoid those traps of the universe, or its blind, and still endless loops (which are not like ends), we must have in our use the priciple of synechism, as well as many other means. And we must also comprehend in the new way those things - eternal and infinite - as kinds of possible futures, because the world we have is not such kind yet, but also as a kinds of ends, but those ends does not stand in saecula saeculorum

((L.) In saeucula saeculorum: For ever and ever.) but instead they have their effectiveness for a moment, and they fall asleep - until they shall be awaken at the future reality - as the new starts, perhaps.

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## Idealism and pragmatism

Most critics, as well as historians of the American philosophy have generally regarded transcendentalism

(Transcendentalism: Transcendental philosophy: especially idealism of **Schelling**, **Fichte**, and **Hegel** which does not recognize **I. Kant**'s distinction between transcendent and transcendental. Also: the religious-philosophical doctrine of Emerson and his followers. Other, more diffuse meanings of the term are e.g.: extravagant, vague, or visionary quality, philosophy, language, etc.)

as very essential philosophical movement in America during the 19th century. From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>1</sup> we know that at the beginning the center of that movement was Boston, and its influence was the most effective just before American Civil War

(American Civil War (1861-1865); War between 11 Southern (Confederate) States and the rest of the Union.)

American transcendentalists were interested in philosophies of **Immanuel Kant**, and **Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel**

((1770-1831); **Hegel** was the German philosopher, in whose system known by the name of Absolute Idealism pure being is regarded as pure thought, and the universe, as well as its development, and philosophy - as its dialectical explication.)  
, **Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling**

((1775-1854); **Schelling** was the German philosopher, who regarded nature as single living organism working towards self-consciousness, a faculty dormant in inanimate objects and fully awake only in man, whose being consists in 'intellectual intuition' of the world he creates.)

and **Victor Cousin**, but they also were acquainted with **Platonian** thoughts. **Ralph Waldo Emerson**

((1803-1882); **Emerson** was an American philosophic writer and essayist.)

has presented most clearly the characteristic traits of American transcendental metaphysics in his *Nature* which was published in 1836.

I think that from those philosophers above the most interesting thoughts has been presented by **F.W.J. von Schelling**, if we think e.g. the cosmology by **C.S. Peirce**. There is a certain similarity with **Schelling** how **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>2</sup> has put to the human mind, as a plastic unit, to the important role in the development of the universe. And what concerns the development he has assumed that in the human mind evolution and generalizing tendency is still at work.

In **C.S. Peirce**'s (Loppuviite)<sup>3</sup> synechism, which we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study, there was e.g. the sentence, which says:

"... a man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole,

which expressed, I think, a similar point of view that **Schelling** has advocated for. Unfortunately, I cannot prove that **C.S. Peirce** has derived his thoughts from him. Anyway, there were this kind of thoughts in that philosophical climate where **C.S. Peirce** spent his life, and all of those ideas he introduced were not new ones.

We have an objective, or absolute idealism, whose advocator is e.g. **Friedrich Hegel**, whose name the term dialectic

(Dialectic: Critical dealing with metaphysical contradictions and their solutions, especially in **Hegel**'s philosophy, the stages of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis representing the process of thought developing towards completion.)

has been generally associated to. He has regarded the whole and objective reality as the reflection of Geist, and that man is able to comprehend it, too. There cannot be the larger objective reality behind that totality which we are able to apprehend, and with which we can interact actively, notwithstanding that we cannot reach all of its ultimate ends right now. But at some day, perhaps, we shall become acquainted with those things, too. That is, there is nothing preventing us to apprehend the whole world as it is, and just for that sense there is nothing hidden, or secret, or something unknown forever, and which only Geist knows.

It is no wonder that in the American philosophical tradition there are all kinds of personalism - also idealistic ones - as we know from the sixth **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>4</sup>. From the fourth **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>5</sup> we can read that **George H. Howinson** has been known as an advocate of personalism but he did not interpret individuals dependent from infinite person, or creation, as e.g. **B.P. Bowne**, or rational theists - and their predecessor St. **Thomas Aquinas**

((c 1225-1274); **Aquinas** was the Italian philosopher, a Dominican friar, whose many writings, and works, notably his *Summa Totius Theologiae* represent the culmination of Scholastic philosophy.)  
has done. **Howinson** emphasized the freedom of individuals which would be fulfilled if there were such a creator who has ruled all the things beforehand.

**Morris L. Bigge** <sup>6</sup>(Loppuviite) has described idealism, as a whole, that it considers the world as the universal consciousness, whose variants are substantial consciousnesses. I think that there are something very **Hegelian** in **Bigge's** illustration, but it says nothing about that how large the whole universal consciousness really is, or is it becoming something more, or what kind are the real and ultimate things in themselves in the universe.

There is also subjective idealism which considers the nature as the reflection of finite spiritual being who have no objective reality behind it, that it, or behind the wholeness we know e.g. at the moment. **George Berkeley**

((1685-1753); **Berkeley** was an Irish bishop and idealist philosopher. Well-known is his statement *esse est percipi*, which is an expression of that idealism, too. His critics against the law of cause and effect was the preliminary of later critics made by **Hume**.)

and **Immanuel Kant** (in his critical stage) have been regarded as advocates of such idealism. There was also German idealist **Johan Gottlieb Fichte**

((1762-1814); **Fichte** was the German idealist philosopher, and an advocate of **Kant's** philosophy, and inspired by it, he wrote *Versuch einer Kritik aller Offenbarung* (1792), which was regarded as written by Kant. He was also famous for his *Reden an die deutsche Nation* (1807-1808), which he wrote during the French occupation of Prussia.)

who have been regarded as subjective idealist, and a founder of German idealism. I shall discuss the philosophy of **Kant** later during the current study, but now few words about **Berkeley**.

If we think e.g. **George Berkeley's** statement *esse est percipi* applied in a concrete situation - e.g. that we have a knowledge concerning a thing because somebody has had a experience of its existence, and that somebody has perceived it to happen - we do not have much idealism in our view. It is quite possible that I myself do not have that knowledge because I do not have that experience, and I do not know anybody who has it. But if we think that the existence of a thing (or any thing) cannot be possible at all, without that somebody is perceiving it, say, God, for example, we have an idealistic interpretation concerning the true essence of the world. We might suppose, that if there are no mental acts, there is nothing.

Namely, if we think the world in *initio*

(L.) In *initio*: In the beginning.)

and any kind of existence in *initio*, in general, there might be nothing without a perception before. But there is nothing, to which to perceive, either, because there have been no actions, and the only actions,

which we ought to count, should be perceptions. And there might be no development at all, without other, more sophisticated perceptions made by God. There is a question of that did God have any more complicated plan in His mind before the very first perception, or not?

It is strange that **Berkeley** argued for that there are no abstract ideas, or matter in themselves. But this sounds clear, if we think the idea, that perception comes before any thing perceived, and that there must be a self-communication of God, or that there were not needed any mutual interaction before any existence. Because the whole universe exists because of the self-perception continuously made by God, we might discuss of our own ignorance mainly by the terms of incompleteness, or something to come, and not yet reached.

But what about those American transcendentalists who influenced to pragmatism, or who have been in contact with it? Let's take two of the cases in consideration. From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>7</sup> we know that one of those was **Paul Carus**. In a letter, which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **Paul Carus** and which has been written in 1910 (Loppuviite)<sup>8</sup> there are **C.S. Peirce's** thoughts concerning the logic of science. Unfortunately part of the letter have been lost. From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>9</sup> we know that also **Henry James, Sr** has been one of the American transcendentalists, who has been in close contact with pragmatists, too, and whose production has been considered to be full of mystics. He has had an important role in the philosophical development of **William James**, which we have discussed at the footnote at an earlier stage in the current study. At the footnote in question **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>10</sup> told us that **William James** wrote an introduction to The Literary Remains of the Late Henry James . **Henry James Sr.** can be regarded as **William James's** spiritual father, who has influenced strongly to his moral and intellectual orientation, as well as to the development of his religious attitudes.

But we cannot forget **Josiah Royce**, with whom **C.S. Peirce** was in correspondence. But what about **C.S. Peirce's** attitudes towards **Royce's** philosophy? In the letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **William James** on the 12th June in 1902 (Loppuviite)<sup>11</sup> he told that he has being studied **Royce's** The World and Individual, and that he regarded its ideas as beautiful ones but that its logic seemed to him most execrable

(C.f. **C.S. Peirce's** opinion to **Hegel's** logic later during the current chapter.)

These opinions suggest to that, notwithstanding that **C.S. Peirce** didn't accept **Royce's** logic, he had some contacts with American idealistic tradition by him. From the fourth **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>12</sup> we get to know, in turn, that **Josiah Royce** was a member of **William James's** intellectual society. **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>13</sup> appreciated the idea of the instant and infinite nature of God's consciousness by **Josiah Royce's** (Loppuviite)<sup>14</sup>, which can be found at The Conception of God.

But from pragmatists we must take in advance **John Dewey**

((1859-1952)); **Dewey** was an American philosopher, pragmatist, and an influential figure especially in the field of education. In his philosophical development there were different stages, namely [Scottish] intuitionism, absolute [Hegelian] idealism, and instrumentalism (**Vaughn** 1976, 77). It was due of **G.S. Morris** , that he became an advocate of Hegelian idealism (**Boring** 1931, 506-507, 539-542). His interest to experimental psychology influenced to that he rejected his Hegelian idealism (**Vaughn** 1976, 81). His experiences at the field of pedagogics influenced to that he adopted instrumentalism (**Bernstein** 1976, 83-84). When he became the professor at Chicago in 1894, he founded the work [laboratory] school in 1896, and he was a principal of the school until 1904. However, his concepts concerning education didn't change much after 1897 (**Vaughn** 1976, 87). Later his method influenced to Austrian school reform.)

**John Dewey** (Loppuviite)<sup>15</sup> has derived some of his thoughts from **Royce**, as he says in his article which concerned **G.H. Mead**.. We shall return to this article later during the current study, because there is a reference to **C.S. Peirce**, too.

But now I want to discuss idealism in the sense of **Plato**, and his concept of idea

(Idea [in Platonic philosophy]: Externally existing pattern of which individual things in any class are imperfect copies.)

But there is also the general definition of the term idea

(Idea: [General definition]: Archetype, pattern, as distinction from its realization in individuals; also conception of standard or principle to be recognized or aimed at; plan of action; notion conceived by the mind; way of thinking; vague belief, fancy)

The adjective ideal

(Ideal: Relating to consisting of Platonic ideas. There are also a meanings: 1.) Answering to one's highest conception; perfect or supremely excellent in its kind. 2.) Embodying an idea; existing only in idea, visionary.)

which can be related to the sphere of the world which is consisting of Platonic ideas, too, but there are also the meanings of ordinary life in it. But is it the case, as **Plato** says, that object of external perception can be held to consisting of ideas? Or is the rock-bottom of the whole world something according to **Democritus**

((c. 460-c 370 B.C.); **Democritus** has advanced the theory that the world was formed by the concurrence of atoms. He held that the universe consists of material bodies and void. He has also been called to a laughing philosopher, as a contrary to **Heraclitus**.)

Notwithstanding that we shall discuss the atomistic philosophy of **Democritus** later in the current study few words of it. He just reasoned that the world might be made of materia, and void, and it is not the same as atom theory

(Atom theory [Physics]: Theory that elements consist of atoms of definite weight, and that atoms of different elements unite with one another in fixed proportions.)

The essence of Democritean materialism, or atomistic philosophy, is that there are two kinds of reality in the universe, namely chaos

(Chaos: Formless void, great deep of primordial matter, abyss from which cosmos was evolved.)

and cosmos

(Cosmos: The universe as an ordered whole.)

and that the latter will exist only temporarily, and only for an age. Hence, a cosmos is not as eternal, as the former, with its smallest particles, atoms, which are eternal, and infinite in number. But there can exist also rational cosmos, but its duration does not match cosmos, and it is finite, and therefore, there cannot exist infinite ideas in the materialistic universe.

**Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>16</sup> has called **C.S. Peirce** as Platonian realist for the reasons that **C.S. Peirce** has advocated the view that the whole nature is controlled by laws which are above all existences. Those laws are that power which make it possible that there can be a space, where, in turn, the results of those laws can exist- as well as organic existences and life, and both matter and causation. Those laws are eternal forms, and like the mind, thought, or ideas, but not like any of the rules which we can discover in actual and sequential causation, and finite existences. As the consequence of this, the final mind has nothing to do with operating with signs, in spite of that we can regard a sign as means, by which something is brought into the mind, meanwhile the object, to which sign has referred to, has been left outside the mind. Hence, phenomena have been only presented to the mind.

**Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>17</sup> has argued for that **C.S. Peirce** regarded symbolic process also as something more than the means, by which man will achieve the larger contexts of understandings. But there is also that conception of sign that they can develop further, according to the laws of interference, which is obviously linked to the association. **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>18</sup> has written, too, that **C.S. Peirce** emphasized the symbolic nature of man, and externality, too. Every thought can be regarded as

external sign, and, therefore, man can be regarded as such one, too. From **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>19</sup> we know **C.S. Peirce** regarded the human mind as symbolic, unlimited, and as a sign by interference, and that concept - as well as the concepts of thought and idea, act like eternal laws which are something above space - where all the results and existences can be. According to **Morris**, all of this is like Platonian idealism.

But if we think e.g. the term idea there, we can say that in **C.S. Peirce's** conception of the term in question there can be find something of **Rene Descartes** and **John Locke**

(Idea: In the philosophies of **Descartes** and **Locke**: immediate object of thought or mental perception.)

and something of **Immanuel Kant**

(Idea: In the philosophy of **Kant**: conception of reason transcending all experience.)

and something of **Friendrich Hegel**

(Idea: In the philosophy of **Hegel**: absolute truth of which all phenomenal existence is expression.)

In addition to this, as we have seen during the current study, that **C.S. Peirce** has also derived his ideas concerning the role of man in the development of the universe - not from **Plato** (if we are speaking about the idea in question derived from idealism) - but from **George Berkeley**, and, perhaps, from **Schelling**, and **Josiah Royce**, too. And as we shall see, there are certain influences from **Friendrich Hegel**, as well as from **Benedictus (Baurd) de Spinoza**

((1632-1677); **Benedict (baurd) de Spinoza** was a Dutch Jew of Portugese origin, philosopher; author of Ethics, in which he rejected the Cartesian dualism of spirit and matter and saw only 'one infinite substance, of which infinite existences are modes or limitations'; God was for **Spinoza** the immanent cause of the universe, not a ruler outside it, and his system is, in a sense, panteistic; he also denied personal immortality and the transcendent distinction between good and evil. He was an author of Tractatus Theologico - Politicus (1670), De intellectus emendatione, and Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata., Postume publ (1677))

and from **Immanuel Kant**, too.

Of course, it was not only a single term, say, idea, which **C.S. Peirce** adopted from idealism, but instead the general belief to that there are some eternal features, by which we can explain the world: how all once began, and what kind might be the end, after all. And if we discuss development, any kind, there must be something out of reach, by which to explain becoming. I think that these kind of ideas he just derived from idealism, when emphasizing the role of generalizing tendency [of ideas] when describing e.g. forms of consciousness. The similar echoes we have in his nomological psychognosy, which we discuss later in the current study.

But we shall discuss now in detail **Benedic (Baurd) de Spinoza** who, **C.S. Peirce** has appreciated very high, as we know from his letter to **Mario Calderoni** which has been mailed approximately in the year 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>20</sup>. But what kind of idealism **Spinoza** advocated for? In general, he was an advocator of rationalism

(Rationalism: Practice of explaining the supernatural in religion in a way consonant with reason, or treating reason as the ultimate authority in religion as elsewhere; theory that reason is foundation of certainty in knowledge.)

, as well as an enthusiast advocate of the pantheistic philosophy

(Pantheism: Doctrine that God is everything and that everything is God.)

Both of these elements are essential features in his philosophy:

First, **Spinoza** has emphasized the unity of the world, and that we cannot reach the dimensions of infinite as persons but we must join to the wholeness of the world. There seems to be the same tendency as in **C.S. Peirce's** (Loppuviite) 21 doctrine of synechism, namely, to regard the world as an unity, too.

But there are differences between pragmatists and **Spinoza**, too, especially what concerns the concept of substance

(Substance: What underlies phenomena, permanent substratum of things, that in which accidents or attributes inhere; also essential nature, and essence of most important parts of anything, and purport and real meaning - **Descartes** emphasized the independence of substance, as a contrary to its varying attributes, and referred to God, who doesn't need anything else to maintain His existence; **Spinoza** referred, by the concept, to the whole universe, but for **Hume** substance was an imagined thing.)

and how it has been introduced by **Spinoza**, who has urged in his *Ethica ordine* for that the basic concept of the substance implies to which has an self-existence, and which will be understood by that self-existence

(E.g. **William James** rejected spiritualistic substance psychology (**James** 1952, 211). He referred with the concept substantial mainly to the self-existing being, or one which needs no other subject in which to inhere (**Ford**) 1982, 13)

This kind of [fundamental] substance **Spinoza** called God, who has infinite number of characters. We do not know all of His characters but only two of them, namely the thought and the dimension - which are eternal and infinite in their nature, because they are the characters of God.

Second, **Benedict (Baurd) de Spinoza** has thought that there are several competing things as the pleasure and egoistic strives between higher perfection which is the final goal of all souls. This, in turn, is connected to the relationship of love and reason, in general. From **Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)22 we know that **Spinoza's** idea that the individual mind strives so far as it is able to continue its state of being but that the object of this impulse cannot be separated from pleasure or joy; because they are a passion, in which the soul passes to higher perfection. The pleasure is not the goal that impulse primarily aims but at the mind's perfection, or at self-realization or self-development.

I think that there is a similarity between **Spinoza** and **C.S. Peirce** concerning the diminishing role of the single personality in the mind's perfection. In **C.S. Peirce's** epistemology

(Epistemology: Theory of method or grounds of knowledge.)

there are present as the components of rational pursuit of love and reason. From **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)23 we get to know that, according to **C.S. Peirce**, there are the laws of love and reason, which shall join together in a very distant future. But in addition to this, it might be suggested that by this kind a view, **C.S. Peirce** can be associated to **Plato**, who suggested that counterpart of the human spirit is Eros, when we are striving for goodness and beauty. And if we are discussing beauty, we must take account also an art of aesthetics

(Aesthetics: Philosophy of the beautiful; philosophy of art.)

We can find the term aesthetic almost in every turn, when studying pragmatism. There is the letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **William James**

(**William James** has, in turn, explained at his Pragmatismi, that there is an aesthetic unity with things, which is very much like teleological unity (1913, 96).)

and which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (Loppuviite)24 where he has illustrated his new view on logic saying that logic is anchored to ethics

(Ethics: Science of morals; study of the principles of human duty, or treatise of this; moral principles; rules

of conduct.)

and that in turn is anchored to aesthetics. But what does this mean, actually? I think that there is an emphasis the role of ethic and aesthetic nature of the whole knowledge, and that without that very nature we are not able to reach higher levels of knowledge at all.

Third, Benedict (Baurd) de Spinoza has argued for that individual soul is limited, but which we can expand. There are some lower levels in man's pursuit to the completeness of his understanding. In that lower level the principle that the rational action follows is necessarily egoistic, and there is nothing but the impulse of self-preservation. From **Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>25</sup> we get to know that:

"...The individual mind, like everything else, strives so far as it is able to continue its state of being, and that effort is its very essence ... But the highest form of the self-realization or self-development consists in a clear comprehension of all things in their necessity order as modifications of the one divine being, and willing acceptance of all which springs from this comprehension ... This is the notion of self-realization as defined not only but for a philosopher".

One consequence of this is that we cannot speak about our very own special personality any more as infinite. In its individual form also soul is a kind of mode or limitation, because it can partly regarded as material one but there is no strict boundaries to that spiritual dimension of it. Hence, we can state that any soul contains something of thought and something of dimension, as well as it has that finite essence. But why our soul must contain both finite and infinite characters? Because one part of us must exist in finite collections or series of events, meanwhile that another part of us comes to existence to that spiritual dimension. We cannot live forever as persons, and as modes or limitations. Is there the fact that we cannot reach the essence of God at all, or that we cannot have any eternal life in heaven? We must reach in some or another way something of the reality of God because as persons, modes or limitations we cannot have any infinite existence. The substance of God must maintain His certain characters in finite existences, notwithstanding that they are not such ones. Otherwise he could not exist at all in [our] souls.

Fourth, Benedict (Baurd) de Spinoza has proposed for the possibility of the highest realization of the self-development. From **Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>26</sup> we know that:

"... In this state the mind is purely active, without any admixture of passion or passivity; and thus its essential nature is realized or actualized to the greatest possible degree. We can see that man is forced to renounce the world which is accepted in the egoistic state and man must become an inseparable part of the totality".

Both will and activity belong - as components - to the three classes of mind, which we have discussed at an earlier stage during the current study. Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>27</sup>, and some psychologists at his age, have described the mind consisting of feeling, cognition and volition (will). As predecessors of the conception **C.S. Peirce** has referred especially to **Immanuel Kant** [ as well as to **Kant's** philosophical grandfather **Tetens**], but also to some ancient writers upon rhetoric

(Rhetoric: Treatise on the art of persuasive or impressive speaking or writing, also language designed to persuade or impress.)

According to **C.S. Peirce**, those ancient writers instructed the orator to begin his discourse by creating a proper state of feeling in the minds of auditors, to follow this with whatever he was going to address to their understandings, that is, to produce cognitions, and finally, inflame them to action of will. For rhetoricians, therefore, the triad named the three states of mind. But no sharp line of demarcation can be drawn between different integral states of mind, and certainly not between such states as feeling, knowing and willing.

And there we have, again, the principle of synechism at hand. And there we have echoes of **C.S. Peirce's** Platonian realism, which we have discussed at the current chapter, if we think that **Spinoza's** emphasis: "... actualization to the greatest possible degree".

It seems to me that **Spinoza** has emphasized the process, by which we can reach the (final) goal, and unity. There are similar tendencies also with **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>28</sup> who has regarded those features essential his grand cosmogony

(Cosmogony: (Theory of) the creation of the universe.)

which is the philosophy to come.

Quite another point of view has had **Arthur Schopenhauer**

((1788-1860); **Arthur Schopenhauer** was the German philosopher, who has been described a pessimistic philosopher, and an author of *Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung*, 1-2 (1818), and *über den Natur* (1836). He considered himself as a follower of **Kant**, but he interpreted **Kant's** critical idealism into psychological idealism. He taught, too, that the absolute reality is blind and restless will, that all existence is essentially evil, and that release can be attained only by overcoming the will to live. Among his followers are **Nietzsche, Wagner, and E. von Hartmann.**)

as well as other voluntary philosophers, which, as a term, refers to one's own free will, or acting, and intentionality. But there must be remembered that most voluntarists put will to the main role in human enterprises. But there must be present something more than some blind tendency, or willing of organisms. **C.S. Peirce's** (Loppuviite)<sup>29</sup> has described e.g. an occult

(Occult: Kept secret, esoteric; recondite, mysterious, beyond the range of ordinary knowledge; involving the supernatural, mystical.)

nature of icon

(Cf. Iconology: The study of icons, but also symbolical representation, symbolism.)

and diagram, which are something at higher level, and beyond the horizon of instancy, and, in their way, independent, but in the same time, true levels of experience, which still remain unknown and hidden, because they are not fully apprehended.

And, according to Platonian realism, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>30</sup> has argued for that there is a larger cosmic process where the mentality and the mind are nothing but cases of it; there are eternal forms and laws which make possible that which is potential can become actual, and revealed. There are the finalistic laws and causalities which - in every time and age - will favor certain kind of existences and deny others. Our mentality has its true existence in the world of the final causality, and not in the finite existences and strivings, where they occasionally seem to appear and disappear, and change their appearance. All of their existences shall obey The Laws of Final Causality. The mentality and mind, as well as cases in the phenomenon which can be called life, can be seen as cases in the larger (cosmic) processes. Hence, both thought and mind belong to the internal characters of the universe.

I think that all of these references suggest both to the presence of the infinite totality - what concerns our development, and they are quite similar to **Spinoza's** idea of being inseparable part of the totality. But we must remind that **C.S. Peirce** did not mention or refer to **Spinoza** at these questions, but there are still certain similarities.

Fifth, according to **Benedict (Baurd) de Spinoza**, we do not know all of the characters of God but only two of them, namely the thought and dimension - which are eternal and infinite. By these characters man is able to join to God. **C.S. Peirce** has tried to connect to each other the dimensions of thought and dimension - especially when studying abstraction, and the essence of signs, but he has also been interested in processes and feelings, and the whole phenomenon, where we perceive something at its instancy. Of

course there might be other influences, too.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>31</sup> has described the abstraction as a certain kind of an expansive process, or centrifugal tendency of thought. There might be an interesting, but quite opposite link to **Rene Descartes'** vorticism

(Vorticism: The philosophical theory of vortex (vortices); in older theories of the universe, especially that of **Rene Descartes**, (cosmic matter carried round in) rapid rotatory movement round centre or axis, supposed to account for origin and phenomena of terrestrial and other systems.)

by which he tried to explain the development of the universe. There is the general principle, at least, which seems to be dissimilar to **C.S. Peirce's** model. We know that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>32</sup> has also suggested for that there are also other kind of processes, and they are present when we deal with our ideas; that ideas must consist of large associations, before they will be crystallized into the sets which remain such ones. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>33</sup> has also proposed to that associations [or sets of ideas], which stay for a long time, are mainly something like inherited, spontaneously grown, but that there are also accidental born sets of ideas. The rest of them depend upon the principle that ideas once brought together into a set so that they also remain that set. These integrated structures have no central axis, or principle. At least, they have not such at the moment. It seems to me that there are not influences from **Descartes'** vorticism, notwithstanding that both philosophers have emphasized that likelihood to natural forces.

But there is not, yet, any thought present, as such. We cannot assume, either, that the growth of intension

(Intension: (logic) connotation of a term, sum of the attributes, qualities comprised in a concept. Also: Intensity, high degree, of a quality, opposite to extension; strenuous exertion of mind or will.)

of all the terms is automatic, and that certain tendencies or formations produce meanings by extension. If we talk about the dimension, or some kind of expansion, or enlarging possibility, we do not talk about the sense of the process, or any meaning. However, the thought is connected to the human mind, which is participating to the whole progressive development of the universe, and which can be regarded as an inseparable part of the internality of the whole universe, as we have discussed before. But we have also discussed that the human mind is a sign, too. Let us say, too, that the thought is connected to human consciousness, too.

We can easily see that **C.S. Peirce** has joined functionally together both the thought and dimension, and especially that part of the function of the thought, which is able to make more dimensional spheres, to where our thought can expand itself, as well as the processes which make connections between ideas and creates the configurations of them, and by which we can have the consciousness and by which there shall become to existence the human mind. But for the reason of the function of the thought and dimension, there does not exist, one and only principle, by which the whole reality shall be arranged, but several ways and stages, by which things shall be arranged. As the result of them we can get us something which is quite independent of the processes by which the result is produced. But far more important than the thought and dimension and such, are the possibilities of varieties, and potentialities, and in the same time there must be present the thought, by which all of these enlarging varieties and potentialities can be developed and expanded to triadic connections, as well as rise them up to different levels, too.

Sixth, **Benedict (Baurd) de Spinoza** has emphasized that we are moving to a kind of a larger self (there are larger cosmic processes, to which we shall join as the self join to another self), and when we have reached those selves, we shall loose our egoistic ways of being, and to reflect the world. I think that **C.S. Peirce** has derived some of his main thoughts from **Spinoza** - especially concerning the questions like the larger cosmic nature of symbolic process.

From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>34</sup> we get to know that the most famous of the American transcendentalists, **Josiah Royce**, tried to find an absolute whose essence is just being in the universe. **Royce** began from fragmentary experiences and was to conclude that there is a larger self, but also that there might be present an error, too. Despite the presence of that error he concluded that there might be the

absolute truth. The mind is such an ultimate reality which no subjective consciousness can recognize, because of their subjectivity. There must be present an absolute experience because the mind is the total intellectual structure of the universe. In the absolute experience all the things are present, as well as we can understand every finite experience in that very moment.

But are there any references to self in the texts of pragmatists? Let us remind our discussions concerning the theme at the previous chapter. In his synechism, **C.S. Peirce** 35 has used both an expression pure and infinitive Self, as well as the the expression poor individual self - when dealing with spiritual dimensions of man. Let us remind our short discussion at a footnote

(See: p. 6, footnote 3.)

too. From **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>36</sup> we have got to know that, according to C.S. Peirce, we have a self which is not predetermined and which is not an entity, but it is developed in social contexts and will reach itself to the context and later outside of it. And further, the spiritual development of the (larger) self needs a vision which is more than any (temporal) self has at a certain moment in itself.

But there are other references to the self. When dealing with the human consciousness, and its processes **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>37</sup> has used the expressions "self" and "not-self", which are opposite poles of the double-consciousness, which we shall discuss later in the current study. From other pragmatists also also **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>38</sup> has described the development of self as a chain of past selves, or as series of experiences, or feelings and thoughts, as we have seen at footnote

(See: p. 6. footnote 3.)

at the previous chapter. Moreover, **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>39</sup> has explained in Principles that spiritualists held that the self is the same as immortal soul.

But what about the nature of things, then, which can be recarded as objects of our intellectual, or perceptual operations? What is their existential status? From **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>40</sup> we get to know that, according to **C.S. Peirce**:

"... there are real things out there whose characters are independent of our opinions of them".

I think, that this suggests both to that our knowledge is not something before objects, to which interpretation **C.W. Morris** has suggested to.

But, of course, the way, by which we apprehend something, may be due to the different icons

(According to **C.S. Peirce**, in the development of mind, there can be different icons in different stages. One of them is the stage of qualisigns [as different perceptions with their emotional tune]. At the second stage, there are iconic sinsigns [individual habits to describe cases with diagrams]. At the third stage there iconic legisigns [which is a generalized characteristic]. However, during the whole progression symbols are an inseparable part of the internal nature of object (**Peirce** 1966, 228, 230))

which, in turn, are an inseparable part of objects. We may suppose that, at least, that things, and some of icons have been in there before we have had any conception of them.

In the human mind, there can be large references, as well as unities, to which signs also refer to. From that reason, we tend to apprehend most things and objects as corresponding complexity as to which references suggest, and as unities, when our object seems to have that property only. However, they might be, in fact, quite simple, as in the simple levels of feelings. This is the case especially when we are striving for something, for which things themselves are not oriented to. But there is the fact that these tendencies, and functioning according them, as well as producing more general tendencies, and habits, is the role of human mind in the development of the whole universe.

For all of those reasons, it makes no sense to talk about substances, or given and staying features in the world, even when we are referring to icons and diagrams, which may be temporal, or, perhaps, something to be developed to fill a potentiality, or law to come, or mind. Hence, we are not connected with things, as they are, but according to how they might become to existence by our feelings of them, or our sense of their immediacy, and the reflection thereafter. The whole human experience, and the altersensing and the medisensing departments of mind, in turn, are continuously changing and vivid ones, were their contents recollected or directly experienced, but this is not their final aim.

There are also alternatives to these tendencies of vividity. If we think e.g. mathematics, we cannot change its eternal prerequisites by no way, namely those which make mathematics possible to exist and develop further. This is just the way of life of mathematics. If we make those changes, we have dealing with something else than mathematics - or we are interpreting it in a new way, or arguing: let there be this kind of mathematics with its brave new world. But if we accept the vividness of the whole world, as the fact, we must accept its consequences, too. One of the most decisive of them is that we cannot have any formal structures, or that we are able to have only a relatively fixed structures.

When **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>41</sup> introduced his doctrine of synechism, he proposed for that one consequence of the doctrine is that we are not permitted to say that the sum of the angles of a triangle exactly equals two right angles but instead we can say that it equal that quantity plus or minus some quantity which we excessively small for all triangles can measure. Another consequence of the doctrine is that we are not allowed to claim that space has strict accurately three dimensions but instead that any movements of bodies out of three dimensions are at most exceedingly minute.

But are we dealing with fundamental truths of mathematics? The answer is no, because we are discussing only certain consequences of the live departments of the world evolution, as well as the consequences of the doctrine of synechism. In a good reason, we could make a hypothesis that the Euclidean Geometry is valid, to, in its own and restricted context, which we can determine with appropriate concepts. But applying synechism to the geometry in question, we ought to make it only a borderline case, which has almost nothing to do with living world.

We cannot conclude from our principles not much what the world is like, but only their consequences, or what kind views we can get by them. According the pragmatic maxim we must trace if there might be consequences of our concepts. It might seem, that we ought to think, what kind of object we are studying, having this or that strategy, and what are their consequences. Or, instead of it, we might suppose that when giving different explanations, we have the same object, and some of our explanations might be wrong, which has several consequences, too. But this is not the case, however, because the consequences which we are discussing are quite different, namely, have our concepts any practical bearings, whatever our concepts are like, or what kind of strategy we have, or have we wrong explanation at hand.

Accepting synechism as a common and valid principle, we cannot say that there are such and such kind of valid objects, from which we can get only one kind of explanations. Instead, we might suppose, that when we are dealing with valid explanations, with their valid objects, we are in close contact with both of them. Because of that very principle, it might be true that we cannot strictly speak about totally independent objects, because we cannot even prove that such objects never exist, or will become to existence, especially if they were totally independent ones and unable to communicate with other objects, or unable to change due of that lack of communication. And what comes to mathematical truths, in general, they might be true only if we have certain scope to them, but still they may be regarded as truths of their own kind. There is the question of an absolute accuracy, which we must reject, and instead accept that those truths are relative - which does not mean their weakness, but instead their readiness to quite different future, and an ability to more complete modes of communication.

Let us remind how **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>42</sup> has emphasized in his doctrine of synechism - that a man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe, as a whole. Is this a kind of automatic process, or inevitable state of things, whether we strived for it, or not? Is there something behind of all experimentality, which is not apprehended but these kind of visions?

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>43</sup> has argued for certain non-materiality of the laws of universe in his general psychognosy

(Gnosis: Knowledge of spiritual mysteries, e.g. in the sect of gnosticism.)

which we shall discuss at the end of the current study in detail. During the current chapter we have known by **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>44</sup> about his concept of human mind - as well as the concepts of thought and idea, which are also corresponding terms to eternal laws, and according Platonian realism, too. But what is important there, is that this kind of view is not something which emphasizes nothing-but interpretation of the world, or something which wants to deny all which is other kind of quality. On the contrary, it says only that this is the way, by which things will happen, and that our ideas have their role in the general development of the universe, too. Nothing more, or less.

But next I'm going to study **Immanuel Kant's** philosophy. There are two of **Kant's** terms, between which he made differentiation, namely transcendent

(Transcendent: Transcending, altogether outside, unrealizable in, experience)

and transcendental

( Transcendental: That is, not derived from experience a priori)

There are several other meanings between the terms by other philosophers.

(Other philosophical meanings: 1. Transcendent: That transcends ordinary limit, pre-eminent, supreme, extraordinary. 2. Transcendental: The meaning of the term generally based on recognition of a priori element in experience.)

In **Immanuel Kant's** philosophy, there are the two different stages

(See: p. 8., footnote 3.)

namely the pre-critical and critical ones. In the former stage he argued for that it is possible to get information of substance by the reason. He was convicted, too, that it is possible to give an ontological

(Ontology: Department of metaphysics, concerned with the essence of things, or being in the abstract.)

proof of the existence of God. At this stage he got a lot of influences from **Isaac Newton's** physics to his studies in natural philosophy.

In the latter stage **Kant** was influenced by English **John Locke**

((1632-1704); **Locke** was the English empirical philosopher, who had great influence on 18th-c. philosophy in general; and especially, he was an author of Essay Concerning the Human Understanding (1690), Two Treatises of Government (1690), Some Thoughts on Education (1693), and The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695). Well-known is his idea of soul as tabula rasa at its birth.)

and his empirism

(Empirism: A philosophical meaning; refers to philosophical doctrines, as a contrary to empiricism.)

which was the reason that he rejected his earlier speculations, as well as that he rejected the idea that we can get to know information of substances. But what kind of denied substances? Are there similarities to Scottish **David Hume**

((1711-1776); **Hume** was the Scottish philosopher, and author of Treatise of Human Nature, and of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1750). In his system of philosophical scepticism, human knowledge is restricted to the experience of ideas and impressions, and ultimate verification of their truth or falsehood is impossible. Well-known is his scepticism, which he himself described merely academic.)

who has argued for that there are no substances at all outside our experience? But for what **Hume** referred by substances?

**David Hume** (Loppuviite)<sup>45</sup> has argued for that all of our perceptions are different from each other, and that they are different from everything else in the universe, too. He regarded them distinct and separable, and suggested that they may be considered as separately existent, and they do not need anything else to support their existences. They are, therefore, substances, as far as this definition explains a substance. This suggests to, that for **Hume** substances were just hypothetical, or merely imagined

(See: p. 19, footnote 3.)

**Kant** expressed his new epistemology in his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1781), which can be regarded as a reaction to English empirism. But **Kant** was not a pure empirist, and not at all empiricist

(Empiricism: The practice of relying on observation and experiment, especially in the natural sciences.)

at least in his critical stage; instead he believed that we can surely become acquainted with true knowledge just by knowing, and we should take advantage with the mind such things, by which can preserve and maintain that knowledge. Hence, the only thing he accepted from English empirism (e.g. by **Locke**) was that all our knowledge gets start from experience. But he emphasized that we cannot explain the essence of our knowledge just by our experiences, notwithstanding that there is a kind of reality which is produced by phenomena, which our experiences concern. But just by becoming acquaintance with that reality we cannot directly comprehend, that is, Das Ding an sich, or explain how the knowledge is, when being as it is, but which an essence we get from the mind a priori

(A priori: (Reasoning) from cause to effect; deductive(ly). [Tr. L., = 'from what is before'.])

we reach the true source of our general knowledge. There are such things as mathematics, which is a priori; it is derived from the mind, and not from experience. In his Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Naturwissenschaft (1786) **Kant** also dealt with knowing and its nature.

But now we don't discuss the topic of knowing no longer but instead the certain similarities between **Kant** and pragmatism. Notwithstanding that they are studied by many commentators before, I am going to discuss some topics next.

From **John Dewey** (Loppuviite)<sup>46</sup> we know that **C.S. Peirce** took the term pragmatism from Kantian epistemology. **Kant** made the difference between the terms pragmatic

(Pragmatic: Concerned with practical results and values; treating things in a matter-of-fact or practical way.)

and practical

(Practical: Concerned with practice, or use, (opposite to theory).)

referring probably with the latter to scheming

(Scheme: Systematic arrangement; table of classification or of appointed times, or plan for doing something - also: artful or underhand design.)

if we think the archaic meaning of the word practice, but it would also refer to habitual actions, or carrying on, as well as to methods of legal procedure. Anyway, we can find the differentiation in **Kant's**

Metaphysic of Morals, where the first term pragmatic refers to the rules of function and to the techniques which are common in human experience, and which we are able to change. The latter term practical refers to the general moral laws and rules which are a priori in their nature, and which we cannot change by human activities but instead we must obey them, when they come in front of us, as a kind of omen.

That was **John Dewey's** opinion, but what about **C.S. Peirce** himself? From the letter, which **C.S. Peirce** mailed to **Mario Calderoni**, which was written approximately in 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>47</sup>, we get to know that **C.S. Peirce** got philosophical influences from **Immanuel Kant**. But, in addition to this, he emphasized just at this letter that the essence of pragmatism was to be a philosophical method. **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>48</sup> has told us, too, that **C.S. Peirce** appreciated the way how **Kant** linked knowing to the constitution of the human mind. **C.S. Peirce** also accepted the way by which **Kant** restricted the field of experience that is possible to man.

Here and there in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy we can meet that idea of insufficiency of man's knowledge, or his concepts, or that man only has been interpreting instead of using final, and accurate signs.

From **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>49</sup> we know that in **C.S. Peirce's** late philosophy, there has been an important thesis that time is a continuum and [by virtue of its infinite divisibility] an infinity which we actually apprehend. **Gullvåg** has also referred to Chance, Love and Logic (Loppuviite)<sup>50</sup>, but he didn't associate this **C.S. Peirce's** view to Kantian tendency, to where it suggests for, especially when we think the general meanings of the terms intuition

(Intuition: Immediate apprehension by the mind without reasoning, or immediate apprehension by sense, or immediate insight.)

and continuum

(Continuum: A whole, the structure of whose parts is continuous and not atomic.)

and the emphasis which both philosophers have had in their discussions - especially when concerning the essence of time, or the apprehension of time.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>51</sup> has both criticized and interpreted **Kant's** conceptions on the time and continuity. He admitted that **Kant** was quite right when saying that every partitioning in time is time itself but suggested to that **Kant** didn't understand quite well what he was proposing for, that time, in itself, is infinite, and that it does not consist of infinitely divisible parts. That is, **Kant** did not make differentiation between two things. First: how we apprehend time, and second: what time itself is, in its infinite divisibility. Thought, **Kant** did not understand that there must take in consideration two different ideas concerning time - the one, which says that time, as intuited [**Kant** translated the Latin term *intuitus* into the German *Anschauung*], can never be divided so that parts were times themselves, and the another, which says that, in time there might be still something which can cause that we cannot reach all of its infinite divisible parts, as they are, if they existed. Hence, when considering **Kant's** proposition as a whole, **C.S. Peirce** has suggested to that the conclusion of those two considerations should be that time, as intuited, has no separate parts. **Kant** did not illustrate the essence of [the whole] time, as such, whatever it is, or shall be. This kind a view **C.S. Peirce** accepted, too, and suggested that his own concept of percipuum

(Cf. especially the meaning of Perceive: Apprehend with the mind.)

is quite the same as **Kant's** concept *Anschauung*

(*Anschauung*: The term has also been used by **Edmund Husserl**, indicating to the principle of principles, which refers to all which is directly given, or seen.)

in this sense.

There is an interesting connection to **Ludwig Wittgenstein** in this question, too. From **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>52</sup> we know that **Wittgenstein's** argumentation that we do not grasp the infinity of time, or

time as an infinitely divisible continuum - as a real extension, but only as a possibility, an intension. **Gullvåg** suggested for that this argument was a reaction to **C.S. Peirce's** opinion concerning continuity of time, but, in fact, it does not add anything to it, or deny it, either. On the contrary, there seems to be the connection to **Kant's** conception of time, too.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>53</sup> has emphasized, too, that there is not at all such thing as absolute immediacy, or something which were absolutely present, either accidentally or by confrontation. There we have, his doctrine of synechism, again - which means that we cannot escape the thirdness, where the classes of mind are synthesized together.

I think that this synthesizing tendency of the mind and thought is necessary because of that things, as well as time, which have been splitted over and over again, and still do so, cannot be apprehended by us, as they really are - because of the thought needs the presence of infinite continuums, from which we actually build the world, and according to that continuity we apprehend time, too. Let us also remind what I have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study on **C.S. Peirce's** doctrine of synechism, and such themes as the generalizing tendency, fulfillment of the laws, and other counterpart activities to them.

But now I want to discuss in detail **Friendrich Hegel's** philosophy, who named his whole doctrine the absolutic idealism, as a contrary to **Kant's** and **Fichte's**, and some others' subjective idealism. **Hegel** considered the whole universum as the system which developed within one time system. Hence, the totality is, and will be able to give the whole meaning to its parts. Different ages follow each other in that one main system as a dialectic continuum. The history, as a whole, can be considered as the manifestation of the eternal truth or Geist.

But that manifestation takes time, and also ideas are at the beginning very dim ones. **Hegel** used, as his tool, the dialectical method which was developed already by **Plato** and **Zeno of Citium**

((c. 300 B.C.); **Zeno** was the Greek philosopher, and the founder of Stoic scho ol)

All of them supposed that we can elevate to the true world of ideas by uncovering the contradictions of beings.

**Friendrich Hegel** derived some of his ideas also from **Immanuel Kant**, especially what concerned his idea of antinomies

(Antinomy: Contradiction in a law, or between laws, or principles.)

to which the reason is continuously drifting. But **Hegel** considered the antinomies as existing in the objective reality. The purpose of his positive dialectics was to synthesize the antinomies and conflicts so, that there would be quite new and harmony solution. But there are also things, which are another kind, as they appear to be. For the problems which will arise from them, he introduced his negative dialectics. Hence, there was the leading idea of a dialogical solution in **Hegel's** whole epistemology. But there are different dialogical solutions, on the one hand those which can be applied to the philosophy of nature, and on the other hand those which can be applied to the Philosophy of Geist, because of the difference of their very nature. The kernel of **Friendrich Hegel's** philosophy can be found in mainly at his *Wissenschaft der Logik* (1812-1816).

But there were also the American Hegelian philosophy. From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>54</sup> we know that the role of **William T. Harris** in the development of the American Hegelian philosophy is considerable one. He argued for abstract philosophy emphasizing that superiority of speculative method in relation to the methods of both empirism, and positivism

(Positivism: Philosophical system of **Auguste Comte**, recognizing only positive facts and observable phenomena and abandoning all inquiry into causes or ultimate origins; religious system founded upon this.)

and also to the view of agnosticism

(Agnostic: One who holds that nothing is known, or likely to be known, of the existence of a God or anything beyond material phenomena. -adj. Pertaining to this theory. [Gk. agnostos (theos) unknown (god); taken by **Thomas Henry Huxley** f. Acts xvii 23].)

**Harris**, and his counterparts, thought that with pure reason it would be possible to get knowledge concerning an ultimate reality, and that Hegelian philosophy should offer a world view which is acceptable, and which can be applied to ethics, religion, arts, politics, law and pedagogic.

We can read at The third **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>55</sup> that **Harris** studied at the first stage at Yale College Platonian philosophy but was not satisfied with the teaching style and level of that College, and soon he began his studying in St. Louis. There he met **Henry C. Brockmeyer**

(**Brockmeyer**: Of Russian origin, who was studied **Hegel** by Prose Writers of Germany which was published in 1874)

Since 1858 **Harris**, **Brockmeyer** and some other philosophers began to meet each others in Kant Club, and **Harris** also got a copy from **Hegel's** study on logic and encouraged **Brockmeyer** to translate in into English but **Brockmeyer** made only some outlines.) who had a role in translating some **Hegel's** text into English. In 1886 it was founded St. Louis Philosophical Society, whose chairman was **Brockmeyer** and whose secretary was **Harris**, and which had several American philosophers as its members

(As the members of that philosophical society were e.g. **Denton J. Snider**, **George H. Howinson**, **Kroeger**, and **Thomas Davidson**.)

From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>56</sup> we get to know further that most of the members of that Society were emigrants who had escaped the rebels of 1848 in Europe.

But what kind of philosophy was that of **William T. Harris** own? From the third **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>57</sup> we know that **Harris** used the parallel analysis and recognised three levels of knowing, and in the third level, he supposed, it will be achieved an individual independence, as well as it will be realized that all things are dependent from each other, and that there is the governing principle of relativity in that process where individual by self-reflection get that sight of infinitive. But why there must be an individual being? Without that individuality the causality is not able to produce certain causes and effects. Hence, the causality is dependent of those self-activities which are self-relative, independent, free, and creative. The only totally independent and original cause of all things is God, whose essence is just reason. Like **Hegel**, also **Harris** believed that philosophy approaches [the ultimate] reason by the concept analysis, according to the first principles.

From the third **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>58</sup> we know that in 1867 **Harris** began to publish The Journal of Speculative Philosophy - for the reason that his article "The mere dry husk of Hegelianism" was not accepted by the publishers of The North American Review. There must be emphasized that in The Journal of Speculative Philosophy they published also some **William James'**, **John Dewey's** and **C.S. Peirce's** articles.

But there is not much of **Hegel** in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy, in spite of what we know from e.g. **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>59</sup>, who has emphasized that **C.S. Peirce** respected **Hegel's** view on the nature of phenomenon, as well as his view concerning the nature of history, but he regarded his logic as poor. (But, as we know from the **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **William James**, which was dated at 12th June in 1902 (Loppuviite)<sup>60</sup>, he regarded also **Josiah Royce's** logic execrable.)

From **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>61</sup> we get to know that **Bertrand Russell**

((1872-1970); **Russell** was an English philosopher, logician and mathematician. He was, with **A.N. Whitehead**, an author of Principia Mathematica., 1-3., (1910-1913), and where they presented logistic thesis [accompanied with **Gottlob Frege**], which says: mathematics is a part of logic, and that both of them can be expressed with logical calculus). Among **Russell's** other influential works are e.g. Problems of

Philosophy (1912), and Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), but he has also written a lot of popular philosophical books.)

adopted from **C.S. Peirce** one part of his logical theory of relation, namely the part of external relations, but he rejected its another part - the theory of internal relations, because it smacked too much of Hegel. We shall discuss this theme later in the current study. However, it seems clear that some philosophers have regarded **C.S. Peirce** as Hegelian.

But can we, in regard to these references, consider **C.S. Peirce** as an advocate of Hegelian philosophy, and in what quantity, if he was that one? In a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has written to **William T. Harris** on the 30th November in 1868 (Loppuviite)<sup>62</sup> he criticized Hegelians for that they considered the philosophical doctrines, which have been presented during different ages, as true ones, when presented in certain time and context, and further he criticized Hegelians for their categorization of the knowledge of different ages. An interesting detail there is that **C.S. Peirce** is repeating the expression Hegelians, which refers to followers of **Hegel**, and to the mistakes they have made. Only critics, which he seems to be directing to **Hegel**, is the critics concerning his logic.

However, **C.S. Peirce** has referred to **Hegel's** writings several times when illustrating some of his own concepts. One example of these we find where **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>63</sup> has used a similar example of Baccants as **Hegel** when describing e.g. association.

Further, we get to know from **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **William James** which has been dated on the 7th March in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>64</sup> that **C.S. Peirce** has regarded **Hegel's** philosophy as nominalistic, and suggested to that only here and there it expressed a taste of realism, that is, **Hegel** cannot be regarded as a realist. We know how strongly **C.S. Peirce** attacked against nominalism: the one purpose of the pragmatistic doctrine was that of denying nominalism

(see: notice of **Frazer's** Berkeley, in North American Review, October, 1871)

But there has also been an interaction between **Hegel's** philosophy and **John Dewey**

( See: p. 16, footnote 2.)

which we have discussed during the current chapter. From **S.R. Vaughn** (Loppuviite)<sup>65</sup> we know, that there have been three different stages in Dewey's philosophy, which **Lewis E. Hahn** has described. The first stage was Scottish intuitionism

(Intuitionism: (General meaning.): The doctrine that in perception external objects are known immediately, without the intervention of a vicarious phenomenon.)

the second absolute idealism, and the third of the stages was instrumentalism

(C.f. Instrument: There are two meanings of the term, which come very close to where the term instrumentalism refers to: Implement, apparatus, used in performing an action, especially for delicate or scientific work. - also: Person used by another for his own purposes.)

**Dewey** became an advocate of Hegelian philosophy when he was continuing his studies at John Hopkins. At the same time he was also studying experimental psychology by **G. Stanley Hall**, and those studies can be regarded to be as the most influential to **Dewey's** philosophical development. However, from **S.R. Vaughn** (Loppuviite)<sup>66</sup> we know, too, that **Dewey** himself has said that his Hegelian stage didn't left any permanent effects. **E.G. Boring** (Loppuviite)<sup>67</sup> has given us an information concerning **Dewey's** own role in the development of functionalistic psychology, as well as what kind were those influences which he got from it.

But what about Hegelian tendencies [of pragmatists], and their criticizing, anyway, as well as their rejecting? A good question right there is if pragmatists ever studied the whole **Hegel's** huge literal remains. Are their arguments valid at all? I mean, that it is easy to talk about certain philosophical tendencies

without saying anything, and reject other doctrines as well. As ordinary citizens, we can reject the whole philosophy, as a science, or as an art of knowledge without knowing much about philosophy. Most men of steets actually do that, and their attitudes have been accepted generally. And we may propose that every man has his own philosophy, in a quite good reason. There are thousands of people who will accept that they have their own and valid philosophy, or, as a consequence of it, certain lifestyle. However, it is clear that we have not proved anything by that, or have not made serious arguments which philosophers would criticize or accept. I just had these irrational thoughts - because I just wondered if **C.S. Peirce** ever read all of **Hegel's** works, and made his arguments after this enormous enterprise?

In our modern scieties we have just believed that philosophy is useless, and have believed that every man is able to philosophize the things as they are, in a measure. But any well-educated philosopher

(Philosopher: As lover of wisdom, or student of philosophy; as one who regulates his life by the light of philosophy, or one who shows philosophic calmness in trying circumstances.)

may argue for, in a quite good reason, and without any megalomania, that most politicians, as well as philosophers of streets, and all **Platos** of pubs, with their tiny thoughts, are quite useless, as their whole poorsome lives, if he evaluates their role in the whole development of human knowledge.

But what about all of the ideas which pragmatists have derived from the idealistic tradition of philosophy? There seems to be several similarities between those schools, as well as some disagreements. However, we have only taken short snapshots; we have not done any profound analysis. But there are lot of studies, which have gone much deeper, I guess. There is e.g. **Karl-Otto Apel's**

(**Apel, K-O.**, "Von Kant zu Peirce: Die Semiotische Transformation der Transzendentalen Logik", in Transformation der Philosophie., II., Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft.ää): , Frankfurt am Main., pp. 157ff, 1973; see also: **Apel, K-O.**, Charles Sanders Peirce., Schiften., I., Einführung., Frankfurt am main., 1967-1970)

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work, and **Ingemund Gullvåg's**

(**Gullvåg, I.**, "Wittgenstein and Peirce"., in Wittgenstein-Aesthetic and Transcendental Philosophy., edited by **K.S. Johannesen.**, and **T. Nordenstam.**, Hölder-Pichler-Temsky., Vienna, 1981)

article, which have revealed more of the connections of **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy to European philosophy.

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### **The ancient philosophy, older empirism, and pragmatism**

Most philosophers in ancient Greece interpreted the world by emphasizing one of its basic elements, from which the world is made of, and they applied certain cues of instant reality, when explaining what kind is the world like. There were, among others, eleatic

(Eleatic: Of, pertaining to, a school of Greek philosophers of the 6th c. B.C. founded by **Parmenides** and his successor **Zeno** at Elea in Lucania; these philosophers combated the anthropomorphic religion of the ancient poets and maintained that there was a single eternal god not resembling mortals in appearance or thought.)

[school], whose members were advocates of monism, because they thought, that such concepts as variety [plurality], not-beingness, movement, etc. might be problematic, when used in philosophy, because they would lead to contradictions. One of them was **Parmenides**

((6th c. B.C.); **Parmenides** was the Greek philosopher of Elea (Italy); founder of the Eleatic school which believed in unity, and continuity of being, and unreality of change or motion, too. [see also **Xenophanes** ].)

but there were also **Zeno**, and **Xenophanes**

((c 576-480 B.C.); **Xenophanes** was the Greek philosopher and poet, formerly thought to have been the founder of the Eleatic School of philosophy.)

among others. More dynamic view than one before was introduced by **Heraclitus**

(**Heraclitus** was the Greek philosopher of Ephesus; he wrote a work Concerning Nature (c. 513 B.C.), in which he maintained that all things were in a state of flux and that fire, the type of this constant change, was their origin. He accepted that there are contradictions, as e.g. wealth and illness, but somehow, they are one and the same. His melancholy views on the changing character of life led to his being known as the 'weeping philosopher' [cf. **Democritus** who has been regarded as 'the laughing philosopher'].)

However, these philosophers could not invent any applicable, and empiristic approach, because of their denying of the truth of things, which are in front of us; they were just believing in unity, or the continuity of being. They did not discover that change, how illusory it might be, could be measured, and explained, or that there are no unchangeable facts.

And then there was the Pythagorean school

(Pythagorean school was founded in 530 B.C.)

or religion of numbers. The most famous of its advocates was **Pythagoras**

((6th c. B.C.); **Pythagoras** was the Greek philosopher and mathematician of Samos; his philosophical teaching included the doctrine of the immortality and transmigration of the soul, and he evolved the idea that the explanation of the universe is to be sought in numbers and their relations.)

of whose person we have not much to tell about, because the sect held that the founder of school was divine being, and giving any intimate information of him was forbidden. At last the whole sect was destroyed in a revolt. Because of that mysticism concerning numbers, the school, or the sect, cannot be regarded as the forerunner of the idea of calculus.

Then there were natural philosophers of Miletus, e.g. mathematician, **Thales of Miletus**

((end of 7th c. B.C.); **Thales** was the Greek philosopher, and one of the 'seven sages', who believed to have founded the geometry of lines. He discovered several theorems, and advanced the study of astronomy; he regarded water as the principle of all material things.)

who regarded water as *arkhe*

((Gk.) *Arkhe*: the origin of all which exists.)

and as the material cause for the development of all which exists. He thought that at the beginning there was an enormous sea, from which fog ascended, and to which it descended as rain, forming the land, and all of beings. There we have certain echoes of the idea of development, which originated from a simple [natural] cause. **Anaximandros**

((610-547 B.C.); **Anaximandros** wrote a book on nature, in which he tried to join together his findings in astronomy, geology, and biology into the complete presentation of the physical universe. According to him, the whole universe was born from one of the elements, which is infinite, to *apeiron*, and which is unlimited, and the substance of all, and to where all beings shall return back. The natural order is essentially moral, as well as the law, according with all beings are born at certain time, and fall down to eternity another time.)

was the philosopher, who was trying to systematize his empirical findings, and who was emphasizing the physical nature of the universe.

Later there has been some of their successors, e.g. **Archimedes**

((287-212 B.C.); **Archimedes** was the Greek mathematician of Syracuse, and a pupil of **Euclid**. He studied at Alexandria, but spent the most of his life in Syracuse. He has said to have made many mechanical

inventions, including the screw for raising water; principle of Archimedes [physics], which is the principle that when a body is partly or completely immersed in a fluid the apparent loss of weight is equal to the weight of the fluid displaced.)

### and **Hippocrates**

((b. c 460 B.C.); **Hippocrates** has been the most celebrated physician of Greek antiquity. [[Hippocratic = Of Hippocrates or the school of medicine named after him; applied to the shrunken and livid aspect of the countenance immediately before death, so called because described by **Hippocrates**] [Hippocratic Oath = Oath embodying the code of medical ethics, preserved in **Hippocrates**' writings (though probably of still earlier date), and still taken, in various modified forms, by those who qualify as doctors of medicine.]

### and **Aristarchus**

((c 280 B.C.); **Aristarchus** was from Samos. He was an astronomer and mathematician; he maintained that the earth revolved round the sun, though he thought that its orbit was a circle [not an ellipse])

an inventor of solar system. But in addition to them there were many others, who have influenced strongly to the development of modern science.

However, it was **Aristotle's**

((384-322 B.C.); **Aristotle** was the Greek philosopher, and a pupil of **Plato** at Athens. Later he became tutor to the young **Alexander** of Macedon, and returned to Athens in 335. There he conducted a school which was known as the Peripatetic from his habit of walking up and down (peripaton) the paths of the Lyceum while lecturing. He wrote the Ethics, Politics, and Poetics, and works on zoology, physics, metaphysics, logic (which he invented), and rhetoric. One half [or perhaps more] of **Aristotle's** writings has been known via translations from Arabic texts. An interesting is his doctrine of categories: the most fundamental of them he regarded the category of substance, according which other categories could be verified. In general, substances are born, when elements are mixed with each others with certain proportions.)

who made the most complete classification concerning sciences, and was the founder of scientific approach, but we must not forget another **Aristarchus**

((c 217-c 145 B.C.); **Aristarchus** was of Samotrace; librarian at Alexandria, who edited the Greek classics, and has been regarded as the originator of scientific scholarship.)

who, in turn, has had certain role after the classic philosophers in the development of natural sciences and philosophy. **Aristotle's** work didn't influence only positively, if we think the development of science, because several Christian theologians, and especially The Fathers of the Church fixed his ideas into the doctrines of Scholastics for centuries.

According to **Aristotle**, there are theoretical, practical, and productive sciences. From those, theoretical sciences [as physics, mathematics, and metaphysics] were studying things which could not be otherwise than they were. The purpose of practical sciences [as ethics and political science] was, instead, to be as servant in human activities, and they studied those things which could be, perhaps, in other way than they actually were. Productive sciences were aimed to find out how to prepare things

(There is an interesting point that ancient philosophers, like **Plato** and **Aristotle**, didn't appreciate much e.g. machines, or preparing them, because it was the concern of slaves.)

But if we now discuss about the role of physics in the development of philosophy, we must emphasize that for now physics, for example, has not, in every case and the point of time, been regarded as theoretic science.

However, it seems to me, that we can trace the belief on the success of science, and empirical methods almost to the beginning of the ancient Greek philosophy, until some of philosophers tried to express the knowledge as the group of axioms

(Axiom: The self-evident truth, or established principle, or maxim [which is a general truth drawn from science or experience, principle, or rule of conduct].)

There was e.g. **Aristotle's** axiomatic ideal of science, in which every branch of science have rooted to certain axioms and universal truths. Then there was also **Euclid**

((c 300 B.C.); **Euclid** (Eucleides) was the mathematician of Alexandria, and an author of a treatise of geometry (the Elements). Geometry itself is a science of properties and relations of magnitudes in space, as lines, surfaces, and solids. Geometry has also been considered as a school subject, model of thinking, and the geometry of ordinary experience - accepting **Euclid's** axioms as indisputable, in a narrow or wider context.)

with his geometry, which was aimed to be as the universal model, too, but which was inappropriate, as such, to the new science. But why this emphasis of geometry? Because it was a model of how things should be arranged, in order to be accepted as universal truths, or proved to be true. And this is the case also in our modern science.

Later, there has been the school of neoplatonism

(Neoplatonism: A philosophical and religious system, chiefly consisting of a mixture of **Platonic** ideas with Oriental mysticism, which originated at Alexandria in the 3rd c.)

From neoplatonists I want to mention especially **Plotinus**

((c A.D. 205-262); **Plotinus** was the Egyptian-born philosopher, and he has been regarded as the founder of Neoplatonism.)

**Porphyry (Porphyrius)**

((A.D. 233-c 305); **Porphyry** was the Scholar and philosopher; originally called **Malchus**; by birth probably a Syrian; became a disciple of **Plotinus** at Rome; left numerous works in Greek.)

and after B.C. there was **Boethius Anicius Manlius Severinus**

((c 475-525); **Boethius** was the Roman philosopher; consulted under **Theodoric the Ostrogoth**; was suspected of treason and confined to prison, where he wrote *De Consolatione Philosophiae*; the neoplatonic and stoic ideas of his work had great influence throughout The Middle Ages.)

But why they are important when discussing empirism. Because the whole Christian tradition was, at the beginning, deeply influenced by neoplatonism, and one of The Fathers of The Church, namely St. **Augustine Aurelius**

((354-430); St. **Augustine** was the theologian, and a son of a pagan father and Christian mother (St. Monica); he was for a time attracted by Manichaeism, but baptized as a Christian 387; became bishop of Hippo in North-Africa, 391; defended Christianity against ancient religions and philosophies and contemporary heresies in numerous writings, of which the best known are *De civitate Dei*, and *De Trinitate*, as well as his *Confessiones* (c. 400), which was an autobiographical work. There was later also another St. **Augustine** (d. 604), namely the first archbishop of Canterbury who led mission to England from Rome and founded a monastery at Canterbury.)

derived some of his ideas from neoplatonism, and later, in turn, he influenced to early empirists. Since 200 B.C. the neoplatonist school has been influential, but as the originator of the school is regarded St. **Augustine**. However, the school stayed persistent for centuries. Hundreds of years later there was **Henry**

## More

((1614-1687); **More** was an English Platonist and philosophical poet. Other Cambridge Platonists were **Ralph Cudworth**, **John Smith**, and **Nathanael Culvervel**.)

et.al., who have been generally known as Cambridge Platonists.

But what kind was that earlier neoplatonism which we have discussed? I will give a short example of it. In his cosmology e.g. **Plotinus** claimed that the eternal source of the all beingness is the infinite unity, from where all the variety emanates as light to an incompleteness and to indefinite. The very first source of that emanation is Nus which includes the infinite ideas; and it effects to the souls, and at last to the materia. The individual soul belongs in the same time to the spiritual and to the material world. These ideas presented by **Plotinus** became later a part of philosophy to many latter philosophers, and we can trace them also by **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>1</sup> in his synechism, where he has described e.g. carnal-, social-, and spiritual consciousness, and which we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study.

**Thomas Aquinas**, who was also one of The Fathers of The Church, has got his neoplatonistic ideas just from St. **Augustine**, but he has derived some of his ideas also from **Aristotle**. The philosophy of St. **Augustine** was a kind of mixture of ancient Greek philosophy and the doctrines Christianity, and he has influenced strongly to them both

(**Aquinas'** works were largely studied through the whole Middle-Ages.)

And seen as a whole, both **Aristotle**, and **Plato**, have influenced to Cristianity, and they have been together, in a certain stage of history, as inseparable companions, as well as a carrier of Greek philosophy to our modern age. But we must remind, however, that in St. **Augustine's** philosophy there were also such influences from Christian tradition, which was not yet written clearly, or canonized

(Formal definition of Christian faith was largely the achievement of the General [or Ecumenical] Councils of Nicaea (325), Constantinople (381), Ephesus (431), and Chalcedon (451))

and which was not fully developed which means that it was not yet canonized to which we know it now.

By St. **Augustine**, there is the fundamental truth, that we cannot doubt logical and mathematical truths. But it is also true, that it could be quite impossible that there were no truths at all - because then it should be accepted, as the truth, that there is no truth. But what would be the consequences if we reject both of these propositions? If we think e.g. our modern science, we ought to reject all of its conclusions - because we have applied both mathematics and logic, when concluded, and we have also believed to that there can exist truths. There are also other logical argumentations quite similar to these, but we don't discuss them any more.

One of those early empirists, who was influenced by St. **Augustine**, whether one wanted to receive those influences or not, was **Roger Bacon**

((1214-1292); **Roger Bacon** was an English Fransiscan, and philosopher and student of experimental science [especially optics] at Paris and Oxford; credited, then and later, with magical powers.)

who was one of the predecessors of the new natural science. But **Roger Bacon** got also his philosophical influences from **Robert Grosstete**

((1175-1253); **Grosstete** was an Oxfordian teacher **Roger Bacon**.)

who was an advocate of Platonian philosophy.

By the way, there are several later philosophers, who has e.g. taken their examples from St. **Augustine** - one of them is **Ludwig Wittgenstein** (Loppuviite)<sup>2</sup> who cited his Confessiones

(**Wittgenstein** used **Augustine's** examples when describing the learning of language.)

**Roger Bacon** was familiar with The Renaissance, and he anticipated those thoughts which were presented later by **Francis Bacon**

((1561-1626); **Francis Bacon** was Baron Verulam and Viscount St. Albans, and Lord Chancellor of England (1618-1620), and a philosopher who introduced the inductive method into science, and author of Essays.)

and by **Leonard da Vinci**

((1452-1519); **Leonardo da Vinci** was the Italian painter, sculptor, architect, engineer, man of science, and writer of prose and verse.)

We can say, in general, that **Roger Bacon** was at crossroads where on the other side of it were the thoughts of the ancients and on the other side the world of natural science which was just coming to existence.

**Roger Bacon** has presented his ideas in his three books

(Opus majus, Opus minus, and Opus tertium.)

which he wrote on the request of Pope **Clemens IV**. He made also several natural scientific experiments and he foretold e.g. that in future there would be constructed such mechanical things as aeroplanes and mechanical vaggons. He emphasized that there ought to use experimental knowledge and experimental study in the science, and he also emphasized that the knowledge achieved should help to master the nature.

But it was **Francis Bacon** who introduced the new scientific thinking and empirism far better that **Roger Bacon** had done. **Charles Hartshorne** (Loppuviite)<sup>3</sup> has appreciated **Francis Bacon** one of the greatest names of empirism. **Francis Bacon** has written such works, as Essays (1597-1625), as well as the pedagogic The Advancement of Learning (1605), and Novum Organum (1620), which is a part of his Instauratio Magna, which he didn't get ready, and then there is his The New Atlantis (1626).

In general, **Francis Bacon** stated as a goal of his literal and scientific work to advance the human knowledge and the restauration in science itself. He also thought that we can master the nature just obeying it, and that knowledge and power are quite the same thing. He believed that with science we can change better the poor conditions where people live, and he was in that sense the predecessor of **Auguste Comte**

((1798-1854); **Comte** was the French philosopher, and founder of the positivistic system.)

and his positivism, which we shall discuss later. We can say that **Francis Bacon** was also an advocate of meliorism

(Meliorism: The doctrine that the world may be made better by human effort.)

which, as a term, has been used by **Morris L. Bigge** (Loppuviite)<sup>4</sup>, too, when he has described the essence of the school of positive relativism, where he put also pragmatism.

**Francis Bacon** (Loppuviite)<sup>5</sup> said also that we cannot trust to our senses and make generalizations by them. In addition to this, we have certain idols, as the idols of the tribe,- cave,- market place,- and theatre - as we know from Novum Organum. However, I think, the conception of false beliefs is as old as the whole mankind, at they have been existing since Cro Magnon was born and just began to spread and shape his communities. I mean that most animals make fever mistakes than human beings, and if they do, they are not because of bad knowledge, or beliefs. Those ancient people must have made, at least, the difference between the false and real gods and accepted and denied habits.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>6</sup> has emphasized that a portion of false beliefs, or stubborn habits in our knowledge, is remarkable. He has also connected most fictions to an ignorance in the ordinary life, as well as they can be found in science. Fictions can be connected also to all the beliefs, which were accepted generally, and without any doubt, as knowledge and truth, notwithstanding that they might be false. He seems to have emphasized the ignorance of the whole mankind, and argued for, that most of its fictions are associated to our ignorance. It seems to me clear that there is the similar tendency between **Francis Bacon** and **C.S. Peirce** in this question.

And if we discuss the most simplest induction, we cannot trust such kind of induction, where we only list things at hands, one after one, and this after that - which operation **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>7</sup> has described as rudimentary

(Rudiment: First steps or stages [of an art or science], or earliest form, of which a later development is or might have developed; imperfectly developed part; - also: elements or first principles of, or of knowledge or some subject.)

induction.

This is just what **Francis Bacon** suggested us to do: that we must go step by step to more general arguments and to the right knowledge, concerning the laws and the more general shape of phenomenons. He emphasized, that we ought to classify, analyze, and compare our observations, and try eliminate all the competing hypotheses

(Hypothesis; pl. hypotheses: Supposition(s) made as basis for reasoning, without reference to its [or their] truth(s), or as starting point(s) for investigation.)

until we can get the right conclusion. **C.S. Peirce** has presented just similar ideas when e.g. describing induction, and abduction, which is not the same as working according to ex hypothesi

((L.) Ex hypothesi: From the hypothesis, from the facts advanced.)

but instead, according to what kind of hypothesis we might get by conclusions de facto

((L.) Litt. De facto: From the fact(s); in reality.)

That is, what kind of hypothesis is that we really need, according the few, surprising facts we have, in order that the facts shall be explained, and the other facts with which they are connected, revealed, in their true essence.

For the very reason, we should not e.g. choose a pre-determined hypothesis, what the facts should have, according to habit and tradition, or a point of view.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>8</sup> has suggested that certain kinds of induction are statistical in their nature, that is, we cannot easily find any representative observation which in such were reliable one, and that we cannot rely on the predictions or verbal descriptions either - in spite of how logical they are, and how a compact system they seem to produce. He has emphasized in the third genus of induction that we must test a hypothesis by sampling the possible predictions that may be based upon it. But if we do not have any hypothesis in mind, or we cannot make any prediction, either, as we generally do by induction, we must use abduction [we must find a hypothesis which explains the best way the surprising facts].

But there are differences between **C.S. Peirce** and **Francis Bacon**, too. But these might be due of better mathematics and statistical theories [which **C.S. Peirce** could use], especially due of the concept of probability, which were not know in **Francis Bacon's** age.

But various things may happen, and do so, whether we make predictions or not, and if we have some

consequences at hand, they may be due of some other reasons we do not know. There might be an explanation which is something of the kind we do not know at all, that is, there is a form of a hypothesis we cannot trace, because of that we are this or that kind of beings. Notwithstanding all of this, we must concentrate to the facts which we can recognize, and try to see have their consequences. We can read at *Chance, Love and Logic* (Loppuviite)9 on the importance of practical bearings, or consequences of the predictions or descriptions we are able to formulate concerning the surprising facts - as **C.S. Peirce** has stated them in his famous pragmatic maxim. As a consequence: whether I want to add to this that to any phenomenon, there must always be something which causes that the new features behave as they do. We must reckon the possibility that there might have become to existence quite new features into the world, due of the development of the mind and the universe. However, there must still be present those practical bearings. But still there might be something without any practical bearings.

It is no wonder that **C.S. Peirce** criticized later his earlier writings and their emphasis of practical results, in a letter to **William James**, which was dated on the 13th March in 1897 (Loppuviite)10, as well as he was conscious of the difficulties, when we try to have the facts, which he expressed in *Chance, Love, and Logic* (Loppuviite)11:

"... Facts that stand before our face and eyes and stare us in the face are far from being, in all cases, the ones most easily discerned".

**C.S. Peirce** was not an utilitarianist, either, especially when speaking the utilitarian tendencies in the field of education, as we know e.g. from **I. Scheffler** (Loppuviite)12.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)13 has regarded **Francis Bacon** as very scientific and experimental person who also died as a consequence of his last experiment. **C.S. Peirce** did not consider that very consequence very brilliant one but it proved the originality of **Francis Bacon's** intelligence. But what kind was that experiment. From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)14 we get to know that **Francis Bacon** studied how chicken would preserve in snow, and he died by the consequence of catching a cold during that experiment.

**Francis Bacon's** theory of the eliminative induction has influenced to **John Stuart Mill**, who has been said to adopted the theory in question, and assimilated it to his rules concerning experimental study. From **Dagobert D. Runes** (Loppuviite)15 we know that e.g. **William James** has derived some of his ideas, from **John Stuart Mill**, which we shall deal with later.

But now few words about **John Stuart Mill**

((1806-1873); **Mill** was the English political economist; he was an author of *On Liberty* (1859) and *Utilitarianism* (1861). There are several other books which we shall discuss in the text in detail.)

in general. He was employed at The East-Indian Trading Company during the years 1822-1858 and 1865-1868. As a political economist, he has written *Principles of Political Economy* (1848), which concerned **Adam Smith's**

((1723-1845); **Smith** was the Scottish political economist; an author of *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), which established political economy as a separate science.)

and **David Rickardo's**

((1772-1823); **Ricardo** was the English political economist of the free-trade school, and an author of *Principles of Political Economy and Taxation*, which deals with the causes determining the distribution of wealth.)

economical views. There is also **Mill's System of Logic** (1843), where he has emphasized the role of induction in scientific study. He had also got positivistic influences from **Auguste Comte**, which we

discuss later in the current study. **Mill** has been known an advocate of utilitarianism

(Utilitarianism: Utilitarian principles, doctrines, etc., especially as expounded by **J. Bentham** and **J.S. Mill**.)

too.

The time between 1837-1901 was Victorian era, during which England was powerful empire, and during which there was a strong development in industry. For the reason, most philosophers of this era were thinking how to divide the welfare, or how to utilize different resources. There is the fact, that in that time, there was a large discussion concerning ethical and moral questions. Most philosophers tried to accommodate and assimilate e.g. the questions of ethics and moral to utilitarian tendencies in the society. There is an interesting philosophical relationship between **Mill**, **Jeremy Bentham**

((1748-1832); **Bentham** was the English utilitarian philosopher, and writer on ethics, jurisprudence, and political economy; prison and poor-law reformer; he believed that the end of life is happiness (which he identified with pleasure) and that the highest morality is the pursuit of the greatest happiness of the greatest number.)

and other philosophers, because there was something better to wait for in future, too?

**Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>16</sup> has given a description that **Mill** tried to establish a logical connection between the psychological and ethical principles, which a view he shared with **Bentham**. All of this was connected to the principle of universal hedonism

(Hedonism: The doctrine of ethical theory that pleasure is the chief good, or proper end of action; originator of the school is **Epicurus**.)

**Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>17</sup> suggested that notwithstanding that **Mill** has developed **Bentham's** doctrines he didn't accept them as such. There is an utilitarian thesis by **Bentham**

(E.g. in **Bentham, J.**, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.)

which says that the ground of morals and legislation should be their utility, and that covering principle there should be common pleasure and hedonism.

From **Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>18</sup> we know that **Bentham** has presented these ideas in detail in his Memoirs, too, but also something concerning individual pleasure. However, let us remind, that **Bentham** didn't discover that principle. We know that the doctrine of hedonism has been derived originally from **Epicurus**

((c. 300 B.C.); **Epicurus** was an Athenian philosopher who held that pleasure (the practice of virtue) is the highest good.)

whose role in the development of atomistic philosophy shall be discussed later during the current study by **J.C.A. Gaskin** (Loppuviite)<sup>19</sup>.

But we cannot say that these were the only influences that **John Stuart Mill** adapted from his contemporary philosophers, when developing his ethical, and other theories. It was also **David Hume's utilitarian orientation on the questions of ethics, which influenced to Jeremy Bentham's, as well to Mill's philosophies, as to Adam Smith's economical theories.** And further, from **Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>20</sup> we know that **Hume** has criticized e.g. **Adam Smith's** certain conceptions.

In fact, I do not have much to tell about those philosophical influences, which **C.S. Peirce** has adopted from **Jeremy Bentham**. Some of **C.S. Peirce's** commentators have suggested to that influence, however. As an example **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>21</sup> has proposed for that **C.S. Peirce's** philosophical strategies were

similar to **Bentham's**. Both of them were willing to give several answers to an argument, and both of them were continuously seeking different points of views to any case they were studying.

And there are some evidences to this. For example, **Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>22</sup> has described the whole edition process of Collected Papers, and how they found often several versions which dealt with the same theme, but any of them was not final, and it was not possible to imagine what kind a version should be the final one. However, we shall discuss the edition process in detail later during the current study. But what comes to the tendency in question - might it be due of to which **A.J. Ayer** has just suggested for? We must carefully take in consideration, however, that **C.S. Peirce** was not always in the situation, where he could put his ideas to paper without any disturbances, economical difficulties, and continuous argumentation against his followers, but we shall return to the topic later.

Then we have **John Locke**, whom **Charles Hartshorne** (Loppuviite)<sup>23</sup> has regarded as one of the greatest empirists. We have an evidence, that **C.S. Peirce** valued **Locke** high. From a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **Mario Calderoni** approximately in 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>24</sup> we can trace this appreciation; there **C.S. Peirce** referred to **Locke's** famous Essay, too, especially to its IV chapter.

**John Locke** has made a difference between those things of outer world, which we are not certain, and all of the provable things, as mathematics, and moral philosophy

(Moral philosophy (general meaning.): A study of principles of human action or conduct.)

which both can be proved to be true. Thus, according to him, we can prove the existence of God by logic, but, as a contrary, we cannot find out a true knowledge concerning the characters of God.

If we just use logic, e.g. when studying cause and effect, it is relatively easy to state that there must be terminus a quo

((L.) Terminus a quo: The starting point; the earliest date possible.)

if we think that something has once began to take place, and there must also be terminus ad quem

((L.) Terminus ad quem: The goal or end; the last date possible.)

if we think that something has its end in time. This is quite enough if considering most human activities, and natural events. But there must have been something before any time, and any case existed. But why? If we accept as the main principle of the world *ex nihilo nihil fit*

((L.) *Ex nihilo nihil fit*: Nothing comes from nothing.)

there must always be something, whatever it is. Further, we can accept that there is something *jure humano*

((L.) *Jure humano*: By man's law.)

and that there is something out of its reach, or beyond its horizon - *jure divino*

((L.) *Jure divino*: By God's law.)

Now, if we think further, that God is omnipotent, and that man is not, we can easily see that we cannot ever apprehend Him, or His laws, whatever they are. We can state several prerequisites, or demands like these, when proving something to be absolutely true. But the conclusion is always, what comes especially to human beings, that they cannot possess any absolute truths. Hence, if we think now that very beginning of all, for instance, it is rather difficult to imagine what kind of characters may be needed to create the whole complex world, or maintain it, and prevent it to collapse back e.g. to nothingness, or diffuse state of being - as the beginning of all might appear to us. If there were at the beginning nothing but God himself - what kind of being we ought to discuss, and what kind of life and personal characters?

Before **John Locke** there have been several advocates of natural philosophy, after the ancient natural philosophers, whom we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current chapter. Of the more modern natural philosophers was, in a way, **Agrippa of Nettesheim**

((c 1486-1535); **Agrippa** was the mystic and German natural philosopher and writer; he was an author of *De Occulta Philosophia* (1531), which dealt with astrology, music, geometry, and magic, and tried to find a common rational basis to them. The students of occultism adopted the book in question as their handbook.)

a kind of mystic, who wanted to explain things which are something beyond the scientific scope. After the era of **Locke** there has been several natural philosophers, quite another kind, and one of them was **Henry Cavendish**

((1731-1810); **Cavendish** was the English natural philosopher; he discovered the constitution of water and atmospheric air; experimented on electricity and the density of the earth. His name is commemorated in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge for physical research, founded in 1847.)

a pure natural scientist and physicist, in the strict sense of empiricism.

But is it correct to speak natural philosophy at all, when discussing of the thoughts of physicists, or advocates of pseudo-science, like mystics? There are two meanings of the term: an older meaning of natural philosophy

(Natural philosophy: (old use) physics.)

which is referring to the branch of science, namely to physics. And there is also wider meaning of the term natural philosophy

(Natural philosophy: (wide) System of thought resulting from such a research of knowledge.)

which has much more to do with the philosophy of **Locke**, and his disciplines. However, we must be careful when using the term in question, because there seems to be several philosophers, quite different kind, to whom it is referring.

**John Locke** was a physician, and a politician, and he has written a lot of works, which we have discussed at previous chapter of the current study

(See: p. 28, footnote 6.)

However, there are his *Two Treatises of Government* (1690), in which he expressed his political philosophy, suggesting e.g. that there is the natural code of procedure which is independent of legislation. In his *Some Thoughts of Education* (1636) he has discussed on education, and he has emphasized that educators must take in account the natural development of a child. In *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695) **Locke** has discussed on the philosophy of religion. But the most important of the books by **Locke** is, however, his famous *Essay Concerning the Human Understanding* (1690), where he has rejected philosophical speculation and tried to prove [especially against **Rene Descartes**] that we have no inborn ideas at birth, and for the reason, our soul can be regarded as *tabula rasa*

((L.) *Tabula rasa.*, Litt.: A smooth or blank tablet; often used figuratively of a person's (empty) mind.)

All of the works of **Locke** are, among other things, considering such human enterprises, in which human beings are interacting with each others.

**C.S. Peirce** was a physicist, who philosophized his empirical findings. From **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>25</sup> we know that **C.S. Peirce** published a lot of writings and reviews in scientific and philosophical journals. **Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>26</sup> has presented similar information concerning the quantity, but, in addition to this, that those writings by **C.S. Peirce** has concerned the study in natural science, and that some of those writings have been rather long; they were made mainly at The United States Coast Survey,

dealt with astronomy, geodetics, and psychology. However, his only empirical book, which was published, was *Photometric Researches* (1878), which can be associated to the field of physics. However, he didn't become any leading figure in the study of natural science, notwithstanding that his studies in astronomy were original, and his colleagues ranked his studies in photometrics rather high.

**Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>27</sup> has proposed for that **C.S. Peirce** derived his pragmatist theory of meaning from his empirical studies in natural science, which [theory] can be considered as an overview on the scientific practices of his age. And further, he derived his indeterminism from the empirical works at Coast Survey, too. And his studies on psychology has influenced to his theory of mind. And moreover, his experiences at laboratories have influenced to those parts of his theories, where he has referred to laboratory conditions.

Is it that simply? It is true that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>28</sup> has applied certain physical, and natural forces to describe the nature of abstraction, which he expressed as separative process - the centrifugal tendency of thought, and to describe the study of The Great Law of Association [fusion], or mutual attraction of all ideas - as analogy to gravitation in physical world, as **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>29</sup> has suggested in his nomological psychognosy [psychology]. However, these ideas does not suggest to the similar attitude than vorticism

(See: p. 23, footnote 1.)

which we have discussed at previous chapter of the current study. There is something more than natural phenomena per se. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>30</sup> has argued for that when we advance further and further into science, the aid that we can derive from the natural light of reason becomes, no doubt, less and less. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>31</sup> has believed, too, that there are natural born icons and diagrams which suggest themselves, at first dimly, but later clearly to us, which we have discussed at the previous chapter

(See: p. 25, footnote 2.)

From **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **John Dewey**, which has been dated on the 9th Juny in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>32</sup> that he had written an article which was concerning **John Dewey's** *Studies in Logical Theory*. I do not deal with the contents of the article, but I say only that he informed **Dewey** for his intention to comment the book in *The Nation*

(*The Nation.*, 79., (15 Sept 1904), pp. 219-220)

In the letter in question **C.S. Peirce** outlined shortly how to solve the problems of normative science, and suggested that instead of the idea of normative science we must develop the idea of natural history.

**John Locke** has considered the task of philosophy to study the origin of human knowledge, its character and extension, and he has emphasized there that the natural reasoning is something which happens according the natural laws, but which still can include something, by which it is possible to evaluate whatever we are reasoning. That is, there must be certain tendencies in the nature which makes it possible. There might be a connection to **C.S. Peirce** in this question, and we know, that he also recognized quite well tha he has derived some of his ideas from **Locke**.

But what about natural law and the meaning? Let 's study them generally for a while. It might be true that the beings of the nature do not come to their existence for that reason that the nature is going to prove something, e.g. going to prove that it is capable to create different beings, and that it will be valid and reliable at the end. If we think the concept of natural law and the meaning we might to refer to those cases in which something takes place notwithstanding the presence of human beings. But if we think about human beings and their rationality we must conclude, however, that human beings belong to nature, and they are, as they are and become to more than they are, the essential part of nature. Without the aid of natural laws they could not be the beings of nature at all? But are there in nature another similar rationalities, as known by human beings? Accepting that also human beings can be covered with natural laws we must decide if there is also some other kind of reason which is characteristic right to man, and can it be considered natural, or not. That is, are there certain tendencies which can be explained only by the

existence of human reason, and are there some special mental equipments which only the human reason can use? There is the question on how natural laws will cause the expansive development of the whole nature.

The nature do not at all behave like mathematics, or it behaves so occasionally, but in addition to it also by innumerable other ways, too. This might be true because in mathematics we can produce only such mathematical creatures which are not in conflict with them which already exist and which can obey the rules. But this kind a situation is impossible in the nature; there is a continuous process where quite new beings come to existence with their new rules. Mathematics is something that is a kind of truth in itself, because its very nature is to be provable and create proofs. If there were no need to prove something to be true or valid, we should consider mathematics as a simple game, or as a special kind of world which has no external connections and interferences to our reality. But what seems to be sure is that the truths in mathematics are not something given, as many cases in nature are.

But right now, in our modern world, there are several cases where somebody is trying to prove and explain something, as well as there are still such phenomena which seem to be purely given. It might be proposed for that these new features are as natural as the previous occurrences of simple phenomena. And we might also suppose that there must be certain interference between both of them. But it is quite acceptable as an idea, too, that something, which can be considered the most developed being, as infinite and eternal soul, can never explain us himself or itself so that man, who is dying creature, could understand him or it clearly.

**Robert E. Grinder** (Loppuviite)<sup>33</sup> has described **Aristotle's** and **Plato's** conception of soul. According to him, **Aristotle** divided soul into three levels. De Anima stimulates e.g. plants to grow and gives to man and animals their biological appearance, and is the cause, by which all beings in the biosphere preproduct themselves, and at the process in itself there are no acknowledged feelings. It is Sentient Appetive, which includes movements, feelings, and hope. Rational is typical only for man, and makes him the highest form on the earth. **Aristotle** emphasized the role of experience in the development of man, because he regarded soul as a goal, and soul must be developed by education. However, soul is not something apart from the rest of the totality, notwithstanding that soul is fundamentally different that body. An education of soul is something, by which it can be made to realize that it is just soul.

It seems to me that **John Locke**, as well as both **Plato** and **Aristotle**, have suggested to the same thing when they described soul, and it is not probable that **Locke** did not recognize that soul must have some lower levels, too, which are prerequisites to the higher development of it, and which are already present at birth. When **Locke** has described soul as tabula rasa, he also referred to the absence of the higher levels of it at the beginning of the development of soul, and that there must be education.

From **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>34</sup> we know that **C.S. Peirce** called the entity, which symballeins

(Symballein: Throw together word and thing)

e.g. interpreter, interpretent, asserter, mind, "I", ego - but also with the name soul. Notwithstanding that he has not given us information concerning the beginning of the development of soul [except in his cosmology, accordin which there was no active consciousness in the beginning] - it might be empty, as well as the possibility for something more complete.

It seems to me, however, that both **Locke** and **C.S. Peirce** have referred to the very same thing, namely to that there must be a medium, where a self, who is an agent of understanding, can be maintained. We may dispute endlessly, if soul is due of God. But if God can be regarded as natural cause, or as a part of causation, we have a link to Aristotelian soul. But if God is only one of the necessary hypothetic constructions in philosophy or religion, we shouldn't discuss Him in a connection of the origin of soul at all.

We know that there are thousands of things which can be understood quite well by man, but only understood. There is the fact that animals have some abilities and senses, by which they can get that information from the world we never can perceive - as biological and natural beings, in that sense. The

question is, what is the meaning of things, when accepting that man is not able to perceive all the things of the world by his senses, and that they are not familiar of percepts of animals, to which we still give an existential status, which must have meanings. How well things can be understood? Must we conclude that all of the meanings are only expressed by the human words and ideas, which have restricted interference to natural cases?

**John Locke** (Loppuviite)<sup>35</sup> has tried to solve the problem of meaning saying that the use of words is to be sensible marks of ideas. He argued for that the ideas they stand for are their proper and immediate signification.

But does this indicate that whenever we use our words, it refers to the presence of ideas, too? Are all of our words such that we can be convicted that they indicate to the true existence of some idea? Let us remind what **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>36</sup> has already proposed for at an earlier stage in the current study: there two kinds of natural events in the world, namely dyadic and the other kind ones - triadic. But there are also such as complexus of dyads used by animals. It seems to me that those complexus of dyads are predecessors of the more complicated triadic events.

In triad we must have an agent who uses certain symbols, namely man himself. The question of single mental images and sensations is not important, if we think those phenomena which can come to existence quite freely in the nature because both of them are connected to the two kinds of natural events which have been discussed by **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>37</sup>. But why? Because if we use that expression of natural, and accept that the meaning is something larger than an image, or a sensation, we are able to get the essence of nature, too.

However, in single triads they are just special kind of natural events, but because they are meanings, too, they are more that something right there. Hence, we can easily present certain images or ideas by an art, and by literature, for example, as well as we can discuss our experiences, thoughts and ideas, and get other people to understand them.

If we try to prove, as **John Locke**, that there are natural laws- and events, we must connect the meaning to mental images which come from reflection or from our sensations. **Locke** has regarded both reflection and sensation as natural events. But there are still several questions as open. If we understand reflection that it is something which is going to organize itself in mind, and that we have corresponding sensations to it, we make no difference between animals and man. These connections may take place when dealing with complexus of dyads - which term **C.S. Peirce** has used. But mind is something more than these things, namely, it it connected to non-functional characters of the universe, which work like final causation, but mind can be associated to natural born laws and events which have developed according to the circumstances in actu.

**John Locke** has emphasized that we can have an instant experience only of our mental images, and because of that we don't have certain knowledge on the creatures and beings of the outer world as such. **Locke** has claimed for that all of the mental images arise from either sensations or reflection. If we discuss reflection we are studying far developed phenomenon in comparison to sensation. Anyway, we have a good reason to ask how those mental images can arise into our soul which is quite empty at birth? But who is the first teacher?

How we can reflect something? Who is perceiving sensations, and how that somebody can develop from emptiness, where is nothing but nothing, and shall still later recognize those mental images as informative? And what kind a difficulty would arise on the question of meaning there, if we think that there cannot be any meanings in nature as such?

We cannot prove our mental images to be true because these are natural events which are covered by the natural laws, I mean, that there is no sense to speak about truth, when something is going by its way, whether we did something to it, or not. This could mean that mental images are inseparable part of the nature, and for that reason, we cannot force them to behave as mathematical creatures, which have their own rules. Mathematical creatures have been made to co-operate with similar kind of creatures, and if they are against some of them, it is because of their supporting role in a theorem. A remarkable difference to

any mental image is that a mathematical creature cannot have any other roles than it has in a task, while mental image must have innumerable references, because it is their essence. But still mental images seem to be, as they are at certain moment, and they are, in the sense that they are given to us in certain manner and context, and they seem to flow, in a way they do, as long as we expect fluidity.

We do not have such mental images which can hold some meaning as the same - notwithstanding of different situations and contexts which vary and change, or in spite of more general changes which explain that mental image to us, and which effect to the meaning, for sure. That is, if we have received our sensation in different contexts, how we can make such mental image which explain them all so that there is no doubt about the validity? We simply do not know what of our senses have been decisive when we have got a mental image to which we have given some meaning, and we do not know if it is right one at all? And what about our memories and dreams, then? The essence of natural events is just change, and if we use nothing but the simple mental images which are connected to simple natural events, we are not able to reach more universal structures of the universe, if they exist.

Hence, there must be in the nature such more general principles, or tendencies which human reason can take advantage. But this means that mental images we have are not unchangeable entities but instead we must conclude that they cannot stay untouchable, and that they must interact with each other somehow. We can also say that we have in the same time one of the possible meanings in hand. But this does not suggest to that illusion that we had some meaning in itself, as an entity.

We approach very Peircean view there, and his emphasizing to the sociability of the language and human beings as a whole, where no single mental image cannot, as such, contain some stable meaning. The decisive elements of stable meanings are such as e.g. ability to interference, habit taking, generalizing tendency, by which our senses are shaped to receive more selected and stable sensations. But what about the relationship between materia and its effects to us?

Mental images, if they are not like entities or if they are not something which has been given in predetermined way, are not able to contain the stable meanings, because they are something interpretant, and no signs. Hence, any kind of a meaning we can have as humans, is not the same as those complexus of dyads, as such, but instead in their expanding and changing relationships as triads. And this is the very essential character of the whole universe. Then, it seems very probable that they must be true, too, or that - at least - signs have much to do with true objects - for the reason that signs are able to interact with each other in that way that they can refer to the objects which do not fade away soon after our consciousness has oriented to other objects.

This kind a view of instant experience, and the instant connection of the meaning to it, as discussed previously, is at certain points quite similar to the view **C.S. Peirce** advocated for. Namely, we cannot escape certain intimacy, instancy and presence of our experiences which can guide what we are able to understand and how we shall advance in our enterprise in knowledge. But there are no direct interpretations of our experiences as such, and they do not contain as such any meanings, either. There must be some kind of judgements of them.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>38</sup> has argued for that we can make perceptual judgments, if we are going to know something concerning our percepts. We can perceive different influences and that something resists our strivings, or that it is organized in certain way. We can see all that as totality, too. What he has written concerning perceptual judgments does not describe what we are actually perceiving. But this is not the whole story, because all we are perceiving is also a kind of totality which we can call the percipuum, which in turn means that there is something which forces that perceived something will take certain form which we cannot call into question. There are certain physiological processes to which we cannot do a much, as well as there are hallucinations and false percepts.

But what about **William James**? From **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>39</sup> we know that **William James** emphasized that in function there is thought as participant by that role which it is playing, and by that function percept has been differentiated from thought. We can think that thought has a task which explains it, and the concept of thought is a kind of percept, too, because it is explaining other percepts, but it can have to them also other relationships. However, the scope of thought is expanding when is changing more

and more abstract, and more and more general. But these general tendencies could not mean anything to us, if we were not able to build them meaningful ones as persons. **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>40</sup> has argued for, too, that always when we are intellectually dealing with a pure experience, we are doing so because we can get more pure experiences, and in the same time we can get more and more concrete levels of being.

**William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>41</sup> has also written that knowledge and truth express themselves as those relationships which concepts and percepts have, as well as by those states of things which are born as results of our person-guided activities, and which are present, too, when we are studying those results. In this way percepts, which describe cases, are an essential part of a follow-up system, by which a concept-guiding apparatus can see causation in empirical world, and by them can guide itself further in personal manipulation of that reality.

I think that this **William James'** view emphasized the mutual dependence of concepts, percepts, thought, and person, and there are certain similarities to **C.S. Peirce's** (Loppuviite)<sup>42</sup> concept of percipuum. This concept in question illustrates how our conceptions can be twisted according certain maintaining structures which prevent us to escape them. These structures function according natural laws, by which our perceptions try to hold their appearance to us - is it sensible or not in regard of our rational strivings.

However, the most important idea which **Locke** has had is that we have no inborn ideas. But what are its consequences?. How we can maintain our well-developed knowledge concerning ourselves, and nature, if we have nothing at the beginning of every individual's development. And for what reason **Locke** has emphasized in *Some Thoughts of Education* that we must take in account the natural development of a child? Are there some principles in nature which are not like tabula rasa? If **Locke** has referred, by his empty schedule of soul, to the plasticity of individual's mind, and mind in general, he has made a similar interpretation as **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>43</sup> has done, when discussing evolution of the laws of nature, especially when regarding that there are natural laws, which have developed more or less complete, and they are continuing their evolutionary progress - according to the principle, which in itself will be of the nature of a law: the most plastic of all things is the human mind, and next after that comes the organic world.

But from where this plasticity comes from? I think that we have that plasticity because of we must be ready both to accidental changes and development, as well ready to reject our previous models of thinking - which might be a risky operation, if we just try to maintain the past, and for the reason we can regard an entity which symbolleins together an object and its meaning - as an empty before every new connection.

It have been proposed for that **David Hume's** philosophy is just a modification of Lockean empirism. However, **Charles Hartshorne** (Loppuviite)<sup>44</sup> has appreciated **Hume** as the most important of English empirists, perhaps. But for what reason? We can find quite similar philosophical tendencies also elsewhere. **Hume** has regarded philosophy as science on the human nature, but so did also **Plato**, who has argued for that the most noblest of all things is the study of man. And there has also be found a tendency of scepticism

(See: p. 28, footnote 8.)

in **Hume's** philosophy; his famous thesis is that scepticism is the only one of the right philosophical attitudes. And again, there is also **René Descartes** and his Cartesian scepsis

(in his famous *Discours de la méthode*)

**David Hume** has influenced to other philosophers in certain other fields in philosophy, too. Namely, when he adopted an utilitarian orientation on the questions of ethics emphasizing the benefit of the society, which in turn influenced to **Jeremy Bentham's** and **John Stuart Mill's** philosophies, and to **Adam Smith's** economical, and other theories - as we can remind from an earlier stage of the current chapter

(See: p. 48)

But these, and also another influences between those philosophers are nothing but a rough estimate, by which I want to say that we cannot present all of their ideas as their own, or we ought to call for synechism to an explanation. There are a lot of fine-tuned nuances which I do not discuss right there closely. And there are also different interpretations of the question concerning originators of certain philosophical ideas. I want to take an example of this. From **Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>45</sup> we get to know that we cannot regard **Hume** as an originator of utilitarianism but instead **Cumberland**.

When **David Hume** considered induction he proposed for that we believe in it by habit or routine. Why so? The possible answer is that he considered causal reasoning the very original form in thinking, because it has been connected to the ordinary life. But does this mean that the meanings have their origin with habits? If there are events which repeat themselves is the meaning of them connected with their recurrences? This is certainly not the case, because **Hume** argued against that the recurrence of events would be as the good explanation of them; this is the case also with the ordinary life and common sense.

We must keep in mind that there are recurrences and habits also in the human mind, which are rather as barriers to the further development, especially when we try to understand something whose own habits are partially unknown. And we might also say that from old habits in the human mind will emerge the new habits and they will expand until there are new ones which overrun the old ones.

But what about scepticism? In general, there are several reasons for scepticism, if we maintain in our mind only those habits which can produce nothing but similarities. **Hume** argued against the proposition that the reasoning by which we get causal laws were logical but he supposed that this reasoning would expand our knowledge to the things which we have not yet discovered. There we have similarities to **C.S. Peirce's** ideas concerning the expansive development of human thought. We might to say, too, that there was an emphasis of agnosticism in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy, but - as a whole - there is a strong emphasis of gnosis, too, especially in his general- and special psychognosies.

**J.E. Smith** (Loppuviite)<sup>46</sup> has suggested to that the reason for his indeterminism was that he didn't accept those explanations where the probable state of things has been fixed before, and we must not accept beforehand what we shall regard as truth and what we shall reject as false. If we think that there is an emphasis of the fluid nature of the world, as well as human mind, and the knowledge which we have at the moment, this comes very near both to Humean agnosticism- and scepticism. Let us remind, however, what we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study on **C.S. Peirce's** indeterminism and freedom. Hence, we can conclude that the kind of agnosticism which emphasizes fluidity of the world and mind at the moment is the only thing which **C.S. Peirce** has derived from **Hume**, but there was also an addition that there might be some determinism, too. Indeed, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>47</sup> has regarded the role of the human mind very important in the development of the universe, for its plasticity and fluidity.

But there are two kinds of interpretations of that plasticity, when considering the views of **Hume** and **C.S. Peirce**. Namely, **David Hume** <sup>48</sup> has considered human individuals as a bundle of collection of different perception, which will succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and they are in a perpetual flux and movement. The mind is a kind of theatre where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situation. From **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>49</sup> we have got to know quite opposite interpretation; that man is a participant of a drama of creation, where "actors" are identifying by their rôle to "author" - the better they can do that, the better they are able to understand the manuscript.

However, it seems to, me that there are certain similarities between **David Hume** and **C.S. Peirce**, notwithstanding that the latter has described merely cosmological characters of the human mind, but also some elements of human consciousness, which were present at the very beginning of the world evolution, namely feelings which may have been a bundle of collection, which **Hume** has described before.

**William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>50</sup> has included **Hume's** description

(See: at the end of p. 58.)

concerning human individual into his Principles of Psychology. Both **James** and **Ludwig Wittgenstein** have agreed with this question of vagueness. **M. Fairbanks** (Loppuviite)<sup>51</sup> has suggested that both [**James** and **Wittgenstein**] have emphasized that we live in the world which is full of [that] vagueness, which is a thoroughgoing epistemological state concerning all human experience.

But if we think these **Humes'** opinions above, should we conclude that he was an evolution philosopher, and that he wanted to deny a pure rationality of man? The answer is yes, since **J.C.A. Gaskin** (Loppuviite)<sup>52</sup> has suggested for that there are certain evolutionary tendencies in **Humes** philosophy, and he has cited also **David Hume's** Dialogues

(Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion., Part VI, 1779)

where there are quite similar ideas of vagueness that we have been discussing. These ideas have been presented a nearly hundred years before **Charles R. Darwin's** famous The Origins of Species (The Origins of Species by Means of Natural Selection (1859).

**David Hume** argued for that there are instant impressions, and that ideas, which we have in the mind, can be reduced to them. But are there any similarities to **C.S. Peirce's** thoughts concerning the question of reducibility? Let us study the question more closely. We have referred repeatedly to the concepts dyad, and triad. In general, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>53</sup> has categorized those departments [or levels] of the world, and human experience belonging to Kainopythagoran categories, that is, which are enumerable. They include three (sub)categories, which he has called just dyad, and triad, but in addition there is the category of monad, which includes such experiences, which can be perceived without any inconsistency, notwithstanding that there were any other perceivable things present. The category of dyad suggests both to somebody, who is perceiving, and to a perceived object in a direct observation. The category of triad suggest to understanding, as well as to the experiences, in which different experiences are joined together. But is there any reducibility between them, or the possibility that the experiences in them are similar ones?

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>54</sup> has described e.g. how we perceive purple, and how we experience that quality. There is no beginning and end when perceiving, or the continuity, in which we could experience both the concept "purple" and pure color, and still that purple is that color what has been seen. But we cannot observe the quality of sensation, in its all pureness, because in our sensation there are several other elements present which modify our sensation and feelings. Because of our sensation is restless, and there are several disturbances, it is clear, that the way, by which we can qualify our sensation, is all what we can know about it. This qualification of sensation is, in itself, simple, and it is not an object, and it is not connected to any special object, either, but instead, it is a state of consciousness. However, the quality, which we have, can be connected to objects, and we are able to give to it different meanings.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>55</sup> has described a sensation, when presenting the three integral states of mind. He suggested to, that remembering a sensation is not at all the same thing as having it - for thought there is some vestige of compulsiveness, even in the memory, it is not at all comparable to the compulsiveness of the actual sensation. The verb feel is indispensable, because to actually sense a sensation is very different from remembering or imagining it. **C.S. Peirce** urged for, that it is usual to put sensation under the head of knowledge, but that he refuses to classify sensation in that way.

Let us remind, again, how **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>56</sup> has described e.g. the centrifugal tendency of thought

(See: pp. 23, 51)

It is a process, by which any idea by following out its own development becomes separated from those with which it is connected, and this can be called abstraction, and it belongs to medisense, which has several other varieties, too. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>57</sup> has described also an opposite influence, by which when one idea has its vividness increased, it gives an upward impulse to a number of other ideas with which it is connected so that it forms one set with them. Hence, there seems to be an abyss between what is directly experienced and what is comprehended, and there is no way to reduce things in medisense back to feelings and sensations, as they once were.

As we have seen, **David Hume** has presented that ideas can be reduced to impressions. From that version of Collected Papers which was edited by **Hartshorne** and **Weiss** (Loppuviite)<sup>58</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce** did not anchor his argument to the statement that abstractions must give an account to themselves, and that they must do it in terms of concrete experience according to older empirism. In older empirism it has been considered that abstract generalities could be affirmed in terms of mere qualities of sensation and emotion. There seems to be no room for reduction in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy. Let us remind what **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>59</sup> argued for: all that we can get are the qualities which are not the same as our restless sensations which are not connected to certain circumstances.

I think that this argument is not very Humean one, because we have that **David Hume's** sentence that there is no demarcation line between ideas and impressions. This kind a view also **C.S. Peirce** advocated for, in a measure, as we have seen at an earlier stage in the current study, when discussing e.g. his doctrine of synechism.

However, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>60</sup> has made the categorization of consciousness, which has distinct departments [but which still can be regarded one and the same]. There is a field of primesense, where we have feelings which are momentarily present contents of consciousness - apart from anything else. Then there is altersense, in which we have sensations and will, which are consciousness of directly present other. Then we have the field of medisense, where we have the consciousness of thirdness, but which we can regard also as a medium between primesense and altersense. But, in addition to these, there is an element, which **C.S. Peirce** has called fatigue, from which our mental life and health depend to a far greater extent, that it would be guessed upon the action of it.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>61</sup> has emphasized that feelings obey certain principles, or rules. There are two kinds of intensity. The first kind of intensity is the intensity of the feeling consciousness, and the second kind of intensity is the intensity of altersense or assertiveness of feeling, which can be called the second vividness. Hence, we can say that there is the intensity of feeling itself, by which e.g. loud sounds are distinguished from faint ones, and the other kind of intensity is the intensity of consciousness that "lays hold" of the feeling, which makes e.g. the ticking of a watch actually heard infinitely heard more vivid than a cannon shot remembered to have been heard a few minutes ago.

But how is it possible "lay hold of the feeling" if feeling, in itself, does not have any specialty, or it cannot be recognized as a specialty? Because the consciousness has the intensity, as a whole, that is, there is no separate department, in which we e.g. feel something, and another department, in which we just reflect. But this does not make possible that reduction, however. But **Hume** has believed that instant impressions can, as such, produce more developed ideas in one or another way, and that ideas, when comprehended, must be in a continuous interaction with instant impressions. This is, I think, much closer to **C.S. Peirce's** idea of the essence of consciousness.

At an earlier stage of the current study

(See: p. 28)

we have discussed **Hume's** conception of substance. **Hume** (Loppuviite)<sup>62</sup> has argued for that since all of our perceptions are different from each other, and from everything else in the universe, they are also distinct and separable, and they may be considered as separately existent, and they have no need of anything else to support their existences, and, therefore, they are substances.

**C.S. Peirce** did not consider ideas substances, or something like separate reality. They are derived from an instant continuity, but soon after being sensed they have been differentiated and integrated by more sophisticated processes to the form, which only seems to be substance, or something, which has always been. We must return to his concept of feeling for explanation. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>63</sup> has described feeling itself as continuous recollections, which are inseparable until they shall be picked into pieces by reflection. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>64</sup> has discussed on vividness with abstraction, too, where one idea can have its vividness increased giving an upward impulse to number of other ideas, with which it is connected so that it forms one set with them.

This set, which has been formed, is not substance, but the staff, from which it has been derived, during a processes of abstraction, or association, is not substance, either. In fact, there are no such staying structures in that staff, which just exist forever, because if there were those structures an sich, the shouldn't be any need to make sets.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>65</sup> has also discussed the concept of continuity just by his concept of feeling, especially when he considered the role of it in his three states of mind. But, as we know from his cosmology, floating, and separate feelings have had a decisive role in the world evolution, making the continuity with simple connections, like an intermediating media, which orginally made possible that there existed the first simple relationships, and connections, and then feelings kept on that continuity, but it has also got certain new roles. In the three states of mind, there is a sensation which is not a feeling, but an element of it. Because they have joined to each other, we are able to be somewhere in time, and we can also have the sense the assertiveness of feeling.

It seem obvious that also ideas can take advance of that continuity. Let us study two sentences In Chance, Love and Logic (Loppuviite)<sup>66</sup>. One of them is:

"... A Continuum of ... feeling, infinitesimal in duration, but still embracing innumerable parts, and also, though infinitesimal, entirely unlimited, is immediately present. And in its absence of boundedless a vague possibility of more than is present is directly felt".

But we find also another sentence in Chance, Love and Logic (Loppuviite)<sup>67</sup>:

" ... in the presence of this continuity of feeling ... there /can no/ ... longer be any difficulty about one idea resembling another, when we pass along the continuous field of quality from one to the other and back again to the point which we have marked".

I think that this means that ideas has certain startpoint, or continuous birth, or being in continuity, and we can imagine that without that continuity they would not enlarge themselves at all. But we cannot say, however, that continuity is all that we must have to explain all that seems to be at a state of discontinuity.

But what about **John Locke** with his concept of mental images and **C.S. Peirce**? As **S.R. Vaughn** (Loppuviite)<sup>68</sup> puts it, **Locke** has claimed for that all of the mental images arise from either sensations or reflection. That is, the expressions have certain meanings because of they indicate to definite ideas in the mind of speaker [ideational theory]. As we have seen, **C.S. Peirce** did not consider lower levels as e.g. primesense such one that it is dicectly connected with sets of medisense. And if we think the very essence of the human mind, there are, for sure, several associations which have nothing to do with sensations as such, notwithstanding that there are several elements which are derived from sensations, and with which associations work. That is, some of the meanings have their true explanation only trough social settings, and not because of particular sensations of an individual.

But it is true that without impressions - which a term **David Hume** has used - and their continuous instancy, we could not develop any ideas of them. And we know, for sure, that we have now certain well-developed ideas, notwithstanding that have we impressions of them right now, or not. We may also have dreams and illusions, which refer merely to those well-developed ideas - as well as dreams, which refer only to our actual impressions which we have when dreaming. But we may also have dreams, which we cannot explain at all with our present ideas, and they may have still some rational in them. Hence, we cannot speak about ordinary meanings, or the essence of our interpretations like entities or substances, but we cannot deny, or prove that there might be something which exist in itself, and which has always been. We can have e.g. an idea of omnipotent God, who has created the whole world, and who is its substance. Adding, that we cannot comprehend that substance, we make it impossible to prove it false. But is this only a logical trick, we cannot prove.

But **David Hume** can be regarded as an advocate of associative theory, who have denied the existence of substantial mind, as we know from **M.P. Ford** (Loppuviite)<sup>69</sup>. But for what this actually refers to? I think that if we say that the mind is not substantial, we consider it something which is changing, and becoming to something else than it is at the moment, as well as our associations can vary a lot, and shall do that more and more. There are any definite structures in them, in a sense that we had found the final explanations. According to the very nature both the mind and associations, they cannot be explained by any distinct and separable perception, or referring to them, but instead by ideas. But they must have some connections to instancy, too.

If we just think that the most important factor of the whole reality is change, as well as chance, and if we regard human beings as agents of that change, and overrunner of chance, we must presuppose that there must be continuous interaction with man and the world. And if **Hume** has just referred to the fact, when discussing the reductibility of ideas into sensations, we have, I think, a similarity to **C.S. Peirce**.

But there are other similarities, too. **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>70</sup> has described **C.S. Peirce's** model of the doubt and the belief, and science as social context, and that there are several things which we can doubt, as well as there are things which we ought not doubt at all. For instance, we can doubt personal motives of scientists, and the validity of their scientific findings, as well as motives of those, who have given a permission to scientific programs [as e.g. politicians and economists], but we must believe to man himself, and to science, as a whole enterprise, which is aimed to make our life better. But nowadays, I think, there are several reasons to believe that we ought not to trust to the current motives of science, and there is no room for meliorism.

But what about the role of **George Berkeley** in the development of the older empirism, e.g. in the philosophy of **Hume**, and pragmatism? Few words on the topic. From **Dagobert D. Runes** (Loppuviite)<sup>71</sup> we know that **William James's** philosophy had a close contact with **George Berkeley's** philosophy, who has been regarded as an subjective idealist, too, which we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study

(See: p. 15, Footnote 1.)

There are some common features in **Berkeley's** and **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy. Let us remind a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **Mario Calderoni** approximately in 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>72</sup>, where **C.S. Peirce** has written that he has got from **Berkeley** the most brightest influences.

**Charles Hartshorne** (Loppuviite)<sup>73</sup> has considered **Berkeley** one of the most important empirists. That may be due of that **Berkeley** criticized that law of causation, and preindicated the critics which was presented later especially by **Hume**. From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>74</sup> we know that **Berkeley** visited also in the New World and he influenced to **Samuel Johnson**, who accepted his views but argued for, too, that there are also abstract archetypes

(Archetype: Original model, prototype; also especially in the psychology by **C.G. Jung**: universal symbol, and mental image given by inheritance.)

and that we can be conscious of them. Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>75</sup> has used quite similar term, namely archetypal idea - referring to the possibility of our final and fundamental spiritual consciousness, especially in his synechism, insisting that the idea in question can never fail.

This topic might not essential for the purpose of current study, perhaps, but we get to know, at least, that **Berkeley** was known in the New World before **C.S. Peirce's** philosophical career, and that there were presented similar ideas as archetype before, and also later. However, there are some indicators to a similar conception of matter and mind in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy as **Berkeley** had.

It seems to me, that any philosopher can be classified to any philosophical school, and that there is a synechistic tendency in philosophy. But what can we say, after all, the philosophical relationship between older empirism and pragmatism? Jus that, that there have been several, but rather complicated influences,

which are not direct, in every case. Most commentators have referred just to these philosophical influences, and emphasized those from English empirism.

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#### **Four views to pragmatism: Voluntarism, naturalism, humanism, and phenomenology**

Voluntarism and pragmatism

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite) 1 has argued for that we are continuously reacting against the outer world, and our sensation consist of feeling, but also of the sense of its assertiveness, or being compelled to have it; there is always present the compulsiveness of actual sensation. But to where these ideas are referring, and what is their philosophical background? We must seek the origin of these ideas from voluntary philosophy, or voluntarism. From **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)2 we know that voluntarists emphasized that organism applies mentality, and it does that because of the utility of mentality in surviving. There are certain influences from the early evolution philosophy, and psychology. This kind of view has been called also modern irrationalism, notwithstanding that it stands for behaviorism, and not for idealism. **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)3 has categorized **Friedrich Nietzsche**

((1844-1900); **Nietzsche** was the German philosopher, voluntarist, and an originator of idea of 'superman' and of doctrine of perfectibility of man through forcible self-assertion and superiority to ordinary morality.)

**Arthur Schopenhauer**, and **Hans Vaihinger**

((1852-1933); **Vaihinger** was the German philosopher, and an author of Die Philosophie des Als Ob (1911). He developed a theory of fictions, by which science, morals, and religion work mainly with fictions, which are necessary, but consciously untrue. His theory have been said to have some features similar to pragmatism.)

as advocates of that kind of organic functionalism, and instrumentalism. **Schopenhauer**

(See: p. 22, Footnote 3.)

whom we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study, has urged in On the Will in Nature, that the great deal of which we regard as intellectual, is something objective, and secondary explanative, and merely as a means of will, and we can find all of this prius - as the means of intellect, but the intellect itself we can trace only a posterius, as the products of intellect. There are certain similarities to **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)4, especially when he described the forms of consciousness, and the role of willing.

However, it seems to me that **C.S. Peirce** has not been as advocate of an instrumentalism of **Arthur**

**Schopenhauer** - notwithstanding that he accepted the presence of will, as an important factor of the human mind. But there must be something more than willing, or knowing only for the more complete knowledge of things.

However, let us remind, that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>5</sup> regarded the human mind as an essential component in the whole (evolutionary) development of the universe. The human mind is still developing department, because it is the most plastic of all things. All active protoplasm has a tendency to take habits. Quite interesting, and different interpretation of which voluntarists have advocated for is that there are several general tendencies, which cannot be explained only because of utility, for which he tried to construct such laws as The Great Law of Mind, The Law of Association, and the Law of Habit Taking. But what may happen when also this generalizing tendency has reached its ultimate limits - when there do not exist plasticity any more? We might only guess, that the whole universe is developing so that there are, at last, the fulfillment of all laws, and, hence, the death, because there is not any more fluidity, chance or accidents. From a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **William T. Harris**, and which has been dated on the 30th November in 1868 (Loppuviite)<sup>6</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce regarded the mind as virtual, and not as something which is being in time-space, or not as something whose essence would be solid at a given moment.**

It seems to me, if I think all of this closely, that the mind is something between, and not purely rational. We cannot regard it as something which has been derived from materia, by the prerequisites which materia can have in itself, or as something which has always been. but in the same time there is still something which cannot be apprehended, as it is.

### **Gottlob Frege**

((1848-1925); **Frege** was the German philosopher and mathematician, and one of the founders of modern logic. He agreed with **Bertrand Russell** and **A.N. Whitehead** in logistic thesis, that is, mathematics can be derived from logic by its terms.)

came very close to **C.S. Peirce** in the question of the essence of mind, and meaning. **Frege** made a differentiation between the concepts Sinn [the mind of linguistic expression] and Bedeutung [the meaning]. There might be a linguistic expression which has a meaning, whatever it is, but whose mind is always quite another kind than the sum of single meanings.

Hence, the mind can be regarded as something which is not spatio-temporal, and not yet ready. Further, the mind [or explanation] is not something after the action of willing existing, because there are several things, which are, and become to existence without any act of willing, and their true meaning has nothing to do with the acts of willing. That is, we cannot wish e.g. certain sets to take their form, as they shall do - because we do not become know them when willing.

We cannot wish to have e.g. the most complete world, or the most fulfilled future, because we do not know what kind that world, or future should be, to be the best and best-fulfilled. Further, we have one of the possible futures at hand now, which could be derived from the past, and we cannot trace those actions of willing which have lead to it any more. If we consider mind as an instrument which has lead to our present existence, we ought not to forget that it carries always within it our possible future expectations, and the new forms of willing, which are possible in any present spatio-temporality, and, perhaps, in future.

**Juho A. Hollo** (Loppuviite)<sup>7</sup> has proposed for that the same kind of theories like American pragmatism, were constructed in Europe by **Henri Bergson**

((1859-1941); **Bergson** was the French philosopher who regarded reality as change and movement, 'becoming' rather than 'being'.)

**Hans Vaihinger**, and **George Simmel**. Now, let us study that claim that **Vaihinger** had been an advocate of pragmatism. We can doubt his view, because **Vaihinger's** philosophy grounded on such kind of philosophical schools, whose general claims **C.S. Peirce** has, in turn, prove as false. But of course, it can be said, that **Vaihinger** developed a theory which has certain similarities to pragmatism, too.

This is the state of affairs, especially where **Hans Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)<sup>8</sup> has assumed, in his short description of the philosophy of 'as if', that science, morals, religion, etc. deal with fictions which are consciously made as false ones, but in the same time, they are quite necessary. Let me say generally right there, that also **Jeremy Bentham** was acquainted with fictions and he wrote a book which associated to them, as well as to the themes of general linguistics.

**Hans Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)<sup>9</sup> claimed that **Francis Bacon**, **George Berkeley**, and **David Hume** didn't have a clear and acceptable conception on fictions. However, especially the philosophies of **Hume** and **J.S. Mill**, influenced to the development of his own philosophy between 1874-1876. On the opposition to this, **C.S. Peirce** appreciated all of those philosophers, and also generally such schools as English empirism and Scottish realism. At the letter, which he has written to **Mario Carderoni** in 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>10</sup> he expressed his appreciation to those philosophers, and schools, referring especially to **John Locke**, and to his Essay. In addition to this, **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>11</sup> has suggested to, that **C.S. Peirce's** model of the doubt and belief associated generally to Humean skepticism. For these reasons, it seems to me, that **C.S. Peirce** and **Vaihinger** derived their philosophical ideas concerning fictions, at least, from different sources.

**Hans Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)<sup>12</sup> based his philosophy just on English nominalism, which was also an essential part of Scholastic philosophy. Namely, he argued for that there were indicators that just in English nominalism it have been recognized the nature of fictions properly, and he mentioned here specially **William of Occam**

((1290-1349); **Occam** was an English scholastic philosopher, and a founder of a speculative sect reviving the doctrines of Nominalism. Well-known is Occam's Razor, that is, the principle that 'entities' must not be unnecessarily multiplied.)

who has described the fictitive nature of general ideas. Let us remark, however, that by the nominalism of **Occam**, the outside world of language and thought consisted of individual things. But if this is the case it certainly seems to me that in English nominalism fictions and their role will certainly have seen quite another way than in that Scholastic realism, which a view **C.S. Peirce**, and his philosophical grandfather of that realism, **John Duns Scotus**

((1265?-1308?); **Duns Scotus** was an advocate of Scholastic realism, and he was a Scholastic theologian, too. He was born, according to tradition, at Duns, in Berwickshire, in England. He has been called the 'subtle doctor'; his works on theology, logic, and philosophy were university textbooks until the 16th c.)

advocated for.

**Hans Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)<sup>13</sup> mentioned in his autobiography **Thomas Hobbes**

((1588-1679); **Hobbes** was an English philosopher, who had, as a philosophical model, **Galileian** physics. In his political philosophy he was an advocate of social contract. According to his Leviathan (1651), man is a naturally selfish unit, however. By his philosophical orientation, he was materialist and determinist.)

who have described excellent the nature of fictions. **Hobbes** was an advocate of Galileian physics, and he wanted to apply it to the human behavior, and individual psychology. **Hobbes** thought, for example, that suitable conceptions to this were gravitation and centrifugal force. This is like vorticism

(See: pp. 51, 23.)

isn't it? Let us remind, that also **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>14</sup> applied those centrifugal forces to describe the nature of abstraction, and those gravitational forces to describe association. But there are also certain differences between **C.S. Peirce's** and **Hobbes'** orientation, too. **C.S. Peirce** did not advocate for dewterminism and materialism, as we know from **J.E. Smith** (Loppuviite)<sup>15</sup>, and which were the general tendencies in the **Hobbes'** philosophy. Let us also remind **C.S. Peirce's** synechism, which is right as an opposition both to materialism and idealism. But there is also **Hobbes'** nominalism, which regarded the

universal concepts as products of human mind. Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** attacked against nominalism, e.g. in his letter to **William James** which is dated on the 7th March in 1904 (Loppuviite)16 where he suggested for that the one main purpose of the pragmatistic doctrine was that of denying nominalism

(Notice of **Frazer's** Berkeley, in North American Review, October, 1871)

In Another letter to **James**, which is dated on the 13th March in 1904 (Loppuviite)17 **C.S. Peirce** considered nominalism a kind of test, before a [final] move to realism.

Hans **Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)18 named **Immanuel Kant** the person who gave him considerable philosophical influences to his philosophy of fictions; he mentions especially his heuristic fictions which were presented a hundred year before they actually could be understood. But **Vaihinger** was and advocate of **Arthur Schopenhauer's**

(See: p. 22, Footnote 2.)

psychological idealism. It was just **Schopenhauer**, and not **Kant**, who described the most beautifully the view, which **Vaihinger** advocated for: that man can be both practical and the being, who has will. Especially in his later philosophy **Vaihinger** tried to synthesize **Schopenhauer's** interpretation to evolution philosophy, when describing fictions as the point of view of willing. But from **Kant** he accepted his explanation of those antagonisms, with which human thought shall be acquaintance, especially when studying metaphysics.

At the beginning of 1876 **Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)19 started to write his first version of his Philosophie des Als Ob, and concentrated first to **Kant**. When studying **Kant's** texts, he used philological method, and discovered that certain pages in **Kant's** Prolegomena were in wrong order. It seems to me that **Vaihinger** wanted to make the perfect blueprint from the target he was analyzing. But **C.S. Peirce** was not the same kind a person; he wanted instead to hasten the growth of the knowledge, say, the evolution in the language, and the growth of mind, too. For the reason, the old expressions were not, as such, good enough, or they were secondhand. However, let us remind, that we know from several literal sources, that **C.S. Peirce** appreciated **Kant**, as we have discussed at earlier stages in the current study. There is e.g. **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **Mario Calderoni** which has been written approximately in 1905 (Loppuviite)20, in which he expressed his indebtedness to **Kant**.

**Hans Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)21 read also at **Benedict (Baurd) de Spinoza**, when he matriculated to university, and admired especially at **Spinoza's** conceptions concerning the structure of the universe. Let us remind that also **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)22 appreciated **Spinoza**, too, and told to have derived the brightest ideas from him.

But **Hans Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)23 appreciated also **Plato's**

(See: p. 2. Footnote 1,2.)

Dialogs and Apology, which he has read in 1868. Little later he became acquainted with Republic and Phaedrus. He suggested to, too, that the ideas of Greek natural philosophers have certain connection to evolution philosophy, and he studied especially **Anaximandros'**

(See: p. 40, Footnote 3.)

and **Aristotle's**

(See: p. 41, Footnote 1.)

writings when he matriculated to university. We get to know that **Vaihinger** studied Latin and because of those studies, and because of his excellent teacher he could make an accurate philological analysis of the texts he examined. Let us remind what we have known from **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)24 and **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)25 that also **C.S. Peirce** has derived some of his ideas from **Aristotle**. According to

**Percy**, he was acquainted with medieval language, which he translated to the modern English, in order to make the terms more comprehensible.

**William James** and **Hans Vaihinger** had a similar attitude to the relationship of psychology and philosophy in certain questions, as well as there are differences, too. **Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)<sup>26</sup> supposed that without psychology philosophy and methodology would be methodic abstraction, referring to **Johan Friedrich Herbart**

(1776-1841); **Herbart** was the German philosopher, educationalist, and psychologist.)

and especially to **Avenarius**, whose psychology became as a part of him, as he said.

**Herbart** held that the method is the most characteristic to philosophy, not the target which it may have. Philosophy must start from the concepts, which can be experienced as clear and bright. Only starting from those concepts it is possible to make propositions, and from them, in turn, it can be drawn conclusions. This kind of mechanistic view **Herbart** applied to pedagogics, too. From **K. Grue-Soerensen** (Loppuviite)<sup>27</sup> we know that **Herbart** has maintained that there are the laws of associations, and certain rules, which control the way, by which mental images come to consciousness. From that it follows, that pedagogics means how to organize the mental images, and that by organizing of the meanings of them, they are learned. **John Dewey** emphasized the view that the thought is adaption to the outside, but real world, and changing it to such, as it is wished and hoped to be. We cannot learn what kind the outside world is like, if we just organize firmly that way, by which the learning advances. **Dewey** supposed that also our experiences must be organized in a new way. Also **James** attacked against **Herbartian** pedagogic.

**Hans Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)<sup>28</sup> has referred, as an influential person [in psychology] to **Adolf Horwitz** whose *Psychologische Analysen auf physiologischer Grundlage* he got to know in 1872-1873. In the book in question **Horwitz** pointed out that psychology rests upon the responses of reflexive schemes, and their study with stimulation.. However, **Vaihinger** got convicted, that the human thought is nothing but a means, by which man can fulfill his strives, which is according **Schopenhauer's** philosophical scheme. In 1875 he was as a teacher in Leibzig, in the same time as **Wilhelm Wundt**

((1832-1929); **Wundt** was the German philosopher and psychologist, who wanted to approach psychology by the methods of classical psychophysics. He was a founder of an institute of experimental psychology in Leibzig. He was an author of *Grundzüge der physiologischen Psychologie*, 1-3 (1847), *Logik* ( 1880-1883), and *Völkerpsychologie* 1-10. (1911-1920).)

began to teach there philosophy. **Wundt's** first lecture concerned logic.

But isn't it strange that **Hans Vaihinger** (Loppuviite)<sup>29</sup> does not emphasize **Wundt's** psychology very much in his autobiography, though he mentions that **Wundt** came to Leibzig September in 1875 and that he was himself interested in **Wundt's** lectures on logic, and for that reason he wished that he could stay in Leibzig. But **Vaihinger** must go to Berlin, where his first philosophical work

(**Vaihinger, H.**, Hartmann, Dühring, and Lange, *A Critical Essay on the History of Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century.*, Berlin., 1876.)

was published - which consisted of Academic Philosophical Society -lectures, and which concerned the history of philosophy. He was oriented, in this stage, to study e.g. the **Kantian** tendencies of **Friendrich Albert Lange**

(**Lange** is the German philosopher, and an author of *Gesichte des Materialismus* (1857/1873).)

as well as other themes.

As an conclusion, we can say, that **Vaihinger** got his only influences from experimental psychology at very early stage in his philosophy, and later he was not much concerned with it, but instead such themes as material positivism and metaphysics. We must remind that at the beginning of 1876 **Vaihinger** started to

write his first version of his *Philosophie des Als Ob*, and that he started his project from the philosophy of **Kant**. It can be mentioned here, that the very early version, which he wrote between 1877-1879, was later included to the second part of his work. But why this arrangement? Because **Vaihinger** was forced completely to stop writing his work of 'as if' temporarily in 1879, and he could continue it in 1906, and there were some lectures between. When **Wilhelm Wundt** founded in 1879 the first laboratory of experimental psychology in Leibzig, **Vaihinger** was finishing his first version of 'as if'.

Philosophically **Wundt** derived his ideas from **Rene Descartes** and **John Locke**. Let's remind how negative attitude **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>30</sup> had when describing the difference between *res extensa* [physical], and *res cogitans* [mental], which **Descartes** introduced. In short, of this philosophical interpretation pragmatists couldn't be enthused. Especially **C.S. Peirce**, has strongly condemned this kind of interpretation.

But what about the necessary conclusions of the philosophical relationship of pragmatism and voluntarism? There are certain agreements between voluntarists and pragmatists, especially with the question of the applicability of evolution theory, and of the organic basis of human knowledge, especially what comes to the philosophy of **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>31</sup>, who has e.g. described science as living being, and as the concrete life of men, who try to find out what is the truth. Further, he has emphasized that such branches of science, as e.g. physical chemistry, archeology, and alike, are not only words, but also objects who have their concrete way of life, which the social group of facts maintain, in their relationships to their objects. He has compared them to the functions of human body; sciences are living and active in their very essence.

According to **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>32</sup>, the voluntarist philosophy of **Arthur Schopenhauer**, **Friedrich Nietzsche**, and **Hans Vaihinger**, has been, for the most, pre-functionalistic, because of its emphasis of the biological utility of human knowledge, and the decisive role of will. That is, we have our present knowledge, because of we have achieved with it an utility, and better position, especially in respect to other biological species. But this is not the case with **C.S. Peirce**, as we have seen during the current study, notwithstanding that he has that emphasis of the organic structure of human knowledge. From **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>33</sup>, **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>34</sup>, and from **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>35</sup> himself we know that he emphasized, that the true science must study mainly the useless things, and that science should not deal with the useful things, which have been carried on with commons, just without consultation of scientists. From **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>36</sup> we know, too, that **C.S. Peirce** has considered science the most rational of all enterprises which man can have, and that he proposed for that the only thing, which makes the continuity of the whole human race valuable, is just that rational ideas can developed, as well as the rationalization of meanings between objects and things shall advance further and further. Hence, **C.S. Peirce** has not just seen the whole human knowledge as an useful mean, but instead that it has that property because of it makes our ordinary, and wretched life for nothing, and as for something to get rid of.

## Naturalism and pragmatism

From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>37</sup> we get to know that from pragmatists **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** were advocates of new realism, or to which they have given their sympathies. New realism was a preparative stage before naturalism, and it was a strike back to idealism. **Ralph Barton Perry**, who was an advocate of new realism, too, presented the main ideas of the movement in *The Ego-Centric Predicament* (1910), and he was an author of *General Theory of Value* (1926.). But the movement new realism became when **Perry** e. al.

(**Perry, R.B, Montague, W.P., Holt, R.B., Spaulding, E.G., Marvin, W.T., and Pitkin, W.P.**, "The Program and the First Platform of Six Realists"., in the *Journal of Philosophy.*, 1910.)

wrote an article "The Program and the First Platform of Six Realists". Then there were also **Morris Raphael Cohen**

((1880-1947); **Cohen** was also one of the leaders of American naturalism, known also as an editor of *Chance, Love, and Logic*, which is the first version of *Collected Papers* by C.S. Peirce.)

and **F.J. E. Woodbridge**

((1867-1940); **Woodbridge** was also one of the leaders of American naturalism.)

and the other minor advocates of the movement

(E.g. **E.B. McGilvary**, **J. Lowenberg**, and **J.E. Bloodin**.)

All of new realists rejected the epistemological subjectivism

(Epistemological subjectivism: the rejection of the conception that our knowledge is nothing but phenomenological, and thus not accepting that the world appears to us as seen through Kantian epistemology: any thing is given to us, only after it has undergone changes through a priori mechanisms. Hence, new realism is rejecting the subjective nature of grounds of knowledge, but instead emphasizing that things exist whether we were conscious of them, or not. - C.f. Subjectivism: Any philosophical theory which holds that all knowledge is merely subjective.)

but they didn't agree with the question of error.

The next stage in that development there has been regarded the stage of critical realism. **George Santayana**

((1863-1952); **Santayana** was a Spanish origin, new realist, and American pragmatist philosopher, who was as professor at Harvard in 1889-1912. He was an author of *The Life of Reason*, 1-5., (1905-1906), where he has proposed that the reality is only which we can perceive with our senses.)

was one of the advocates of it, and his *The Life of the Reason* was also influential in the development of naturalistic movement

(C.f. Naturalism in literature is the extreme form of realism, and it is represented e.g. by **Frank Norris** (1870-1902), and **Sherwood Anderson** (1876-1941), and more recent writers are e.g. **Thomas Wolfe** (1900-1938) and **John Steinbeck** (1902-1968).)

Philosophically critical realism advocated for epistemological dualism

(Epistemological dualism: Of the ground of knowledge, which can be explained with two separate principles, or with antitheses which might have validities of their own, that is, because there is that general dual nature of reality, which is a consequence of that mind and matter exist as distinct entities.)

because of they considered the arrangement of objects different than their explanations. As a consequence, the question that **Rene Descartes** and **John Locke** had not been able to solve, became actual again - namely that how we can be sure that those objects, which are not [at all] given to us, really exist. According to epistemological dualism, all kinds of objects can exist, because of their independence of mind, or because of the secret reasons of their own.

We can have this idea, that there are lot of unknown objects, and shall always be. But if they are not given to us, that is, if they do not have any equivalents in mind, we cannot recognize them even when perceiving, and vice versa, have we any idea, which has some relevance to mind, but which doesn't have, right now, any given, material object, we cannot prove that idea false, either, without denying the whole relevance of all the ideas without given objects. But there are several other problems, too. The one is that any idea might have some validity according the coherence, and self-explaining features of mind. And further, we cannot be certain how complex the reality of objects can be, and if our complex ideas are as identical equivalences of them, especially if the object of complex ideas cannot be given to us as complexes, but instead as single cases of them. But why should we need e.g. induction, if there were given the complex

ideas, as they are, with all of their references?

There are the topics in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy which can be associated to this. When describing e.g. experience and inference, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>38</sup> has suggested that experience is a sum of those ideas, which irresistibly, emotionable, and strong experientable have been born within our existence, overwhelming all freely playing thought, accompanied by the tenor of our lives with chorus. We cannot restrict the power of experience; it is the river, against which nothing can stand for a long time, and emotional experience is an aucturity, which rules all of the other experience. When an idea, which is born in experience, and by experience suggests to other ideas, which has its origin in experience, to, is carried forward with the context of those other ideas, there might be born the third kind of idea, a sum, which has a derivative aucturity to both of them, but it has less vividity. This kind of suggestion belongs to the law of association with divide inference into inferences by continuity and inferences by resemblance, which is not derived from the occult inward nature of ideas or soul.

This is rather biological interpretation, and it has an emphasis of the presence of physical world, too. **C.S. Peirce** has emphasized also very clearly that whenever we are discussing experience, and the ideas, which have been derived from it, they are the kinds of ideas, which support other kinds of ideas the same origin. The same tendency we have when **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>39</sup> has emphasized that science, for example, is an unavoidable consequence of certain physical, chemical, and biological prerequisites. Let us remind the letter which has been dated on the 9th Juny in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>40</sup> which **C.S. Peirce** mailed to **John Dewey**, and which dealt with the problems of normative science, and in which he suggested that it must be replaced by natural history. This suggests to naturalism.

One of the American naturalists was **Henry David Thoreau**

((1817-1862); **Thoreau** was an American naturalist, and an author of the books *Life in the Woods* (1854), and *Civil Disobedience* (1849).)

Both from the first and eight **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>41</sup> we know that **Thoreau** emphasized that the most important relationship, which any individual can have, is his relationship to nature, and by that relationship an individual is able to find the principles of morals, as well as to develop his imagination. **Thoreau's** *Civil Disobedience* was the model and the doctrine which **Mathama (Mohandas Karamchand) Gandhi**

((1869-1948); **Gandhi** was the Indian nationalist leader; he has been regarded as an originator of 'passive resistance', as a form of political action.)

applied in India against English colonialists.

From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>42</sup> we know that **John Dewey** was one of the writers of the book *Naturalism and Human Spirit* (1944). Naturalism has been regarded one of the most characteristic of The Golden Age of American philosophy

(But when we speak about literature - the early nineteenth century was the Golden Age, which was marked by the rise of imaginative literature - fiction and poetry. **James Fenimore Cooper** was the first American novelist to gain a reputation in Europe, and he described frontier life in numerous of his works. And there was **Henry Wadsworth Longfellow** with his *Hiawatha*-epos, which was inspired by Finnish *Kalevala*. Then there were **Washington Irving**, **Henry David Thoreau**, **Nathaniel Hawthorne**, **Oliver Wendell Holmes**, **John G. Whittier**, **Herman Melville**, **William C. Bryant**, **Ralph Waldo Emerson**, **Edgar Allan Poe**, and **James Russell Lowell**.)

From the first and fourth **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>43</sup> we know that The Golden Age of American philosophy was between 1880-1940, and there were mentioned all pragmatists, and such idealists as **Josiah Royce** and **Alfred North Whitehead**, who had certain role in the development of pragmatism.

In The Golden Age of American philosophy naturalism was still strongly antireductivistic. **Ernst Nagel** (Loppuviite)<sup>44</sup> has suggested that there are, in the nature, as many characters as we have present in our human experience, and we cannot reduce the nature by the doctrine "nothing but" to its elements. To this

argument can be associated the principle of contextualism which says that there is no separate reality behind context, and that context can be perceived by its own phenomena. **Nagel** argued for that there cannot be a context which were existing only for itself. Every quality and case is a genuine expression, and it owes references and functions which can be explained, too.

In the year 1945 the center of American naturalism was New York, and there especially Columbia University. Before The Second World War the leaders of the movement were **John Dewey** and **F.J.E. Woodbridge** as well as **Morris R. Cohen** who was employed at City College. After The War there was **John Herman Randall, Jr.**

(**Randall** has been known as an author of historical overview *The Career of Philosophy: From The Middle-Ages to the Enlightenment.*, New York., Columbia University Press., (1962.))

who has derived his ideas both from **Dewey** and **Woodbridge**. And there was also **Ernest Nagel**, who we just discussed. From the first *ENCY* (Loppuviite)<sup>45</sup> we know that there were also **Ralph Barton Perry**

(**Perry** has also written on pragmatism, e.g. in *The Thought and Character of William James.*, Boston., 1953)

and **C.I. Lewis** - the latter has been known as an advocate of the doctrine of the conformity of value judgements, expressed e.g. in his *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*

(**Lewis, C.I.**, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.*, La Salle., Illinois., 1962)

Many naturalists have criticized English **George E. Moore**

((1873-1958); **Moore** was The English philosopher, and an author of *Principia Ethica* (1913), and who, with **Bertrand Russell**, was an enthusiast rebeller against idealism. )

especially his *Principia Ethica*, where **Moore** has, in turn, criticized strongly against their naturalistic fallacy, and against **C.I. Lewis**, too, who has argued for that we can confirm our sentences, by which we express values, as well as the sentences of empirical sciences. **Moore** has suggested instead that our moral sentences have not only one and fixed meanings. One of naturalists was **Herbert Schneider**

(**Schneider** wrote *History of American Philosophy*, which was published in 1946.

and there have been many naturalistic philosophers since those, just mentioned above

(E.g. such as **James E. Creighton**, **William E. Hocking**, **Willbur Urban**, and personalistic philosopher **Edgar S. Brightsman**.)

We can conclude that of pragmatists, **John Dewey's** and **George Santayana's** role in the development of naturalism, during the all of its stages, was more apparent than the role of other pragmatists. There is also the fact that there have been separate waves of naturalism, depending on which branch of science we are discussing. As an example, the development of naturalism, when discussing its waves of philosophy and literature. In addition to this, it is not easy, or unambiguous thing to classify certain philosophers to certain categories, like nothing but this. Instead, there seems to be continuous synchistic tendency, or human interaction.

Pragmatism and humanism

At the field of humanism

(Humanism: System of thought or action concerned with merely human interests (as distinction from divine) or with those of human race [as distinction from individual]. See also other meanings: 2. Literary culture, especially that of Humanists. 3. Devotion to human interests.)

there have been several advocates of humanism in literature. Among them are e.g. Marcus Tullius Cicero ((106-43 B.C.); **Cicero** was the Roman republican orator, and a humanist philosopher.)

and Quintus Horatius Flaccus, i.e. Horace

((65-8 B.C.) **Horace** was a Latin poet. His work includes the Satires, Odes, Epodes, Epistles, and Ars Poetica. Well-known is his phrase Pulvis et umbra sumus [We are dust and shadow].)

There were also Publius Ovidius Naso, i.e. Ovid

((43 B.C.-c A.D. 18); **Ovid** was the Roman poet, and an author of Ars Amatoria, Metamorphoses, Fasti, etc.)

and Publius Vergilius Maro, i.e. Virgil

((70-19 B.C.); **Virgil** was the Roman poet, whose chief works were Aeneid, the epic poem of the Roman people, recounting the adventures of **Aeneas** and his Trojans. There is his Georgics, a didactic poem on agriculture and rearing of cattle and bees. Then there are his Eglogues or 'Bucolics', which are pastoral poems.)

These early advocates of humanism were admired especially after the 14th century, as well as an Italian Francesco Petrarca, i.e. **Petrarch**

((1304-1374); **Petrarch** was an Italian poet and humanist, who has been known for his odes and sonnets to 'Laura')

**Petrarch** insisted that the masters of Roman literature were important, not only by aesthetic reasons, but because their new attitude of life, too. Among Platonic humanists there was e.g. **Giovanni Pico della Mirandola**

((1463-1494); **Mirandola** was an Italian humanist, and a Neo-Platonic philosopher, who was a pioneer in the study of Hebrew philosophy and the Cabbala.)

However, during the Renaissance humanistic ideas spread to Gallia transalpina, and one of the most famous of the advocates of humanism was **Desiderius Erasmus**

((1466-1536); **Erasmus** was the Dutch humanist, who e.g. prepared the way for reformation by his version of The New Testament. His condemnation of Church abuses in Moriae Encomium.)

who influenced in the 15th century.

Then we have the new humanists in the 18th century. Among them the most famous are **Johan Wolfgang von Goethe**

((1749-1832); **Goethe** was the German poet (perhaps the greatest), and also scientist, and statesman in the duchy of Weimar. He was an author of many lyric poems, dramas, and novels, of which Faust, a dramatic poem, and the novels The Sorrows of Young Werther and William Meister are the most famous.)

and **Friedrich von Schiller**

((1759-1805); **Schiller** was the German writer, who has written a lot of books, and especially plays, of which Don Carlos (1787), Wallenstein (1800), and Wilhelm Tell (1804) are the best known.)

Notwithstanding that we have discussed mostly literature, it seems that the humanistic tradition is very long. It is quite obvious, that there has been also humanistic elements in philosophy during centuries.

However, humanism is a very fruitful start when we start taking about what is inside pragmatism.

Namely, there were disagreements on how **C.S. Peirce**, **William James** and **F.C.S. Schiller** have described humanism in pragmatism. From **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>46</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce** used the modified term **pragmaticism** to dissociate himself from the views of **William James** and **Schiller**. **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>47</sup> has also suggested for, that **C.S. Peirce** began to use the **pragmaticism** for the reason that other pragmatists, as **James**, **Dewey**, **Papini** and **Schiller**, changed his original ideas, and that the original term **pragmatism** had become known by them. **C.S. Peirce** gave to his "system" a new name which he considered ugly enough that nobody would not to kidnap it any more.

The new term **pragmaticism** we can find in a letter which **C.S. Peirce** wrote to **Mario Calderoni** probably in the year 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>48</sup> where **C.S. Peirce** tried to correct the misunderstanding, namely that **pragmatism** was regarded essentially as a philosophical system. He wanted to reject this interpretation saying that **pragmaticism** was rather a method of thinking. He continued, that **Juliano il Sofista**, who was a friend of **Calderoni**, was quite right when saying that the ideas within **pragmatism** were not new ones in philosophy. **C.S. Peirce** claimed also, in this letter, that he had presented those ideas thirty years ago. Just the similar information on these thirty years we can find also from **William James's** (Loppuviite)<sup>49</sup> article in *The Nation*.

According to **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **William James**, which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (Loppuviite)<sup>50</sup>, **Mr. Schiller** had lost the very essence of **pragmatism**, and that he himself has failed to make such a system, with whose aid:

"it should no longer be possible to create other kind of concepts than pragmatic ones", but

**C.S. Peirce** felt himself as dethroned, and too weak to create the complete system, which were so compact that he wished it to be. But we can "read" from this letter that **C.S. Peirce's** and **James's** personal [and philosophical] comradeship was a good one.

**C.S. Peirce** sent to **William James** a letter which, in turn, has been dated on the 7th March 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>51</sup> where he regarded that the humanistic element in **pragmatism** very impressive, but he did not believe, that the doctrine of **pragmatism** could be proved like **Schiller** has suggested. In this letter **C.S. Peirce** accused both **James** and **Schiller** that they have developed **pragmatism** to far that he could accept it any more.

There is an interesting relationship between **C.S. Peirce** and Immanuel **Kant** in the question of humanism. From **Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>52</sup> we know that **Kant** has stated that:

"... all rational beings as such are ends to each",

which is similar to that:

"... humanity exists as an end in itself".

And further, according to **Henry Sidgwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>53</sup>, **Kant** has also argued for, that so long as one confine himself to mere non-interference with others, one do not positively make humanity his end; his aims remain selfish, thought restricted by this condition of non-interference with others. One's action, therefore, is not truly virtuous; for virtue is exhibited and consists in effort to realize the end of reason in opposition to mere selfish impulses.

Therefore, as we can read at Grundlegung (Loppuviite)54:

"... the ends of the subject, which is itself an end, must of necessity be my ends, if the representation of Humanity as an end in itself is to have its full weight with me".

There are certain themes in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy which are not very far from those which have been presented by **Kant** - e.g. what concerns the meaning of the end. From **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **William James** which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (Loppuviite)55 we know that **C.S. Peirce** considered the term reaction something which is both "be-all" and "end-all", where the end is something which sanctions action, and where it belongs essentially to the third category. He suggested further that this kind of thinking leads to synechism, and further that aesthetics, ethics, and logic, as normative sciences, are corresponding by their psychological aspect to the categories of feeling, reaction and thought.

But, there was another direction in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy, namely the recognition of the social nature of human activities, at all of their levels, which a view emphasized just those characters which makes knowledge into the human product. This kind of view he expressed also in his synechism. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)56 emphasized the sociability of self, arguing for that synechist should not say that:

"... I am altogether myself, and not at all you", continuing

that kind of metaphysics of wickedness must be abjured, because, in the first place:

"... your neighbours are, in a measure, yourself, and in a far, greater measure than, without deep studies in psychology, you would believe! Really, the selfhood you like to attribute to yourself is, for the most part, the vulgarest delusion of vanity. In the second place, all men resemble you and are in analogous circumstances, in a measure, though not in the same way in which your neighbours are you".

These features are quite familiar to man, but also to other species, as to man's fellow animals. But there are features, which are, perhaps, familiar only to man himself, or, at least, to the best of men. Let us remind what we have discussed at the beginning of the current study, where **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)57 has suggested in his synechism:

"... a man is capable to assign him a rôle in the drama of creation, and so far he shall lose himself to that drama, he shall identify himself with an author".

It might be that due of this sociability, and other kinds to come, too, that we are able to perceive something, first at an elementary level, and later at higher levels, as well as we become perceived by others at different levels, too. If we discuss humanism, or its implications to ourselves, there must always be a possibility to the interaction. And if we want to talk about perceiving, or being perceived, there must be that interaction, too. Whenever we talk about perceiving, we talk about sociability, and the communication of different kinds of perceiving and perceived selves, which are complex and developed, and something in itself, too. But those complexes might be illusory, if they really had not the common-accepted complexity. This does not make any illusory experience untrue, however, but denies only its general validity. We must remind that to error is human.

Pragmatism and phenomenology

We have discussed **Wilhelm Wundt**, when we dealt with voluntarism at the current chapter. **Wundt** was criticized already during his lifetime by many opponents. One of those opponents was Aristotelian **Franz Brentano**

((1838-1917); **Brentano** was the German philosopher, who, on the contrary as the most philosophers of his age, was an advocate of **Aristotle's** philosophy, and not that of **Kant**. He took from Scholastic tradition the concept intentional inexistence, because he considered that psychic phenomena differ from all of other phenomena; in psychic phenomena the mind is directed to an object, which has [in that phenomenon] intentional inexistence. He has influenced to **Husserl** and **Meinong**.)

who have been associated to the early phenomenology, has asserted to that sensation must not be described as an idea, but as function. From the fourth and sixth **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>58</sup> we know that the philosophical father of phenomenology has been considered **Edmund Husserl**

((1859-1938); **Husserl** was a German philosopher, and the founder of phenomenism. **Husserl's** influential work is *Phenomenology*, which **C.V. Solomon** translated in English [*Encyclopaedia Britannica.*, Vol XVII, pp. 699-702, (1927)], and which, by him, influenced also to American philosophy. **W.R. Royce Gibson**, in turn, translated **Husserl's** *Ideas*, which was printed in New York in 1931.)

who influenced mainly at Halle, Göttingen, and Freiburg in Germany. **C.S. Peirce** has said to have used the term phenomenology already in 1902, when discussing a description of the object, which is under [our] observation. According to **C.S. Peirce**, we ought to describe the meanings of object, and we must take in consideration all that precedes the mind.

Also, when introducing his synechism, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>59</sup> has used the term phenomena, in a sense of phenomenism. He emphasised, that phenomena are not perfectly regular. We can say about physical and psychical controversy that all phenomena are, of one character, more mental and spontaneous, and others more material and regular. The phenomena are the mixture of freedom and constraint, which makes them to be teleological and purposive.

From **Tuomo Aho** (Loppuviite)<sup>60</sup> we know that, according intentional inexistence, **Brentano** considered psychical phenomena as experiences, and claimed, according Scholastic philosophers, that only psychical phenomena can be intentional, and only them can concern something. I think that this is not quite according **C.S. Peirce's** synechism.

By **Tuomo Aho** (Loppuviite)<sup>61</sup>, there are two kind of theories of intentionality. We can consider **Franz Brentano** as an advocate of object theory

(Object theory: An intentional act is a relation between object and subject, and that an object determines what kind an act is in question.)

which kind a conception of **Brentano's** intentionalism have been supported by **D.W. Smith** and **R. McIntyre**

(**Smith, D.W.**, and **McIntyre, R.**, *Husserl and Intentionality.*, Dordrecht., 1982)

There seems to be as an opposition to **C.S. Peirce**, if we think what **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>62</sup> has written concerning **C.S. Peirce's** conception of object, and its role. We interpret an object, by its effects to us, and it is dependent of those effects, how clear conception we can have about object. In a way, we determine ourselves, by our acts, to understand something about object, and the object we try to understand, in turn, gives certain restrictions to our activities, partly because the effects, which it just has to us, and partly because of the effects, which it has not at all to us, and because of its independence.

From **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>63</sup> we know that **C.S. Peirce's** argument:

"... there are real things out there, whose characters are independent of our opinions of them".

Hence, we cannot say that we create an object by our activities, but we cannot say, either, that our activities are such as they are because of object. There are several kinds of interactions between us and objects, and only one of them is understanding the meaning of them.

But, according to **Tuomo Aho** (Loppuviite)<sup>64</sup>, **Brentano** has been regarded as an advocate of content theory

(Content theory: An intentional act has as such a content, which says to where act is directed for.)

, too, and exponents of this interpretation are, for example, **A. Marras**

(**Marras, A.**, "Scholastic Roots of Brentano's Conception of Intentionality", in **McAlister**)

and **R. Richardson**

(**Richardson, R.**, Brentano on Intentional Inexistence and the Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena., in *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie.*, 65., 1983)

in their writings concerning **Brentano's** intentional inexistence. I think that this a view is much closer to **C.S. Peirce's** view than former interpretation.

There might be a kind of link to **C.S. Peirce's** epistemology, if we accept **Franz Brentano** as an advocate of "content theory". But in the same time, we might to suppose that there is no such link to **C.S. Peirce**. The possible positive answer depends on the level, on which we consider that "content". By the doctrine of synechism, there cannot be any meaning, which is totally apart from things, which we explain. Hence, the all elements of our consciousness must belong to "content".

But what about our sensations, and our activities of willing, which we have discussed when dealing with voluntarism? **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>65</sup> has explained, that our sensations contain two radically different kinds of elements of consciousness. One part is feeling, and the other part is the consciousness of being compelled to feel upon that particular occasion. This consciousness of compulsion has, in turn, a general resemblance to the consciousness of willing, and in that process of willing, there are present both self-consciousness and the consciousness of some exterior force, and the self and not-self are separated in this sort of consciousness. But this suggests only to that there might be a relatively simple contents in this process.

But is this according the content theory? Not necessarily, because there is the presence of exterior force, according which something is to be willed, and willing shall reduce when by it has been achieved something. There is no content in willing, as such. But what about self? Namely, there must be more stable structures, if we want to join to them contents. From **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>66</sup> we get to know, that, according to, **C.S. Peirce**, the self is not predetermined, and not an entity. Instead, it will be developed in social contexts, and will reach itself first to the whole context, and later outside of it. The spiritual development of the self needs a vision, which is more than the self is at a certain moment in itself. However, I guess, these are much more like ideas of Scottish realist, **Sir William Hamilton**

((1788-1856); **Hamilton** was a Scottish philosopher, who held that all knowledge is relative, and concern the things, of which we just happen to know something, because of the presence of certain prerequisites and conditions. Hence, the absolute truth is unknown to us, and our knowledge of it is negative, because our knowledge is based on the difference between self and not-self, which we create when knowing. The self, where knowledge is something more structured, is continuous confrontation against not-self, whose reality and possible structure is outlined according to which we have in self.)

than of **Franz Brentano's** ideas, especially what comes to the roles of self, and not-self, in the development of knowledge.

But what about, if we discuss single persons, or finite processes? If we accept, as the fact, that during those finite processes we can use, at least, temporary concepts, there is a question, from where we have got them. Have our signs created during process of knowing, or have them something always been? The answer is not simple, because we should put neither processes nor persons to an explanative role when discussing the essence of signs.

From **C.S. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>67</sup> we know, that, according to **C.S. Peirce**, there cannot be any final meanings in any of those processes, by which we produce something, which is merely interpreted, and that we cannot conclude what kind the final meanings should be, if we are considering only processes or developments. But if they are not something achieved, there is a question of the origin of them, as well as the origin of the mind and thought, which are not results, which we shall have when using signs, because both of them are internal and non-functional characters of the universe.

The ideas, which we bring up by ideas, are [always] well-developed contents, notwithstanding that they are not final ones. On the other hand, those higher contents should not be possible at all, if there were not present those previous [preparatory] actions of willing. We may say that willing is quite the same as direction, or that there is a movement. The differentiation of self and not-self makes, in turn, room for "our" contents and "our" surroundings. But what is there which precedes the mind? There are percepts

(Percept: Object of perception; mental product, as opposite to action, of perceiving.)

and perceptions

(Perception: Action by which the mind refers its sensations to external object as cause. See also: Act, faculty, of perceiving; intuitive recognition (of).)

The latter may be illusory, or imagined, or they may be dreamed, too. **C.S. Peirce** has emphasized, in many of his writings, that we have an illusory way of perceiving and apprehending the world, but he didn't want to make them worthless. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>68</sup> has e.g. proposed for, that there is no fundamental difference between true perceptions and hallucinations. And in his special psychognosy **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>69</sup> has put imagination, vividness, and belief to the category of association, and other rational functions. But why? One of the possible explanations is of future. When **C.S. Peirce** has (Loppuviite)<sup>70</sup> studied the relationship between present and future, he has used expressions like quasi-conjectures, and dreams, when describing them as our expectations for future. **C.S. Peirce** has also proposed for that such as illusions and dreams are the equipments of philosophy, too, but not accepting them forever and ever. From **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>71</sup> we know that in **C.S. Peirce's** model of human knowledge there was a claim that the whole science is inspired by doubt and belief. Any true proposition is conditional for future; and it is general just at a measure, in which it can be judged to join adequately to human practices in future, where it shall express its rationality. That is, there must take in consideration also other perspectives than our currency. But, of course, **C.S. Peirce** has used the term phenomenon, because it is a common English word, too. Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>72</sup> has regarded e.g. science as an organic phenomenon, which (science) is, in the same time, a kind of form of life, whose name is knowing and who operates analogically as an organic body and it's limbs. Then, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>73</sup> has e.g. suggested for that mentality and mind are only cases in the phenomenon of life, and they are part of larger processes.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>74</sup> has used the term phenomenological pneumotology in his general psychognosy, when describing the essence of mind, and the law of final causation, which are non-biological. In the same context, when describing the aim of general laws of concert and strict, he has used the term special phenomena [as constitution of society and law], to which these laws can be applied. But, of course, these terms don't refer to phenomenalism, but instead e.g. to evolution philosophy, psychognosy, physiology, psychology, and to certain Platonian ideas. Those who are interested to researches concerning the relationship of phenomenalism and **C.S. Peirce**, there is e.g. a study of **Catharine Wells Hantzis**

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### **The triangle of positivism, instrumentalism, and experimental psychology, and their role when understanding pragmatism.**

Positivism and pragmatism

#### **Auguste Comte**

(See: p. 44, Footnote 4.)

can be regarded as the originator of positivism

(See: p. 32, Footnote 2.)

which, as a term can be associated to the name of his Cours de Philosophie positive. As a meliorist

(See: p. 44, Footnote 5.)

**Comte** believed, that man, who has an autonomous reason, can develop himself and his society without any restrictions to the stages, which are far better than any of the previous stages. The first steps of the technical breakthrough, which were taken during **Comte's** age, seemed to offer reason enough for a kind of optimism. Further, **Comte** supposed that if man just knew the laws of nature, he should certainly master it, and just by knowing those laws he was going to be able to regulate nature better and better. **Comte** believed that there will be the final positive stage in the development of science, as a whole, and correspond to it, there will be an industrial society, where scientists are the highest class, as the clergy in The Middle-Ages.

**C.S. Peirce** has a similar emphasizing - as by **Comte** - concerning the view of the stages in the development of science, and human knowledge. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>1</sup> has used that example of geological succession concerning the development of the branches of science, in his lectures at Lowell-Institute during the years 1892-1893, as well as he has discussed the birth of the heart of science. But there are other similar themes, which refer to clearly Comtean philosophy, too.

**Comte** suggested that there are three main stages in history which he categorized:

(1) teleological

(Teleology: Theory, teaching, or belief, that events and development are due to the purpose or design that is served by them. Oppose to the mechanistic theory of the universe - adj. Teleological.)

(2) metaphysical

(Metaphysical: adj. Of metaphysics - Metaphysics: Branch of philosophy dealing with first principles of

things, including such concepts as being, substance, space, time, and identity, etc. - See also:  
Metaphysician: (Gk.) ta meta ta phusika; the works (of **Aristotle**) placed after the Physics by **Andronicus of Rhodos**)

and  
(3) positive.

But, in addition to these, there are certain synthesizing tendencies, especially in history, which he considered the general ones. For example, he supposed that polytheistic religion will be replaced by monotheistic religion, and it will be, in turn, replaced by metaphysical philosophy, that is, by philosophical speculations. In the course of time, those philosophical speculations will be replaced by science, and by scientific way to think. In addition to these tendencies **Comte** made a categorization of sciences: that there are sciences from abstract to concrete, and they can be seen as a system, where the highest level is that positive one. He suggested for that mathematics can be seen as an example of those sciences which has achieved that highest positive level. He supposed that sociology will achieve that level lastly. All that indicates for that **Comte's** aim to deny metaphysics and instead to create monistic system, what comes to the epistemology.

There was something in **Comte's** philosophy, which didn't exist any more in later logical empirism, namely, the emphasis of philosophical speculations, after man has began strongly doubt his beliefs, but not yet reached the scientific way of thinking. He put sociology in the whole development of knowledge to the lowest level in the current development: the study of the social contexts of man are very far from complete, but sociology, as well as all other branches of science, which are diffuse now, shall achieve the highest positive level at the end. There are no exceptions, what concerns the human knowledge and its specialities. Only some old religions, and such kinds of pre-knowledges, has no possibilities, in such, to achieve the highest levels. Hence, there is an emphasis of fluidity in his view.

We can find that view of the fluidity in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy, as well as the expectations for more fixed future - e.g. in **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **Christine-Ladd Franklin**, which has been dated on the 29th August in 1891 (Loppuviite)<sup>2</sup>, where he suggested that we are living right now partly in spontaneity, which resists laws, and which have not yet reached their full conformity, and that we live only partly according fixed habits [but merely under the principle habit taking]. Those habit takings and generalization [tendency] shall grow and develop continuously partly from spontaneity, but also from some more fixed habits. Generally it can be said that gradually we have those more and more fixed groups of habits, notwithstanding that they have originally been derived from the world of pure chance - which has no meaning.

From **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>3</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce** has used an expression positive doubt - that is: man can learn something new by mistakes, and trough positive doubt concerning the interferences of twisted signs. However, man can learn to separate those positive doubts from the doubts which are imagined and twisted themselves, and which shall never have definite object, or consensus of the meaning. Let us remind that the model may be also Humean, as we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study

(See: p. 58)

But there are several topics, in which he has been just an advocate of **Comte's** positivism. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>4</sup> has e.g. explained, how just by logic we can research the positive facts, and not by the aid of mathematics. We shall discuss this detail on the next page.

**William James** has derived some of his ideas from positivism, whether he ever wanted to do it, or not - from those philosophers, who have been known as advocates of evolution philosophy. We know that **James** appreciated especially to evolution philosopher **Herbert Spencer**

((1820-1903); **Spencer** was an English philosopher, who sought the unification of all knowledge on the basis of the single principle of evolution; the principle of his philosophy was laid down e.g. in his Programme of a System Synthetic Philosophy (1860), to the elaboration of which he devoted the rest of his

life.)

who has got a lot of influences from **Comte's** philosophy, and who has suited **Comte's** ideas into his own philosophy. From the first and seventh **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>5</sup> we get to know that **Spencer** has also derived some of his philosophical ideas from **John Stuart Mill**, as it has been proposed for, but also from Scottish philosopher **Sir William Hamilton**

(See: p. 88, Footnote 1.)

as well as from **David Hume** and **Immanuel Kant**.

**William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>6</sup> has expressed his appreciation concerning the philosophy by **Spencer**, but he has rejected coarse-grained positivism as a doctrine. Thus, we can conclude that **James** was not an enthusiastic advocate of positivism of that kind. From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>7</sup> we know that **James** has derived from **Spencer** three principles, namely, integration, differentiation and determination into his theory of the development of the knowledge.

But it was **C.S. Peirce**, who has expressed the most purely, and with the greatest originality the positivistic tendencies in his philosophy. **Paul Weiss** (Loppuviite)<sup>8</sup> has written in his Dictionary in 1934, that **C.S. Peirce** has been the most important logician and philosopher through all the ages, and that he can be regarded as an individualist in that area, too. In addition to this, we know that **C.S. Peirce** was the first who introduced the truth tables. It was just his interpretation concerning the nature of logic and philosophy, by which he can be associated to [older] positivism.

In general, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>9</sup> regarded logic, as a science, and as experimental and positive, because it is common for all human beings, and because it is part of our experience. Logic tells us about the positive facts, and how they are arranged in the universe. And further, that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>10</sup> has proposed for that logic is a part of philosophy, which is also experimental and positive. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>11</sup> has used that term in question, too, when discussing **Newton's** physics. But **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>12</sup> has not only used the term positive when discussing the methods used, but also when describing the role of facts, or surprising facts, which both lead to the new hypotheses. Those new hypotheses can, in turn, be regarded as positive ones, too, because of their experimentality.

Further, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>13</sup> has emphasized in his writing concerning philosophy and science, that practice comes always before theory - which is not quite the same thing as pragmatix maxim, according which our concepts must have practical bearings. From the Collected Papers, which was edited by **Charles Hartshorne** and **P. Weiss** (Loppuviite)<sup>14</sup>, we know that abstractions must give an account to themselves, and they must do it in terms of concrete experience. **C.S. Peirce** concluded further in his writing concerning philosophy and science that we should not learn logic from the books, in a sense, that only by logic we were able to verify, or deny something. A consequence of this, the material of positive science must form the latitude and means of science. However, we cannot do much just teaching the methods of positive science - notwithstanding that we knew the whole current science with its objects. That is, only by using the methods of science we cannot find out what kind the new science shall be. Another important thing, which we ought to pay attention to, is that, according to **C.S. Peirce**, our destiny seems to be making mistakes, and, perhaps, learning by them.

But does this suggest to that our thought is concrete in that way we can understand e.g. physical things - physis

(See: p. 2.)

- right now? No, because it suggest only to that our abstractions must have consequences in empirical world. The answer to this depends on what we shall mean by concreteness in future. If we think that mutual interaction between our thought and experience have been, and will be inseparable during all the ages, we may conclude, that when we get advanced in our knowledge in future we will regard quite new things as concrete ones, and which may be as our hypotheses right now, perhaps.

From **John Dewey's** article "The Development of American Pragmatism" (Loppuviite)<sup>15</sup> we know that - as an empirist [and as an empiricist] **C.S. Peirce** appreciated for the study of phenomena

(Phenomenon; pl. -ena: (litt.)That of which a sense or the mind directly takes note, immediate object of perception; remarkable person, thing, occurrence, etc. - also : thing that appears, is perceived, especially thing the cause of which is in question.)

in given, or natural circumstances, which cannot be repeated in any laboratory. Because of that he emphasized those natural and living contexts, and wanted to accommodate his methods according to them, he didn't want to call his method practicalism, or maintain that all what we can do is nothing but passive obeying of the eternal, never-born rules and laws, which had been given, as an final explanation, before all, and that we must be obeying that kind of necessity. Let us remind what we have discussed at the previous chapter on **Hans Vaihinger's** practical and voluntaristic view

(See: p. 75.)

From **R. Rorty** (Loppuviite)<sup>16</sup> we know that great many philosophers have regarded pragmatism as muddle-headed step to positivism - which those philosophers have regarded as the prelude to the epos of man. **Rorty** said, too, that we ought not name **C.S. Peirce** by that naughty term, and if we dare to do that, we should just think his vaste work in logic. And if we are going to use the term muddle-headed, we should call him schizophrenic, too. But from where is that unpolite expression muddle-headed from?

An astonishing thing is that we can find it from **C.S. Peirce** himself. Namely, from **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>17</sup> and also from *Chance, Love, and Logic* (Loppuviite)<sup>18</sup> we can read:

"... For an individual ... there can be no question that a few ideas are worth more than many confused ones. A young man would hardly be persuaded to sacrifice the greater part of his thoughts to save the rest; and the muddled-head is the least apt to see the necessity of such a sacrifice ... It is terrible to see how a single unclear idea, a single formula without meaning, lurking in a young man's head, will sometimes act like an obstruction of inert matter in an artery, hindering the nutrition of the brain, and condemning its victim to pine away in the fullness of his intellectual vigor and in the midst of intellectual plenty. Many a man has cherished for years as his hobby some vague shadow of an idea, too meaningless to be positively false; he has, nevertheless, passionately loved it, has made it his companion by day and night, and has given to it his strength and his life, leaving all other occupations for its sake, until it has become, as it were, flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone; and the he has waked up some bright morning to find it gone, clean vanished away like beautiful Melusina of the fable, and the essence of his life gone with it. I have myself known such a man; and who can tell how many histories of circle-squarers, metaphysicians, astrologers, and what not, may not be told in the old German story".

But what about **Melusina** of the fable? From **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>19</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce's** first wife was **Zina Fay**. However, we can find in *Collected Papers* (Loppuviite)<sup>20</sup> quite different name, **Melusina Fay**, whose name **C.S. Peirce** was, perhaps, associated to "beautiful Melusina of the fable". Isn't it beautiful?

But what about the role of **John Stuart Mill** in the development of American pragmatism? **Mill** became, as a young man, an advocate of **Jeremy Bentham's** utilitarianism, too, but later he became, as well, an advocate of **Comte's** positivism. It was just **Mill**

(**Mill, J.S.**, *Auguste Comte and Positivism.*, 1865)

who has written a book which concerned **Comte's** positivism, already by its title. But **Mill** can be regarded as a kind of phenomenalist

(Phenomen(al)ism: Doctrine that phenomena are the only objects of knowledge. C.f. Phenomenology: The term, which **Johann Heindrich Lambert** introduced in 1762, to name the doctrine of appearance, in German Schein, as opposed to the doctrine of the truth, in German Sein. **Edmund Husserl** didn't

understand the term as the negative counterpart of absolute truth, but for him the principle of all principles was the directly given, or seen, in German Anschauung, and the task of the new phenomenology was to investigate everything that could be given, or seen in this way.)

and empirist, too.

By the way, **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>21</sup> has used **Mill's** conception when considering together the concepts theism and materialism, and concluding that God has stated the absolutic references to good and evil. An illustrative example of this is in Pluralistic Universe, where **James** has discussed e.g. the problem of the human suffering, as well as the role of evil in the world.

But what about other predecessors of logical positivism, as well as of pragmatism? From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>22</sup> we know that **Chauncey Wright**, who has been known as evolution philosopher, has also presented in his writings such themes, where has been anticipated verification principle, pragmatic truth criterion, and naturalism. He has also criticized those strivings, in which they tried to applicate evolution theory to the metaphysics explanations of the essence of the world. In addition to this we get to know, too, that **Chauncey Wright** was one of the members of **William James'** intellectual society, as we have seen at an earlier stage in the current study.

### Logical positivism and pragmatism

In general, logical positivism derived its ideas, concerning e.g. the ideal of science, from those empirical methods which were in use on the both sides of the 19th and 20th centuries. From the fourth **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>23</sup> we know that later logical positivism had three emphases, or orientations, namely social,- evolutionary,- and critical positivism. This, in turn, is an illustrative example of how any ism tries to enlarge its original scope to the areas, in where it does not succeed to explain things, to which it is suited for, any more.

Logical positivism was in close companionship with conventionalism

(Conventionalism: The view, which emphasized that the meaning of things depends on conventions, which we have concerning meanings - that is - meanings do not depend on supernatural, or natural sources. Conventionalism suggests to that we must have an agreement of what is truth, and that we must have common tools, by which we prove things to be true ones. - Conventional: Depending on convention(s), not natural, not spontaneous.)

If we think now conventionalism as a kind of theory, which includes the consensus concerning social relations, and agreement concerning meanings, we should wait for a regulated interference between meanings, too. We can say that pragmatism has adopted some features of such conventionalism, and it is and advocate of that view. We shall discuss this later when dealing with instrumentalism. From **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>24</sup> we know that according to **W.W. Bartley III**, also late **Ludwig Wittgenstein** has been considered as conventionalist, too. There is a similar emphasis of the sociability of language, as well as the sociability of human knowledge, as with pragmatists.

But what about the question of methodology? **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>25</sup> emphasized, that our age is the era of methods, and that it is due of method, that we have our modern science. Let us remind, too, that according to **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>26</sup>, the material of positive science must scope the whole area of science, which material is also a wechile of science. And because practice precedes theory we cannot prove something only by using logic.

This is, in a way, against the famous logistic thesis

(See: pp. 72, 33, Footnotes 1, 1.)

because the other alternative means to logic we have, is not mathematics, but observation. Because logic, as such, is inappropriate, it cannot be thought as a counterpart of mathematics, or to be joined to it.

From **Morris L. Bigge** (Loppuviite)<sup>27</sup> we know that, according to logical positivism, or empirism, as **Bigge** calls the doctrine, the physical world, which human beings experience by their senses, is a real one. This world has its true existence, in spite of that there were no conscious human beings experiencing and apprehending it. Another claim of logical empirism [according to **Comte**] is that within science, as a whole, there is a hierarchy, and on the top of it there are objective sciences, which are the most reliable ones, what comes to the validity of their empirical methods. There is also a claim in logical empirism, which says: if something has an existence, we should be able to measure it. There are other claims, e.g. that reality, which goes on by natural laws, and which can be described by truth definitions, do not change. In that sense laws are always evident ones. Logical positivists believed, too, that if we can find out the true principles of epistemology and logic, we can succeed to overrun all metaphysics. And, as the result, the epistemological monism

(See: p. 3, Footnotes 2-5.)

would, in turn, produce that unity of science, and there would no longer be any room to the questions of value and metaphysics within science.

The originator of modern logical positivism is considered Austrian **Moritz Schlick**

((1882-1936); **Schlick** was the German-Austrian philosopher, who advocated the view that physicalism is the solution to psychological problems. He was an originator of Vienna Circle.)

who was as professor in Vienna, where he founded the famous Vienna Circle. **Schlick** had a thesis that the truth is dependent of the equivalence between the facts and their descriptions. This suggests to the correspondence theory

(Correspondence Theory: That is, Picture Theory of Meaning, i.e. that the words are corresponding images of objects they describe.)

which, for example, was presented by **Ludwig Wittgenstein** in Tractatus

(E.g. **Wittgenstein, L.**, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus., transl. by **D.F. Pears & B.F. McGuinness.**, with the introd. by **Bertrand Russell.**, Repr., London., Routledge & Kegan Paul, This transl. first publ. in 1961)

But do we know that Vienna Circle ever existed? There are lot of studies, e.g. Werksausgabe in 8 Bänden

("Ludwig Wittgenstein und der Wiener Kreis", Gespräche., aufgezeichnet von **Friedrich Waismann.**, in Werkausgabe in 8 Bänden., Bd. 3., Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp., Taschenbuch Wissenschaft., aus dem Nachlass hrsg., von **B.F. McGuinness.**, 1984)

in which **Friedrich Waismann** - whose name has been associated to Vienna Circle, too - has explained **Wittgenstein's** role in Der Wiener Kreis., which was the German name of that Circle.

**Moritz Schlick** has suggested that the most important task of philosophy was to analyze logically the propositions of science. There were, as members of Vienna Circle, some mathematicians, and philosophers e.g. **Kurt Gödel**

((1906-?); **Gödel** was an Austrian logician, who immigrated to The U.S. in 1938, and became a professor at Princeton in 1940. He was an author of über formal unentscheidbare Sätze der Principia Mathematica und verwandter Systeme I (1931), which changed completely the conceptions concerning of the formal systems, which were accepted to the basis of mathematics. He was also an author of The Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis (1940). In general, he has studied mathematics, logic, as well as theory of

relativity.)

who tried e.g. to prove, when he was just 25-years old, that the absolutic truth in mathematics do not exist. Other members were e.g. **G. Bergmann**, **H. Feigl**, **P. Frank**, **H. Hahn**, **O. Neurath**, and as Finnish member, **Eino Kaila**. We shall discuss **Ludwig Wittgenstein's** role later. But one of the most famous members of Vienna Circle was **Rudolf Carnap**

((1891-1970); **Carnap** was an Austrian origin philosopher, and an advocate of logical empirism; an author of *Der logische Aufbau der Welt* (1928), in which he introduced formal language, and, as a method, methodological solipsism, by which we start from individual psychological phenomena, and enlarge the results to other individuals, others. Because of the influence of **Neurath**, and others, he tried to develop a language of physicalism. He also presented the famous verification principle.)

who was an advocator of reductionism, when discussing phenomenal experience, which is, according to him, a start point when we outline the world for something.

But from where is that idea of reductivity derived from? Already in classical atomism there had been an idea that reductivity, but it didn't suggest to that there should be any explanation after cosmos shall be reduced totally to atoms. What will be left after that is, in its most simplicity, eternal but not conscious. It is clear that this is not cosmism

(Cosmism: Conception of the cosmos as a self-existent, self-acting whole.)

Let us study the question closely. What is important, is that when the final and complete reduction had taken place, there is no conscious activities or reflection left, which would understand what had actually taken place, and if there shall be a new kind of cosmos, it is not our cosmos, and we have no role in it. That is, we cannot prove afterwards that there were no rationality after the total reduction, and if there were something like that, after all, the hypothesis of atomism should be rejected. It can be easily seen that this is a kind of intellectual trick. For the reason, it makes no sense to talk about eternity of atoms, as reduced to their true essence as atoms themselves. But as a result of conscious, logical operation, or as something apprehended it makes more sense, but only when the whole hypothesis is wrong. However, are we living in this, or that kind of rational cosmos, it is quite possible to propose for that the world consists of atoms, or that every cosmos will be die, or that it shall stand forever, notwithstanding what is the case. But what says the classic atomistic theory concerning the topic.

**J.C.A. Gaskin** (Loppuviite)<sup>28</sup> has written that the very first advocates of atomistic philosophy were **Leucippus**

((5th c. B.C.); **Leucippus** was the Greek philosopher who has been regarded, with **Democritus**, as founder of the 'atomistic' theory that the universe is composed of a vast number of invisible particles moving and combining in space.)

and **Democritus**

(See: p. 17, Footnote 4.)

From **Democritus** we have got only few writings. The best way that atomistic philosophy was presented by Titus Lucretius Carus i.e. **Lucretius**

(c. 99-55 B.C.) **Lucretius** was the Latin poet, and an author of *De Rerum Natura*, in which he tried to show that the course of the world can be explained without resorting to divine intervention.)

In addition to this, we also know the collection *Vatican Sayings*, which was written later, and was founded in 1880. Hence, we do not have much literal remains, as a whole, concerning atomistic philosophy. But what is important is that, in the cosmology of classic atomistic philosophy, there was room enough for reason.

**J.C.A. Gaskin** (Loppuviite)<sup>29</sup> has written that in the atomistic system of **Epicurus**

(See: p. 48, Footnote 1.)

and **Titus Lucretius Carus** the universe consisted of bodies and void, that is, of material things and emptiness. The former ones can be perceived by senses, but the latter one is a space, where material things can move and where they have their location. That emptiness is still something which is out there. The classic atomistic philosophers regarded cosmos as relatively stabile, and they thought, too, that cosmos consisted of configurations of such material things which could not last forever - all the configurations should be spread out there into atoms soon after they were no longer able to maintain their existence as configurations. This kind of erosion of cosmos shall take place continuously in the universe, as well as new configurations shall emerge from simple atoms. The classic atomistic philosophers thought that the total amount of atoms must be infinite, that is, that atoms themselves are eternal ones. But some of their configurations, as cosmos, for example, cannot be such one, notwithstanding that it seems to be an essential part of the whole universe. And, in the universe, there cannot be any beginnings or ends in it, or any centrum and fixed boundaries.

However, I guess, this kind of atomistic philosophy is not very near to **Rudolf Carnap's** phenomenal reductionism, or the elementarism in logical positivism, or the concept of object in it. That is, if we discuss any of our complicated objects, which our language deals with, they must be consisting of huge masses of atoms, and always of their configurations, as an exception a concept atom, and a smallest possible particle, to which it refers to. However, the concepts we use must be in some relationship to each others in cosmos. There cannot be any discussion concerning atoms themselves, in their simple ways of being, or afterwards points of view, if the prognosis of atomistic philosophy happens to be valid.

From **Jerrold J. Katz** (Loppuviite)<sup>30</sup> we know that **Carnap** accepted the fact that, in human contexts, there are no object sentences. Because of that, there must take in advantage two forms of them. On the one hand, there is that material form of sentences, which refers to the things and objects which are experienced, as actual, and to which we can give name pseudo-object sentences. On the other hand, there is that formal one which refers to the linguistic constructions and relations.

From **Jerrold J. Katz** (Loppuviite)<sup>31</sup> we get to know further that **Carnap** got his model originally to his syntactic from **David Hilbert's**

((1862-1943); **Hilbert** was the German mathematician, who influenced strongly to the development e.g. of the invariance theory of algebra, and the theory of integral calculus.)

metamathematics but he wanted to expand it so that there must take two additional things in consideration. On the one hand, there must be semantics which concerns the relations between linguistic entities and cases, and between things and objects in the world, where we must know the circumstances of their use, if we want to know if the sentences are true or not. On the other hand, there is also pragmatics which includes such things as psychological motives and the reactions of hearers. There must be also syntactics, where we must get in use the rules of designation- and truth. But why this expansion, then? Because there is the fact that it is impossible to describe by the own terms of natural language, and what it may mean in every context. But what is important is that the situation does not get better if we succeed to describe the logical form of the sentences used.

The natural language is something larger and fluid one than syntactics, semantics, and pragmatics as such. I mean by this that the descriptions we are able to form, are systematic ones, and they emphasize that in sentences there must be systematic reason, and that there must be strivings for something, or motive. If we think syntactics, and its truth rules, our sentences may be true in that sense that they obviously seem refer to certain explanative circumstances, but in the same time they can be also false, because wish actually to refer by them to another kind of explanative circumstances, as we do when ironizing. We should have a rule which explain that tendency, and when we are making irony. Then there is also our "small talk" which seems to refer to certain circumstances, but actually does not that. What is the truth in "small talk"? Is it that our sentences do not mean anything more; that they refer only to this kind of nonsense pragmatic use?

There is also mathematicians as advocates of logical empirism. Well-known is Warsawan school, whose grandfather was **Alfred Tarski**

(1902-?); **Tarski** was a Polish, and a philosopher and logician, who worked first in Warsaw as a professor from 1925 to 1929, when he immigrated to the United States. His *Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen* (1936) has been an important work for semantics. His other works were *Cardinal Algebras* (1949), *Logic, Semantics, Methamathematics* (1956), and *The Completeness of Elementary Algebra and Geometry* (1967).)

and who has an idea, namely so called Banach-Tarski paradox which was presented already in 1924. This paradox can vanish when we admit that such things as volume, mass and density can be applied only to certain mathematical entities because they are not physical objects. This kind a view, concerning the defects of mathematics, is similar one that **C.S. Peirce's** (Loppuviite)<sup>32</sup> has advocated for, especially when he explained the fundamental difference between mathematics and logic - which is quite opposite to logistic thesis

(See: pp. 72, 33, Footnotes 1, 1.)

According to **C.S. Peirce**: if we accept that, in mathematics, it is question of deduction by purely hypothetic constructions, that is, the things which we use in deduction belong to hypothetic structures, we can only conclude, therefore, that we cannot apply logic to mathematics, which is a kind of a science, to which logic is not relevant. There are certain areas in mathematics, however, where we can apply logic, especially when we ought to find out with mathematical methods the state of things, whatever it is, is too diffuse. But why to use logic right there? Partly because of, in mathematics they do not call their conclusions into question, if they only seem to obey the rules accepted. An partly because of we cannot pick up by the rules and principles of mathematics the right facts from the pool of vaguety, but we can do it by logic, and make, at least, experiments. Hence, logic is, instead, experimental, and as a science, positive - not because of the observations made by it, but because of it is common part of experience to all human beings. As a consequence [as we can remind] is, that when we use logic, we deal with the positive facts, and find out how they are arranged in the universe.

But these passages of the development of logical positivism were taken place long time after **C.S. Peirce's** and **William James'** death. We can only search the influences from pragmatism to logical positivism. It was not until in 1930's, when **Ernest Nagel**, and some other philosophers, brought positivistic ideas from Vienna, and introduced them to American philosophers. An interesting fact there is that **Nagel** was a student of **Morris Raphael Cohen**, who, in turn, had an important role as an editor of **C.S. Peirce's** literary remains, and who was an advocate of pragmatic and experimentalistic rationalism, and realism. Another interesting fact is that **Nagel** didn't accept the ideas of **M.R. Cohen**.

There have been a lot of studies concerning **C.S. Peirce**, and pragmatism. One of the commentators has been **Charles William Morris**

((1901-1979); **Morris** has been known as positivist (**Burr** 1980, 196, 374), but also an advocate of scientific empiricism, and semantic.)

who has published a lot of studies concerning the philosophy of **C.S. Peirce**, but also other themes, e.g. concerning the relationship of pragmatism and logical positivism. For that reason I want to introduce some of his studies. **Charles W. Morris** has written e.g. on neo-pragmatism

(see e.g.: **Morris, C.W.**, "Neo-Pragmatism and the Ways of Knowing"., in *The Monist.*, 38 (1928), pp. 494-510)

on pragmatism and metaphysics

(see e.g.: **C.W. Morris.**, "Pragmatism and metaphysics"., in *Philosophical Review.*, 43 (1934), pp. 549-564)

on **Schiller's** relationship to pragmatism

(see e.g.: **Morris, C.W.**, "Professor Schiller and Pragmatism"., in *The Personalist.*, 17 (1936), pp. 294-300)

on the relationship between pragmatism and logical positivism

(see e.g.: **Morris, C.W.**, "The Concept of Meaning in Pragmatism and Logical Positivism"., in *Actes du Congre's International de Philosophie Scientifique.*, Pd. 8., Paris (1936), pp. 130-138)

**Charles W. Morris** has written on **William James's** philosophy

(see e.g.: **Morris, C.W.**, *William James Today, Commemoration of William James.*, Hg. V.H.M. Kallen., New York., pp. 178-187, 1942)

on the relationship between pragmatism, logical positivism and scientific empiricism

(see e.g.: **Morris, C.W.**, *Logical Positivism, Pragmatism and Scientific Empiricism.*, Paris., 1937)

and on themes which are concerning semiotics - as on the theory of signs

(see e.g.: **Morris, C.W.**, "Foundations of the Theory of Signs"., in *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science.*, Bd.I., No. 2., 1938; see also, "Signs about Signs, and Signs"., in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.*, 9., (1948))

and on the relationship between semiotics and scientific empiricism

(see e.g.: **Morris, C.W.**, "Semiotic and Scientific Empiricism"., in *Actes du Congre's International de Philosophie Scientifique.*, (1935))

etc.

Of course there have been several other studies after these writings, but it is the fact, that their writers have not been so close to the subject than **Morris**. But there is another difference between him and later commentators. That is, we are, perhaps, too far from the age of pragmatism, and its meliorism

(See: p. 44, Footnote 5.)

and their aim to defence the view they advocated for, against the other interpretations. Now, if we try to apply the doctrine of synechism right there, we can see, that the very essence of any ism, is continuous interaction with other isms of their own ages, and before, but they are quite helpless to the deviant interpretations made in future. Therefore, if we try to explain any of the former philosophies now, our explanation seems to be partially outside of both explanations and expectations which they have had. None of the old philosophers couldn't imagine the reality, in which we live now, where we have lost most of those melioristic expectations concerning future. Hence, there is an alternative possibility. Those philosophers of former ages have known better than us, perhaps, what to wait for the future, and for its knowledge, and if their explanations and expectations do not agree with our conceptions of reality, and the future expectations, it is possible that we have choosen wrong, and for the reason we are tend to interpret those old philosophers in a way we do. In that sense, there is no room for synechism, but instead an to a kind of quantum theory, because of that abyss between present and past .

The early and late philosophies of Ludwig Wittgenstein, positivism, and pragmatism

**Ludwig Wittgenstein** owed his Tractatus to his close friend, **David Hume Pincent**

(**Pincent** died on the 8th March in 1918.)

As a work, Tractatus can be seen as a derivative of Principia Mathematica, and its logistic thesis

(In his Notebooks (1914-1916) **Wittgenstein** introduced, however, a concept Sachverhalt, referring with it to the absolute potential fact, whose equivalent is the unanalyzed and contingent truth we have now. This idea is not according to logistic thesis.)

**Bertrand Russell**, who was **Wittgenstein's** early philosophical tutor

(**Wittgenstein** became **Russell's** student 18.10. 1911 at Cambridge, after he has made a short philosophical essay, which **Russell** valued very high.)

and who has written an introduction to one of English translations of Tractatus

(See: p. 102, Footnote 4.)

By **Russell** there is an interesting link to pragmatism, and to **C.S. Peirce**, especially when discussing logic. **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>33</sup> has regarded **C.S. Peirce** as the founder of logical theory of relations - although he says that there were some influences from **Augustus de Morgan**

((19th c.); **Morgan** was the British logician and mathematician.)

too. **Russell** appropriated one half of **C.S. Peirce's** theory - namely the one of external relations, but he rejected the idea of internal relations, because feeling that it smacked too much of **Hegel**. Let us remind our earlier discussion concerning the topic in the current study

(See: p. 33, Footnote 1.)

We know, too, that **Bertrand Russell** (Loppuviite)<sup>34</sup> has espoused some ideas from **William James**, too, as he has told in his The Analysis of Mind, and moreover from **John B. Watson**

((1878-1958); **Watson** was an American psychologist, and an originator of behavioristic school, and he was especially an advocate of the most strict materialistic interpretation, who wanted to deny all mentality, and emphasize pure reflex schemes and conditioning.)

who was the originator of behaviorism. According to **S.S. Hilmy** (Loppuviite)<sup>35</sup> **Russell's** opinions on behaviorism were negative still in 1919 but in 1921 already his opinions were changed to positive. It can be also said that he created his causal theory of meaning, which he calls according to **S.S. Hilmy** as mnemonic causation. **Russell** used also **R.W. Semon's** writings, Die Mneme for example. **Bertrand Russell** (Loppuviite)<sup>36</sup> has presented his causal theory especially in his On Propositions. He might be referred to the method which was aimed to improve memory, and which is known as mnemonics. Usually there can be used verses e.g. for remembering irregular declensions of conjugations. Hence, there seems to have been interaction between behaviorism and logical positivism, too.

**Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>37</sup> regarded **C.S. Peirce** generally as the original father of the pragmatist theory of meaning, but more important than this general valuation, was, however, that he has emphasized **C.S. Peirce's** decisive role in the development of **Frank Plumton Ramsey's** philosophy, which had an influence to **Wittgenstein**

(When **Wittgenstein** dealt with such themes as time, infinity, possibility, and chance, he used an expression Die ramseysche Auffassung, which were, according to **Gullvåg**, very Peircean origin (**Gullvåg** 1981, 75; se also: Philosophical Bemerkungen, sect. 143, 163.)

But isn't it strange that **Ramsey** has alluded to the pragmatist theory of meaning - without mentioning **C.S.**

**Peirce** but instead **Russell**, especially in his *Facts and Propositions*

(**Ramsey, F.P.**, "Facts and Propositions", in: **R.B. Braithwaite**, ed., *The Foundations of Mathematics and other Logical Essays* by Frank Plumpton Ramsey., London (1931))

which has been printed in 1927. There is the fact, however, that references, as well as **C.S. Peirce's** name occur frequently in the later writings by **Ramsey**, and that there are even long passages, which are expositions of ideas of **C.S. Peirce**. But **Ramsey** has certainly known the name, because he has mentioned it in *Truth and Probability*, which has been printed in 1926.

**K.T. Fann** (Loppuviite)<sup>38</sup> has argued for that **Ludwig Wittgenstein**, in turn, has derived some of his philosophical ideas from **Ramsey** [and that **Ramsey**, in turn, got lot of influences from **C.S. Peirce**]. From **R.B. Braithwaite** (Loppuviite)<sup>39</sup>, who was the editor of **Ramsey's** papers after his death, we know that **Wittgenstein** was one of those **Ramsey's** friends who gave advices, how to select **Ramsey's** papers.

**Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>40</sup> has also strongly emphasized the personal philosophical influence between **Wittgenstein** and **Ramsey**, and he has told that they even met each other twice in Austria, namely in 1923 and 1925. There has been mutual interface, and respect - as we can see from a sentence in **Ramsey's** (Loppuviite)<sup>41</sup> *Facts and Propositions*, which expresses **Ramsey's** indebtedness to **Wittgenstein**. And vice versa, **Ludwig Wittgenstein** (Loppuviite)<sup>42</sup> has referred to **Ramsey** at the preface in his *Investigations*.

But what about **Ramsey's** references to **Russell** - as the main source of the ideas concerning pragmatism? **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>43</sup> has doubted those **Ramsey's** own references. But there has been claimed to have been other possible influences derived quite from outside of philosophy. From **K.T. Fann** (Loppuviite)<sup>44</sup> we know that **Wittgenstein** derived some of his ideas concerning his doctrine of language games from **Piero Sraffa**. **N. Malcolm** (Loppuviite)<sup>45</sup> has written that **Wittgenstein** has told him personally that Neapolitan **Sraffa** suddenly made him feel that picture theory and his account of the proposition in *Tractatus* were both inadequate. But there is an opposite interpretation of **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>46</sup>, who has doubted the decisive role of **Sraffa** in the philosophical development of **Wittgenstein**.

But there are certain analogies, however. **Piero Sraffa** (Loppuviite)<sup>47</sup> has used in an introduction of his book, as a mean, simple and imagined society, to which he gradually added new features. From the preface of the book we know that his central ideas have been formulated at the end of 1920's, that is, before **Sraffa** and **Wittgenstein** met each other. **Ludwig Wittgenstein** (Loppuviite)<sup>48</sup> has also used some simplified examples, which he has gradually sophisticated, e.g. in *The Blue and Brown Books*.

But has there been any interface between **Bertrand Russell**, **C.K. Ogden** and **Ludwig Wittgenstein**, too. But what kind? From **S.S. Hilmy** (Loppuviite)<sup>49</sup> we know that **Wittgenstein** has met **Russell** in Innsbruck in 1922, and that **Wittgenstein** has also visited in England in 1925. And then there was available the influential work of **C.K. Ogden** and **I.A. Richards** (Loppuviite)<sup>50</sup>, namely *The Meaning of Meaning*

(**C.K. Ogden** and **I.A. Richards** have probably adopted the name of their book from a symposium, which was taken place three years before, and whose name was quite identical. The nucleus of the symposium was **Russell's** article [See: **Russell, B.**, "On Propositions: What They are and How They Mean", in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 1919, suppl. vol. II.], where **Russell** presented the very first version of his causal theory, and to which he two years later gave more complete expression in his work *The Analysis of Mind* (1921).)

where they have presented 16 definitions of meaning, as well as their causal theory of meaning. The theory of **C.K. Ogden** and **I.A. Richards** was quite identical with **Russell's** theory, notwithstanding that they emphasized the role of images. But what is important, is that their book influenced, in a way, to **Ludwig Wittgenstein**, who criticized its causal theory in his late philosophy. And there is an evidence, that he has become acquaintance with *The Meaning of Meaning*.

**Wittgenstein** mailed a letter to **C.K. Ogden**, which has been dated March in 1923 (Loppuviite)<sup>51</sup> where he wrote:

"... The meaning of meaning" reached me a few days ago. ... I have not yet been able to read your book thoroughly. I have however read in it and I think I ought to confess to you frankly that I believe you have not quite caught the problems which - for instance I was at in my book (whether or not I have given the correct solution)".

All of these remarks suggest to that **Ludwig Wittgenstein** might have got some influences also from other directions, than from pragmatism in such, and that he was probably philosophically active in 1920's.

But there is an interesting question on when **Ludwig Wittgenstein** at the first time had become acquaintance with **C.S. Peirce's** ideas. Let us take one example of the possible early influences. **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>52</sup> has presented two interesting points in **Wittgenstein's** philosophy concerning relations: The one is that he used this differentiation of internal and external relations in his Tractatus but did not there apply it to intentionality; while in Bemerkungen he precisely did that. The other is that **Wittgenstein** was acquainted with **Bertrand Russell** since the publication of Principia Mathematica. Now, let us remind that **Russell** took something from the logical theory of relations by **C.S. Peirce**, and rejected one half of it. The very good question is: why **Wittgenstein** should not have some knowledge of **C.S. Peirce** already at this time.

But were there any influences from pragmatism during these early years, indeed?. From **K. Oehler** (Loppuviite)<sup>53</sup>. we know that **William James' Pragmatism** has been translated in German by **Wilhelm Jerusalem** already in 1908, and during the same year there had been an international conference in philosophy in Heidelberg, which concerned mainly pragmatism. But it seems to me plausible that **Wittgenstein** did not yet follow those conferences, because he was, perhaps, just planning to start his studies in philosophy.

There is no need to discuss how decisive, or deep was **Wittgenstein's** role in the development of logical empirism, I guess, or doubt it - in spite of that there are certain indicators that **Wittgenstein** didn't advocate the views of **Russell**, and others, concerning their causal theory of meaning

(One of the themes in Philosophical Bemerkungen was a criticism of causal theories of meaning like the ones proposed by **Ogden**, **Rickhards**, and **Russell** (**Gullvåg** 1981, 77).).

But the ideas which he expressed in Tractatus before that criticism, were accepted by the most members of Vienna Circle. We know, too, that late **Wittgenstein's** influence e.g. to the development of the philosophy of education was remarkable, which e.g. **Ali Martin Allmaker**

(**Allmaker, A. M.**, "Wholeness" in the Philosophy of the Later Wittgenstein and its Applicability to the Philosophy of Education., Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms, 1984., State University of New York at Albany, 1972)

for instance, has described.

Instrumentalism and pragmatism

According to the introduction of **John Dewey's** article by **Dagobert D. Runes** (Loppuviite)<sup>54</sup>, was **John Dewey's** instrumentalism derived from Neo-Kantian background, but carefully differentiated from it, and then developed further to a reaction against **Bradley's** and **Bosanquet's** idealistic interpretation, and finally it was associated near to **John B. Watson's** behaviorism. But we don't discuss those Watsonian influences in detail in the current study, but instead only refer to the footnote at this page

(Since in 1910 **Wilhelm Wundt**'s pedantic study on sensations appeared to be as old-fashion one. There were born two schools of psychology; the one at that time, and the other almos immediately after it. **John B. Watson** was the person, who founded behavioristic school in the United States in 1913. The other school was the school of Gestalt psychology, which was originated by **Max Wertheimer** in 1910, and whose other developers were **Wolfgang Köhler** and **Kurt Koffka**. The school of Gestalt psychology influenced a lot, in turn, to **Karl Bühler**, who was a professor in Vienna, and who has published *Geistige Entwicklung des Kindes* (1918), which was a course book in the New Education Institutes, from where also **Wittgenstein** qualified as teacher, and where he must read **Bühler**'s book in question.)

because there were also other possible influences to be adopted. It is quite possible that more important than school of behaviorism were the influences which **Dewey** been derived from sociology, psychology, and from the field of education, because behaviorism, in itself, has no philosophy to apply.

**John Dewey** (Loppuviite)<sup>55</sup> has described in *From Absolutism to Experimentalism* the change, which took place in his thinking from Hegelian idealism to instrumentalism, especially emphasizing his experiences in the field of education. Let us remind our previous discussions on the theme during the current study

(See: pp. 16, 34, Footnotes 2, 2.)

He has also described his interest to the relationship between values and scientific beliefs, and his interest to **William James**' psychology, and to social categories, when explaining the meaning of participating activities.

There are certain similarities especially between **John Dewey** and **George Herbert Mead**, what comes to their emphasis of sociability of language which, as they thought, makes it possible to have any concepts. From **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>56</sup> we get to know that both **Dewey** and **Mead** saw language as a tool:

"... its primary function being the realization of cooperative activity. They focussed on the biological and sociological nature of language",

which a view was familiar, according to **C.S. Hardwick** (Loppuviite)<sup>57</sup>, to **Wittgensten**'s concern with the uses of language, and with language as a form of life

(See: p. 5, Footnote 1.)

notwithstanding that **Wittgenstein** was not concerned to propound an explicit theory of language.

In his article, concerning **George Herbert Mead**, which has been published in *Journal of Philosophy*, **John Dewey** (Loppuviite)<sup>58</sup> clearly expressed his indebtedness to **G.H. Mead**, due of the positive development of his own thinking. But he also told, that his thinking has been derived mainly from **C.S. Peirce**, and **Josiah Royce**, to, but only by and after **G.H. Mead**.

In his *Six Theories of Mind* (1932), **Charles W. Morris** has discussed largely those influences. According to him, in all of the most essential questions **Mead** agreed with **Dewey**. One similarity we have e.g. when both of them are reasoning that the mind consists of the symbolic functioning of cases. According to **Morris**, there are other similarities, too, e.g. when **G.H. Mead** (Loppuviite)<sup>59</sup> thought that thinking is a method to maintain the contact with a world, which is not yet given, but to which we have a kind of contact, by which we know something on how it has been given. This kind of situation we have, for example, in pioneering scietific research, in which the process of knowledge is born due of the new kind of contact, in which, in turn, something is supposed to exist, before the exact knowledge on what it is, and how to get it. **G. H. Mead** (Loppuviite)<sup>60</sup> thought, too, like **Dewey**, that evolution in nature, where the culmination point is sociability, which is the principle and form, by which the symbolic function comes out. But **G. H. Mead** (Loppuviite)<sup>61</sup> comes very close to **Dewey** also when arguing for, that human life is

mostly the enrichment of intellectual features.

In his *Six Theories of Mind* (1932) **Charles W. Morris** has associated together both **C.S. Peirce** and **George Herbert Mead**, especially when discussing concepts and conceptual systems and the generalization within them according to the depth of meaning. Hence, I think, these thoughts above were very familiar to **C.S. Peirce**, too, and he has presented them far before **G.H. Mead**.

Now, if we think the term instrument, and how it has been used by **C.S. Peirce**, we get an idea of something not-yet-ready, or something which is under processing by something, which has been used as means to reach something more complete. One example we have when **C.S. Peirce** has described how we get the sets of ideas. Let us remind that, according to **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>62</sup>, there is, in the mind, a continuous flow of ideas, or objects, of whose presence we have no understanding, before they become to our consciousness as recollections, but only after they have associated together, and got through several changes. These recollections, notwithstanding that they are not accurate, are accepted as true. We can combine ideas into sets, and separate from each other the material, which is available to cognition, and the choice, of which to constitute a set. We have the relative freedom. The potential idea of form of the set is operative, because it is an instrument, without which it wouldn't be possible to make (any) association in the mind. It can be described by mathematical diagram, as something rational in itself. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>63</sup> has described an organism as an instrument of thought, too.

At a first glance, it seems to be, that there are something, which has been derived from voluntarism, but also some Deweyan, both of which we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study

(See: p. 34, Footnote 4; see also: p. 71, Footnotes 1-2.)

But this is not the case, however, because there is that emphasis of the presence of rationality in every, more or less complete group of association, namely set, which we can have in the mind. And this rationality doesn't stand for the fulfillment of our temporary purposes, as organisms, or persons, but instead it is something for itself, and it is such as it is because the essence of the world.

Some of the followers of **C.S. Peirce** have claimed just similarly that there are no natural born sets of ideas, but instead that we must develop them. From **J.E. Burr** <sup>64</sup> we know that **C.I. Lewis**, in his *Mind and World Order*, synthesized his concept of mind, using as one of its components Kantian epistemology, and he has described the mind as natural instrument, too, by which man organizes phenomena of the world. He has used the **Kantian** categories of thought, however, when explaining the question how. In his *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, **C.I. Lewis** didn't hold [when studying logic, epistemology, and the value theories] that there is something a priori in the human mind, but that there must be, however, some organized [and learned] meanings, before man is able to verify something. The idea of instrumentalistic nature of the human mind, or the means, was in the use of other philosophers, too. Among them is e.g. **Ludwig Wittgenstein** (Loppuviite)<sup>65</sup>, who regarded language as instrument, as well as he regarded its concepts as instruments.

But there is a question of the independence of the means. If we now think that we use different means, or instruments, are they themselves without any other meaning, than we might conclude of their use? Is it only the goal, or purpose, for which they serve, the only meaning, that we ought take in consideration, when discussing meaning of any thing. Or is the case that, when discussing instruments, we are dealing with things, which are suitable to be used in those kind of functions, or activities, when trying to mean something. However, we don't discuss these difficulties just now, but I want only mention that there are certain problems concerning any instrument, or its use, and possible meaning in itself. Those, who are more interested in the question, I refer to **May Brodbeck**

(**Brodbeck, M.** (ed.): *Readings in the Philosophy of Social Sciences.*, Toronto . Ontario., The MacMillan Company., 1968)

who has studied the problems of purpose and function.

William James and experimental psychology

From **Dagbert D. Runes** (Loppuviite)<sup>66</sup> we have already got to know during the current study

(See. p. 46)

that e.g. **William James** derived his ideas from **John Locke**, **David Hume** and **John Stuart Mill**. It seems clear, that, from the purely philosophical point of view, **James** has derived a lot of ideas from English empirism, especially when he was defining, in a new way, both the correspondence and coherence theories of truth, or when he was defining his concepts of habit and mind - using a pragmatic method. But, in addition to these influences, **James** has derived some of his ideas also from **Alexander Bain**

((1818-1903); **Bain** was the Scottish philosopher, and an experimental psychologist, and an exponent of a system of psychology which traces psychological phenomena to the nerves and brain.)

and **Sharworth Hodgson**

(**Hodgson** was an author of The Philosophy of Reflection, and he has also studied metaphysics e.g. in his Metaphysics of Experience.)

From the first **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>67</sup> we know that **Hodgson** was as member in his intellectual society, too.

Scottish **Alexander Bain** insisted that psychological phenomenons can be reduced to brain functions. **Bain** (Loppuviite)<sup>68</sup> has written on pleasure and pain in his Principles of Psychology:

"... Pleasure and pain, in the actual and real experience, are to be held as identical with motive power", and

**Bain** (Loppuviite)<sup>69</sup> has also written them also in his Mental and Moral Science:

"... our pleasurable emotions are all liable to detain the mind unduly [through the] atmosphere of excitement [with which they are surrounded, carrying the mind] beyond the estimate of pleasure and pain, to the state named passion [in which a man is not] moved solely by the strict value of pleasure [but also by] the encroaching power of the excitement".

**Bain** (Loppuviite)<sup>70</sup> has also written in the same book:

"... acute pleasures and pains stimulate the will perhaps more strongly than an equivalent stimulation of the massive kind".

I think that there are certain similarities both to **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** in the question of the role of the concepts we know as the passion and the will. When explaining e.g. memory, imagination, and love, in his Principles of Psychology, **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>71</sup> has cited the association laws of **Alexander Bain**, and **David Hartley**

((1705-1757); **Hartley** was an English physician and philosopher; regarded as the founder of the English (associationist) school of psychologist.)

but he has applied them, too, when explaining language. But what is important there is that **James** has cited in his *Principles of Psychology* e.g. the scientific discoveries of **Francis Galton**

((1822-1911); **Galton** was an English anthropologist, geneticist, and psychologist, and the cousin of **Charles R. Darwin**. He was the founder of eugenics, by which which was aimed to make the human race genetically better. He suggested e.g. that we ought to choose parents. He used a lot statistical methods.)

and **Wilhelm Wundt**

(See: pp. 76, Footnote 2; see also p. 77.)

But we have also some knowledge of **William James'** critical attitudes concerning the ideas of **Wundt**. From **E.G. Boring** (Loppuviite)<sup>72</sup> we know that **James** did not accept elementarism, as well as **Wundt's** certain concepts. Further, **John R. Wilson** (Loppuviite)<sup>73</sup> has written, in a popular series, which has been published by *The Time*, that **James** considered the whole German psychological tradition very boring, but admitted that it would be very difficult to disprove e.g. **Wundt's** theories, by splitting them into smaller parts, without that those parts still were alive like short pieces of a worm.

From **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>74</sup> we know that in the year 1872 **William James** was an instructor in physiology at Harvard Medical School, and that he was the leader of the first course on experimental psychology in the United States in 1875. It was because of his work, that Harvard became later as an important center of psychology.

But there were also other pragmatists, who were interested in experimental psychology. Let us remind the role of experimental psychology in **John Dewey's** philosophy, which we have dealt when discussing his relationship to **Friedrich Hegel** at the chapter of idealism

(See: p. 34.)

but also elsewhere

(See: p. 112.)

However, once more, **Dewey** rejected his Hegelian tendencies, when studying experimental psychology by **G. Stanley Hall**

(**Hall** was an advocate of the school of Wundt. But there were more dynamic influences, too, which were more important to the development of **Dewey's** thinking: 1) An individual goes trough the history of human specie during socialisation and cognitive development. 2) Nature is always right. 3) Physical growth is more essential than cognitive, because all which has been fluid before, is just repeating the previous stages of mankind, as fixed form of them. Then there were some later ideas, which were derived both from **Freud** and evolution philosophy, whose possible influence is more questionable, such as: Every change, which is a true step forward in evolution, takes place in the population of adolescence, and that we may apply catharsis-hypothesis, and the concept of storm and stress, and generally we can accept that there is the nascent-period, during which there is overflow of hereditical energy. (**Grinder** 1973, 20-24).)

as we have known from **S.R. Vaughn** (Loppuviite)<sup>75</sup>. For more information I refer also to **E.G. Boring**

(**Boring, E.G.**, *A History of Experimental Psychology.*, The Century Co., New York, pp. 539-542, 506-507, 1931)

and to the footnote on the current page, and especially to **Boring's** description concerning both **Dewey's** work and role in the field of experimental psychology.

But **C.S. Hall** [as the most of psychologists of his age] had quite different professional contacts, also when he was at an older age, as we know e.g from **Benjamin Kleinmuntz** (Loppuviite)<sup>76</sup>, who has presented a

well-known photo, where psychologist **C.S. Hall** met e.g. **Sigmund Freud**

((1856-1939); **Freud** was an Austrian specialist in neurology, and the founder of psycho-analysis.)

and **Carl Gustaf Jung**

((1875-1961); **Jung** was the Swiss psychologist, and a follower of **Freud**. Later he founded a school of analytical psychology, differing from psycho-analysis in its use of the concepts of unconscious and libido and in its advocacy of a complex classification of types of personality.)

and some other psychiatrists at Clark University.

But if we think **Dewey**, and the later experimental psychology, there is a question of ignorance, or denied influence of it. Already in 1930's there were **Clark L. Hull**'s electrochemical models, as well as his model of maze learning - which do not seem to have influenced much to **Dewey**'s philosophy, any more.

From the whole correspondence between **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** we know that they had a lot of discussions about experimental psychology, as well as philosophical themes since 1870 and long after that date. In a letter, which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **William James** on the 3th October in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>77</sup>, he referred to several psychological books, which he had used in his previous letter to **James**, which was dated on the 28th September in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>78</sup>. In the letter which **C.S. Peirce** mailed to **William James**, and which was dated on the 25th November in 1902 (Loppuviite)<sup>79</sup>, there is a reference to psychological aspects of aesthetics, ethics, and logic. What is important there, is that these things took place long after **C.S. Peirce** has left Coast Survey and universities.

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## **Introspection to pragmatism: some remarks of C.S. Peirce's life, literal remains, and of some philosophical themes**

Edition process of Chance, Love, and Logic, and Collected Papers

If we discuss both the edition and publishing process of **C.S. Peirce's** literal remains, there is the fact, that we have several collections, or the stages of them. We can divide roughly the whole process into two different main stages. And in addition, it might be suggested, that the third stage of those Papers is the stage of the late followers, or commentators, who know, nothing less, what **C.S. Peirce** was just really saying here and there, or intending to do, or was he worthy of nothing, or muddle-headed

(See: p. 99)

or something worse than it.

From **Ingemund Gullvåg** (Loppuviite)<sup>1</sup> we know [and at an earlier stage in the current study we have known

(See: p. 78, Footnote 2.)

that Chance, Love and Logic

(**Cohen, M.R.**, (ed.): Chance, Love and Logic, Philosophical Essays by the late Charles S. Peirce., New York, 1923)

was the first version of Collected Papers by Charles Sanders Peirce, which was much larger, and was called the Great Harvard Edition

(**C.S. Peirce.**, Collected Papers by Charles Sanders Peirce., I-VIII, edited by **Charles Hartshorne** and **P. Weiss.**, Cambridge-mass., 1931-1958)

But there have been also later editions, which are more complete, but still essentially the same.

I have regarded, as the most important source, the 7th and 8th volume of the later Collected Papers

(**Peirce, C.S.**, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, Vol. VII/ Science and Philosophy, Vol. VIII/ Reviews, Correspondence, and Bibliography., edited by **Arthur W. Burks.**, Cambridge-Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., 1966)

the former deals with science and philosophy, and the latter deals with reviews, correspondence, and bibliography. There is the fact, that lot of **C.S. Peirce's** essential writings can be found in them.

For example, an introduction to "A Treatise of Cosmology"

(**Peirce, C.S.**, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce., VIII, edited by **Arthur W. Burks.**, Cambridge-Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., Introduction to "A Treatise of Cosmology"., in Reviews., pp. 148-154, 1966)

and an article concerning **Lady Welby's** "What is Meaning"

(**Peirce, C.S.**, Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce., VIII, edited by **Arthur W. Burks.**, Cambridge-Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press., An article concerning **Lady Welby's** "What is Meaning"., in Reviews., pp. 131-140, 1966)

We shall not much discuss that cosmology, but instead we shall deal with few words that semiotics later during the current study.

**Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>2</sup> has written that when editing Collected Papers, some of **C.S. Peirce's** writings has been adopted from philosophical newspapers, and some of those writings were homogenous. But there were also writings, which didn't agree with each others, notwithstanding that they dealt with the same themes. Editors found often several versions of writings, which concerned the same theme, but any of them was not final. It was not always possible to imagine, what kind might be the version, which could be accepted as the final. It was no wonder that often editors must synthesize the possible solution from different materials, which were available. But that couldn't guarantee, that in the text accepted, there were not any more fragmented elements, or that the final version were more comprehensible than the individual texts, from which it was synthesized. This is [and will be] the case concerning any acceptable edition of **C.S. Peirce's** literary remains. Accepted solutions are, and shall always be, a result of the policy of editor's. For example, one of the most influential factors concerning the policy [in the case of Collected Papers], was the possible public attractiveness of the accepted writings.

This fragmentary of **C.S. Peirce's** writings, presented as the fact, is just according to **John Dewey** (Loppuviite)<sup>3</sup>, who has proposed for that **C.S. Peirce** did not write down his philosophical findings systematically, and did not succeed to make any homogenous theory of pragmatism, and that **William James**, and **Dewey** himself, has done the rest of work.

Let us remind, however, our previous discussion concerning the birth of the new term pragmatism, which we dealt with at the chapter of humanism in the current study

(See: pp. 30, 83)

and the letter which **C.S. Peirce** wrote to **Mario Calderoni** probably in the year 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>4</sup> where **C.S. Peirce** proposed for pragmatism [pragmaticism] was not aimed to be a philosophical system, but instead a method of thinking. But what is the difference, when discussing method, or theory. In a nutshell, a theory has not necessary any consequences, or practical bearings, and still it may be quite correct formally, but if a method has no consequences, it should be rejected.

We have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study the lack of published works of **C.S. Peirce**

(See: p. 51)

However, he planned to write several times a book concerning pragmatism. For example, in a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed a letter to **William James**, and which has been dated on the 7th March in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>5</sup> **C.S. Peirce** told him that he was going to write a 150-sided book on pragmatism. He planned to join to it some of his earlier writings concerning same themes with critical notes.

But there were economical, and other difficulties, which we shall discuss later in detail, but for now we can say that **C.S. Peirce** sold the books which he owned e.g. to libraries, and there were also his own writings with them. In a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **William James**, and which has been dated on the 28th September in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>6</sup> he has used an exclamation mark (!) when describing his "library". Unfortunately I do not know who was that person [or an institute] who has bought his books in this time. From Collected Papers (Loppuviite)<sup>7</sup> we know that **C.S. Peirce** sold e.g. to the library of John Hopkins University several hundreds of his books, as well as the material which he had written.

But there were also some private collections, to where his books were archived. Hence, if we think all of this, it is no wonder that **Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>8</sup> has written, that for localize **C.S. Peirce's** literal remains, editors worked a lot, and a part of the material, which was found, was unknown before. But it was not because of the efforts of editors, that those literal remains became a work, at last. Behind the edition process, there have been several *éminence grise*

((Fr.) *éminence grise*: Eminence.)

without which the edition work couldn't be possible

(such as Rockefeller Foundation, Department of Philosophy of Harvard University, and Horace H. Rackham School of Graduate Studies of the University of Michigan)

But from where the editors got all of those **C.S. Peirce's** literary remains, and other materials? From Collected Papers (Loppuviite)<sup>9</sup> and its Bibliography we get to know that at Harvard University Houghton Library there have been twenty boxes and bundles, but they have not been catalogized, because of their fragmentary. However, every single finding have been examined carefully by editors, and by those people, too, who have personally known **C.S. Peirce**, or who have been acquainted with the texts in question. Then there will be arisen an eternal question, how the editors of **C.S. Peirce's** literary remains did succeeded to create such an enormous work as Collected Papers, which has its own way of life, if there were no system in **C.S. Peirce's** writings? And further, if there were no rational in those writings, how editors could make them more sensible and reasonable than they were originally?

And what about that fragmentary? We get one possible answer from **Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>10</sup>, who has proposed for that fragmentary of material was partly quite illusory, and too apparent, because of editors tried to put writings under [their] pre-determined headings, according to their current policy. Those headings has been stated mostly by editors, but is some cased they have used **C.S. Peirce's** own headings. However, in general, editors have used his own way to use punctuation marks, spelling, or underline, but they have made some corrections, too. From Collected Papers (Loppuviite)<sup>11</sup> and its Bibliography we know that at Harvard University Widener Library there were sixty boxes and bundles, of which **Knight W. McMahon**

(**McMahon, K.W.**, Catalogue of C.S. Peirce Manuscripts, December, 1941)

has made a catalogue, as follows:

#### I Science of Discovery

- A. Mathematics
- B. Philosophy

1. Pragmatism and the categories
2. Normative sciences (logic)
3. Metaphysics

#### C. Idioscopy

#### II Science of review: Classification of the sciences

#### III Practical science and miscellaneous

#### IV Book reviews

#### V Life and letters

- A. Bibliography
- B. Correspondence

1. Personal
2. Professional
3. Business
4. Official: Coast Survey (The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey)

## 5. Application

And then few words concerning the early version of Collected Papers. If we study only *Chance, Love, and Logic*, we can find most of those ideas of **C.S. Peirce**, which are well-known as the kernel of pragmatism. For example, in *Chance, Love and Logic* (Loppuviite)<sup>12</sup> there is the famous pragmatic maxim:

"... Consider what effects, which might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object",

which we have already discussed during the current study

(See: p. 46)

Then, there is a reference to the thought-sign-theory

(thought-sign theory: Presented e.g. in the article "Signs", which is in **Baldwin's** Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology.)

which holds that thoughts are signs. But the theory was not properly presented in *Chance, Love and Logic* (Loppuviite)<sup>13</sup>, but was only mentioned in **M.R. Cohen's** bibliography. Then, in *Chance, Love and Logic* (Loppuviite)<sup>14</sup> there is an idea of the irritation which is produced just by the doubt, and which is the only motive in that striving, where we will find out, that we are believing to something (and not knowing), and that striving comes to its end, when there is no doubt left. This, in turn, indicates to certain Humean tendencies in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy. However, if we read nothing but *Chance, Love, and Logic*, we get an impression of logician, and mathematician, and not mystician, which kind **C.S. Peirce** also, quite apparently was.

The personality, life style, and philosophy of C.S. Peirce.

From **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>15</sup> we know that **C.S. Peirce** was a difficult and eccentric man. But what kind was that difficulty or eccentricity? Let us start from his poor academical career. Both **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>16</sup>, and **John E. Smith** (Loppuviite)<sup>17</sup> has given an identical information that **C.S. Peirce** didn't succeed to have any permanent academical post, notwithstanding all of his efforts - but they do not explain much of those reasons, which ruined all of his efforts to have academic career at Harvard and John Hopkins. From **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>18</sup> we get to know e.g. that **C.S. Peirce** did not succeed to have an influential academic position at Harvard and John Hopkins, because of his way of life, which was too intemperate to the academic world and its permanency. Because of his lack of academic status, he could not be as influential as e.g. professors **John Dewey**, and **William James**.

From **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>19</sup> we get to know, too, that **C.S. Peirce** was an enthusiast user of cocaine, and morphine, as **Thomas A. Edison**

((1847-1931); **Edison** was an American inventor of the phonograph, and [with Sir **J.W. Swan** (1828-1914)] of the incandescent electric lamp.)

and **Ulysses E. Grant**

((1822-1885); **Grant** was an American general, who fought on the Federal side during the American Civil War. He was also 18th president of U.S. between 1869-1877.)

in U.S., and **Jules Verne**

((1828-1905); **Verne** was a French-born novelist, who achieved popularity by combination of adventure with popular science in his *Twenty Thousand Leagues under the Sea*, etc.)

who was French origin. As we know from **L. Grinspoon** et. al. (Loppuviite)<sup>20</sup>, there was a large acceptance of cocaine in the field of medicine at the beginning of 1800's

(E.g. by **Johan Jacob von Tschuld**, **Clements Markham**, and **H.A. Weddel**, for instance, who praised cocaine very high.)

(Loppuviite). At the end of 1800's, it was **Paolo Mantegazza**, who influenced a lot to that **Sigmund Freud** became a cocaine addict. Thus, we might say, at least, that **C.S. Peirce** was not quite alone with his problem with drugs and alcohol. The use of cocaine at those days was not at all understood as a problem. But we shall never get know the role of the drug use in the development of **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy, or in the development of the psychology of **Sigmund Freud**. However, gradually **C.S. Peirce** became a morphine and cocaine addict and he was forced to take larger doses to get an impact which was enough.

However, I am not going to emphasize those misappropriations and the problems with alcohol and drugs, which **C.S. Peirce** has had, as we know from **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>21</sup>. But certain conditions of other kind might be more decisive, as e.g. certain social relationships, and philosophical climates, which were available, and which didn't agree with each other, and from where philosophers can derive their ideas from. But we cannot predict a much from milk and butter the things which influence just to the production of ideas.

From **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>22</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce** has lectured occasionally at Harvard, but also at John Hopkins university for five years on logic. But how he actually got those vacations? From **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>23</sup> we know that it was due of **C.S. Peirce's** father, **Benjamin Peirce**, that **C.S. Peirce** had, on the whole, that opportunity at all to lecture first at Harvard, and later at John Hopkins.

**Benjamin Peirce**

(**Benjamin Peirce** was e.g. one of the founders of the Academy of Sciences [with **Louis Agassiz** and senator **Henry Wilson** in 1863, with the patronage of **Abraham Lincoln**]. In addition to this, **Benjamin Peirce** was the leader of the foundation which was aimed to advance science, and he was the supervisor of The United States Coast Survey, which, in turn, I guess, facilitated to that **C.S. Peirce** got a post at the institute in question.)

was an influential figure in the many scientific fields in the United States at those days. **C.S. Peirce's** mother was **Sarah Hunt Mills**, who was a daughter of senator **Eliah Hunt Mills**. Hence, **C.S. Peirce** seems to have had good resources for life. But this was the case with most American philosophers, they were not advocates of mob

(There is an expression "general mob of writers" in **C.S. Peirce's** text (Cohen 1923, 43f)

Such kind of wealthy people were also pragmatists **George Santayana** and **William James**. In general, philosophizing was not a poor man's profession, until a wealthy man became poor, for one reason or another. According to **Joseph Brent**, there were several different stages in **C.S. Peirce's** personal life, too, and one of them was the self-destructive stage in 1880's, which **Brent** has called Fall of Man, according to **J. Milton's**

(1608-1674); **Milton** was an English Puritan poet, and author of the epics *Paradise Lost* (1667) [consisted of 12 books, and described the battle with heaven and evil], and *Paradise Regained* (1671).)

However, after **C.S. Peirce** had lost his vacations at universities and Coast Survey, he wrote more philosophy than during his earlier years. **Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>24</sup> has given us an accurate information concerning the two sessions, during which **C.S. Peirce's** was employed at Coast Survey

(**C.S. Peirce** has been employed two different sessions at The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey.

The first of them began on the 21th September in 1859 and lasted on the 1th June in 1860. The second session began on the 1th July 1861 and lasted on the 31th September in 1891.)

During the sessions at Coast Survey, and especially after them, there was growing self-critics, which we must especially reckon, when dealing with the correspondence between **C.S. Peirce** and **William James**.

An example of the critics is one of **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **William James**, which has been dated on the 13th March in 1897 (Loppuviite)<sup>25</sup>, which dates after both of the sessions mentioned. At the letter **C.S. Peirce** criticized his earlier writings and their emphasis of practical results. I wonder if his pragmatic maxim has been formulated at these early years? Five years later, in a letter, which has been dated on the 25th November 1902 (Loppuviite)<sup>26</sup> he has expressed also criticism concerning his earlier philosophical ideas - which he had had e.g. in 1877 or during Cambridge lectures. From the letter in question we can find [a kind of] supporting information to the claims which **Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>27</sup> has given, namely how **C.S. Peirce's** experience in empirical science influenced to his philosophy. It is quite obvious that he recognized via his experiences, and experiments, how far we actually are from the accuracy of the explanation, when using pragmatic maxim now. He was an instructor at Cambridge e.g. in 1898, where one of his themes in his [two] lectures was the term habit, especially on the 7th lecture, during which he referred to his father, **Benjamin Peirce's**

(**Peirce, B.**, Analytic Mechanism)

work, and used his examples during those lectures. During 1883 **C.S. Peirce** made measurements in gravity, and invented that there were also some physical instabilities. At the same time he participated to psychological experiments at John Hopkins university. We can read at those psychological studies in question at Memoirs

(**Peirce, C.S.**, Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences., 3, Part I (1884), pp. 73-83)

and that their active participants were **C.S. Peirce** and **Joseph Jastrow**. But we can get better information of them also from Collected Papers (Loppuviite)<sup>28</sup>.

But when **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** actually have become acquainted with each other? **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>29</sup> has affirmed that **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** were close friends trough their whole life, since the year **James** has started his studies at Harvard. In the same time **C.S. Peirce** has been employed to The Coast Survey. But it is plausible that **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** did not contact much face to face during the first session when **C.S. Peirce** worked at Coast Survey. But for what reason?

From the fourth ENCY (Loppuviite)<sup>30</sup> we know that **James** has been studying in Europe during the years 1855-1860, because his father had sent **William**, with his brother **Henry**, to Europe - according to **Ralph Barton Perry** (Loppuviite)<sup>31</sup>: to get some impacts from German and French cultures. According to the fourth ENCY, **James** wanted to study psychology more, and he went again to Europe, especially to Germany, in 1867, where he studied widely the books of science and philosophy, until he got emotional crisis in 1870. And it is quite obvious, as **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>32</sup> has suggested for, that **James** told about those voyages to his close friend, **C.S. Peirce**.

According **Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>33</sup>, **C.S. Peirce's** second working session at The United States Coast and Geodetic Survey began on the 1th July 1861 and lasted on the 31th September in 1891. After this last date there were no professional contacts between Survey and **C.S. Peirce**. But what was actually the reason why **C.S. Peirce** must leave his work at Coast Survey? **Brent** has given us an information that **C.S. Peirce** was discarded from the Coast Survey by the Comission of the Senate - partly because of his drinking and partly because of his misappropriations of money.

From **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>34</sup> we have got to known

(See: p. 9, Footnote 1.)

that at first **William James** was an instructor in physiology since 1872, and he was elected to an office of

professor in 1880, when he had already degree in medicine. From **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>35</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce's** academic career ended at John Hopkins in 1884 - a year later that he has got married with his new wife, **Juliette Annette Peirce**. His first wife, **Zina Fay Peirce**, was left him already in 1876. **C.S. Peirce** has visited in Berlin in 1875, only a year before it. But what comes to **Zina Fay**, we have discussed quite different name during the current study

(See: p. 100)

Notwithstanding all the difficulties, and changes in **C.S. Peirce's** personal life, it seems to me, that **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** must have had conversations concerning Europe, and its philosophical climate. From **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>36</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce** appreciated the universities of the Middle-Ages, as well as universities in Germany and new colleges in England, because of they have done so much for personality of students. Especially French language and philosophy had a certain role in the development of pragmatism. From the fourth **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>37</sup> we get to know that after **William James** has got his emotional crisis in 1870, he could be cured from it only by the belief to the free will. When **William James** was in Europe, he has studied e.g. **Charles Renouvier's**

(**Renouvier, C.**, *Essais de Critique Générale.*, 4 Vols., Paris., 1854-1864)

influential *Essais de Critique Générale*, which was already available during **James's** first journey to Europe. **James** has derived a lot of his conception of freedom from **Charles Renouvier**. Later **James** also personally met **Renouvier** who joined to his intellectual society.

From the sixth **ENCY** (Loppuviite)<sup>38</sup> we get to know that **Charles Renouvier** had got published his *Le Personnalisme* in 1903, and it might be quite possible, too, that **James** knew also something about this book, or became acquainted with its ideas. But this is a hypothesis. However, **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>39</sup> owed one of his books to memorial of **Renouvier**. And we have some evidences of that **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** have discussed **Renouvier** and that both of them have been acquainted with his literal production. We can meet **Renouvier's** name in **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **F.C.S. Schiller** which is dated on the 10th November in 1906 (Loppuviite)<sup>40</sup> where **C.S. Peirce** referred to **Charles Renouvier's** work, which he, for some reason, named to *Essais de Critique Philosophique* [or something like that]...

... Anyway, there was that common French language between **C.S. Peirce** and **William James**. And what is important there is that **C.S. Peirce** seems to have derived the concept real from **Renouvier**, which has originally been presented by **John Duns Scotus**

(See: p. 74, Footnote 2.)

whom we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study.

In a letter which **C.S. Peirce** mailed to **William James** on the 23th July in 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>41</sup> he praised for **James's** fluent French: the rhetoric qualities of French produce to **James's** expression a clarity that seems to lack in his English expressions. And in addition: **C.S. Peirce** has made a remark, that nearly always, when **James** has written something in English, he has not quite understood the goal of **James's** writings, or what he was going to say. Just in that time **William James** has written an article, *La Notion de Conscience*

(**James, W.**, *La Notion de Conscience.*, *Archives de Psychologie* 5., June., 1905; see also: *La Notion de Conscience.*, in *New York Evening Post.*, 31.7.1905)

**C.S. Peirce** and **William James** had also other common themes to discuss, too. During the time when **C.S. Peirce** was employed at John Hopkins university, he had an opportunity to be acquainted with empirical psychology and its methods. From *Collected Papers* (Loppuviite)<sup>42</sup> we know that there **C.S. Peirce** and **Joseph Jastrow** participated to psychological experiments, to which we have referred before

(See: p. 130)

But there were also later philosophical interaction with French philosophy after the death of **William James** and **C.S. Peirce**. From **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>43</sup> we know that 90 years later, when there was a great interest to semiotics by French philosophers there was a contact with **C.S. Peirce's** ideas again. We shall discuss the topic later during the current study. However, **C.S. Peirce** was not from French origin because the first advocate of his family became from Norwich in 1637, and the name of that grandfather of family in question was **John Pers**. But this is a quite different story.

There are several indicators which suggest to that **C.S. Peirce** lived economically unstable life, and we can make a hypothesis that it has affected on it how much he has produced philosophical texts. This question is not at all that simple, since he had written really an enormous amount of texts - in spite of his poor economical status. The collectors and editors of his writings found his writings all around but they were fortunately untouched. Let us remind to what has been said at an earlier stage during the current chapter about the edition process of Collected Papers by **Arthur W. Burks** (Loppuviite)<sup>44</sup>, and especially that editors must trace his literary remains from here and there.

There are a lot of information concerning **C.S. Peirce's** poor economical situation - for example by **John E. Smith** (Loppuviite)<sup>45</sup> and by **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>46</sup>. It is no wonder that **C.S. Peirce** got repeatedly a direct economical support from his friends and from his family. For example, soon after **C.S. Peirce** has got married with **Juliette Annette Peirce** in 1883 they bought a farm in Arisbe Milford, which relatively quickly began to fall into disrepair - because they lost their money. In order to get money **C.S. Peirce** sold his books to his brother, **James Mills Peirce**, who gave the books back soon after he has given the price of those books. Notwithstanding this present he has got, he didn't succeed to keep his library for a long time. From his late years, I want to mention, too, his letter to **Paul Carus** which has been written in 1910 (Loppuviite)<sup>47</sup> where he gave thanks to money he has got. In the letter **C.S. Peirce** also told that his wife was unhealthy, and that they tried to prepare their house. All of this seems to suggest to that **C.S. Peirce** lost all that he owned, including all of his books. However, this was not the case. **C.S. Peirce** have probably had some dictionaries in his use, as well as other books, from time to time, at least, as we know by the letter which he wrote to **William James** on the 23th July in 1905 (Loppuviite)<sup>48</sup>, in which he told that he was forced to consult 23 books in order to answer the question of entity. And, as he told, he told, too, that he didn't count to them **Baldwin's** dictionary and **Eisler**.

Those poor social conditions may be negative and punishing. But when considering the correspondence, there are not much of their valuation, or feeling sorry for them, which may be due of that those letters are not included to Collected Papers, or there may be some other reasons. Anyway, the themes, which the most letters deal with, are philosophical. But there is still something left in them, namely the rejection of philosophy, and ideas. I shall take a letter in consideration which expresses very well his own feelings of the receptiveness of the whole philosophic audience concerning his ideas. As we know via his correspondence - e.g. in a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **William James** on the 12th June in 1902 (Loppuviite)<sup>49</sup> he complained, that almost at every turn he must hear that all what he has said is incomprehensible, and nobody has taken a notice to his careful and long duration studies with language. He continued that **James** has autosuggested himself to believe, too, that:

"... all what C.S. Peirce says is unintelligible",

and in the letter **C.S. Peirce** has given a kind of explanation: that he knew quite well that his expressions were gauche, but that his recluse life

(Recluse life: Live like a hermit. See also: An expression eremitical life, which refers to hermits, who in early Cristian times lived alone)

which has lasted twenty years, has made them such ones. At the end of the letter he has used an expression:

"... Forgive the garrulity that comes from my eremitical life, and God bless you".

There can be found quite similar information also by commentators what concerns **C.S. Peirce's** tendency to use his own terminology. For example, **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>50</sup> has described **C.S. Peirce's** style using an illustrative term crabbed, and he has also noticed his tendency to use his own terminology, too. But **Ayer** has not explained closely why **C.S. Peirce** had that tendency.

But what about the personal characters of **William James**? **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>51</sup> has given to **James** a lot of positive attributes, and he has described **James** as a person who had a sense of humor, and whose lectures were vivid, and who had a lot of enthusiastic students, because of his sympathetic personal characters. Let us remind, too, that **William James** was a sociable person, and that he had a kind of intellectual society. Hence, we may conclude that he was quite different than difficult and eccentric **C.S. Peirce**.

If we think **C.S. Peirce's** poor economical status now, the question which arises there is: could it be possible that **C.S. Peirce's** obvious poor economical status should have influenced to his philosophical ideas - or to his productivity in general? **John E. Smith** (Loppuviite)<sup>52</sup> has supposed that **C.S. Peirce's** spirit was quite free of his own poor economical and other circumstances alike. And from **Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>53</sup>, but also from others, we know that **C.S. Peirce** has written a main part of his writings during the last twenty years of his life - just when he had more economical, and other difficulties than ever. Notwithstanding all this **C.S. Peirce** referred quite seldom to his own poor economical status e.g. at his letters [which were accepted to published]. There are only few such references available, and moreover, these are indirect ones - as an example the exclamation mark (!) when he described his "library", which we have discussed during the current study

(See: p. 125)

But it may be true, anyway, that if he [or anyone] had more resources, he should have been capable to collect his writings himself, and that we might have now quite different kind of Collected Papers available.

An interesting question, which will arise, is that what kind of motive drives a philosopher to have more and more knowledge, or explanations, which, perhaps, only future generations shall understand. It might be possible that nobody shall be interested in the findings. And in general, in future there could be nobody, who were interested in complicated explanations, and instead of them, only in instant pleasure, or a life of others in electrical, virtual worlds. There is an expense of all human powers, and a lack of all benefits which he could to have with the aid of money. The only result a philosopher can have is that he shall be accused to be as muddle-headed at distant future? A philosopher will never know how future philosophers shall interpret his ideas, or are them only philosophical dead ends - which have no value to anybody. I think that this is far more important question, than have a philosopher got money or not. If one has no ideas, money does not help to get them.

But **C.S. Peirce** discussed the general themes of economics and effectiveness very often - also in his writings. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>54</sup> has insisted that the true hypothesis is only one out of innumerable possible false ones, when he discussed with hypotheses and criterions by which we are choosing them. And there is always the consideration of economy, of enormous expensiveness of experimentation in money, time, energy and thought. He also suggested that economy, in general, depends upon three kinds of factors which are cost, the value of the thing proposed, in itself, and finally its effect upon other projects. But there is the principle of simplicity, too. As we advance further and further into science, the aid that we can derive from the natural light of reason becomes, no doubt, less and less; but still science will cease to progress if ever we shall reach the point where there is no longer an infinite saving of expense in experimentation to be effected by care that our hypotheses are such as naturally recommend themselves to the mind, and make us just the impression of simplicity, -which here means facility of comprehension by the human mind, -or aptness, or reasonableness, of good sense. Let us remind what I have said at an earlier stage in the current study about simplicity of the concepts, laws and rules.

This may sound to us as there were a businessman telling about his quite narrow visions. But we know that **C.S. Peirce** wasn't a such one, and for that reason he could mean only that, in general, there are certain

boundaries around the human activities which can dictate how far the human beings can reach as individuals and groups, in spite of their extraordinary intelligence and effectiveness. And for certain, that simplicity does not mean that we can easily access those more advanced truths.

But there has been also other tendencies in **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy. **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>55</sup> has emphasized that **C.S. Peirce's** urge for the larger education, and for developing the personalities of students, as English colleges, German universities, and the great universities in The Middle-Ages had done. He also insisted for that the economical utility itself must be banned and instead of it there must emphasize that students would find the truth. **C.S. Peirce** has used the expression meagerness to describe the result which may be followed from the purely an Utilitarian orientation.

But why he had these kind of opinions? Let us take in consideration that **A.J. Ayer's** <sup>56</sup> emphasis concerning the free climate of European universities. We have also an article, which was published in Science, in which **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>57</sup> attached strongly against the pure pragmatic view in education and criticized also the economical productivity as a reason for choosing professors to American colleges and suggested instead to aiming to the theoretical orientation and studies. He supposed that we should not to see reality only measuring it trough the economical wins. He argumented so that money, productivity and utilitarianism belong to the wrong pedagogic orientation, and to its criterions, when ranking succeeding in educational enterprises. An yet there is one comment on utility - which we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study, which is considering specially the very nature of science, in which **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>58</sup> has uttered that, in general, science should concentrate to those things which have no instant utility, because the useful ones are carried on much better without the consultation of the scientists. let us remind our earlier discussions concerning the theme during the current study.

An finally, in a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **William James**, and which has been dated on the 13th March 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>59</sup> he has told to **James** that in his former writings he emphasized too much the narrow pragmatic view, which wanted immediate results. This is something against his pragmatic maxim. However, his new view can be linked to what he has, according to **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>60</sup>, argued for better education. At the letter **C.S. Peirce** admitted, that in his younger days he made him quilt to that too pragmatic view, considering pragmatism and also the duty of science by an Utilitarian way, but as an older he wanted instead to ask what an usage, and practical bearings themselves could mean. We can see clearly now, that there are certain discrepancies in **C.S. Peirce's** thoughts concerning the question of utility. But on what reason? Because of the philosophical development of **C.S. Peirce** and because of the different themes and contexts, too. In addition to this he emphasized in his younger days different things as older, and also for that reason there seems to be different seasons in his thinking. An illustrative example of this is the development of his thoughts concerning logic, for example via **C.S. Peirce's** letter to **William James**, which has been dated on the 25th November in 1902 (Loppuviite)<sup>61</sup>, in which he evaluated his view in 1877 as rough, as well as when he lectured at Cambridge. According his new view the foundation of logic is in ethics, which in turn has its foundation in aesthetic.

All of these passages suggest to the philosophy of change, and acceptance of the new influences, and the points of view, as far as they are not offering only one kind of explanation, or fixing the reality far before the beginning, and becoming. It might be possible, that man with one kind of life, can never adopt this kind of acceptance.

C.S. Peirce: inventor of the term pragmatism

When I have read the correspondence between **C.S. Peirce** and **William James** them it has began to seem to me quite obvious that **James** appreciated **C.S. Peirce** in a way, by which any other pragmatists seldom did. I shall present three different contexts where **James** clearly expressed his indebtedness to his philosophical grandfather. First I consider the term pragmatism. In the letter which was dated on the 10th November in 1900 (Loppuviite)<sup>62</sup> **C.S. Peirce** inquired from **James** the person who originally invented

the term pragmatism. He was at that time illustrating to **Baldwin's** Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology

(There is an article "Signs" in **Baldwin's** Dictionary of Philosophy, where **C.S. Peirce** has introduced his thought-sign-theory (**Gullvåg** 1981, 77))

those philosophic ideas, which could be associated to the character "j". **William James** answered to **C.S. Peirce** with a postcard dated on the 26th November in 1900 (Loppuviite)<sup>63</sup> saying that he regarded **C.S. Peirce** as the inventor of the term in question. **James** told that he has given an honor to his close friend in his lecture on "Philosophical Concepts and Practical Results", and that he sent two copies of it to **C.S. Peirce** two years ago.

Secondly. There are also other graduations concerning **C.S. Peirce's** role in the development of American pragmatic movement. **William James** has given an honor to his friend in some of his articles, too. For example, **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>64</sup> he has described **C.S. Peirce's** philosophy, as a whole, in his article concerning **F.C.S. Schiller's** humanism, which was published in The Nation on the 3th March in 1904:

"... Quite recently the word pragmatism, first used thirty years ago by our American philosopher, C.S. Peirce, has become fashionable as the designation of a novel way of looking at the mind's relation to reality",

of which **C.S. Peirce**, in turn, gave thanks to **James** by his letter on the 7th March in 1904.

Thirdly. One occurrence of those references to **C.S. Peirce**, we have in The Will to Believe, which concerned religion, from which theme those close friends so much discussed, and where **William James** (Loppuviite)<sup>65</sup> has written:

"... To My Old Friend, CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, to whose philosophic comradeship in old times and to whose writings in more recent years I owe more incitement and help than I can express or repay".

But, of course, these kind references are only kind references, and especially this reference does not tell us, which were the ideas in **C.S. Peirce's** "writings", which **James** felt valuable, and how he has associated them into his own philosophy. In that sense, we have only kind words, and not the doors to the development of pragmatism. But all of these passages suggest to the fact that **William James** has greatly appreciated **C.S. Peirce**, and that their comradeship was warm. Let us remind that **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>66</sup> has also emphasized their close comradeship which lasted almost through their whole life

(See: p. 130)

. I think that there is no doubt about this friendship, but it doesn't tell us much, if we think their philosophies, which were not so much alike, as e.g **John Dewey** (Loppuviite)<sup>67</sup> has emphasized when saying that James just continued C.S. Peirce's work.

If we think all of those similarities in their philosophies, however,, it seems quite clear that we can categorize them under the common term pragmatism, notwithstanding what we have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study concerning disagreement between C.S. Peirce, and his followers, **James**, **Dewey**, **Papini**, and **Schiller**

(See: p. 83)

I think that we must seek alternative, and complementary tendencies from certain single doctrines within pragmatism - such as the doctrine of synechism, for instance, which seems to me more universal and

applicable than a school of pragmatism, or pragmatic method as such.

Finnish writer and professor **Juho A. Hollo** (Loppuviite)<sup>68</sup> has categorized pragmatism belonging to the school of relativism, and he has promoted **William James** to the father and the developer of pragmatism. I think, that this kind of proposition is due to that **Hollo** didn't recognize **C.S. Peirce's** decisive role as originator in the whole development of pragmatic movement. Let us remind that this kind an attitude concerning **C.S. Peirce's** lesser role in the development of pragmatism was also familiar to **John Dewey** (Loppuviite)<sup>69</sup>, who described how **William James** reduced **C.S. Peirce's** philosophical method, but in the same time, he enlarged the field of application of pragmatic method. In 1898 James started up the new philosophical movement with his "Philosophical Concepts and Practical Results"

(**William James'** lectures "Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results" became later published in Collected Essays and Reviews.)

which we discussed at the previous page.

But those ideas which **William James** introduced, were not very original. There were such kinds of claims that beliefs are the true rules for action

(Cf. **Peirce** 1966, 7.49-50; see also VII, p. 207)

or that every idea we have concerning an object, is due of the influences of that object to us

(**Odgen & Richards** 1923, 442-443)

which are both very Peircean heritage. In addition to this, **James** emphasized clearly special consequences of object, as well as special consequences of ideas. But is it quite natural to trace special consequences of objects and ideas, if we think about any special circumstances, from which we are enlarging our experiences to more general ideas, as e.g. in elementary education, and in religious experiences - where **James** has used his method, too? However, we cannot avoid the general, or merely social consequences of them both.

There are other similar reviews concerning the lesser importance of the role of **C.S. Peirce**. When discussing **C.S. Peirce's** educational and religious ideas **Israel Scheffler** (Loppuviite)<sup>70</sup> has generally argued for that **C.S. Peirce** didn't succeed to join together the strivings of human intelligence to the other human activities by his logic and by his other means - which were inadequate for the questions of pedagogic. I think that these kind of negative general judgments may be the reason that **C.S. Peirce's** ideas were not much appreciated in the large pedagogic fields, and that most of them had no instant applications. But there are obviously other reasons, too.

But isn't it strange that **Juho A. Hollo** didn't recognize **C.S. Peirce** as the founder and grandfather of pragmatism, and just the person who strongly influenced to **William James**. From **Juho A. Hollo** 's (Loppuviite)<sup>71</sup> short version of *Kasvatuksen maailma* we know that he has written the larger version of it already in 1927. But what are the necessary conclusions of this? We know that **C.S. Peirce** was not yet generally known and accepted as an originator of pragmatism, then. However, **Hollo's** shorter book in question has been published in 1952, when there should have been enough knowledge concerning **C.S. Peirce** and his role in the development of pragmatism.

Most of those books, which included **C.S. Peirce's** own thoughts, seems to have been published far after **C.S. Peirce's** death, including his postume "logical" book *Chance, Love and Logic*, dealt with logic, signs, relations, chance, and such themes, and for that reason, I guess, he was known, for a long time, as a logician, but also an enthusiast advocate of philosophy of science. For the reason, there are lot of books concerning the theme, e.g. a study of **Jeremiah E. McCarthy**

(**McCarthy, J.E.**, *Peirce's Normative Science.*, Facs. - Ann Arbor, Mich.: UMI, 1984; Diss.: University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1980)

on **C.S. Peirce's** normative science. And we have also a study of **Robert Allen Brown**

(**Brown, R.A.**, Peirce's Normative Conception of Truth., Facs. - Ann Arbor, Mich.: University Microfilms International, 1984; Diss. Waltham, Mass.: Brandeis University, 1979)

on **C.S. Peirce's** normative conception of truth.

Grand Cosmogony - the philosophy of creation, and the scheme of the general- and nomological psychognosies

When **C.S. Peirce** was an instructor at Lowell-Institute 1892-1893, he gave lectures, which were named "The History of Science". Between those years at Lowell-Institute he presented some traits of his grand cosmogony, which was, as he insisted, something to be realized in future. We know that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>72</sup> has emphasized the view that the human thought has been developed from generation to generation, and that the development still continues. He regarded that development [almost like **Auguste Comte**], as geological successions. The development can be seen clearly at art, religion, and politics, and at certain institutions - but also in the individual minds and organisms. They have produced all that which is to come to actual existence, crystallizing all the time the fundamental laws of matter and the mind. And because of those preparatory stages and prerequisites, we can also wait to come in future such as grand cosmogony, which can be called the philosophy of creating. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>73</sup> tried also to formulate a kind of high philosophy, when he considered the relationship between logic and metaphysics. He wanted to outline a system which consisted of different levels, and one of them, namely high philosophy, linked the whole system to the level of ordinary life and experience.

We know that it was **Aristotle**, who has introduced the syllogistic logic, brought into use also variables. In addition to this, there was that idea of the change from potentiality to actuality, as well as the idea that all of the possible essential forms shall, one after another, become to existence. There are such causations as material,- formal,- and final ones. Both **Plato** and **Aristotle** have also made a classification what comes to the levels where human beings perceive their experiences. First. They can perceive their instincts and feelings. Secondly. They can also perceive spiritual level such as perseverance and heroism. These previous two levels are common with humans and animals. Thirdly. Only man is able to reach Nus, which is pure reason and being inseparable part of the universe. Let us remind our previous discussion concerning the topic

(See: p. 53)

These ideas can be associated to **C.S. Peirce's** cosmology, as well as to his scheme of general- and nomological psychognosies. But there are some differences between **Aristotle** and **C.S. Peirce**. The former regarded the system of biological organisms unchangeable, and that there was no place to evolution in it, which a view the latter did not advocate for.

**C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>74</sup> has made also the classification, which is made by the aid of the concepts of general

(General: Refers to certain internal characters of the universe, from which we do know nothing but their generality, or that there is a principle which we can apply but what we cannot localize to certain place or time.)

and nomological

(Nomology: Refers to the theory, and to the general legitimacy, as well as to that we can make such theories which we can legitime.)

psychognosy, which he obviously aimed to be a hierarchy, to which he did want to put most of his philosophical findings:

## GENERAL PSYCHOGNOSY

### FAMILIES:

I Essence of Mind and The Law of Final Causation (non-biological), phenomenological pneumotology.

II How Final Causation works on the development of biological stocks.

III How The Law of Final Causation can be applied to biological individuals and their consciousness.

### DEMONOMY:

IV Applications and Associations as professions, etc.

### SUBFAMILIES OF GENERAL PSYCHOGNOSY:

V General Laws of Concert and Strict

- Apply to these principles of special phenomena as constitution of society and law, also the wealth

## NOMOLOGICAL PSYCHOGNOSY OF SPECIAL PSYCHOGNOSY

Treat Laws of Mind [laws of process], in which Association is subordinate to The General Principles of Causation.

### FAMILIES:

Study of The Great Law of Association [fusion] or mutual attraction of all ideas (as analogy to gravitation in physical world)

### SUBFAMILIES OF SPECIAL PSYCHOGNOSY:

Association per se

Association as modified by Association

- Habit, Imagination and Vividness, Generalization and Reasoning, Recognition and Belief.

The Laws of the Growth of Mind in individual and in the society or stock:

- Relating to general laws; Growth of Morphogeny; Growth of Consciousness of Mind; Laws of Growth of Social Consciousness.

## STUDY OF THE CONNECTIONS OF BODY AND MIND

### SUBFAMILIES OF THE CONNECTIONS OF BODY AND MIND:

Elementary Laws:

Psychophysics, Sensation, Volition, Impulse, Control, Controlled Volition.

Laws of Peculiar States of Mind:

Dissolution and Double Consciousness, Credenciveness, Suggestion, Passion.

Short excursion to C.S. Peirce's semiotics by his correspondence with Christine Ladd-Franklin and William James

**Joseph Brent** (Loppuviite)<sup>75</sup> has suggested that **C.S. Peirce** formulated his first versions of semiotic theories already during 1860's, but that he got the final version of it twenty years later. A hundred years later **C.S. Peirce** was promoted with Swiss-French **Ferdinand de Saussure**

((1857-1913); **Saussure** was the Swiss linguistic, and a professor in Geneva since 1891. He was an advocate of modern descriptive linguistics, and an author of *Cours de linguistique générale* (1916). He made a difference between diachronic and synchronic research, and he regarded language as a social institution, and in it parole (speech) precedes always langue (language). There is also the difference between the structure and materia of language. In general, **Saussure's** ideas are the basis of modern structural linguistics, and there were born several schools, as Geneve school, and Glossematic school in Copenhagen, and the school of Praha.)

to the grandfathers of semiotics by French philosophers.

**Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>76</sup> has promoted **C.S. Peirce** to the founder of semiotics, which is the science of signs. Let us remark especially that **Percy** has used the term semiotics, and not semantics, or the term semeiotics. **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>77</sup> has suggested to that **C.S. Peirce** can be regarded as the grandfather of modern symbolism, because he has made an extensive analysis of symbols, and stated sign as the fundamental category: all that is thought, can also be expressed as signs, and as a consequence, the whole human nature is symbolic.

I am not intending to examine in detail the modern symbolic logic, semiotics, or semantics, such as they exist now. The main concern of my current study are only the general characters of **C.S. Peirce's** semiotics, which he regarded as the science of signs. Let us remind how **Charles W. Morris** (Loppuviite)<sup>78</sup> has illustrated **C.S. Peirce's** view concerning the sign of signs, which is man himself. According to him, we must consider the mind as sign, too. But when analyzing those units, we can find out that they consist of three components. Therefore, signs has three characters: object, its effects, and person. And, in addition to this, there are certain universal features. In the course of the development, during which what is interpreted, gradually becomes, or approaches to sign ad infinitum

(See: p. 4, Footnote 2.)

- during which what is now personal, becomes non-personal and infinite. These general features are essential when understanding the essence of signs.

**C.S. Peirce** has mailed the letter to **Christine Ladd-Franklin**, which has been dated on the 29th August in 1891 (Loppuviite)<sup>79</sup>, in which he explained, that his work in philosophy consisted of the strict analysis of ideas, and that he has tried to prove what is essential when studying the target of analysis. But it took a long time. From the letter, which **C.S. Peirce** mailed to **William James** on the 3th October in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>80</sup>, we know, as he wrote, that he had for a long time carried on the study which concerned the essence of language, and he wondered why other philosophers had not understood them. And further, **C.S. Peirce** wrote to English semantic **Lady Welby**

(Maid of Honour to Queen Victoria)

several letters concerning semantics, and some other themes, too. **C.S. Peirce** wrote her a long letter, which is only partly been spared. This letter in question has been dated on the 12th October in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>81</sup>, in which **C.S. Peirce** discussed the theory of signs and categories. He also explained that he was forced to develop totally new terms and words to describe his findings. In addition to this **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>82</sup> has written an article to *The Nation*, which was concerning **Lady Welby's** *What Is Meaning*. Unfortunately, many of **C.S. Peirce's** writings concerning semantics has been just synthesized from different sources, and we have not a clear idea of the total view he had.

However, those who are more interested in semiotics I want to refer to **Umberto Eco** and **Thomas A. Sebeok**

(**Eco, U.**, and **Sebeok, T.A.**, *The Sign of Three: Dupin, Holmes, Peirce.*, Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, (Advances in semiotics), 1983)

who have adopted a logical approach in their *Sign of Three* to **C.S. Peirce**. But why him? In linguistics it has been used **C.S. Peirce's** model of abduction-deduction- induction, when explaining e.g. the development of linguistic constructions of children, who abduce first what kind of rules to apply, and then they deduce the rule accepted to the different usages. Quite similar situation we have when a detective tries to trace behind diffuse hints any rational activity, which a criminal has actually done when doing a crime [a criminal is always rational being in these contexts, and he has also a motive, were he e.g. mentally sick, psychopath, or corrupted genius - he has always some rationale].

Scholastic-, and philosophical realism, and pragmatist idealism

Now we shall discuss Scholastic tradition, in which there were two ways in explaining the essence of our language: The one was the nominalistic way, which **Wilhelm Occam** advocated for, as we can remind

(See: p. 74, Footnote 1.)

and the other was Scholastic realism of **John Duns Scotus**, as we can remind, too

(See: p. 74, Footnote 2.)

The latter criticized **Thomas Aquinas**

(See: p. 14, Footnote 2; see also: p. 43, Footnote 1.))

and emphasized that there is fundamental difference between [the sentences of] faith and knowledge, that is, propositions for the existence of God, or for an immortal soul, are not at all provable by reason. **John Duns Scotus** was an early voluntarist philosopher, because he thought that our will presences our

understanding, and that our will determine what we are understanding.

From **A.J. Ayer** (Loppuviite)<sup>83</sup> we get to know that **C.S. Peirce** appropriated **Duns Scotus** especially because of that Scholastic realism. There is the letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to **F.C.S. Schiller**, and which has been dated on the 10th November in 1906 (Loppuviite)<sup>84</sup>, in which **C.S. Peirce** referred to **Charles Renouvier's** *Essais De Critique Philosophique*

(See: p. 131, Footnote 3.)

when explaining that there are two kinds of concepts: the technical concepts, which are defined before they are actually used. As an example of those technical concepts is the concept real, which have been introduced by **Duns Scotus**. Then there are the concepts of common sense, which are mostly naturally born, to which philosophers must give the exact meanings.

From **John Dewey's** (Loppuviite)<sup>85</sup> article concerning pragmatism we know, that every concept seems to have an ability to regulate itself - not because of certain conditions, but instead because of which is the most appropriate function to the concept, which seems to give to it an ability to control itself, in every situation, and in every purposive use it may have. Hence, there is an optimal position to every concept. But, of course, there are no such kind of concepts, which just control themselves, without an aid of any agent; there must always be such an active agent behind every self-controlling activity of concepts.

But what does this mean? There are certain 'abilities', for which reason we can use concepts for our purposes, whatever they are. But this does also mean, that we can construct our concepts to be applicable in certain uses, if we want to. But to where this 'self-controlling' refers to, then? It suggests to referentiality of concepts, that is, without any referentiality of them we cannot have any functional or meaningful concept. There we are approaching the phenomenon of association, which, in turn, is connected to the centrifugal tendency of thought. When describing the forms of consciousness, and in it the formation of the sets of ideas, i.e. association, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>86</sup> has told us that

"... A great many associations are inherited. Others grow up spontaneously. The rest depend upon the principle that ideas once brought together into a set remain in that set. Many associations are merely accidental".

There are the words 'inherited', 'accidental', which suggest to naturally born concepts [of common sense, perhaps], and then there is the word 'the principle', which, in turn, suggest to an equipment, by which we can create [perhaps] more complicated concepts.

When seeking the ground, to which **C.S. Peirce** wanted to base upon his pragmatist idealism, we find several propositions. On the one hand, **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>87</sup> assumed that the human mind might be such a media where evolution and generalizing tendency is still at work. That is, we are a kinds of agensts. On the other hand, he has believed also that the laws of universe have been formed under a universal tendency of all things towards generalization and habit taking. That, in turn, is, that the stuff we handle has certain potentialities to become more than it is now.

The generalization is an expansive process, and habit taking tries to make the new areas of the reality stable; both those processes support each other. But what is important there is that there must be plasticity in the areas which are developing, and also that future is something which depends greatly on plasticity of the world. Let us remind what **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>88</sup> has argued for that plasticity of the mind when it is connected to the living influence of diagram and icon to us, and what role **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>89</sup> has put to the human mind, as a plastic unit in the development of the universe. Let us remind, too, that most laws in physics, as gravitation, has already reached its ultimate limit, and they cannot create as such a different and to more complex, and further developing future. Let us remind also **C.S. Peirce's** (Loppuviite)<sup>90</sup> doctrine of synechism, which we have discussed twice at an earlier stage in the current study

(See: pp. 7, 14)

Let us especially remind the sentence which says:

"... a man is capable of a spiritual consciousness, which constitutes him one of the eternal verities, which is embodied in the universe as a whole",

which, in turn, suggests to that generalizing tendency to the eternal verities is connected to that spiritual consciousness. **C.S. Peirce** has considered the human mind really as a very important factor in the development of the universe, and in a way, the human concepts are byproducts of the mind, in spite of that the mind produces nothing. The concepts, or what has been interpreted, are available, because of that there is also the human mind and its possibilities and potentialities, and gradually we can expand our concepts ad infinitum.

But what is the mechanism? In a letter which **C.S. Peirce** has mailed to his friend **William James**, and which has been dated on the 28th September in 1904 (Loppuviite) 91 he described pragmatist idealism in which the reality is experienced as future by mellonization

(Mellonization: The term is derived from Greek where it has ment same as "intend to do something", "exist" or "suffer".)

In **C.S. Peirce's** epistemology the term suggests to that logical operation where something, which is considered as parelythose

((G.k.) Parelythose: Has been)

is in fact regarded as repeating and expansive infinite, from where we are going to what will always be. The mellonization states no marginal conditions - but at the same time it is a form to receive something. There are still writers, as **C.S. Peirce** continues, who want to restrict our consciousness to which can be regarded as past, but which those writers still consider present. Those writers think that the problem is whether we accept the external world alone as real, or call we the internal world as fiction. Just this kind of illusion shall vanish, if we consider past as repeating and expanding infinity. In this kind of a process we also use the double consciousness, where we go from that part of it which causes compulsion to the part what is infinitive.

It seems to me that the question of pragmatist idealism associated to the essence of time, whose dimensionality is also the essence of mellonization. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)92 has argued for that any present percept is only once special case, when discussing perceived things and time. No principle should prevent us to talk about antecepts which mean things perceived in future, or to talk about ponecept which are things perceived in past. And there are corresponding continuities to them, whose concepts are percipuum, antecipuum, and ponecipuum, which all mean together the direct and uncontrolled interpretation of percept, antecept and ponecept. But what about the perception of time as a whole? Let us remind that **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)93 has derived his concept of intuited time from **Kant**, as we have seen at an earlier stage in the current study, and that he also regarded his concept of percipuum as identical to intuited time

(See: p. 30)

If we think what we have presented right before, there seem to be different kind of continuities, but obviously ponecipuum, for example, will be seen in the process of mellonization, as "expansive infinite", and we do not apprehend time as different kind of percipuums, however. For the other explanation which have been presented during the current study I refer also to **C.S. Peirce's** (Loppuviite)94 general psychognosy, and there especially to the law of final causation, and to the laws which are the eternal forms, and to their role in the development of the whole universe. But I want refer to his special

psychognosy, to, and there especially to the laws of the peculiar states of mind, which I have discussed at an earlier stage in the current study. Both of them explain together the dual role of mellonization.

But from where is **C.S. Peirce** has derived his philosophical realism. We have an evidence that is was **Aristotle**. As **Walker Percy** (Loppuviite)<sup>95</sup> has written:

"... The great contribution of Charles Peirce, a rigorous scientific realist, was that he preserved the truth, as he saw it, of philosophical realism from Aristotle to the 17th century, salvaged it from the medieval language of scholastics which is now all but incomprehensible to us, recast it in terms familiar to scientists, to the most simple-minded empirist, and even to us laymen. It, Peirce's realism, cannot now be escaped or fobbed off as scholastic mumbo jumbo".

That is pretty good thing, but **C.S. Peirce** is not the only philosopher, who has made those translations. For the reason I don't want to discuss it more. But we have been discussing such term as double consciousness, which I wan to make more clear with few words. In the letter, which **C.S. Peirce** mailed **William James** on the 28th September in 1904 (Loppuviite)<sup>96</sup>, he suggested to that feelings have an intermediate role in double-consciousness. **C.S. Peirce** (Loppuviite)<sup>97</sup> has also proposed for that feelings have two kinds of intensity. The first one is that intensity of feeling itself, and the second one is that intensity of altersense consciousness. This suggests to that feelings can be, as a component, both of sensation and will, and thus a part of human activities. It seems to me that by feelings, in a way, we can join to the continuous creation, as well as to an intima contact to instancy and continuity.

As we can see, the whole structure of realistic view, concerning human consciousness, and other things, is a little bit confusing, and moreover, that there are elements which seem to be far away from realism, as we interpret the term now, in our cold world. But it may be due of that we have lost the world of feelings, as well as intimacy and continuity, and we have nothing to wait for.

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